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Interest and engagement on voluntary CSR initiatives has grown substantially 
over the last decades. Such initiatives may offer an alternative to traditional 
command-and-control regulation, particularly relevant in the context of a 
globalised economy where regulating the behaviour of corporations in regards to 
corporate social performance (CSP) poses major challenges (Hess, 2008). 
These have thus been of increasing interest to firms, governments, civil society 
and other stakeholders, configuring what Waddock (2008) has termed an 
emerging institutional infrastructure for corporate responsibility. The United 
Nations Global Compact (UNGC) is the largest CSR initiative in the world. With 
over 8,000 participating firms from more than 140 countries and varied sizes 
and industries, the UNGC has a truly global and diverse coverage if compared 
to similar initiatives. Adding to its uniqueness, the UNGC is backed by the 
United Nations. However, despite the UNGC’s success in attracting participants, 
market willingness to reward responsible behaviour (Hull and Rothenberg, 2008), 
and mounting stakeholder pressure, a great level of variation can still be 
observed on firms’ engagement with the UNGC.  
Equally, despite increasing interest, a number of gaps remain in the literature in 
the understanding of drivers for joining and for performance in the initiative. For 
one thing, only one study focused on speed of adoption in the UNGC; it was, 
however, restricted to the Spanish context. In the sphere of performance, 
studies have often used limited samples or measures of performance that do not 
encompass all the UNGC issues; in addition, results remain mixed generating 
an inconclusive body of knowledge. Applying institutional theory, this thesis 
evaluates the extent to which institutional pressures at firm, industry and 
national levels may influence firms’ decision to join the UNGC, their speed of 
adoption, and their performance in the issues advanced by the initiative. Using a 
dataset covering environment, social and governance data on over 4,000 global 
listed companies since 2002 in combination with relevant institutional data, this 
thesis addresses the gaps above. 
Results suggest strong evidence that institutional forces at all levels are at play, 
influencing firms’ decision to join and performance in the UNGC principles. For 
one thing, mimetic forces were very important in driving both firms’ decision to 
join the UNGC and their performance. Being under greater stakeholder scrutiny 
due to large size or belonging to an extractive industry was also an important 
driver for joining the UNGC, arguably in views of protecting legitimacy seen to 
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be at threat. Finally, looking into the UNGC as a source of institutional pressure 
as well, despite criticisms in regards to the UNGC’s “lack of teeth”, there is 
strong evidence to suggest that participants are improving performance more 
than non-participants in the UNGC principles. Even though more attention 
needs to be dedicated to the delivery of outcomes, there is strong evidence that 
the UNGC is making important strides in its aim of promoting a more sustainable 
and inclusive global economy. 
This thesis makes important contributions to the academic literature by, among 
other things, using a measure of performance that encompasses all UNGC 
principles and builds on sound theoretical base, longitudinally covering all 
UNGC principles in the aspects of policies, processes of implementation and 
whenever feasible outcomes. It also contributes to a better understanding of 
speed of adoption across participants in different countries and of role of CSP 
and mimetic pressures in firms’ decision to join the UNGC. For practitioners, it 
provides valuable information for those trying to increase sign up or improve 
participants’ performance in voluntary CSR initiatives in general and in the 
UNGC in particular. Empirical evidence on drivers for joining and performing 
may help these professionals choose the more appropriate strategies to make 
these initiatives successful in achieving a more responsible corporate world. 
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COP – Communication on progress – The COP is a requirement by the UNGC 
to participating firms for an annual communication on the progress made in the 
implementation of the initiative’s principles. 
EITI – Extractive Industry Initiative – EITI is a global standard that strives to 
promote accountability and transparency in the management of natural 
resources. 
EMAS – EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme – Management tool to help 
firms evaluate, report and improve their environmental performance. 
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PRME – Principles for Responsible Management Education – Initiative that aims 
at inspiring and championing responsible business education, research and 
thought leadership in the world. 
SA8000 – Social Accountability 8000 – It is a voluntary auditable social 
certification standard for working conditions. 
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – This is a 
United Nations’ body that deals with development issues, notably international 
trade. 
UNCTC – United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations – United 
Nations’ body created in 1974 and abolished in 1993, which aimed at supporting 
UN’s efforts to establish rules for transnational corporations’ conduct in the 
global economy. 
UNGC – United Nations Global Compact – United Nations’ initiative aimed at 
engaging businesses in incorporating ten principles in the areas of human rights, 
labour, environment and anti-corruption into business practices. 
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WGI – Worldwide Governance Indicators – Country level governance indicators 
provided by the World Bank. 
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What do a major Indian multinational oil corporation, an American media SME, a 
Ugandan mobile telecommunications company and a small Russian law firm 
have in common? They are all current active participants in the United Nations 
Global Compact (UNGC). The UNGC and other voluntary Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) initiatives aim to influence firm behaviour in Corporate 
Social Performance (CSP) (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010) and to hold firms 
accountable for their actions by creating transparency (Rasche, 2009b). Interest 
in, and use of, a diverse range of such initiatives has grown over time, especially 
in a context of a globalised economy where regulating the behaviour of 
corporations in regards to CSP poses major challenges (Hess, 2008). Arguably, 
initiatives such as the UNGC offer an alternative to traditional command-and-
control regulation (Hess, 2008), and have thus been of considerable interest to 
governments, firms, civil society and other stakeholders over the last decades, 
configuring what Waddock (2008) has termed an emerging institutional 
infrastructure for corporate responsibility. The UNGC is considered to be the 
largest CSR initiative in the world. With over 12,000 participants worldwide, 
including over 8,000 firms, the UNGC currently has participants from over 140 
countries and local supporting networks in over 100 countries, a truly global and 
wide coverage if compared to similar initiatives. 
Despite the UNGC’s (and other voluntary CSR initiatives’) success, market 
willingness to reward responsible behaviour (Hull and Rothenberg, 2008), and 
mounting stakeholder pressure, a great level of variation can still be observed in 
corporate social performance across firms, and more specifically on their 
involvement with voluntary CSR initiatives and the UNGC. While sign up to the 
UNGC has grown substantially from the first 42 pioneer firms that joined when 
the initiative was launched in 2000 to over 8,000 firms today, this represents 
only a small fraction of large firms globally many firms remain unaware of the 
initiative and the issues it promotes.  
In addition, the variety of behaviour does not only relate to the decision to join 
the UNGC. Even amongst those firms that decide to join, great variation in CSP 
behaviour still occurs, with some firms being considered “champions” of the 
initiative, with case studies portrayed in publications, while others are expelled 
for failing the basic requirement to communicate on progress in implementing 
the UNGC principles. As of 2 November 2013 4,199 firms had been expelled 
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from the UNGC for failure to communicate on progress. Given that in the same 
period the UNGC had 7,868 corporate participants, this is a significant number 
representing over 50% of the accumulated number of participants, and suggests 
that participants vary significantly in their performance and level of commitment 
to UNGC goals. 
1.1 A research agenda 
This thesis aims at increasing our understanding of the underlying processes by 
which variation across firms in the decision to join the UNGC and the 
subsequent variety in the levels of commitment to improved social performance 
arise. Specifically, it aims to evaluate the extent to which institutional pressures 
at multiple levels may influence firms’ decision to join the UNGC, their speed of 
adoption, and their performance in the principles advanced by the initiative. 
While valuable knowledge has been shared in the literature, several questions 
remain open. Two main issues require additional investigation: drivers for joining 
and drivers for performance. A number of studies have identified and explored 
drivers for firms’ joining the UNGC but these have tended to neglect the role of 
firms’ previous CSP and of mimetic pressures, especially at industry level, in the 
decision to join the UNGC. In regards to speed of adoption, little has been 
covered in the field of voluntary CSR initiatives – except perhaps for the 
ISO14001 certification standard. Notably, studies on the diffusion and speed of 
adoption of the UNGC are extremely scarce (Arevalo et al., 2013). To the 
author’s best knowledge, only one study on the UNGC has looked into speed of 
adoption (Arevalo et al., 2013) and that study was restricted to the Spanish 
context, and focused mainly on the interplay between motivations for joining the 
UNGC and speed of adoption. Questions remain regarding the influences on 
firms’ decisions to join the UNGC and in relation to the processes by which sign 
up diffuses across companies at a global level, crossing different institutional 
contexts. 
Beyond the decision to join the UNGC, significant work remains to be done in 
relation to more fully illuminating the role played by UNGC membership in 
shaping firms’ performance on social and environmental issues. Despite great 
interest on firm performance after joining voluntary CSR initiatives and on 
institutional influences on other aspects of CSP (Campbell, 2007, Matten and 
Moon, 2008, Jeurissen, 2004, Gjolberg, 2009), the literature on institutional 
influences on firm performance on voluntary CSR initiatives remains at an early 
stage of development (Knudsen, 2011). In addition, while the UNGC’s ability, or 
otherwise, to influence CSP has been focus of major debates and criticism, only 
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a small number of studies have tackled this question empirically, and often with 
a limited sample or a measure of performance that did not encompass the full 
spectrum of UNGC issues. Results found were mixed, placing the UNGC’s 
impact anywhere in a spectrum from having some impact on firm behaviour, to 
being weak at best in influencing corporate action (Hamann et al., 2009, 
Baumann and Scherer, 2010, Chen and Bouvain, 2009, Runhaar and Lafferty, 
2009). 
1.2 A contribution to scholars and to practitioners 
Better understanding of these issues would make an important contribution both 
academically and to practitioners. The UNGC is the most prominent voluntary 
CSR initiative in the world and the one backed by the UN. As a result, it is 
watched closely by supporters and critics of this model of decentralised 
institutions through voluntary CSR initiatives. Arguably, its success or failure 
may have an impact on this model as a whole. Therefore, knowledge on aspects 
that make the initiative more or less effective in attracting firms and getting them 
to abide to the commitments made is very valuable for both academics and 
practitioners.  
This thesis makes a number of relevant contributions. Overall it sheds light on 
firm behaviour in an important area of corporate social performance – 
engagement in voluntary CSR initiatives. This study shows strong evidence that 
this type of club-like behaviour has an important role to play in firms’ CSP. Given 
the increasing interest and levels of sign up to voluntary CSR initiatives globally 
this makes an important contribution to the literature on CSP in general. 
More specifically, it looks into the case of the UNGC and contributes to a better 
understanding of two fundamental aspects of voluntary CSR initiatives: firms’ 
decision to join (part one – breadth of participation) and firms’ performance in 
the commitments they sign up to (part two – depth of participation). In regards to 
the decision to join the UNGC, this thesis makes a relevant contribution by 
providing empirical evidence of the key role that mimetic pressures play in 
driving sign up. In other words, firms are more likely to sign up if peers within the 
same country or the same industry also do. These findings contribute to the 
literature on the UNGC in particular, as this effect has been largely unexplored 
in this literature. 
Additionally, this is relevant information for practitioners. It suggests that 
strategies such as establishing partnerships with industry organisations or 
supporting local networks may be valuable tools in increasing sign up. These 
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may offer valuable outlets for the UNGC to display its participant’s base and 
ultimately communicate its legitimacy amongst firms. 
This first part, that explores the decision to join, also makes a relevant 
contribution to institutional theory by testing, discussing and questioning the two-
stages model proposed by Tolbert and Zucker (1983) and also by institutional 
theory more generally. Results suggest that differently than proposed by theory, 
early joiners are more susceptible to mimetic pressures than late joiners. This 
suggests that legitimacy is an important motivation already in the early days of 
adoption of the UNGC. In addition, attention to the economic benefits of 
participation – arguably a more efficiency related motivation – was only relevant 
for late joiners. Overall this suggests that the model proposed by institutional 
theory does not hold for the UNGC. 
Similar theoretical contribution is made on the second part of empirical studies, 
which explores firms’ performance in the commitments made to the UNGC. 
Once again, the two-stages model is tested and does not hold for the UNGC, as 
early joiners are not found to be more likely to improve performance than late 
joiners.  
The main contribution the second part makes, however, is empirical. This thesis 
offers a very broad and encompassing measure of performance of the UNGC, 
covering all ten principles firms commit to upon sign up. To this authors’ best 
knowledge this is the first study on the UNGC with a measure of performance 
that encompasses these multiple dimensions of CSP. This offers the opportunity 
for a more granular understanding of performance in the initiative. 
This second part also makes a relevant contribution to practitioners. For one 
thing, results suggesting that participants are more likely than non-participants 
to display improvements in the development of policies and the setting up of 
management structures to deliver on them supports the importance of the 
UNGC in helping establish higher CSP. The fact however that similar evidence 
in regards to the deliver of outcomes is more erratic is also relevant, suggesting 
that participants need extra support (or extra pressure) on how to deliver on the 
commitments made. This may be useful information for the UNGC, highlighting 
the need to define strategies to improve the delivery of outcomes. The initiative 
has been often criticised for not having the means to improve participants’ 
performance. Therefore, being able to show participants’ improvements in 





1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis will be divided into seven chapters. Chapter one presents the 
conceptual development. An introduction to neo-institutional theory will be 
followed by an application of this theory to the explanation of institutional 
influences on corporate behaviour at different levels, from the firm to the global 
level. Chapter two presents the literature review. An overview of how the 
relationship between business and society evolved over time will be followed by 
a review of the concept of CSP, main theories used to explain it, how drivers for 
CSP have been tested empirically in the literature and a specific review on each 
one of the four empirical questions related to corporate involvement in voluntary 
CSR initiatives. Chapter three will present an overview of the methodology used 
in this thesis, including details on the choice of research strategy, design, and 
methods. Chapter four is the first empirical chapter, and addresses multilevel 
institutional influences on firms’ decision to join voluntary CSR initiatives in 
general and the UNGC in particular. Chapter five follows, with an empirical study 
on the institutional influences on firms’ speed of adoption of the UNGC. Chapter 
six focuses on performance on the UNGC principles, and empirically addresses 
the question of institutional drivers for firm performance. Finally, chapter seven 
looks into the UNGC as an institutional force aiming to shape firm behaviour, 
and seeks to understand to what extent sign up is associated with improved 
performance in the UNGC principles. A conclusion and final remarks close this 
thesis. 
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2 Chapter 1: Conceptual Development 
A sizeable part of the literature on drivers of corporate social performance posits 
that CSP is largely driven by instrumental motives (Jackson and Apostolakou, 
2010). Companies use adoption of such practices as a mean to manage 
reputational and other risks, protecting or improving financial performance. 
Other factors, however, may be at play and influence managerial decision in 
establishing firms’ social, environmental and governance practices. An 
institutional perspective on corporate responsibility suggests that managers’ 
decision making will not be purely instrumental, but actually framed within a 
broader social context in which they operate (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010).  
Institutional frameworks operate and affect corporate behaviour at several levels. 
Given increasing levels of globalisation, it is expected that firms may be subject 
to institutional demands 1  in transnational spaces. As companies’ 
internationalisation has increased, a number of actors (NGOs, investors, 
multilaterals, among others) have mobilised in an effort to monitor and impose 
controls over corporate behaviour (Campbell, 2007). Such efforts have been 
particularly important in a scenario where greater corporate international mobility 
has created enormous challenges for national governments to regulate and 
control corporate behaviour (Campbell, 2007). 
At the industry level, the literature suggests that firms operating in the same 
industry are exposed to similar challenges and institutional demands and 
therefore similar patterns and regulations on corporate responsibility are likely to 
emerge, leading to convergence in corporate social performance (Jackson and 
Apostolakou, 2010). It is posited that firms and their managers will consider 
peers’ behaviour and community-accepted standards when deciding on their 
own strategies and actions in terms of CSP. Industry-level codes are also seen 
to lead to more isomorphic behaviour, by providing a benchmark for corporate 
action, offering incentives to conformity and creating peer pressure within the 
industry (Yang and Rivers, 2009). Empirical studies have found results in 
support of this, indicating, for example, a positive relationship between a firm’s 
CSP and that of its immediate competitors (Beliveau et al., 1994).  
At the individual level, several studies have explored the role of individuals, 
notably in their role as managers and executives, in influencing corporate social 
                                                
1 Following Pache and Santos (Pache and Santos, 2010), institutional demands are defined as the various 
pressures for conformity that institutions exert on organisations.  
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behaviour. The central idea at this level is that individuals will interpret and make 
sense of the rules and the environment, prior to taking action. Factors such as 
individuals’ values (Muller and Kolk, 2010), age (Waldman et al., 2006) and 
awareness in relation to corporate responsibility issues and initiatives (Weaver 
et al., 1999) are believed to have an influence in corporate social performance. 
Finally, as important, is the influence of countries’ institutional frameworks in the 
definition of corporate social performance (Chen et al., 2008b, Matten and Moon, 
2008, Campbell, 2007, Jones, 1999). An institutional perspective suggests that 
different countries have different institutions, customary ethics and social 
relations, and that this leads to the development of different institutional 
frameworks at a national level (Matten and Moon, 2008). Companies’ choices 
and decisions are not made in a vacuum, but rather they are made within this 
context or institutional framework. These different institutional frameworks will 
offer varied incentives and impose different controls and limitations on 
companies, therefore resulting in variations in corporate behaviour (ibid).  
In the specific case of corporate social performance, Matten and Moon (2008) 
compare Europe and the US and argue that while the former’s national business 
system creates the conditions for implicit CSP, i.e. business participation in the 
formal and informal institutions of society in order to address some societal 
interest, the latter has seen the emergence of explicit CSP, i.e. voluntary 
activities that aim at addressing some societal interest (Matten and Moon, 2008). 
Campbell (2007) also theorises that institutional demands at a national level can 
influence corporate social performance. The author (Campbell, 2007) proposes 
that companies will be more likely to behave responsibly if, among other factors, 
strong and well enforced state regulations are in place; if private, independent 
organisations exist and monitor corporate behaviour; if firms are engaged in 
institutionalised dialogue with unions and other stakeholders; and if normative 
calls for higher social responsibility are institutionalised in the firm operating 
environment, for example, through business schools. Chih et al (2010) tested 
Campbell’s propositions in a sample of 520 financial firms in 34 countries finding, 
among other things, stronger legal enforcement, more cooperative employee-
employer relations and higher quality business schools to be related to higher 
CSP. 
In view of these discussions, this thesis will focus on contributing to a greater 
understanding of drivers for corporate social performance from an institutional 
perspective. As highlighted by several scholars, this remains an understudied 
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area in the field of business and society (Aguilera, 2007, Campbell, 2007). This 
chapter has two main sections. The first section will review the relationship 
between institutions and organisations in general. Here will be reviewed 
definitions of institutions, the way institutions behave, processes of 
institutionalisation and the role of individual agency in responding to institutional 
demands. This first section aims at establishing the ground for the conceptual 
development. Having established how institutions shape organisational 
behaviour in the first section, the second part will focus particularly at how these 
pressures shape corporate behaviour at different levels.  
2.1 Institutional theory and organisations 
This first section will provide an introduction and discussion of key concepts and 
ideas of institutional theory that will frame and define the theoretical 
underpinning of this thesis. It starts with an introduction to neo institutional 
theory followed by a discussion on what are institutions and how they behave. It 
then discusses the idea that despite transmitting the idea of stability and 
resilience, institutions are also prone to incremental or radical change. To this 
follows a discussion on how institutions may shape organisational behaviour, 
and finally an appreciation of a role for agency of individuals and organisations 
in reacting to institutional demands. 
Scott (2008) identifies three main streams in current work about the relationship 
between organisations and institutions. The first one suggests a game analogy, 
positioning institutions as the “rules of the game” and organisations as “players” 
of this game. This stream, adopted by many institutional economists and most 
notably developed by Douglas North, focuses mainly on rule-setting and 
enforcement (Scott, 2008). The second strand identifies organisations as 
institutions themselves. While some theorists in this strand focused on the 
regulatory pillar, seeking to understand the impact of “background conditions” 
(such as property rights, contract law, among others) on the economic 
organisation of individual firms, others focused on the normative pillar, studying 
how firms develop unique character structures over time that constrain or enable 
behaviour in accordance with their values (Scott, 2008). The third strand 
focuses on the cultural-cognitive pillar, and understands the modern 
organisation as a key institutional form in modern society. For these scholars, 
rationalised organisational practices are cultural, following modern culture focus 
on rationality (Scott, 2008). Although social scientists identified and studied 
institutions quite early, the study of organisations as a specific type of social 
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form started much later with its origins dating back to the period around the 
1940s (Scott, 2008). DiMaggio and Powell (1991) add that the focus on new 
institutionalism in organisational studies dates from 1977, when John Meyer 
published two seminal papers in this field. 
2.1.1 Introducing neoinstitutional theory 
Early institutional theorists working between 1880s and mid-1900s developed 
important ideas that were later expanded or re-interpreted by contemporary 
scholars. Their ideas offered often a reaction against a constant debate between 
the extent to which individuals are able to make independent rational choices 
versus the extent to which these decisions are constrained and shaped by the 
environment within which the individual exists. All of them shared a common 
limitation though – they focused little attention on organisations and their role as 
institutional forms (Scott, 2008). The way in which institutions influenced groups 
of organisations has also been underexplored by these theorists (Scott, 2008). It 
was only during the 1940s and 1950s that theorists began to understand the 
relevance of particular groups (individual organisations), and the different role 
they played when compared to broader social institutions and individuals (Scott, 
2008). 
Selznick is a leading early figure in institutional analysis of organisations. From 
the beginning, Selznick aimed at distinguishing between organisations as a 
mechanism designed to attain specific goals and organisations as an organic 
system that can be influenced by the characteristics of its participants as well as 
by pressured exerted by its environment (Scott, 2008). This scholar posited that 
actions are not context free but rather have their outcomes moulded by the 
environment in which they exist (Scott, 2008). Selznick also argued that 
institutionalisation is a process that happens over time, building on the 
organisation’s history and people. At the point when organisations become 
infused with value beyond what is technically required for the completion of 
tasks, the organisation is no longer seen as expendable and all efforts are made 
to maintain it (Scott, 2008).  
Neoinstitutionalism, although rooted in Selznick’s ideas, diverges from this 
tradition in several ways (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). In common, “old” and 
“new” institutionalism share a scepticism in relation to an atomistic rational-actor 
model of organisations, understand institutionalisation as an state-dependent 
process that limits organisational choice, emphasise the relationship between 
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organisations and their environment and draw attention to the role of culture in 
shaping the reality of organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
New and old institutionalisms diverge in a number of aspects though. For one 
thing, they have different understandings of what constitute sources of constrain 
to organisational behaviour. While the old placed emphasis on power relations 
and vested interests, the new institutionalism focuses on the imperative of 
legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). They also diverge on the 
understanding of environment. While old institutionalism focused on 
organisations embeddedness in local communities, new institutionalism also 
advances the idea of non-local environments, concentrating on organisational 
fields, whose boundaries roughly correspond to professions, industries or 
national societies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Environments are here believed 
to penetrate organisations and define the lens through which actors view the 
world. 
Another interesting distinction builds on the varying notions of environment, and 
concerns the process of institutionalisation. Old institutional theory understood 
the institutionalisation process as more confined to a particular organisation, 
representing its efforts to adapt to its local environment. Neoinstitutional theory, 
on the other hand, sees institutionalisation as an inter organisational process, 
tending to reduce diversity in local environments (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
Finally, both discredit the idea of an organisation as a sum of individual actions. 
However, neoinstitutionalism stresses that individual action is mainly 
unreflective, based on taken-for-granted ideas and routines; for these scholars, 
institutions shape actors and their interests. Old institutionalism, on the other 
hand, could accept that actors had and pursued material and ideal objectives, 
even though scholars did not agree with the idea that individual striving will lead 
to organisation rationality (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
There are several strands of new institutionalism - in economics, organisation 
theory, history, and sociology, among others. Based on different assumptions 
and focusing on diverse social phenomena, these strands have little in common, 
but a conviction that institutional frameworks and social processes matter and a 
scepticism towards an atomistic view of social dynamics (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). Neoinstitutional economics focuses on transactions as the unit of 
analysis and posits that institutions arise and persist when they are able to 
reduce transaction costs. Several unresolved issues remain within this strand 
though, for example: how optimal institutions are as responses to social needs, 
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the weight of the state and ideologies and the treatment of transaction costs 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
In the field of politics, two major strands of new institutional theory emerged: the 
positive theory, concerned with domestic political institutions, and the regime 
theory, focusing on international relations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). The 
positive theory of institutions concentrates on how political structures, i.e. 
institutions, shape political outcomes. Scholars in this field argue that political 
institutions contribute to create stability in political life, for example, by reducing 
the volatility inherent to majority voting system through legislative rules. 
International regime scholars investigated conditions under which international 
cooperation occurs and studied the institutions, i.e. regimes, which promoted 
this cooperation. Regimes are considered institutions because “they build upon, 
homogenise, and reproduce standard expectations and, in doing so, stabilise 
the international order” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 7).  
In summary, neoinstitutional theory informs some key assumptions and the 
theoretical background that will frame this conceptual piece. This thesis 
emphasises the relationship between organisations and their environment, 
rejecting a purely atomistic rational-actor model of organisations. It also 
considers institutional frameworks and demands to have an important role in 
shaping corporate behaviour, by offering incentives or imposing constraints to 
certain behaviour. 
2.1.2 What are institutions? 
Scott (2008: 48) proposes that institutions “are comprised of regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated 
activities and resources provide stability and meaning to social life”. He adds 
that institutions function at multiple levels, from the global system to personal 
relationships (Scott, 2008) and are shaped by and shape social behaviour (Scott, 
1995). Another important feature of institutions is that although stable by 
definition, they can change over time, either in an incremental or discontinuous 
way (Scott, 2008). 
Institutions are comprised by symbolic systems (norms, rules and cultural-
cognitive beliefs), as well as by the activities that produce and reproduce them 
and the resources that sustain them (Scott, 2008). Summarising: 
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• Institutions can constrain behaviour, by distinguishing legitimate and 
illegitimate conduct and by defining legal, moral and cultural boundaries, 
or enable behaviour, by providing guidelines or by empowering actors; 
• Institutions operate at different levels, from the global system to 
interpersonal relations; 
• Although institutions transmit the idea of stability, they can also go 
through change, either radical or incremental; 
• Institutions have different carriers and can be instantiated in different 
media. 
In other words, institutions are multifaceted systems, comprising regulative 
processes and symbolic systems, the latter formed by cognitive constructions 
and normative rules. Scott adds that “rules, norms and meanings arise in 
interaction, and they are preserved and modified by human behaviour” (Scott, 
2008:49).  
2.1.3 How do institutions behave? 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three mechanisms of institutional 
isomorphic change, namely: coercive isomorphism, normative pressures and 
mimetic processes. In a similar vein, Scott (2008) proposes that institutions are 
formed by three pillars, namely regulative, normative and cognitive. The table 
below summarises the main characteristics of the three pillars of institutions 
shedding light on the way institutions function: 
Table 1: The three pillars of institutions (Scott, 2008: 51) 
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These elements form “the elastic fibres that guide behaviour and resist change” 
(Scott, 2008: 49). While these pillars or mechanisms are analysed separately 
here, it is important to highlight that most empirical observations will identify not 
an isolated pillar in action, but a combination of different elements (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983, Scott, 2008). Also importantly, the pillars may not always be 
aligned, and may sometimes generate concomitant incentives for conflicting 
behaviours, creating confusion and in some cases providing conditions prone to 
institutional change (Scott, 2008). 
It is also important to note that, depending on time and circumstances, the 
supporting pillar of an institution may change. For example, while laws are 
mainly understood to be in the realm of the regulative pillar, based on their 
coercive elements, cognitive and normative elements may be required to 
support them in some cases. In several instances, laws are sufficiently 
ambiguous not to state a clear prescription for action, in which case actors are 
required to elaborate their own interpretation of those requirements. In these 
cases, laws offer an opportunity for collective sense-making, relying more on 
cognitive and normative elements, than coercive ones per se (Scott, 2008). In 
addition, these different mechanisms may be at play concomitantly (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). It is important to explore the three pillars in more detail.  
2.1.3.1 The regulative pillar: isomorphism through coercive mechanisms 
The regulative aspects of institutions are to a greater or lesser extent observed 
by all institutional scholars (Scott, 2008). The central concept around this pillar is 
that institutions regularise and constrain behaviour. This process involves the 
capacity to establish rules, monitor compliance and apply sanctions (Scott, 
2008), and control is mainly done through mechanisms of coercion (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). The operationalisation of this process may be highly 
formalised and implemented by specialised actors, or it may use informal 
mechanisms and involve folkways (Scott, 2008, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Coercive pressures are generally proposed to stem from actors upon whom the 
organisations depend (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   
Where actors do not have the authority to impose conformity, they may choose 
to offer incentives for compliance (Scott, 2008). In Brazil, for example, the 
government incentivizes corporate investment in cultural activities by offering tax 
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incentives for companies participating in the scheme 2 . Also importantly, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) highlight that while coercive power is often 
associated with the state, the imposition of rules and standards through coercive 
mechanisms may also take place outside the government arena, for example, 
between parent company and subsidiaries.  
2.1.3.2 The normative pillar: normative pressures for isomorphism 
The normative pillar concentrates on a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory 
focus on social life. A normative system is formed by values and norms; while 
the former defines socially accepted and desired behaviours, as well as 
standards to which existing behaviours can be compared, norms will define the 
acceptable means to achieve them (Scott, 2008). For example, while values can 
define the legitimacy of profit, norms will define what is considered appropriate 
behaviour to achieve profit. 
Normative systems also support the emergence of roles. While some values 
and norms apply to society in general, others will be specific to certain actors or 
positions, defining what consists appropriate goals and behaviours in these 
particular cases (Scott, 2008). These normative external expectations are held 
by other participants of the social interaction in case, and will prescribe 
behaviour for the individual that holds the particular position (ibid). The individual 
will experience these expectations as external pressures to conform, and 
internalise them to varying degrees. It is important to highlight that roles can be 
formally constructed, to respond to a specific need, or informally constructed, 
through repeating interactions over time (Scott, 2008). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that normative pressures stem primarily from 
professionalisation. According to these authors, isomorphism is enacted through 
two key aspects of professionalisation: first, through formal education and 
legitimation through the development of a cognitive base by specialists at 
universities or training centres; secondly, through interactions within 
professional networks. While the former is an important source for the 
development of professional norms to be followed by members of that 
profession, the latter touches professionals in similar roles across several 
organisations and offer a valuable conduit for the diffusion of models and ideas, 
and for the definition of organisational behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
                                                
2 For more information please refer to: http://www.cultura.gov.br/site/categoria/apoio-a-projetos/mecanismos-
de-apoio-do-minc/lei-rouanet-mecanismos-de-apoio-do-minc-apoio-a-projetos/ 
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As it is the case of the regulative pillar, normative systems can either constrain 
or enable behaviour (Scott, 2008). As Scott (2008) highlights, normative 
systems “confer rights as well as responsibilities; privileges as well as duties; 
licenses as well as mandates”. Differently from the regulatory pillar, compliance 
is based on social obligation. 
2.1.3.3 The cultural-cognitive pillar and mimetic processes 
The cultural-cognitive elements of institutions are defined by Scott (2008: 57) as 
“shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames 
through which meaning is made”. Individual’s responses to external stimuli are 
mediated by cognitive and cultural frameworks, which help the actor make 
sense of the world around him, interpret it and decide how to behave (ibid).  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) stress the power of uncertainty in leading to 
isomorphism. In face of ambiguity and doubt, organisations are likely to engage 
in mimetic processes, modelling themselves after peer organisations that are 
seen by them as more successful or legitimate. This modelling process may be 
unintentional, for example through employee turnover, or intentional and explicit, 
for example through the work of consulting firms in replicating models across 
client firms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Scott (2008) stresses a cognitive-cultural pillar, arguing that “internal 
interpretative processes are shaped by external cultural frameworks”. He argues 
that compliance in the cultural-cognitive pillar is achieved as individuals perceive 
alternative behaviours to be inconceivable and take routines for granted. 
Compliance is often associated with feelings of certitude, confidence and 
connection to one’s environment; non-compliance, on the other hand, is linked 
to feelings of confusion and disorientation (Scott, 2008). 
2.1.3.4 Carriers 
Institutions are conveyed by different carriers, which Scott (2008) calls symbolic 
systems, relational systems, routines and artefacts. Two important aspects of 
carries must be highlighted: (1) they apply to all pillars, although different 
authors will focus on different carriers; and (2) carriers are not neutral modes of 
transmission, but rather are able to affect the message’s reception and 
interpretation (ibid). 
Symbolic systems - Institutional scholars are interested in a variety of symbols 
used to guide behaviour, such as for example rules, values, scripts, 
representations, classifications, etc. Scholars emphasising the cognitive pillar 
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are interested in how symbolic systems can shape perception and 
understandings. Those focusing on the normative pillar, concentrate on how 
values and expectations shape behaviour, while regulative scholars are 
interested in the effect created by conventions, laws and rules (Scott, 2008). 
Human language, followed by writing and more recently by advances in 
communication technology through internet and TV for example, greatly 
facilitated the transmission of ideas across time and places (Scott, 2008). 
Relational systems – Institutions can also be carried by relational systems, i.e. 
patterned interactions connected to role systems (Scott, 2008). Relational 
systems may exist within an organisation, or across the boundaries of different 
organisations. They may also be common to several organisations creating 
structural isomorphism, or specific to a single organisation creating a singular 
organisational character structure (Scott, 2008). While cognitive theorists will 
tend to focus more on structural models, normative and regulative scholars will 
be inclined to understand relational systems as governance systems, with the 
normative authority and the coercive power to create and enforce rules, codes 
and norms (Scott, 2008). 
Routines – Routines, as “deeply ingrained habits and procedures based on 
unarticulated knowledge and beliefs” can also function as institutional carriers, 
and have been pointed by scholars as a key element to ensure organisational 
reliability and stability (Scott, 2008: 82). Routines involve acquiring knowledge 
on how to act and solve problems, developing patterned behaviours, and are 
typically learnt within a specific community; that implies in that routines are not 
easily transposable to different settings where new actors or relationships are 
involved (Scott, 2008). 
Artefacts – Artefacts can be defined as “discrete material object, consciously 
produced or transformed by human activity, under the influence of the physical 
and/or cultural environment” and range through human history from very 
rudimentary tools to complex contemporary technologies (Scott, 2008: 83). 
Artefacts have both technical and symbolic features, the latter in some cases 
extrapolating the former (for example, goal posts in the football match). Finally, it 
is important to highlight that although artefacts are often a product of human 
invention, once developed and in use, they seem to become part of the 
objective reality of a specific situation; that does not mean, however, that they 
are immutable – through social use and interaction the meaning and use of 
artefacts can be modified (Scott, 2008). 
Chapter 1: Conceptual Development 
 30 
2.1.4 How do institutions change? 
Institutions, although transmitting the idea of stability and resilience, are also 
prone to incremental or radical change; therefore, it is important to understand 
them not only as a state of things, but also as a “process”, including 
institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation (Scott, 2008). Scholarly 
understanding on the emergence or change in institutions varies, but can be 
roughly classified in two strands: naturalistic and agent-based (Scott, 2008). 
While the first posits that institutionalisation is a natural and unguided process 
arising from the collective sensemaking of actors facing similar issues, the latter 
stresses the importance of actors as causal agents, who engender intentional 
action to achieve their ends. A balanced view, taking account of both agency 
and structure in the process of institutionalisation, seems the most sensible 
approach (Scott, 2008).  
Scott (2008) suggests that at the early stages of institutionalisation, the adoption 
of the specific practice by an organisation is largely an issue of choice, which 
varies according to their needs or interests. As the process of institutionalisation 
advances, increasing cognitive and normative pressure make adoption more of 
a requirement than a choice. The question then arises as of why certain 
organisations adopt some structures and practices, while others in similar 
situations do not? What drives variation in processes of institutionalisation? As a 
first point, Scott (2008) proposes that although exposed to the same institutional 
demands, not all organisations active in the same environment will experience 
these pressures equally. The reasons for that vary. For one thing, these 
organisations are not equally subject to existing institutional demands. 
Regulatory requirements may vary as a function of size; for example, regulation 
on inclusion of people with special needs may apply only to firms that have more 
than a certain number of employees. In addition, Oliver (1991) proposes that 
conforming is not the only available choice for an organisation faced with 
institutional pressures. Possible responses vary according to the level of 
resistance to institutional demands and may range from acquiesce, to 
compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation (Oliver, 1991). 
Organisations’ willingness, capacity and ability to conform will drive their 
response to the institutional demands.  
Organisational factors are also understood to be linked to early adoption. Scott 
(2008) divides these factors in three groups, namely attributes, linkages and 
reference groups. Attributes refer to organisational characteristics that can 
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influence early adoption, of which these are some that have been found to be 
relevant: size, as larger organisations are more resourceful, more visible and 
more sensitive to environmental changes; work with the public sector; level of 
unionisation; and CEO characteristics, such as background, compensation, 
structure, power in relation to the board or incentives systems (ibid). Linkages 
refer to inter-organisational connections shared by organisations’ participants 
within networks, such as for example, interlocking board of directors (ibid). It is 
theorised that where information is readily available, the diffusion of adoption of 
a certain practice is more likely to be influenced by the behaviour of others we 
found to be similar to ourselves (a case of structural equivalence) than by those 
we maintain contact with (a case of cohesion). Reference groups refer to the 
choice by an organisation of similar organisations to mimic. Studies show that 
organisations tend to choose their references based on geographic proximity; 
perception of being similar to self, for example, belonging to the same industry; 
closeness of connections; high prestige; level of success (Scott, 2008). 
Institutional change involves, however, not only processes of institutionalisation, 
but also processes of deinstitutionalisation. Deinstitutionalisation happens when 
the utility or legitimacy of a certain institutionalised practice is seriously 
questioned, leading to the weakening and eventual substitution of institutions 
(Oliver, 1992). Oliver (1992) identifies three main areas of pressure within and 
beyond an organisation which will determine deinstitutionalisation, namely: 
political, functional and social. Political pressures derive from changes in the 
power structures that gave rise or sustained institutions. Functional pressures 
result from perceived performance failures on institutionalised practices or from 
changing consumer preferences. Finally, social pressures are associated with 
increasing fragmentation of normative consensus and the consequent creation 
of divergent beliefs and practices, weakening the “competing” institutional 
frameworks. 
2.1.5 How do institutions shape organisational behaviour?  
According to institutional theory, institutions will help establish what constitutes 
acceptable and appropriate behaviour and impose restrictions or sanctions on 
behaviour that falls outside of these “boundaries” (Scott, 2008). As a result, 
institutional demands will influence the structure and the behaviour of 
organisations operating in a certain environment. Organisations will acquiesce 
to prescriptions advanced by institutional norms, rules, values or beliefs, aiming 
to “fit” the expectations of their operating environment (Dacin, 1997) and acquire 
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legitimacy, i.e. be perceived as following socially accepted goals in a socially 
accepted manner (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  
Legitimacy requirements may pressurize organizations to adopt certain 
structures or practices which, although not necessarily improving efficiency, 
conform to institutional demands (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Vaughan, 1999). 
The result is increasing similarity within the environment through processes of 
institutional isomorphism. Organisations active within the same institutional 
environment will face similar constrains and conditions, and therefore will tend to 
be isomorphic to one another and to their environment over time (Dacin, 1997).  
2.1.5.1 Why do firms engage on a quest for legitimacy? 
Why would firms be interested in acquiring legitimacy? Why would they accept 
to engage in behaviour that may at times sacrifice their ultimate objectives of 
efficiency and profit to acquire legitimacy? Organisations need more than 
material resources and technical information to thrive in their social environment 
(Scott, 2008). Organisations also need social acceptability and credibility, a 
concept that sociologists call legitimacy. Legitimacy has gained prominence in 
management studies since the late 1960s, when open system and institutional 
theories have started to change the notion that the organisation is a tightly 
bounded entity clearly separated from its surrounding environment (Suchman, 
1995).  
For the purposes of this work, Suchman’s definition of legitimacy was used, 
namely that “legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 
1995:574). Therefore, an actor’s behaviour is considered legitimate when it is 
seen to be socially appropriate and consonant with accepted rules, norms, 
values and beliefs (Sonpar et al., 2010) and represent the endorsement of an 
organisation by relevant social actors (Deephouse, 1996). 
What is the gain for firms from engaging in activities and behaviours that aim at 
acquiring legitimacy? Legitimacy arguably not only reduces need for cognitive 
processing by managers, as institutional norms and values are taken for granted, 
but more importantly ensures the support and access to resources provided by 
key stakeholders and ultimately supports organisational continuation and 
survival over time (Sonpar et al., 2010). Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) add to this 
that when a firm is granted legitimacy, it is also granted a “stock of goodwill” 
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which can protect it from future legitimacy threats. In other words, the firm is 
allowed to occasionally deviate from social norms, rules or values without 
seriously damaging its status (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Scott (2008), in a 
review of a number of empirical studies, advances that organisations that have 
culturally approved format and activities, are granted support from normative 
authorities and approval from legal bodies, are more likely to survive over time, 
as compared to organisations lacking these legitimating elements. In other 
words, acquiring legitimacy is an important feature for organisation viability and 
continuity.  
Fombrun et al (2000) illustrate the benefits of acquiring legitimacy with a 1999 
example of Coca-Cola. At that occasion, the company faced a race-bias suit put 
forward by a group of employees. The company, however, received support by 
black community leaders, who highlighted Coca-Cola’s strong record of 
citizenship activities in benefit of black colleges (Fombrun et al., 2000). The end 
result was positive publicity to Coca-Cola, praising and profiling its citizenship 
programmes (ibid) - the previously acquired legitimacy protected the company 
when a threat to its legitimacy occurred. A quote from a Shell executive, in the 
context of the impacts of the Brent Spar incident and the execution of the Wiwa 
leader in Nigeria, also illustrates the relevance of legitimacy for firms: “…There 
is a real concern for legitimacy and what the community thinks. There is a fight 
for the hearts and minds of the public; this is a long-term force affecting our 
business” (Levy and Kolk, 2002: 290). 
It is important to remember, though, that legitimacy involves a relationship 
between the organisation and its environment, rather than being a “possession” 
of an organisation (Suchman, 1995). This relationship is dynamic and as such 
subject to change over time. This dynamism is compounded by the fragmented 
nature of certain institutional environments, which may create multiple and 
conflicting demands, leading to further instability and threat to the organisation 
legitimacy. As a result, organisations need to focus not only on gaining 
legitimacy, but also on maintaining legitimacy and at times repairing legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995).  
2.1.5.2 How do firms acquire or maintain legitimacy - different sources of legitimacy? 
Bases of legitimacy differ across the three pillars, each presenting different 
requirements for companies to be conferred legitimacy. The regulative pillar 
emphasises compliance to the relevant legal or quasilegal requirements (Scott, 
2008). To accrue legitimacy, organisations need to comply with the explicitly 
Chapter 1: Conceptual Development 
 34 
defined requirements of the regulatory system (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). This 
could be illustrated, for example, by the implementation of a new environmental 
regulation. If a company decides not to comply, it will arguably suffer sanctions 
and have its legitimacy challenged by social actors questioning the extent to 
which the firm’s objectives are congruent with society’s ones. Another example 
of this is corporate philanthropy in the United States. Although business leaders 
in the United States have a long tradition of philanthropy, it was not until the 
Revenue Act of 1935 that companies started making charitable contributions 
(Coffey and Wang, 1998). This court decision legitimised corporate giving, 
opening the way for companies to legitimately engage in such activities (Coffey 
and Wang, 1998).   
Legitimacy can also be associated with desirability and normativity, through a 
normative perspective, or it can be associated with taken for grantedness, from 
a cognitive perspective (Deephouse, 1996). The normative pillar relies on 
deeper moral judgements to assess legitimacy (Scott, 2008), entering the 
domain of social values (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). To be legitimate, 
organisational values need to be seen as being congruent to wider societal 
values (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Finally, cultural-cognitive forces require 
conformity to shared frames of reference or mutually recognisable template 
(Scott, 2008). Legitimacy accrues from conforming to or being consistent with 
cognitive structures in society (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Compliance in this 
pillar is achieved as individuals perceive alternative behaviours to be 
inconceivable and take routines for granted (Scott, 2008). It is important to 
highlight though that the three pillars are not necessarily independent and one 
may influence the other. For example, values may impact cognitive 
categorisation and as a result influence regulation (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
In a study of the cattle industry in California, Elsbach (1994) noted how firms 
employed references to institutional characteristics3 to protect legitimacy when 
responding to controversial events. In the early 1990s, despite the size and 
financial strength of its industry, California cattle organisations faced several 
threats to their legitimacy, including public criticism over the use of hormone in 
cattle and the possible health implications, excessive use of water and 
contamination of underground water by cattle manure, grazing on public lands 
and inhumane treatment of cattle (Elsbach, 1994). Some activist groups had 
                                                
3 Institutional characteristics are here defined as normative and socially accepted organisational practices 
associated with institutional structures (hierarchies and goals seen as legitimate), procedures (rules and 
processes seen as legitimate), goals (goals and outcomes seen as legitimate), and structural decoupling of 
legitimate and illegitimate structures (Elsbach, 1994). 
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even started the “Beyond Beef Coalition” which claimed beef cattle to be one the 
greatest ecological threats on Earth and aimed at cutting beef consumption by 
half by 2002. There seemed to be a strong perceived discrepancy between 
some of society’s goals and expectations and that of the cattle organisations. 
Cattle firms in the study were found to resort to institutional characteristics as 
means to respond to threats to their legitimacy. One of the studied firms focused 
on institutional structure, highlighting that its Total Quality Management 
Department would meet or exceed the US Department of Agriculture guidelines 
(Elsbach, 1994). As highlighted by Fombrun (2005) , the “more widely accepted 
the label or standard, the more the company can claim legitimacy in complying 
with prevailing ‘best practice’”. In an example of institutional goals, an 
organisation praised the positive economic impact of the industry in the region 
(Elsbach, 1994), arguably implying that economic prosperity was a common 
objective of both the company and the community. Focusing on institutional 
procedures, one of the firms claimed that grazing limits were determined by the 
State, while another highlighted that government inspectors oversaw all 
production in order to ensure compliance with food safety standards. Finally, in 
a case of decoupling, a firm blamed other stakeholders unrelated to the industry 
for the environmental degradation in the area. In all cases, firms seemed to 
position the use of widely accepted and endorsed structures and procedures as 
a proof of their legitimacy, seeking to avoid further questioning and ensure 
continuation (Elsbach, 1994). 
2.1.5.3 Who has the authority to assign legitimacy? 
Considering that legitimacy results from the endorsement of an organisation by 
certain actors, it is important to understand who the latter are. Theory proposes 
that only certain actors within the greater scope of relationships a firm is 
engaged on have the power and authority to confer legitimacy (Deephouse, 
1996). In addition, it is also theorised that who these actors are can vary over 
time (Scott, 2008). Scott proposes that in contemporary society governments as 
well as professional and trade associations are key to organizations (Scott, 
2008). Another important actor is public opinion, who has a strong influence in 
defining standards of acceptability (Deephouse, 1996). As highlighted by 
Greening and Gray (1994), media also has an impact in confirming or eroding 
the legitimacy of a firm. Given this diversity of actors, one can anticipate some 
challenges. Different actors may have different priorities and therefore pose 
distinct and even conflicting demands over the firm for legitimacy to be assigned. 
What would organisations do then, when facing competing sovereigns? 
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2.1.5.4 What do firms do when facing competing sovereigns? 
Different actors, as well as different pillars, may have conflicting requirements 
for conferring legitimacy. Scott (2008: 60) highlights that sometimes different 
actors will have conflicting normative requirements and standards to confer 
legitimacy: “in complex situations, individuals and organizations may be 
confronted by competing sovereigns”. In these cases, organizations may have 
difficulty in taking action given that conforming to one standard may imply in 
non-conformity to the other one (Scott, 2008). 
The conflicting demands of competing sovereigns can be illustrated by the 
issues around firms’ decision to engage in activities associated with corporate 
social performance. While in many cases a business case for CSP can be made, 
even in the short term, in other cases, compliance to higher social and 
environmental standards may only pay on the long (or extremely long) term. It 
may also happen that firms are not able to see the financial return for such 
action. In those cases, firms may find themselves dealing with conflicting logics. 
More importantly, firms may find that ensuring legitimacy with one actor may 
compromise its legitimacy with another (perhaps equally) important actor. For 
example, firms can be caught in situations of conflict between shareholder 
interests for higher returns and NGOs call for voluntary implementation of higher 
environmental standards to reduce climate change impacts.  
If “competing sovereigns” can be found within the same social and geographical 
environment, what to say of actors seeking to ensure legitimacy across different 
regions? Challenges for MNCs, for example, are compound by the diversity of 
norms, beliefs, rules and values across their multiple host environments 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). An institutional perspective suggests that firms will 
seek to acquire legitimacy by becoming isomorphic with its operating 
environment. Therefore, the greater the extent of which operating countries 
institutional environments differ from one another, the greater the challenge for 
the firm to ensure legitimacy through isomorphism (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
In addition, the greater the institutional distance between home and host 
countries, the greater the difficulty to understand and interpret local institutional 
requirements. Firms’ structures, practices and policies generally reflect the 
institutional environment in which they were developed; therefore it would be 
arguably more difficult for a MNE to make sense and adapt to an institutional 
framework which differs significantly from the one in its home country (Kostova 
and Zaheer, 1999). 
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In summary, reducing isomorphism to the result of a single institutional pressure 
would be too simplistic and ignore the full extent of societal complexity (Scott, 
2008). Organisations are often exposed to multiple, multilevel and multifaceted 
institutions, making it at occasions impossible to conform to all. In addition, 
conforming is not the only option, and firms may decide to do otherwise (Oliver, 
1991). The variability in organisations’ response to institutional demands has 
been pointed as a topic of interest for research within the neoinstitutional theory 
(Özen and Küskü, 2009). This will be further explored in the section below. 
2.1.6 A role for agency? 
Institutional theory advances the notion of stability, suggesting that “behaviours 
are patterned and reproduced because social norms become taken-for-granted” 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006: 28). While it is widely acknowledged that 
organisations will tend to fit into prescriptions of appropriate behaviour there is 
also growing interest in understanding actors’ impact in those very same 
institutions in which they are embedded (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). This 
discussion is not new - the agency versus structure debate has been continuous 
in the social sciences. The tension between “freedom and control”, between 
individuals’ ability to act and limitations imposed on their action by structural and 
cultural constrains is an ongoing debate (Scott, 2008). Theorists have found 
different solutions to address this apparent dichotomy. 
Reed (2003) identifies four major attempts to clarify this relationship: 
reductionism, determinism, conflation and relationism. The reductionism 
approach reduces collective units to an aggregate of individual constituents, 
explaining social action and the social structures they reproduce as an outcome 
of individual behaviour. Within organisation theory, this approach can be clearly 
identified on rational choice theory, decision making theory and public choice 
theory (Reed, 2003). Determinism values structure over agency, almost 
disregarding the latter completely. In this approach, agency is understood as an 
outcome of underlying structural imperatives, merely reproducing the status quo 
(Reed, 2003). Conflationism, on the other hand, argues for the mutual and equal 
co-determination of agency and structure. This approach, tends, however, to 
internalise structure, dissolving or hiding the complex interplay between agency 
and structure (Reed, 2003). Reed suggests that relationism seeks to address 
the weaknesses of the previous approaches. Relationism equally values 
structure and agency, and argues for the need to maintain the ontological and 
analytical separability of these two constructs in order to be able to assess the 
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degree to which different social and organisational structures are open to 
change through social action (Reed, 2003). 
Giddens (1984) advanced the theory of structuration to address the interplay 
between these forces. The structuration theory proposes that actors are 
knowledgeable and reflexive, and create and follow rules and use resources, “as 
they engage in the ongoing production and reproduction of social structures” 
(Scott, 2008: 77). Agency then refers not to actors’ intention of doing something, 
but to their capacity of doing them (Giddens, 1984). Scott highlights that 
whatever the conceptualisation of the social actor, be it following a rational-
choice model, presupposing fixed preferences, or looking into individuals, with 
ever changing interests and taste – the possibility of changing institutional 
arrangements exist (Scott, 2008). 
While early institutional theory considered actors’ agency, later this literature 
tended to neglect this discussion (Lawrence et al., 2011), focusing mainly on the 
role of exogenous shocks in institutional change (Battilana et al., 2009). These 
shocks may happen in the form of regulatory change, social turmoil, 
technological disruptions, among others, resulting in a disturbance of existing 
consensus, and allowing for the awareness of alternative logics and the 
possibility of change (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006).  
Endogenous sources of change, however, should also be taken into 
consideration. A concept that supports the understanding of endogenous 
change is that of institutional entrepreneurship. Institutional entrepreneur is the 
actor “who initiate changes that contribute to transforming existing or creating 
new institutions” (Battilana et al., 2009: 66). This concept was first introduced by 
DiMaggio in the 1988 work on interest and agency in institutional theory 
(Battilana et al., 2009). It helps explain the role of actors (individuals or 
organisations) in promoting institutional change, despite institutional pressures 
towards stability and continuity (Battilana et al., 2009).  
Institutional entrepreneurs may be individuals or organisations, or yet groups of 
organisations or groups of individuals (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006, 
Battilana et al., 2009). Battilana et al (2009) also propose that in order to be 
considered institutional entrepreneurs, social actors must not only initiate 
divergent change (i.e. change that transform a field’s institutional logic, which is 
the understanding of goals in that field and how they should be pursued), but 
also have an active role in the implementation of these changes. 
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This concept encounter one of the main challenges in institutional theory – the 
“paradox of embedded agency” (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Reflecting 
the tension between institutional determinism and agency (Battilana et al., 2009), 
this brings to light the discussion on how actors whose behaviour and thoughts 
are constrained by institutions are capable of working to promote some change 
to those very same institutions (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010). In addressing 
this debate, authors have proposed that certain enabling conditions may 
facilitate the emergence of institutional entrepreneurship. Battilana et al (2009) 
propose two categories of enabling conditions: field characteristics and actors’ 
social position. The former may take different forms: shocks and crises such as 
technological disruption or social turmoil; acute field-level problems that may 
lead to crises, such as for example scarcity of resources; higher degree of 
heterogeneity, which may give rise to institutional incompatibilities and internal 
contradictions likely to lead to questioning of the status-quo; and lower degree of 
institutionalisation, which is likely to lead to uncertainty and opportunity for 
strategic action and reflection (Battilana et al., 2009). The latter suggests that 
actors’ social position may influence their perception of the field as well as their 
access to resources necessary for institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 
2009). 
While an endogenous view on the role of actors in affecting institutions has been 
more explored through the lenses of institutional entrepreneurship (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006), the concept of institutional work is also relevant. 
Institutional work is the “purposive action of individuals and organisations aimed 
at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006: 215)” or changing them (Lawrence et al., 2011). Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) argue that practices leading to institutional change go beyond those of 
institutional entrepreneurs, requiring institutional work from a large number of 
social actors, including those that have the resources to be entrepreneurs, and 
those whose actions will support or facilitate the proposed change. Lawrence et 
al (2011: 52) also add that besides the grand account of institutions and agency, 
it is also important to consider the relevance of “day-to-day equivocal instances 
of agency that, although aimed at affecting the institutional order, represent a 
complex melange of forms of agency – successful or not, simultaneously radical 
and conservative, strategic and emotional, full of compromises, and rife with 
unintended consequences”. 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) propose that Oliver’s (1991) article on strategic 
responses to institutional processes and (1992) article on deinstitutionalisation 
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represent important steps in the recognition of agency in institutional theory and 
focus on institutional work. Organisations in the same organisational field may 
be subject to the same institutional demands; however, not all of them 
experience it in the same way; likewise, not all organisations will respond to 
these pressures equally (Scott, 2008). Oliver (1991) suggests that conforming is 
not the only possible response that companies may have to institutional 
demands and proposes a typology of strategic responses to those pressures. 
These responses vary according to the level of resistance to institutional 
demands, and range from acquiescence, to compromise, avoidance, defiance 
and finally manipulation. Oliver (1991) theorises that organisations’ willingness 
and ability to conform will drive organisational responses to institutional 
demands. While the former will be bounded by organisation scepticism, political 
self-interest and organisational control, the latter relates to organisational 
capacity, ability and awareness (Oliver, 1991). The author hypothesises then the 
conditions under which companies will be more likely to resist to institutional 
demands, looking into each predictive factor related to cause, constituents, 
content, control and context of institutional demands (Oliver, 1991). Clemens 
and Douglas (2005) empirically tested Oliver’s framework, studying the steel 
industry and the issue of potential changes to the standards for radioactive 
contamination of scrap steel. Their results indicated overall support to Oliver’s 
framework. 
While much of the discussion on agency may have been centred on institutional 
change, it is important to remark that even the highly institutionalised practices 
and structures depend on individuals’ and/or organisations’ actions to be 
maintained overtime (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). The concept of 
institutional work highlights and supports this idea. Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) stress that this should not be understood as a simple absence of change, 
as maintaining institutions also requires significant efforts by actors. This may 
involve, for example, establishing techniques to socialise new members or 
incorporating changes that occurred in the external environment to current 
practices and routines. In other words, the focus is then in understanding how 
social actors work to maintain stability in the face of change (Lawrence and 
Suddaby, 2006). 
In the context of this discussion, it is important to highlight that bringing agency 
back to institutional theory, for example through the concept of institutional work, 
does not imply the adoption of the rational actor model (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006). Scott (2008:68) proposes that “all decisions are admixtures of rational 
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calculations and non-rational premises”. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 219) 
suggest the concept of an actor that is capable of working with logics that are 
institutionally defined, applying “culturally-defined forms of competence and 
knowledge” and creativity to adapt. 
Another concept that needs to be highlighted as it contributes to the discussion 
on structure and agency is that of institutional logics. According to Thorton and 
Ocasio (2008) this term was first introduced by Alford and Friedland (1985), and 
further developed by the same authors in their (1991) piece. In the latter work, 
Friedland and Alford (1991: 248) define institutional logics as “a set of material 
practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes its organising principles 
and which is available to organisations and individuals to elaborate”. The 
underlining idea is that each core institution in society has a logic that imposes 
limits to actors’ behaviours and forms the basis of individuals, organisations and 
society as a whole; at the same time, however, institutions also offer sources of 
agency and ultimately change (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Institutional logics 
have also been defined as “shared understanding of the goals to be pursued 
and how they are to be pursued” (Battilana et al., 2009: 69) or the institutional 
template for organising (Battilana et al., 2009). Finally, Thorton et al (2012: 02) 
define institutional logics as “frames of reference that conditions actors’ choice 
of for sense-making, the vocabulary they use to motivate action, and their sense 
of self and identity”. On the same note, the actors highlight that “the principles, 
practices, and symbols of each institutional order differentially shape how 
reasoning takes place and how rationality is perceived and experienced” 
(Thornton et al., 2012: 02). 
Scott (2008) proposes that actors in developed societies have to deal with a 
multitude of frameworks in various areas (such as for example, economic, 
political or religious) and each of these are guided by a different logic. 
Institutional logics may vary in a number of ways, such as: in their content 
(beliefs and assumptions), in their penetration (more general or more specific 
details on templates to organise), in the extent of their horizontal links (the 
extent to which it is compatible to other relevant institutional arrangements) and 
the extent to which they are contested (Scott, 2008). Given this variety, actors in 
general and organisations in particular are often confronted with contradictory 
logics (Scott, 2008).  
Thorton and Ocasio (2008) propose five principles that guide the theory around 
institutional logics. The first one is embedded agency, or the idea that “decisions 
Chapter 1: Conceptual Development 
 42 
and outcomes are a result of the interplay between individual agency and 
institutional structure”, advancing a role for agency, while recognising 
boundaries to individual behaviour, in a case of partial autonomy (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 2008: 103). Secondly, it views society as an inter-institutional system, 
with each sector representing different expectations for individual and 
organisational behaviour, exposing the potential to contradictions of conflicting 
logics. Thirdly, an institutional logics perspective assumes that each of society’s 
institutional orders have material and cultural characteristics, i.e. that 
“institutions develop and change as a result of both of the interplay between 
both of these forces” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 105). Fourthly, it recognises 
that institutions are active at multiple levels and highlights the need for studies to 
be very precise about the level they are focusing on when studying institutional 
logics. Finally, the fifth principle relates to the need to be aware of historical 
contingency, in other words, the need to understand whether theoretical 
approaches are universal or particular to a certain historical time and place 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  
All the discussions and theoretical concepts in this section highlight the 
relevance of understanding where a role for agency lies within institutional 
theory. This is a key issue in institutional theory and one that may help explain a 
number of behaviours explored in this thesis, such as for example, decoupling. 
The recognition that actors may have varied responses to institutional pressures 
will therefore underlie this thesis. 
2.1.6.1 Understanding decoupling 
When understanding different responses to institutional pressures, the concept 
of decoupling is one that comes into light. Decoupling involves the disconnection 
between the commitments made, or the practice or structure the organisation 
has formally adopted, and the actual practices of this organisation (Hess, 2008, 
Crilly et al., 2012, Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As proposed by Meyer and Rowan 
(1977: 357) “decoupling enables organisations to maintain standardised, 
legitimating, formal structures while their activities vary in response to practical 
considerations.” In other words, these formal structures are disconnected from 
regular practices, allowing firms to “buffer internal routines from external 
uncertainties” and enhance flexibility while maintaining legitimacy (Westphal and 
Zajac, 2001).  
While the idea of firms knowingly decoupling commitment and practice, taking 
advantage of the information asymmetry between the firm and its stakeholders, 
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has been widely discussed, some authors have also proposed that firms may 
decouple due to a lack of capacity to implement the actions it has committed to 
(Lim and Tsutsui, 2012, Crilly et al., 2012). In addition, more recent work on 
symbolic management discusses not only reasons beyond “bad intentions” for 
failure to keep promises, but also the fact that decoupling is more nuanced than 
a “yes-or-no” decision, allowing firms to choose level of compliance in a 
continuum (Crilly et al., 2012, Kim and Lyon, 2012). In a study on voluntary 
reporting of greenhouse gas emissions, for example, Kim and Lyon (2012) 
found that firms would use selective disclosure of performance. Participants 
generally reported reductions that albeit real, did not show the full picture of an 
actual increase in total emissions (Kim and Lyon, 2012). 
Kim and Lyon (2012: 01) highlight the fact that not all firms resort to the 
seemingly very profitable strategy of decoupling, suggesting that “symbolic 
management is useful for some firms under certain circumstances, but not for all 
firms nor in all circumstances”. Firms’ attributes and characteristics of its 
operating environment may create different incentives or disincentives for firms 
to engage in symbolic management. The behaviour explored in this thesis – 
performance in voluntary CSR initiatives – is particularly interesting because, 
given its voluntary nature, there are often no obvious forces to ensure that 
participants abide to their commitments.  
While there are clear benefits for decoupling, costs of this decision are less 
discussed. Kim and Lyon (2012) propose that firms incur in internal and external 
costs when decoupling. The former relates to resources used to implement the 
minimum to be able to claim and communicate compliance (Kim and Lyon, 
2012). By definition, they will arguably always be lower than the cost of 
substantive (full) implementation. External costs, on the other hand, refer to 
risks associated with increasing scrutiny revealing discrepancy between firm’s 
discourse and action (Kim and Lyon, 2012). This is arguably where most 
variation may be found, with different institutional arrangements providing 
incentives and constrains to symbolic or substantive engagement. 
The fact that not all firms choose symbolic commitment suggests that these 
external costs may indeed vary for different firms, depending on the institutional 
environment within which they operate. One can argue, therefore, that an 
environment that can increase the external costs of decoupling by increasing 
risks of firms being caught in their empty promises and being penalised for that, 
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are likely to lead to a reduction in firms’ likelihood of engaging in symbolic 
commitment / decoupling. 
2.1.7 Summary 
Although the several strands of institutional theory are highly heterogeneous, 
comprising a number of different approaches, a common thread among different 
authors and lines of thought is that organisations are under pressure to adopt 
certain practices and behaviours and demonstrate consistency with their 
institutional environment (Björkman et al., 2007). Organisations seek to acquire 
legitimacy by adopting structures and practices that are considered appropriate 
in their institutional environment (ibid). This process of isomorphism or 
convergence towards similar patterns, can arguably be associated with any of 
the three pillars: regulative, if it results from the coercive imposition of a powerful 
constituent such as the government; normative, if it is associated for example 
with pressures by professional associations to adopt “appropriate behaviour”; or 
cognitive/mimetic, in cases where organisations facing uncertainty adopt 
practices or structures observed amongst organisations considered successful 
in their milieu. Over time specific regulative, cognitive and normative frames 
become institutionalised, i.e. become increasingly consistent and coherent 
making it difficult for organisations to deviate from that expected behaviour 
(Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). 
Another important aspect of institutions is that they operate at different levels, 
which Scott (2008) proposes to call, for the study of organisations: world system, 
society, organisational field, organisation population, organisation and 
organisation subsystem. These levels range from the macro to the micro level. 
These multilevels of influence will be explored in more details in the next section. 
2.2 Understanding multilevel institutional influences in 
corporate behaviour 
This second section builds on the first one and recognises the multilevelness of 
institutions. It provides a discussion on how institutions function at each of these 
levels. As discussed before, institutions are formed by different elements 
(regulative, normative, and cognitive) and are borne by different carriers 
(symbolic systems, relational systems, artefacts and routines). Equally important 
is the recognition that institutions function at different levels, which Scott (2008) 
proposes to call, for the study of organisations: world system, society, 
organisational field, organisation population, organisation and organisation 
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subsystem. In a Russian doll shape, these levels range from the macro to the 
micro level.  
Not only institutions are active at different levels, but also different levels can 
influence each other. For one thing, institutional demands at international level 
can influence the discussion of norms and rules at national level. Cortell and 
Davis (1996) propose that international rules and norms can influence a 
country’s policy choice through the national political process. The authors 
hypothesise that domestic actors – from the government to society in general – 
may evoke international rules and norms to advance their own interests in the 
national political arena. Through this call, international rules and norms may 
enter the national policy debate and, depending on circumstances, influence 
and affect the discussion and the chosen policy outcome (Cortell and Davis, 
1996).  
This section will elaborate further on how these pressures may play at these 
different levels. Given the overlaps between organisational field and industry, 
the discussion on organisational population would arguably find several overlaps 
and therefore most likely add only marginally if at all for the discussion. As for 
organisation subsystem, this will not be explored either. Adding further 
granularity to the organisation level would also arguably not make a significant 
contribution to the discussion. Where appropriate, these will be reflected in the 
discussion at the organisational level. However, this chapter does offer 
considerations at an individual level.  
2.2.1 Transnational level – the World System matters 
World system refers to the transnational space, beyond national boundaries and 
sovereignty. The global perspective posits that there are some fundamental 
values that transcend national boundaries and form the building blocks of every 
society (Arthaud-Day, 2005). Drivers for corporate social performance at the 
international level arguably mainly rely on the normative pillar to influence 
corporate behaviour. 
If one considers the United Nations System (UN) as a main body of international 
governance, it is possible to observe a change in the way it sought to influence 
corporate behaviour in relation to sustainable development and corporate social 
performance. The UN attitude towards the private sector has suffered a 
significant change since the creation of this multilateral organisation in 1945 
(Therien and Pouliot, 2006). It went from neutrality in the 1940s, to confrontation 
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in the 1960s, and turned into a tone of cooperation in the 1990s. In early days, 
in need of maintaining a posture of impartiality towards both market and planned 
economy nations in the context of the Cold War, the UN adopted a posture of 
distance from business (Therien and Pouliot, 2006). In the 1960s, with the rise 
of the North-South conflict and the debut of several developing countries as UN 
members, the UN’s attitude of distance turned into animosity towards business 
and regulating the private sector became a top development priority for this 
institution (Therien and Pouliot, 2006). In the 1970s, multinational corporations 
(MNCs) were perceived as the cause of many underdevelopment problems, and 
the UN created new institutions such as the United Nations Commission on 
Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) to regulate MNCs’ activities (Therien and 
Pouliot, 2006).  
In the late 1980s, the end of the Cold War and the increasing process of 
globalisation, combined with the rise of neo-liberalism, generated major changes 
in the international environment in which the UN operated (Witte and Reinicke, 
2005).  One significant response from the UN was the beginning of a process of 
opening to non-state stakeholders, from both civil society and the private sector 
(Witte and Reinicke, 2005). In this context, the understanding that business 
could contribute to give “a human face to the global economy” (McIntosh et al., 
2004a) and support UN goals started to translate, among other things, a into a 
tone of cooperation and partnership. It was in this context that the United 
Nations Global Compact (UNGC) emerged. Arguably, in institutional language, 
the UN approach to business started to shift from regulatory to mainly normative.  
Scholars have studied the development of other normative frameworks at the 
transnational level, notably in the form of international standards. The Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), which offers a widely used template for corporate 
social reporting, is an example (Brown et al., 2009a, Brown et al., 2009b). More 
recently, the development of the ISO 26000, which aims at establishing 
international (non-binding and non-certifiable) standards for corporate 
responsibility, also is an example of a normative pressure at the international 
level.  
Finally, several scholars have also recognised the importance of NGOs in 
ensuring higher corporate social performance, by monitoring corporate actions 
and advancing normative calls for responsible behaviour. Campbell (2007) 
posits that firms will tend to display higher CSP where private independent 
organisations such as NGOs exist and have the capacity to monitor and in some 
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cases mobilise to change corporate behaviour. This idea can arguably be 
transposed to the international level, where non-governmental organisations 
have been active in a watchdog role. 
In summary, a globalist view posits that while in the past following national rules 
and regulations was sufficient, the regulatory vacuum of the transnational space 
makes it necessary for companies operating at this level to adhere to normative 
pressures to ensure legitimacy and a social license to operate (Gjolberg, 2009).   
2.2.2 National institutional frameworks matter 
Despite increasing globalisation and subsequent claims of convergence of 
business structures and practices, there are remarkable differences in the way 
economic activities are organised and controlled across different countries 
(Whitley, 1999). The reasons for the emergence of different models to organise 
national economic systems have been typically assumed to be related to 
improved features or increased effectiveness of the more recent models 
(Whitley, 1999). This functionalist view is limited though, in that in assuming that 
a systemic rationality governs all economic activities independently of the social 
context, it fails to appreciate the dynamism of economic systems and the 
influence of institutional arrangements in the organisation of economic relations. 
It falls short of accounting for the role of other pressures in shaping economic 
relations and market organisation, notably the historical context and actions of 
interest groups and collective actors (Whitley, 1999). Prevailing social structures 
and conventions have a significant impact not only on the development of 
systems of economic coordination and control, but also on the “rules of the 
game” based on which organisations and individuals make “rational” economic 
decisions (Whitley, 1999).  
It follows that the nation state still represents a relevant context for 
understanding corporate strategy, as it provides institutional environments with 
the ability to influence corporate strategy (Gjolberg, 2009). Firms do not operate 
in a vacuum. Countries develop different institutions, depending on their history 
and national choices. These historically grown institutions lead to the 
development of different national contexts which will form the environment in 
which companies operate (Whitley, 1999). These national contexts will offer 
varied incentives and constrains for corporate behaviour, including in regards to 
corporate social performance. As a result, societies have different social, 
economic, political and cultural institutional patterns, which will exert different 
pressures on companies, setting the conditions to either promote or hinder 
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corporate social performance (Jeurissen, 2004). Jeurissen (2004) argues that 
half of corporate responsibility is actually located in the society that defines the 
institutional framework within which the company operates, and that therefore 
there is no CSP without responsibility being known and valued in the society.  
2.2.2.1 Understanding variations in the national context  
Since the end of the Soviet Union and the consequent collapse of the “contested 
alternative” political economy scholars have started focusing on the comparison 
of different types of capitalism (Kang, 2006). The literature on compared 
capitalism is vast, and is notably concerned with the impact of institutional 
variables on economic performance, modes of governance and company 
strategies (Jackson and Deeg, 2006). Three main institutional approaches have 
been used over the last years to compare and assess variations among different 
political economic systems.  
The first approach – named modernisation (Hall and Soskice, 2001, Jackson 
and Deeg, 2006) or state-centred (Kang, 2006) - focused largely on processes 
of policy making and placed the state at the centre, looking into different states’ 
capacity to devise and implement policies to modernise their industries. States’ 
capacity to intervene in their economies was understood to be heavily 
dependent on the institutional configuration of both state and economy, which 
was in good part a result of history (Jackson and Deeg, 2006).  
The society-centred or neo-corporatism approach also has an interest in 
explaining policy making; it recognises, though, that a wider range of societal 
interests are at play and constrain governmental action. The focus moves from 
the state to the political system. Two main streams can be identified within this 
approach: pluralist, which took on board the full range of societal interests and 
their influence in policy making, and the corporatist approach, positing that only 
some organised interests (for example: trade unions, employers associations) 
had this influence (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
More recently, the “production (or firm) centred” or “social systems of production” 
approaches brought the firm to the centre, looking at capitalism as an 
organisation of economic activity (Kang, 2006, Hall and Soskice, 2001). Several 
approaches are under this umbrella, notably: social systems of production or 
French Regulation theory (see: Michel Aglietta, 1998, Michel Boyer, 2000, 2003), 
theory of flexible specialisation (see: Piore and Sabel, 1984, Hirst and Zeitlin, 
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1989), business systems approach (see: Whitley, 1999) and varieties of 
capitalism (see: Hall and Soskice, 2001). I will further explore the last two. 
The varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach posits that different national 
institutional frameworks will provide firms with competitive advantage to engage 
in specific types of activities (Hall and Soskice, 2001). While institutional 
arrangements may vary within the same country creating inconsistencies at 
national level, the theory of varieties of capitalism focuses on the dominant 
model observed in a specific country (Crouch, 2006). There are two central 
ideas in the varieties of capitalism approach: (1) system coordination and (2) 
institutional complementarities (Kang, 2006). The former suggests the 
occurrence of two different and opposing types of capitalism – Coordinate 
Market Economy (CME) and Liberal Market Economy (LME) - which vary 
according to the degree of “coordination” of a political economy. The latter argue 
that institutions will complement each other and the balancing between these 
will create an environment conducive to certain behaviour (Kang, 2006).  
In a similar vein to the varieties of capitalism approach, the national business 
system approach (NBS) argues that historically grown institutional frameworks 
will mould different market systems or national business systems (NBS) (Matten 
and Moon, 2008). These will constitute the environment in which companies 
operate and offer different constraints and incentives that will shape corporate 
behaviour. The national business systems approach looks then into the 
coordination of economic activities and governance issues, explaining national 
differences in corporate behaviour and market organisations based on variations 
in culture and in formal institutions (Lundvall, 1999).  
The literature on compared capitalism varies in a number of ways such as for 
example, the number of dimensions required to describe an institutional domain, 
the number of institutional domains needed to compare countries or define 
typologies, and even in how many groups or typologies countries should be 
categorised in (Jackson and Deeg, 2006). These are all relevant questions that 
involve trade-offs and can have a significant impact on the results of analyses of 
cross-country variations. Authors have proposed different answers, ranging from 
the adoption of a binary typology by Hals and Soskice’ VoC (Liberal Vs. 
coordinated economy), to Whitley’s NBS’ six-ideal-types typology; or from 
Amable’s and Boyer’s five institutional domains, to Rhodes’, Schmidt’s and 
Ebbinghaus’ emphasis on the state/welfare state as a key institutional domain 
(Jackson and Deeg, 2006).  
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Some key challenges remain in the comparative capitalism literature, notably in 
relation to accommodating institutional change. As reviewed in the previous sub-
chapter, although institutions transmit the idea of stability, they can also go 
through change, either radical or incremental (Scott, 2008). Over the last 
decade, systems of capitalism have gone through significant change, resulting 
on increasing questioning of the typologies proposed by different scholars in the 
1990s (Jackson and Deeg, 2006). In addition, evidence suggests that some 
countries have gone through enough change to put into question the “type of 
capitalism” they had been categorised in the 1980s or 1990s (Jackson and 
Deeg, 2006).  
Another limitation refers to the role of agency. Conforming is not the only 
possible response that companies may have to institutional demands (Oliver, 
1991). Firms may choose strategies that do not necessarily “fit” their 
environment expectations, i.e. firms active in the same environment may 
respond differently to its institutional framework depending on their dynamic 
preferences (Jackson and Deeg, 2006). To these limitations, one could add the 
fact that the whole comparative capitalism literature focuses mainly on Western 
Europe and North America (Jackson and Deeg, 2006) (although some studies 
have applied it to different sets of countries).  
In summary, it is proposed that economic relations and activities are socially 
constituted and institutionally variable, and as a result the organisation and 
outcomes of competitive processes as well as the nature of the participating 
actors will vary significantly across different social contexts (Whitley, 1999), 
notably across different countries. The logics guiding economic decisions and 
activities are highly influenced by the institutional arrangements of the operating 
context, and therefore are proposed to vary across contexts with different 
institutional frameworks, i.e. to vary across different countries. Variations in 
institutional frameworks will create comparative institutional advantage to the 
adoption of specific behaviours, as different institutional settings may present 
diverse incentives and constraints to certain activities. In responding to these 
different incentives and constraints, firms active in different countries, seeking to 
ensure legitimacy, will choose strategies and activities that “fit” their institutional 
environment, resulting in variations in their patterns of behaviour (Jackson and 
Deeg, 2006). In simple terms, national context matters in understanding and 
seeking to predict corporate behaviour. 
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2.2.2.2 Regulatory mechanisms 
From a neoinstitutionalist perspective, organisational practices change and 
become institutionalised because they are seen as legitimate (Matten and Moon, 
2008). Institutional frameworks will legitimise actions through processes 
involving coercive, mimetic and normative pressures. As for the first one, the 
argument is that practices will be legitimised by rules, norms or laws (Matten 
and Moon, 2008). For example, since 2009, large companies in Denmark are 
required to provide information on their work on corporate responsibility in their 
annual reports, or at a minimum state their position in regards to this issue4. As 
the first year of the new law comes to an end, the Danish Government reports 
that 97% of the companies subject to the legislation comply with it (Danish 
Commerce and Companies Agency 2010). Within this universe, 43% report on 
corporate responsibility in the context of the annual report for the first time 
(although several have previously reported on this elsewhere) (Danish 
Commerce and Companies Agency 2010).  
It is proposed that the level and content of state regulation, as well as the level 
of state intervention, can influence firms’ CSP. The way this may happen has 
been subjected to different interpretations. By means of simplification, this can 
be presented as those who believe CSP and regulation are complementary and 
those who believe one substitutes the other. Detomasi (2008) argues that 
countries where higher levels of regulation and state intervention are more likely 
to happen, firms will have greater incentives to engage in CSR. The rationale is 
that firms will voluntarily and proactively engage in self-regulation to maintain 
discretion over the management of certain issues, and they will tend to do it 
more often where the perceived risk of regulation is higher. Reid and Toffel 
(2009), in a study of the conditions under which firms will engage in addressing 
climate change challenges, found a positive correlation between firms’ 
perception of regulatory threat and their engagement in voluntary practices in 
this issue. In parallel, it has also been proposed that firms will be more likely to 
display socially responsible behaviour if there are stronger levels of state 
regulation in place, combined with proper enforcement of these (Campbell, 
2007). Conversely, it has been argued that lower levels of regulation may lead 
to poorer CSP. King and Lenox (2000), in a study of the efficacy of self and 
government regulations in the chemical industry, found that the absence of 
regulation created room for opportunistic action on the part of the companies. 
                                                
4 For more information on this legislation, please refer to: http://www.csrgov.dk/sw51190.asp 
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2.2.2.3 Normative mechanisms 
Normative pressures are associated with the logic of appropriateness, and their 
legitimacy rests on moral dictates (Scott, 2008). Normative pressures are then 
associated with expectations. “Whereas in the past it sufficed for companies to 
follow national rules and regulations, the present regulatory vacuum forces them 
to go beyond legal requirements to be perceived as responsible and legitimate 
actors.” (Gjolberg, 2009: 608). Translated into the national context these 
expectations can be arguably associated with societal normative calls for certain 
behaviour. More specifically, one can point to normative calls for companies to 
adhere to more responsible operating standards, i.e. higher corporate social 
performance. More collective social voices at a national level are often 
associated with pressures from organised civil society (including NGOs, 
community organisation, social movements), media attention, general 
expectations from society and business coalitions focusing on corporate social 
performance (Moon, 2007). Organisations will respond to these calls in different 
ways, seeking to acquire or maintain legitimacy.  
While normative pressures have an important role in constraining corporate 
behaviour, for example, by monitoring corporate activities, they also arguably 
have a role in enabling more responsible corporate behaviour. It has been 
argued that the institutionalisation of normative calls for CSP, for example, 
through embeddedness of the CSP concept into business schools curricula, 
business publications and other educational environments attended by business 
managers, can increase the likelihood that companies will engage in more 
responsible behaviour (Campbell, 2007). For one thing, the United Nations’ 
initiative Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME) has been 
founded “to inspire and champion responsible management education, research 
and thought leadership globally” and currently counts with 325 participating 
organisations worldwide5.  
The inclusion of CSP in these outlets may lend greater legitimacy to this issue 
and enable corporate engagement in CSP. Moreover, the same can arguably be 
said about the role of NGOs or other stakeholders – including scholars in 
countless efforts to prove the CSP-CFP link - in helping building CSP legitimacy. 
In any case, one could argue that the more CSP is seen as a legitimate 
business role, the more institutionalised it is in society (observed, for example, in 
the number of CSP-related accredited and certified companies), the more 
                                                
5 http://www.unprme.org/index.php 
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companies will be enabled to engage in activities leading to higher corporate 
social performance. 
2.2.2.4 Cognitive/Mimetic Mechanisms 
The focus here is on the cultural-cognitive drivers that help shape a shared 
frame of reference on corporate social performance in a specific geographic 
area, here chosen to be a country. Frames of reference are “a source of 
templates or models characteristic of a set of actors that facilitate the adoption 
of similar practices by other members of the group” (Marquis et al., 2007). The 
influence of geographic communities on corporate behaviour has been explored 
in the literature. Marquis et al (2007) compare practices of corporate 
philanthropy in the metropolitan areas of Minneapolis-St. Paul and Atlanta. The 
authors found the nature of corporate social action to vary deeply between these 
two regions, due to businesses alignment to community ideologies and 
understanding (ibid). 
2.2.3 Organisational field matters 
Organisational field is a fundamental concept in understanding neoinstitutional 
theory. DiMaggio and Powell’s definition is very influential, and building on the 
concept of industry states that organisational field consists of “those 
organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional 
life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and 
other organisations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983: 148).  
Key components of organisational fields are: relational systems, cultural-
cognitive systems, organisational archetypes and repertoires of collective action 
(Scott, 2008). Relational systems refer to the linking of organisations to larger 
networks. Organisations can be related to each other through direct or indirect 
connection (“connectedness”) or by similar organisational structures (“structural 
equivalence”). Power relations are also an important component of relational 
systems, as well as governance systems, the latter defined as arrangements 
which allow one set of actors to control the actions of another (Scott, 2008). 
Cultural-cognitive systems allow actors to identify, interpret and understand their 
participation in a common enterprise. Organisational archetypes are also 
important in that they shed light into models for individual actors (roles) and 
collective actors (organisations) in organisational fields. Archetypes provide 
relevant templates around which functions and systems can be organised, 
allowing for the engagement in social and economic action. Finally, repertoires 
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of collective action concern the collection of types of responses or behaviours, 
which are deemed as acceptable within a specific field. These institutional forms, 
by providing organising templates, at the same time constrain actors from 
selecting alternative modes, and legitimise actors enacting acceptable 
behaviour (Scott, 2008). 
According to neoinstitutional theory, it is argued that firms will seek to deal with 
uncertainty and increasing complexity by imitating actions and behaviours 
recognised as best practice within their organisational field (Matten and Moon, 
2008). These mimetic processes represent a source of isomorphic pressures 
and may change over time. Organisational fields in early stages of their life cycle 
have great diversity of approaches and forms. Nevertheless, once established, a 
strong trend towards homogenisation is observed (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Beliveau et al (1994) argue that firms and their managers are part of a web of 
relationships and will engage in activities and behaviours that serve the firm in 
the context of these social relationships. Behaviours repeated within the network, 
gradually acquire legitimacy and can eventually become required behaviours. 
Firms operating in the same network (which could be, for example, the same 
industry) will tend to seek legitimacy (Beliveau et al., 1994) and reduce risk 
(Matten and Moon, 2008) through the enacting of similar behaviour, indicating 
mimetic processes.  
Industry effects that can affect corporate social performance are believed to 
stem from a number of factors. Jones (1999) defines these as the sector to 
which the firm belongs to, the industry’s public visibility and the degree of 
government and public scrutiny the industry operates under, its competitive 
structure and the historically developed industry culture. It is also argued that 
companies operating in different industries will need different legitimising values 
and normative frameworks to achieve legitimisation (Scott, 2008). Beliveau et al 
(1994) found that there is a positive relationship between a firm’s CSP and that 
or their immediate competitors, and propose that industry patterns are a strong 
predictor of firms’ level of CSP. Other studies support this idea. Amato and 
Amato (2007), in a study of large US firms from different industries covering 
manufacturing, retailing and credit intermediation, found strong industry effects 
in explaining variations in charitable donations. The authors argue that industry 
level differences in philanthropic culture guide individual firm behaviour within 
specific industries in regards to that practice; firms would need to meet or 
exceed peers’ levels of charitable donations in order to maintain legitimacy.   
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In summary, the central argument at this level is that firms and their managers 
will take into consideration peer’s behaviour and community-accepted standards 
- legitimised practices - when deciding on their own strategies and actions in 
terms of CSP. This may result in mimetic processes through which firms will 
seek to mimic peers seen as more successful or legitimate in their field, creating 
increasing homogeneity. 
2.2.4 Firm level factors matter 
Firms are an integral part of society and therefore depend on it for existence and 
survival (Sethi, 1975). As a result, firms constantly strive to organise its activities 
in views of being aligned with society’s expectations, seeking to ensure 
legitimacy and continuity (Sethi, 1975). Firms also seek to align structure and 
behaviour to accepted standards in society in order to reduce risk in an 
uncertain environment (Matten and Moon, 2008). More specifically, it can be 
argued that firms respond to regulatory pressures to avoid sanctions from more 
powerful actors, they respond to normative pressures to conform to the 
expectations of relevant actors in the company’s organisational field and they 
respond to cognitive pressures to reduce uncertainty through the mimicking of 
practices that are recognised as successful (Özen and Küskü, 2009). Ultimately, 
firms are arguably seeking legitimisation at all these levels.  
Studies have found a number of firm level characteristics to be important factors 
in confounding the relationship between institutional demands and corporate 
social performance. Firm size, for example, was found to be significantly related 
to higher corporate social performance in a number of studies (Chen et al., 
2008a, Brammer and Millington, 2008, Reverte, 2009, Stanwick and Stanwick, 
1998).  Explanations behind the effect of size have been linked to all of the three 
pillars. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have theorised that organisations that are 
larger in size are likely to be subject to greater pressure for mimetic 
isomorphism. The authors propose that the larger the personnel or customer 
base of an organisation, the greater the pressure on it to demonstrate that it is 
offering programs and services similarly to those provided by other 
organisations; i.e. a larger size may encourage mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983).  
Authors have also proposed that larger firms are more likely to be subject to 
regulatory pressures, in the form for example of higher inspection frequency by 
regulatory authorities (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009). As a result of that, larger 
firms will have greater incentives to signal good behaviour to regulators. Finally, 
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normative pressures from NGOs and other social actors for higher CSP are also 
likely to be more often directed at larger firms. Baker (2010) discusses the fact 
that big international firms are more likely to receive strong criticism under crisis 
than small companies. Following this reasoning, it is expected that larger firms, 
which are more likely to have their legitimacy put at risk, also have the highest 
incentive to proactively signal good performance to stakeholders. 
Despite the variations in focus, the argument is ultimately similar throughout: the 
larger the organisation, the more visible are its actions and therefore more 
attention and more scrutiny it is likely to receive from stakeholders (Johnstone 
and Labonne, 2009, Knudsen, 2011, Schembera, 2012). As result of that, larger 
firms are likely to be under greater pressure to conform to society’s expectations 
and demands, and therefore more likely to respond to such pressures in order to 
enhance its legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Firms’ financial performance has also been extensively covered in the literature. 
Several studies also found different metrics of financial performance to have a 
positive and significant relation to CSP (Brammer and Millington, 2004, 
Brammer and Millington, 2008, Greening and Gray, 1994, Chen et al., 2008a). 
Moreover, firm age has been hypothesised as another important factor. This can 
be arguably explained by the concept of imprinting. Imprinting refers to the 
impact that the institutional context can have on organisations when they are 
founded.  As highlighted by Scott (2008), imprinting processes are relevant as 
they tend to become institutionalised and endure as time passes. In a empirical 
study of 123 rehabilitation organisations established in New York, New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania before, during and after the World War II, Kimberly (1975) 
found that while these started mainly as commercial enterprises (i.e. a high 
proportion of their income was derived from production activities), in the latter 
years beliefs and norms supporting these centres started to shift emphasis 
towards the aim of rehabilitation of clients. The study found that 64% of the 
centres founded after 1946 were rehabilitation-oriented, compared to 18% in the 
previous period (Kimberly, 1975). In this regard one can argue that the firm age, 
as a proxy for the time when the company is founded, is an important factor to 
understand organisational behaviour (Scott, 2008). Extrapolating from that, 
younger firms, founded in a time when social and environmental responsibilities 
of businesses were more extensively discussed, would arguably have higher 
levels of corporate social performance. 
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Other factors that have been theorised or found to confound this relationship are, 
for example, characteristics of firm governance (such as board structure, board 
diversity), firm ownership structure, type of product, firm visibility, level of 
innovation, level of internationalisation, among others.  
2.2.5 Individual level  
All individuals are introduced into a pre-existing social structure which, in static 
terms, will determine who one is, depending on when and where one happens 
to be (Jones, 1999). However, over time, actions of individuals feed back into 
the structure and change it (Jones, 1999). In light of this, it has been theorised 
that individual characteristics, notably of those who are in leadership position in 
the firms, can have an impact in firms’ choice of response to institutional 
demands. Institutional demands at this level are arguably mainly associated with 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements. Waldman et al (2006) argue that 
given that managers are largely responsible for the implementation of corporate 
responsibility measures, it is important to understand if corporate responsibility 
values guide their decisions.  
Values are an important mechanism to shape action (Waldman et al., 2006). For 
one thing, studies have found top management awareness and commitment to 
sustainability-related issues to have a significant positive relationship with 
corporate social performance (Greening and Gray, 1994, Muller and Kolk, 2010, 
Weaver et al., 1999). One could argue that the more ingrained these values are 
in an individual behaviour outside of the firm environment, they will find it more 
naturally and taken for granted to also bring them to the company environment, 
responding positively to pressures for higher corporate social performance. 
Different factors were pointed as having an effect on individual perception and 
understanding of issues related to corporate social performance. For one thing, 
studies have theorised that decision makers’ age can influence CSP. The 
rationale is that individuals at a more advanced age have a broader perspective 
of issues and entities that are involved in the decision-making and include 
different constituent groups (Waldman et al., 2006). Individual’s level of 
education was also expected to affect CSP for similar reasons (i.e. higher levels 
of education expected to be associated with broader view of decision making 
aspects) (Waldman et al., 2006).  
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2.3 Summary and next chapters 
In summary, institutions operate at different levels, which Scott (2008) proposes 
to call, for the study of organisations: world system, society, organisational field, 
organisation population, organisation and organisation subsystem. These levels 
range from the macro to the micro level. Institutions at all levels are proposed to 
influence corporate behaviour in general, and corporate social performance in 
particular.  
While specific propositions and hypothesis will be elaborated in each empirical 
chapter, it is important to offer a brief overview of what each chapter will address 
from a theoretical perspective. Chapter four will focus on drivers for firms’ sign 
up to the UNGC. Organised around the regulative/coercive, normative and 
cognitive/mimetic mechanisms, it will explore how these mechanisms influence 
firms’ decision to make a voluntary commitment to the UNGC. This chapter will 
also take into consideration the role of previous CSP and level of economic 
development at firms’ home country as moderators of firms’ decision to join. 
Chapter five builds on chapter four, and goes into greater detail on the decision 
to join, focusing on speed of adoption. This chapter appreciates that coercive, 
normative and mimetic mechanisms may exert different pressures in each 
phase of the institutionalisation of an initiative. For one thing, mimetic pressures 
are proposed to offer a stronger pressure for firms to join in later stages. As the 
institutionalisation of a practice progresses, the decision to adopt it becomes 
more of a requirement than a choice, as normative and cultural pressures reach 
a point where non-adopters risk to be seen as deviants from the norm (Scott, 
2008). In other words, adopting the new practice becomes important in views of 
ensuring legitimacy (Scott, 2008). Conversely, coercive pressures are proposed 
to have greater impact on the early stages of institutionalisation of the initiative, 
when uncertainty in regards to the benefits of participation is greater (Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho, 2011).  
Chapter six goes beyond the decision to join, seeking to understand drivers for 
firms’ performance in the UNGC. It explores under which conditions promises 
made by firms when they join are more likely to be delivered upon. While 
recognising that firms will aim to conform (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to 
dominant practices within their operating environment in order to obtain 
legitimacy and ultimately ensure its survival in the long run (Scott, 2008), it 
recognises that conforming is not the only available choice for organisations 
(Oliver, 1991). In this context, it is proposed that while firms’ choice of 
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substantive or ceremonial engagement after joining an initiative lies within the 
organisation itself, a number of institutional pressures may influence and 
moderate this decision. For one thing, the operating environment may offer 
different incentives and threats for certain behaviour. These variations will 
arguably influence the external cost of decoupling, i.e. the risks associated with 
increasing scrutiny revealing discrepancy between firm’s discourse and action 
(Kim and Lyon, 2012). This is likely to lead to conditions that are more or less 
conducive for decoupling – the higher the external cost, the less interesting it 
may be for firms to engage in ceremonial behaviour, and vice versa. This 
chapter will explore, from an institutional perspective, the factors that have been 
proposed to influence firms’ decision to make a substantive or ceremonial 
commitment at national, industry and firm levels. 
Finally, chapter seven builds on chapter six, and focuses on the relationship 
between sign up and firms’ corporate social performance. It explores the extent 
to which firms’ motivation to join and characteristics of the initiative may impact 
firm performance in the UNGC. For one thing, following neo-intuitional theory, it 
proposes that early adopters, do so in views of achieving improved performance 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or fulfilling a specific need or interest (Scott, 2008), 
and therefore are more likely to display higher performance improvements on 
the standards or principles they adopted (Naveh et al., 2004, Yin and 
Schmeidler, 2009, Delmas and Montes-­‐‑Sancho, 2010). Conversely, late 
adopters are proposed to be more guided by the aim of ensuring legitimacy 
(Scott, 2008, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and therefore are more likely to 
display a tendency to decoupling. This chapter also explores characteristics of 
the initiative that may be more or less effective in leading firms to display 
substantive commitment.  
However, before the empirical chapters, chapter two will offer a review of the 
state of the art of the literature on CSP, and voluntary CSR initiatives. The next 
chapter starts with a brief outline of corporate social performance and voluntary 
regulatory initiatives. The second section covers the literature on the motivations 
for joining such voluntary initiatives. Following this, the third section reviews the 
literature on the impacts of voluntary CSR initiatives on firm behaviour. Finally, 
the fourth section presents the research agenda that guides this thesis.  
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3 Chapter 2: Literature Review  
3.1 Introduction 
The nature and extent of business’ responsibilities to society have long been 
debated in academic, policy, and practitioner fields (Blasco and Zolner, 2010, 
Jenkins, 2005). As businesses have become larger and more multinational, 
approaches to understanding and ensuring business accountability to society 
have necessarily become more complex and challenging (Lodge and Wilson, 
2006, Utting, 2002). In addition, the globalised world has seen increasing 
involvement of private actors – corporations included – in the development and 
implementation of rules in policy areas that have once been primarily under 
government’s responsibility, suggesting a shift in global business regulation from 
state-centric towards new multilateral and non-territorial forms of regulation, with 
the participation of private and non-governmental actors (Scherer et al., 2006).  
This thesis explores the role of voluntary forms of regulation, specifically the 
UNGC, in influencing firms’ corporate social performance. Despite their 
economic success and apparent power, companies have been often accused of 
several social and environmental problems, including environmental pollution, 
labour rights abuse, erosion of democracy, corruption, and others (Waddock, 
2008), underlining their vulnerability to lapses in regards to social and 
environmental issues. While globalisation may have increased corporate access 
to markets and lower production costs, and allowed multinational firms to 
impose trade conditions on less powerful actors, globalisation has also 
contributed to increased levels of scrutiny over business activities (Knox and 
Maklan, 2004) creating limits to their power. Given the absence of a global 
governance structure able to ensure that businesses are accountable and 
socially and environmentally responsible, “a largely voluntary corporate 
responsibility infrastructure has emerged that is reshaping companies’ 
responses to these issues and fostering wholly new practices and behaviours 
(Waddock, 2008: 87)”. These new institutions foster a multi-bottom-line 
approach, supporting the inclusion of social, environmental and stakeholder 
concerns into the business model (Waddock, 2008). In the long run, it is 
expected that these “new rules of the game” reframe the conditions for 
companies to ensure their legitimacy and acceptance as social actors (Waddock, 
2008).  
This chapter, provides a critical evaluation of research that seeks to understand 
the role and impacts of voluntary forms of corporate regulation in relation to 
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firms’ social and environmental performance. Such voluntary forms of regulation 
are increasingly popular, but evidence on firms’ motivations for participating in 
them, and their impacts on socially desirable outcomes are unclear. The review 
is structured into the following sections. The first section briefly outlines the key 
concepts of the thesis – corporate social performance and voluntary regulatory 
initiatives. The second section then explores the motivations for joining such 
voluntary initiatives, distinguishing between firms’ motivations and contextual 
elements driving sign up and between early and late joining. The third section 
examines research that evaluates the impacts of voluntary regulatory forms on 
firm behaviour and outcomes. Finally, the fourth section reflects on the previous 
discussions to develop a research agenda that identifies key gaps in existing 
knowledge.  
3.2 Corporate Social Performance and Voluntary CSR 
Initiatives 
This section situates the subsequent analysis by defining and delineating the 
key concepts addressed in this thesis.  
3.2.1 Corporate Social Performance (CSP) 
A plethora of concepts are used to define the relationship between business and 
society: corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship, corporate 
responsibility, and corporate social performance, among others. Sethi (1975:58) 
already expressed concern over this lack of clarity over 30 years ago, saying 
that “corporate social responsibility has been used in so many ways that it has 
lost all meaning” and “devoid of an internal structure and content, it has come to 
mean all things to all people”. Sethi (1975) worried that this could allow different 
social actors to manipulate the concept and its operationalisation according to 
their own interests and agendas. 
Although there is not a universal definition of CSP, the majority of the definitions 
seem to involve a concept whereby companies seek to voluntarily understand 
and integrate social and environmental concerns into its operations, and in their 
relation with their stakeholders (Reverte, 2009). In order to choose a definition, a 
methodology informed by that used by Dahlsrud (2008) was applied. As a first 
step, definitions of CSP were collected through a literature review. Following this, 
CSP definitions were analysed and four key themes that underlie this concept 
were identified, namely: 
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Table 2: Key themes of CSP 
Key themes identified Explanation Selected articles 
COMBINATION OF 
PRINCIPLES + 
PROCESSES + POLICIES 
CSP combines principles of social 
responsibility, processes that will 
guide the approach to enact 
corporate responsibility and policies 
that will provide the method to 
operationalise corporate response 
to social issues.   
(See for example: Wood, 
1991b, Wood and Jones, 
1995, Wartick and Cochran, 
1985) 
COMPREHENSIVENESS  
CSP is comprehensive, it is an 
aggregation of different actions, it is 
multi stakeholder and multi issue. 
(Carroll, 2000, Luo and 
Bhattacharya, 2009, Muller 
and Kolk, 2010, Waddock 
and Graves, 1997) 
CONCERN WITH 
STAKEHOLDERS 
The company’s relationship with its 
stakeholders is very important and 
should be considered. 
(Wood, 1991b, Wood and 
Jones, 1995, Carroll, 2000, 
Husted, 2000) 
FOCUS ON OUTCOME 
There is a major concern with the 
outcome of the 
principles/policies/processes; 
Concerns are expressed in relation 
to the company’s social impact. 
(See for example: Wood, 
1991b, Wood and Jones, 
1995, Clarkson, 1995, 
Schuler and Cording, 2006, 
Waddock and Graves, 1997) 
 
A new review of the definitions indicated that the one that more broadly covers 
all these issues is that proposed by Wood, in her paper Corporate Social 
Performance Revisited: (Wood, 1991a: 692): “a business organization's 
configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social 
responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they 
relate to the firm's societal relationships.” A verification of number of citations (as 
noted by Google Scholar) reiterated the relevance of the article, which had as of 
July 21st 2014, 3359 citations6.  
Although Wood’s definition may seem to be too broad, it needs to be so if CSP 
is to be applicable globally and across different industries. Keeping the definition 
broad and setting the study limitations on the scope of what will be reviewed 
seems the most appropriate option. In addition, this definition serves the 
purpose of this study, i.e. it offers an interesting framework to advance the 
understanding of what drives corporate engagement in CSP and how this 
engagement varies depending on the context in which the company exists and 
operates. This definition arguably covers why company engage (principles), how 
                                                
6 Having established that, it is important to highlight that articles that use “sister” concepts have also been 
used in this research. Precisely because of the challenges just mentioned, a review that did not consider these 
other definitions would arguably not offer a clear picture of the state of the art of the CSP literature. 
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they engage (processes) and how this engagement is translated into practice 
(outcomes). 
3.2.1.1.1 CSP Dimensions 
As with definitions, the literature does not offer a clear description of which 
issues constitute the dimensions of CSP (van Beurden and Gossling, 2008). 
Blowfield (2005) makes a distinction between “negotiable” and “non-negotiable” 
values to advance the argument that corporate responsibility has promoted 
change solely in areas where business were willing to negotiate over. Although 
this argument can be to some extent extreme, in that it does not seem to fully 
acknowledge the potential of some social actors to influence corporate 
behaviour, it contributes to build understanding on the power struggles involved 
in defining these areas of responsibility.  
Porter and Kramer (2006) argue that no one business can solve all society’s 
problems, and therefore, firms should choose social issues in which to engage 
based on whether it presents an opportunity to share value (i.e. create benefits 
for both business and society), rather than looking at how worthy a cause is. 
The authors suggest that social issues affecting society falls into three main 
categories: generic social issues, which although may be relevant to society, do 
not particularly affect or are affected by the firm’s activities; value chain social 
impacts, i.e. social issues that are significantly affected by a firm’s activities (an 
inside-out view); and social dimensions of competitive context, i.e. social issues 
that can significantly affect the firm’s operations (an outside-in view). Porter and 
Kramer (2006) say that firms should understand and rank its social issues, and 
concentrate on the ones that have a direct link to its operations. Jenkins (2005) 
adds a geographical concern, arguing that the fact that corporate responsibility 
today has been largely driven by players from Northern countries has an 
important impact on the choice of issues that will have a more prominent role. 
Authors’ choice of issues and/or stakeholders to be studied seems often to be 
made on the basis of convenience, most often depending on the issues covered 
by the dataset used. Along with data availability, another explanation for this 
could be the fact that issues may change across different industries (Carroll, 
1979), place of operation, company size, among other factors. Carroll (1979: 
501) says “it is partly for this reason that the "issues" approach to examining 
business and society relationships gave way to managerial approaches that are 
more concerned with developing or specifying generalized modes of response 
to all social issues that become significant to a firm”. A study by Peloza (2009) 
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illustrates this challenge, pointing out that a review of 159 studies on the 
business case for CSP indicated a number of different metrics to measure CSP. 
The author (Peloza, 2009) adds that the most used metric was applied in only 
18% of the studies, suggesting significant inconsistency in previous research. 
Despite this diversity, there seems to be some convergence in the choice of 
themes. The summary below suggests that some issues and stakeholders were 
more prominent in this review, namely employees/minority relations/diversity, 
community, corporate giving, ethics and the environment.  
Table 3: Key dimensions of CSP 
Issue/Stakeholder Selected Art icles 
Labour/ Employees / Minority 
relations / Diversity 
(Cox et al., 2004, Brammer et al., 2006, David et al., 2007, 
Dentchev, 2004, Carroll, 2000, Albinger and Freeman, 2000, 
Wood and Jones, 1995, Coffey and Fryxell, 1991, Kuntz et 
al., 1980, Lerner and Fryxell, 1988, Van Buren, 2005) 
Community (Cox et al., 2004, Brammer et al., 2006, David et al., 2007, 
Wood and Jones, 1995, Cohn, 1970) 
Corporate Giving (Albinger and Freeman, 2000, Brammer and Millington, 2004, 
Brammer and Millington, 2008, Carroll, 2000, Coffey and 
Fryxell, 1991, Cohn, 1970, Gao, 2009, Lerner and Fryxell, 
1988, Levy and Shatto, 1978, Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009) 
Environment (Cox et al., 2004, Brammer et al., 2006, David et al., 2007, 
Dentchev, 2004, Carroll, 2000, Albinger and Freeman, 2000, 
Wood and Jones, 1995) 
Ethics / Values (Sims, 2009, Weaver et al., 1999, Alas, 2006, Blodgett et al., 
2001, Spicer et al., 2004, Wood and Jones, 1995, Slater and 
Dixon-Fowler, 2009, Beekun et al., 2003, Martin et al., 2007) 
Transparency / Disclosure (Wood and Jones, 1995, Reverte, 2009, Reid and Toffel, 
2009) 
Customer / Consumer / Product 
quality and safety 
(David et al., 2007, Wood and Jones, 1995) 
Governance (Wood and Jones, 1995) 
Legal / Regulatory aspects (Gao, 2009, Wood and Jones, 1995) 
Economic aspects (Gao, 2009) 
 
This is aligned with previous findings in the literature. In a study covering 25 
countries where respondents had to indicate areas where companies should be 
hold accountable for, the domains of labour, human rights and the environment 
emerged most prominently than other areas (Environics, 2000 cited by Arthaud-
Day, 2005). Muller and Kolk (2010: 10) add that the “three domains that emerge 
from the literature as the most commonly measured dimensions of CSP are 
environmental performance, community relations, and labour relations”. It is 
interesting to remark that labour, human rights, philanthropy and the 
environment are also topics proposed in the framework of major practitioner 
initiatives, such as the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) and the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
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This thesis will focus on the four issue areas proposed by the UNGC, namely: 
human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption. This is not only 
necessary – to fulfil the aim of exploring corporate behaviour in this initiative – 
but also aligned with prominent issues in the literature on CSP, as discussed 
above. 
3.2.2 Voluntary CSR initiatives 
In the realm of CSP, voluntary CSR initiatives are an important phenomenon. 
The past couple of decades have seen an important rise in the number of such 
initiatives, and on firms’ interest in joining them (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010, 
Perez-Batres et al., 2012a). CSR voluntary initiatives codify a group of rules, 
roles and expectations that are of public interest, such as for example, care for 
the environment, human rights, labour rights, among others (Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2010). Such initiatives aim at governing firm behaviour in these 
areas (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010) and hold firms accountable for their 
actions creating transparency (Rasche, 2009b).  
By joining such initiatives, firms are signalling to their stakeholders their 
commitment and alignment with certain standards, addressing public concerns 
(Perkins and Neumayer, 2010). Adoption of such standards or guidelines may 
help firms respond to public concerns, reduce the information asymmetry 
between the firm and its stakeholders (Perez-Batres et al., 2012a), ultimately 
increasing its legitimacy. At the same time, it may help firms improve internal 
efficiency and/or that of their supply chains, for example by providing the basis 
for monitoring and verification of suppliers’ CSR standards (Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2010). 
3.2.2.1 From values to standards: different formats of voluntary CSR initiatives 
Leipziger (2010) proposes that voluntary CSR initiatives can be placed in a 
continuum from values, to principles, to codes of conduct, to norms and finally to 
standards. She provides useful definitions that help clarify what each type of 
voluntary CSR initiative entails: 
Table 4: Definitions of voluntary CSR initiatives (Leipziger, 2010: 38) 
Type Definition 
Value “Any object or quality desirable as a means or as an end in itself [American 
College Dictionary 1970]” 
Principle “Fundamental truth or law as the basis of reasoning or action; a personal 
code of conduct [Concise Oxford Dictionary 1995]” 
Code of conduct “A set of rules [Concise Oxford Dictionary 1995]” or a “formal statement of 
the values and business practices of a corporation. A code may be a short 
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mission statement, or it may be a sophisticated document that requires 
compliance with articulated standards and have a complicated 
enforcement mechanism [www.codesofconduct.org]” 
Norm “Model or pattern [American College Dictionary 1970]; norms tend to be 
internationally agreed” 
Standard “An authoritative model or measure, a pattern for guidance, by comparison 
with which the quality, excellence, correctness, etc. of other things (…) 
may be determined [American College Dictionary 1970]; or a set of 
principles, code of conduct or process system established by a third party 
whereby adoption of tat standard leads to a prescribed level of 
performance being achieved [Smith 2002:21]”. 
 
Codes of conduct are generally specific to a firm or to an industry (Leipziger, 
2010). When drawn by companies, they can vary significantly across firms in 
terms of how specific their requirements are or how they monitor compliance 
(Preuss, 2010). A relevant example of a firm-level code is Shell’s Business 
Principle. The document defines the firm’s position in relation to a number of 
issues, including integrity, health and safety, environment, community relations, 
competition among others (Leipziger, 2010). Codes of conduct, however, may 
also be developed at the industry level, often by industry associations aiming to 
providing guidance to its members on material issues (Preuss, 2010). Standards, 
on the other hand, are generally developed through consensus with multiple 
stakeholders, and by definition should generate a uniform output across 
adopting firms (Leipziger, 2010). Examples of standards are the ISO 
certifications, such as the ISO14001. Different formats of voluntary CSR 
initiatives have therefore different values and uses for firms, and often what can 
be observed is that firms may engage in a range of initiatives, from a firm code 
of conduct to a global standard (Preuss, 2010). 
3.2.2.2 Voluntary CSR initiatives: variations in the nature of a diverse universe 
Voluntary CSR initiatives may vary not only in the format, as discussed above, 
but also in several other ways. First, they vary according to their scope – i.e. 
they may concentrate on economic, social or environmental performance, or a 
combination of these three issue areas (Rasche, 2009b), covering one or a 
number of different issues (Leipziger, 2010). For example, while ISO14001 
focuses on environmental management, the UNGC also includes firms’ 
commitments in the social arena. The table below offers some examples: 
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Table 5: Voluntary CSR initiatives: different scopes and examples (built from Leipziger, 
2010) 
Issue Example of voluntary CSR initiative that 
addresses said issue 
Corporate governance OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
Anti-corruption OECD Convention on Countering Bribery 
Business Principles for Countering Bribery  
UNGC 
Environment Ceres Principles 
The Natural Step 
UNGC 
ISO14001 
Labour ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy  
Social Accountability 8000 
UNGC 
Human rights UNGC 
Health ILO Code of Practice on HIV/AIDS and the 
World of Work 
 
They may also be differentiated based on the mechanisms they support, namely 
policy – if they bring principles that work as an initial step for dialogue (Rasche, 
2009b), such as the UNGC for example; accounting and auditing – if they are 
more narrowly defined and based on the measurement of predefined data, often 
with independent verification (Rasche, 2009b), such as the ISO14000, for 
example; or still reporting – if they offer a framework for the disclosure of social, 
environmental and economic information (Rasche, 2009b), such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), for example. 
They may also be distinguished by the stakeholders at the heart of the initiative 
(for example, workers, suppliers, customers, among others) (Leipziger, 2003, 
Leipziger, 2010). For one thing, SA8000 focuses on employees, while the Base 
Code of the Ethical Trade Initiative focuses on suppliers (Leipziger, 2010). 
These initiatives also vary in regards to their focus, i.e. focus on process 
(method) and/or performance (outcomes). While the former defines the 
procedures that should be followed by the firm (for example, how firms should 
report on its social management), the latter helps define what are the minimum 
accepted standards for responsible corporate behaviour (for example, firms 
should not use child labour) (Leipziger, 2010).  
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Finally initiatives may also be distinguished by the way they were developed, i.e. 
uni-, bi- or multilaterally (Leipziger, 2003). While unilateral codes are the ones 
developed by a specific firm (for example, the Shell Business Principles), 
bilateral codes are the ones agreed between two parties (for example, the IKEA 
Framework Agreement), and multilateral or multi-stakeholder codes are the 
ones whose development involves negotiations across a network of 
organisations (for example, the ISO26000 has been developed multilaterally, 
with the involvement of representatives from governments, industry, NGOs, 
labour organisations among others) (Leipziger, 2010). 
One should not forget to highlight that voluntary CSR initiatives may also be 
industry-specific or region-specific. Firms in different industries are faced with 
similar sustainability issues and as a result may develop initiatives tailored to 
address them (Leipziger, 2010). An example of this is the Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights, which was developed by the extractive sector in 
cooperation with multiple stakeholders (ibid). Equally, firms active in the same 
geographical region may also face similar challenges and seek specific 
initiatives to address them. An example of the latter is the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Co-operation Code of Business Conduct (Leipziger, 2010).  
This diversity of focuses and elements illustrates the existence of a plethora of 
standards, norms, guidelines, codes and the likes in the field of CSR, with 
different objectives, levels of stringency, focus and applicability. Arguably the 
most prominent in this group are the so-called global standards, which have 
been named as such for they are designed to be implemented anywhere in the 
world (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010). In the context of a globalised world, global 
initiatives tend to be particularly useful for firms given their universality 
(Leipziger, 2010). 
There are several examples of voluntary CSR initiatives at the global level. The 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are a relevant example, being 
one of the most comprehensive voluntary CSR initiatives given the wide range 
of issues it addresses (Leipziger, 2010). The Guidelines cover issues such as 
labour and industrial relations, human rights, environment, transparency, anti-
corruption, consumer interest, as well as topics that are not always much the 
focus of CSP initiatives such as technology, competition and taxation (OECD, 
2015, Leipziger, 2010). The Global Reporting Initiative is also a widely know 
voluntary CSR initiative at the global level. It offers a framework for reporting on 
economic, social and environmental issues, helping business communicate on 
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key sustainability issues (Leipziger, 2010, GRI, 2015). Another example is the 
ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development, launched by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1991. This Charter covers a total 
of 16 principles that aim at making the environment a priority for firms (Leipziger, 
2010). One of the most prominent examples of voluntary CSR initiative at the 
global level is, however, the United Nations Global Compact. More details on 
this initiative are provided on the next section. 
3.2.2.3 The United Nations Global Compact 
The UNGC is a prominent example of an international CSR initiative, being 
considered the largest one in the world (Arevalo et al., 2013). Participation has 
grown significantly over time, from 42 firms when the initiative was launched in 
2000, to 8,000 business participants from 145 countries globally (UNGC, 2013h). 
This section will provide some background information on the UNGC. 
How did the UNGC emerge? 
In 1999, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, gave a milestone speech at 
the World Economic Forum in Davos (Rasche and Kell, 2010, McIntosh et al., 
2004b). In this speech, Annan invited businesses to “initiate a Global Compact 
of shared values and principles, which will give a human face to the global 
market” (UN, 1999). The speech had a strong positive response from 
businesses and governments alike and in July 2000, after gathering the support 
of NGOs, labour organisations and several UN agencies, the United Nations 
Global Compact (UNGC) was formally launched in New York (Rasche and Kell, 
2010). 
Important changes had to happen in the relationship between businesses and 
the UN, and ideologies had to be overcome, for the UNGC to be able to exist 
and succeed in its current form (Rasche and Kell, 2010). In the 1950s the UN 
adopted a posture of distance from business as the Cold War context required 
impartiality towards both market and planned economy nations (Therien and 
Pouliot, 2006). In the 1960s, the UN’s attitude turned into animosity towards 
business, and the institution established a regulatory approach towards the 
private sector (Therien and Pouliot, 2006). In late 1980s, the end of the Cold 
War and the increasing process of globalisation, combined with the rise of neo-
liberalism, generated major changes in the UN’s operating environment (Utting, 
2001, Witte and Reinicke, 2005). To our present interest, there was growing 
recognition that business could also be part of the solution for many of the 
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development issues the UN aimed at tackling (McIntosh et al., 2003). The UN 
began a process of opening to non-state stakeholders (Witte and Reinicke, 
2005); in a format known as “complex multilateralism” the UN started promoting 
partnerships with non-state actors, especially from the private sector (Utting, 
2001). It was in this context that the UNGC emerged. 
What is the UNGC? 
The UNGC is a strategic policy initiative aimed at engaging businesses in the 
mainstreaming of ten universally accepted principles into business practices, 
and in supporting UN goals (UNGC, 2013f). 
Table 6: The ten principles of the UNGC 
 
The UNGC offers firms a platform for the development, implementation and 
reporting of responsible and sustainable corporate policies and practices. 
The UNGC currently is the largest CSR initiative in the world (Arevalo et al., 
2013). Participation has grown significantly over time, from 42 firms when the 
initiative was launched in 2000, to over 12,000 participants, including more than 
8,000 businesses from 145 countries globally (UNGC, 2013h). Firms whishing to 
participate commit to the 10 UNGC principles (Bernhagen et al., 2012). These 
!
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enjoy global consensus and are based on the following UN conventions: The 
Universal Declarations of Human Rights (Principles 1 and 2), The International 
Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work (Principles 3 to 6), The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(Principles 7 to 9) and The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(Principle 10) (Arevalo et al., 2013). Participants also commit to support UN 
goals and issues. 
Becoming a participant 
To become a participant, firms need to send a letter of commitment to the 
UNGC, signed by the chief executive or equivalent, and addressed to the UN 
Secretary-General (UNGC, 2013e). To maintain participant status, firms are 
required to submit an annual communication on progress (COP), reporting on 
their progress in implementing the commitments it made to the UNGC. Finally, 
firms are asked to make a regular annual financial contribution to the UNGC, 
which is proportional to the annual sales or revenues (UNGC, 2013e). 
Benefits for participation are varied. The UNGC highlights the following: 
opportunity to adopt an established and globally recognised framework for the 
management of ESG issues; participate in a platform to the sharing of best 
practices for common challenges; access to the UN’s knowledge in 
sustainability issues and to the UNGC’s tools and resources; opportunity to 
engage in sustainability solution in partnership with several business and non-
business stakeholders; finally, the opportunity to engage the firm’s value chain 
in sustainability efforts, through the UNGC’s local networks (UNGC, 2013e). 
One could argue that benefits are both related to legitimacy (for example, 
adopting a globally recognised framework based on universally accepted 
principles) and efficiency (for example, access to the UN’s and UNGC’s 
knowledge, tools and resources), catering for different motivations and drivers. 
The appeal of the benefits for becoming a participant is arguably reflected in the 
growing number of firms joining the initiative every year. 
Change through learning, leadership and accountability with integrity measures 
in place 
The UNGC, however, aims not only at expanding its participant’s base but also 
at influencing participants’ behaviour in regards to the commitments they sign up 
for. The UNGC’s change model is based on the fundamental idea that through 
dialogue and partnership projects firms can demonstrate responsibility and learn 
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from all actors involved (Rasche, 2009a). Through learning and dialogue events 
and partnership projects, the initiative aims at engaging firms and their 
stakeholders in discussion, development and implementation of solutions to 
sustainability challenges, as well as in the sharing of best practices and the 
building of relationships and trust (Rasche, 2009a). At the national/local level, 
the UNGC networks help to translate the principles into the local context and 
promote learning amongst participants in light of firms’ on-the-ground reality 
(Rasche, 2009a).  
In addition to these learning and leadership elements, transparency and 
accountability through disclosure of progress is also an important element of 
influencing behaviour. While this is not without shortcomings - it has been 
acknowledged that the overall quality of the COPs needs improvement (Rasche 
and Kell, 2010), for example - it arguably fosters a social vetting mechanism 
(Rasche, 2009a), providing the means for stakeholders to monitor participants’ 
performance, and ultimately exert pressure on them for committed 
implementation of the principles.  
Finally, the UNGC has integrity measures in place to try to curb opportunistic 
behaviour. For one thing, participants are required to demonstrate 
implementation of the principles through an annual report called communication 
on progress (COP). Firms are required to submit a COP within one year from 
becoming a participant, and a new COP every year after that. Firms that fail to 
meet the deadlines are subject to sanctions. Failing the first deadline puts them 
into non-communicating status; those not submitting a report for a second year 
are expelled from the initiative. 
Why does it make a relevant case for this thesis? 
A number of reasons make the UNGC a relevant case study for this work, 
namely: 
1. The UNGC is the largest voluntary CSR initiative in the world, gathering 
over 12,000 participants, including more than 8,000 businesses from 145 
countries. It gathers an enormous variety of firm sizes, industries, and 
nationalities, making it a truly global and diverse CSR initiative, and 
offering a unique universe to work with in exploring the phenomenon of 
voluntary CSR initiatives as a new way of governing corporate behaviour. 
It offers a unique opportunity to study this diverse universe and arguably 
none would offer such a large universe to work with. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 73 
2. The UNGC, on its spotlight position as the largest CSR initiative in the 
world and the one backed by the UN, is watched closely by supporters 
and critics of this model of decentralised institutions through voluntary 
CSR initiatives. Arguably its success or failure may have an impact on 
this model as a whole. Therefore, knowledge on aspects that make the 
initiative more or less effective in attracting firms and getting them to 
abide to the commitments made, is very valuable for both academics 
and practitioners. 
3. Despite growing levels of sign up and interest in the UNGC, pressing 
questions remain open in the literature, notably in regards to drivers for 
joining and performance.  
4. The UNGC is an UN-led initiative. Having the backing of the UN arguably 
grants the initiative a legitimacy from the on-set that other voluntary CSR 
initiatives may not have been able to offer in their early days. In addition, 
the UNGC is based on principles, rather than codes or standards, and is 
designed as a leadership platform (Rasche and Kell, 2010). All this 
makes the UNGC a unique example of voluntary CSR initiative, which is 
worth exploring further. 
 
3.3 To what extent institutional forces shape firm’s 
decision and timing to join voluntary CSR 
initiatives/the UNGC? 
Voluntary CSR initiatives may take different forms but they all aim to influence 
firms’ behaviour to achieve higher corporate social and environmental 
performance. The literature has theorised about reasons for firms’ decision to 
join such voluntary initiatives.  
3.3.1 Firms’ motivations driving the decision to join 
In regards to motivations to adopt an initiative, the literature is largely 
characterised by two approaches. The first builds on the rational actor model, 
and proposes that an organisation adopts a new practice in views of achieving 
efficiencies and improved economic performance (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983, 
Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). The other focuses on the social embeddedness of 
organisations and the importance of their institutional environmental in shaping 
their decision (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983, Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). Here the 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 74 
emphasis is the firm’s search for legitimacy, for approval from its stakeholders 
(Bansal and Bogner, 2002). 
3.3.1.1 Voluntary CSR initiatives’ role in conferring legitimacy 
As stated by Perez-Bastres et al (2011: 845) “If the organisation wishes to 
enhance its won legitimacy in an organisational field where SD [sustainable 
development] issues have become more salient and tied to survivability, then it 
would make good sense to sign or ally with another organisation that has an 
already established and legitimised SD charter or mandate (e.g. the UNGC)”. 
Engagement in voluntary CSR initiatives can signal to stakeholders the firm’s 
commitment to progressive sustainability practices, going beyond legislation 
(Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011, Potoski and Prakash, 2005a). This gesture 
may generate in return goodwill from its stakeholders and ultimately ensure 
legitimacy (Potoski and Prakash, 2005a). An external endorsement of legitimacy 
may then lead to an increase of flow of resources to the firm, which may take a 
number of forms (Doh et al., 2010). In their relationship with regulators, for 
example, firms may find that adoption of a voluntary practice may contribute to 
fewer controls and monitoring, banks and insurers may see participation as 
reducing the risks of environmental incidents, among others (Potoski and 
Prakash, 2005a). All of these have the potential to make a positive contribution 
for the firm survival in the long run.  
The signalling and consequent legitimising value of such initiatives may be 
limited though, depending on context (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). For 
example, where stakeholders mistrust the actual capacity of the initiative at 
hand to effectively improve CSP, the initiative’s power to confer legitimacy may 
be at stake (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). The UNGC, even if not having 
the mandate or the resources to monitor and control participants’ performance, 
has been criticised for not imposing enough controls on firms after these join 
(Mueckenberger and Jastram, 2010).  
3.3.1.2 Voluntary CSR initiatives’ role in increasing efficiency 
On another vein, it has been theorised that voluntary CSR initiatives may 
increase firm efficiency in a number of ways. For one thing, it has been 
proposed that voluntary environmental standards such as ISO14001 may 
contribute to improved environment performance (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011), which may arguably be associated with a reduction in costs (Potoski and 
Prakash, 2005a). Such standard may also contribute to avoid damaging impact 
(for example by reducing environmental liability) due to better management 
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systems in place (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). As highlighted by Bansal 
and Bogner (2002) another key economic benefit of joining a voluntary CSR 
initiative is the ability to sell to customers that require for example, 
environmental management certification. While his example focus on ISO14001, 
there are also examples of the use of the UNGC to manage sustainability in the 
supply chain. For one thing, Schneider Electric7 has been working with its 
suppliers since 2004 in supporting them to publicly commit to and implement the 
UNGC principles. 
More specifically in regards to the UNGC one cannot refrain from mentioning the 
learning element of the initiative. The UNGC aims at providing a learning space 
for participants, which is enacted through dialogue and the sharing of best 
practices on forums organised by the UNGC or its supporters (Rasche, 2009a). 
The UNGC often produces publications with best practices (Rasche, 2009a, 
Mueckenberger and Jastram, 2010) which are widely available. This learning 
process could arguably result in improved practices and efficiency amongst 
participating firms in regards to the management of sustainability issues. 
While these arguments are compelling, there is also controversy in that. Melnyk 
et al (2003) argue that the decision to become ISO14001 certified constitutes a 
dilemma for many American firms, because while it promises to reduce 
environmental related costs and improve processes, the costs and benefits 
associated with it remain difficult to predict. Bansal and Bogner (2002) point that 
even within the same firm benefits obtained from ISO14001 may be mixed. 
Citing the example of Jutras division of the Meridian Magnesium Inc., the 
authors point that while the company reported savings of almost $2 million 
following a $45,000 investment on a ISO14001 certified EMS, similar projects 
within the same company yielded shy or no results in the form of savings 
(Bansal and Bogner, 2002). On a similar line, the UNGC has been criticised for 
having principles that are too broad and therefore difficult to implement, as they 
do not provide clear guidance on the expected conduct for each principle 
(Rasche, 2009a). This criticism has raised questions on the UNGC’s capacity to 
actually lead to improved practices within firms. 
3.3.2 Context driving the decision to join 
Voluntary CSR initiatives have different requirements, which makes for varied 
costs for participation. Becoming ISO14001 certified, for example, imposes high 
                                                
7 http://www.schneider-electric.com/sites/corporate/en/group/sustainable-development-and-
foundation/social-commitments/social-commitments.page 
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costs on firms (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011) in preparing for certification, 
being certified and maintaining the required documentation afterwards. In the 
case of the UNGC, while the actual cost of joining is arguably low (send a letter 
to the UN offices in New York), the costs of maintaining participant status may 
be higher (producing an annual report on progress and making an annual 
financial contribution to the initiative). 
Besides the direct financial costs of joining a voluntary CSR initiative (or 
maintaining participant status), it is also necessary to consider the self-imposed 
controls that stem from the act of joining (Bennie et al., 2007). The UNGC, for 
example, while not actively verifying and monitoring participant performance, 
arguably imposes some restrictions on corporate behaviour by disclosing 
participant’s commitment to the initiative. This commitment, as well as 
participants’ communication on progress, are openly available so relevant 
stakeholders can use these to hold participants accountable for their CSP. Other 
initiatives, such as the ISO14001, offer more direct control of firms’ actions, 
through certification. 
Therefore, while the costs of joining voluntary CSR initiatives are quite concrete, 
the actual benefits remain uncertain. Yet, several firms decide to join voluntary 
CSR initiatives every year. It is arguably necessary to look within and also 
beyond the boundaries of the firm to fully understand corporate behaviour in this 
regard. The literature has proposed that some characteristics of the firm, its 
industry and its environment may increase pressures and benefits for firms to 
join voluntary CSR initiatives. Bansal and Bogner (2002) propose four relevant 
contexts that may encourage firms to become ISO 14001 certified: firms in 
highly polluting industries, those exposed to a high degree of internationalisation 
(either through exports or subsidiaries), firms engaged in a broad network of 
stakeholder relationships and firms in industries with high levels of adoption of a 
standard will all have higher incentives to adopt such standard. Building on their 
work, one can argue that the following elements may influence firms’ decision to 
join voluntary CSR initiatives in general and the UNGC in particular: 
3.3.2.1 Cleaning your act or shouting your credentials 
Firms belonging to industries known for its high environmental impact are 
arguably subject to greater stakeholder scrutiny, and therefore are under greater 
pressure to demonstrate alignment with societal goals and attention to these 
matters (Bansal and Bogner, 2002). Such firms may face real losses if their 
customers or other stakeholders pull back support for them due to poor (real or 
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perceived) sustainability performance (Bansal and Bogner, 2002). These firms, 
therefore, find their legitimacy to be more at risk, as well as their economic 
interests, and as a result, have greater incentives to engage in voluntary CSR 
initiatives to signal to stakeholders their commitment and willingness to address 
such issues. This proposition has been confirmed by a number of studies. For 
example, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2010) and Bennie et al (2007) found that 
firms in the extractive industry are more likely to join the UNGC than firms from 
other industries. Similarly, Perez-Bastres et al (2012a) demonstrated that 
belonging to a highly polluting industry was positively associated with firm sign 
up to self-regulatory codes of conduct. Conversely, firms in “cleaner industries” 
or high sustainability performers may arguably have greater incentives to join 
such initiatives as a mean to display their good deeds and increase legitimacy in 
the eyes of stakeholders. 
3.3.2.2 Dealing with global supply chains 
Secondly, it is proposed that engagement in voluntary CSR initiatives may “ease 
globalisation” (Bansal and Bogner, 2002). Where there is significant physical, 
social, cultural and institutional distance between the firm and elements of its 
supply chain, information asymmetry tends to be higher, potentially leading to 
lack of trust and inefficiencies (King et al., 2005, Tambunlertchai et al., 2013). In 
those cases, the need for a “green passport” or a mean to show responsible 
behaviour that is generally recognised as legitimate – such as an international 
voluntary CSR initiative - may help fill in the information gap between the parts 
(Bansal and Bogner, 2002, Tambunlertchai et al., 2013). As a result, firms in a 
highly globalised supply chain may have greater incentives to join voluntary 
CSR initiatives.  
More specifically, firms may need “sustainability credentials” to be able to trade 
with some international customers (Bansal and Bogner, 2002, Tambunlertchai et 
al., 2013, Neumayer and Perkins, 2004). In a study of adoption of ISO14001, for 
example, King et al (2005) found that the greater the physical distance between 
a firm and its buyers, the greatest the likelihood of these firms to become 
certified. Bansal and Bogner (2002) mention the example of Bahia Sul Celulose. 
This was the first firm to be ISO14001 certified in Brazil, in anticipation of 
certification requirements expected from its European customers.  
Equally, highly internationalised firms may find voluntary CSR initiatives useful 
to coordinate their own sustainability approach across subsidiaries (Bansal and 
Bogner, 2002) and suppliers, protecting the firm against environmental and 
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reputation liabilities (Neumayer and Perkins, 2004). In a study of the adoption of 
ISO14001 by firms in Thailand, Tambunlertchai et al (2013) found that firms that 
receive foreign direct investment (FDI) are more likely to become ISO14001 
certified. This was even more acute for Thai firms receiving FDI from more 
stringent regulatory environments (i.e. OECD countries) and environments 
where ISO14001 is valued (i.e. countries with a high number of certified facilities) 
(Tambunlertchai et al., 2013). Bansal and Bogner (2002) also point to the 
example of Ford Motor Company – the firm has adopted worldwide certification 
for its operations, which has proved a good system to coordinate Ford’s global 
efforts. 
One may argue that different types of international voluntary CSR initiatives may 
provide different benefits in the form of “sustainability credentials”. If the key 
challenge relates to information asymmetry and controlling suppliers and other 
elements of a lengthy and/or globalised supply chain, one could point that 
initiatives which offer some third party control – for example, through certification 
mechanisms such as the ISO14001 – may be more powerful in protecting or 
proclaiming firms legitimacy. However, there is evidence that non-certifiable 
initiatives such as the UNGC have also been used as a tool to address these 
challenges.  
The UNGC does not offer a certification or third-party control. Nevertheless, it 
has also been used as a tool to promote sustainability in the supply chain. For 
example, Schneider Electric8 has been working with its suppliers since 2004 in 
supporting them to publicly commit to and implement the UNGC. Equally, 
Berliner and Prakash (2010) found that the level of UNGC sign up in the focal 
country was positively and significantly associated with the level of UNGC sign 
up in focal country’s key export markets.  
3.3.2.3 Dealing with critical voices or an extensive network 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have an important role in defining and 
advancing standards and norms related to CSR, either by helping design them, 
or by exercising voice and mobilising resources – for example through boycotts 
– to promote these norms (Berrone et al., 2013). As such, NGOs, as well as 
other social actors such as labour organisations for example, exert strong 
normative pressures on firms to change the traditional modus operandi and 
impose more sustainability minded roles and responsibilities for businesses 
                                                
8 http://www.schneider-electric.com/sites/corporate/en/group/sustainable-development-and-
foundation/social-commitments/social-commitments.page 
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(Perez-Batres et al., 2011, Berrone et al., 2013, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011, Campbell, 2007, Bernhagen et al., 2012). 
Firms, seeing their legitimacy potentially at peril, will seek to engage with these 
actors, and ultimately tend to conform to these pressures, in order to protect 
their legitimacy. Therefore, it has been proposed that stronger presence of these 
counterbalancing voices in society is likely to be associated with greater firm 
adoption of voluntary CSR standards and norms (Perez-Batres et al., 2011, 
Berrone et al., 2013, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011, Campbell, 2007, 
Bernhagen et al., 2012). The literature has found evidence for this claim. 
Berrone et al (2013) found that normative pressures from NGOs have a positive 
and significant effect on firms’ efforts to engage in environmental innovation. Lim 
and Tsutsui (2012) found pressure from international NGOs to be consistently 
positive and significant for sign up to both the UNGC and the GRI.  
While this is a compelling argument, which has been supported by evidence, 
there have also been results that contradict this proposition. Perez-Bastres et al 
(2011) found that NGO participation in the UNGC is not significantly related to 
the likelihood of firms in the country to join the initiative. Conversely though, the 
participation of other counterbalancing voices such as academe, are found to be 
associated with higher sign up (Perez-Batres et al., 2011). Berliner and Prakash 
(2010) found support for their proposition that higher international NGO 
presence in a country is likely to be associated with lower UNGC sign up in that 
country, given the criticism of these organisations towards some UNGC’s 
characteristics. These mixed results call for further analysis. 
Bansal and Bogner (2002) go beyond NGOs and other critical voices to propose 
that firms engaged in a broad set of stakeholder relationships or an extensive 
network in general, will find more incentives to adopt CSR norms and standards. 
For example, firms with several suppliers may require ISO14001 certification 
from them to protect its own reputation. In addition, for firms with a large 
customer base, being ISO14001 certified may help generate trust and credibility 
between the firm and its customers (Bansal and Bogner, 2002). 
3.3.2.4 Following the crowd 
Bansal and Bogner (2002) also highlight that a context in which a large number 
of peers have adopted an initiative, may create incentives for firms to join. Even 
if a firm has processes and procedures in place to address the issues at hand 
(in the case of ISO14001 for example, environmental management systems) it 
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may become difficult to justify not having the “stamp of approval” that such 
initiative can confer (Bansal and Bogner, 2002).  
These mimetic mechanisms have also been identified in the context of 
participation in the UNGC. Perez-Bastres et al (2010) found that Latin American 
firms registered in the NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) are more likely to join 
voluntary CSR initiatives – namely the UNGC and the GRI – than non-listed 
Latin American firms, as they tend to imitate behaviour of other listed companies, 
i.e. of peers perceived as successful by them. Perez-Bastres et al (2010), using 
a sample of European and Latin American firms, found similar results with firm 
association with the NYSE being significantly and positively related to firms’ 
decision to join the UNGC.  
Building on this work, the literature points to two more contexts that may 
encourage firms to engagement in voluntary initiatives: being big and wealthy 
and dealing with stringent regulation and regulators. 
3.3.2.5 Dealing with regulators, regulation and monitoring 
The role of the government in influencing CSP, as the regulatory authority with 
coercive power over firms, has been previously discussed in the literature 
(Campbell, 2007). For example, Campbell highlights the extent to which food 
safety and quality practices in the meat packing industry has improved after the 
Department of Agriculture started to regulate the industry in the United States 
(Campbell, 2007). This relation is not always straight forward though, with other 
elements moderating it, such as for example: the state capacity to monitor and 
enforce regulations, the institutional design of such regulations, among others 
(Campbell, 2007). More specifically in terms of voluntary CSR initiatives, it has 
been argued that high (actual or perceived) level of regulation and monitoring 
(Perez-Batres et al., 2012a) as well as a perception of threat of increased 
regulation, provide higher incentives for firms to join voluntary initiatives.  
Equally, it has been proposed that when governments demonstrate support for 
the initiative and issues associated with it or for the institutions behind it, firms 
may be more inclined to join (Bernhagen et al., 2012). In a study of drivers for 
joining the UNGC, though, Bernhagen et al (2012) found no evidence to support 
this claim – i.e. green party participation in the government and country’s 
support to the UN had no significant statistical relationship with UNGC sign up. 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011), however, found government commitment to 
environmental issues to be a positive and significant influence in the early 
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stages of adoption of ISO14001 standards, although its importance decreases 
overtime. Here again conflicting evidence emerges, calling for further 
investigation. 
3.3.2.6 Being big and wealthy 
“Being big” has been largely explored in the literature as an element influencing 
corporate social performance. The underlying argument is that the larger the 
organisation, the more visible are its actions and therefore more attention and 
scrutiny it is likely to receive from stakeholders (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009, 
Schembera, 2012). Therefore, larger firms are likely to be under greater 
pressure to conform to society’s expectations and demands, and therefore more 
likely to respond to such pressures in order to enhance its legitimacy (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). A number of papers have found evidence for the influence of 
size in regards to engagement in voluntary CSR initiatives. Bennie et al (2007) 
and Bernhagen and Mitchell (2010) found larger firms to be more likely to join 
the UNGC. Tambunlertchai et al. (2013) uncovered firm size to be a determinant 
of ISO 14001 certification. 
“Being wealthy” or having slack resources has also been pointed as a factor 
influencing firms’ CSP. Having slack resources arguably allows firms the 
flexibility and discretion to engage in new ventures, practices or routines (Perez-
Batres et al., 2012a, Johnstone and Labonne, 2009), such as for example, 
joining a voluntary CSR initiative (Campbell, 2007). Perez-Bastres et al (2012a) 
found slack resources to be positively and statistically associated with firm 
participation in the GRI. The same was not confirmed for joining in the UNGC 
though. Berrone et al (2013) found slack resources, when associated with 
normative pressures, to be positively associated with firms’ efforts for green 
innovation; However, the authors found that at higher levels of slack, there was 
a negative effect on environmental innovation when associated with regulatory 
pressures. These somewhat contradicting results on the role of slack resources 
may suggest that firms with enough resources may prefer to pay legal and 
economic sanctions than engage in major change in its processes and products, 
or that they find legitimacy and social sanctions from normative actors to present 
a higher risk than economic penalties imposed by regulatory actors, or even that 
regulatory actors are satisfied with more symbolic engagement, not requiring 
innovation to take place (Berrone et al., 2013). In any case, there seems to be 
an interesting phenomenon there, which calls for further exploration. 
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3.3.3 Understanding speed of adoption: why some firms join earlier 
than others? 
Despite the fact that many of voluntary CSR initiatives have existed for a 
number of years, more firms decide to join every year, suggesting that the pace 
and pattern of adoption varies across firms. In the case of the UNGC, 42 firms 
from 14 countries joined the initiative when it was launched in 20009. As of 2013, 
the UNGC had over 7,000 business participants spread across over 145 
countries10. In the following manner, the ISO14001 was present in 22% of UN 
member countries in 1996. This number increased to 50% in 2000 and 70% in 
2006, 10 years after the launch of the standard (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011). Considering that even a considerable time after their launch benefits 
associated with adoption of voluntary CSR initiatives are still found to be 
questionable, what influences these organisations to early adopt in a time when 
risks and uncertainty are much higher? 
Albuquerque et al (2007) propose that diffusion is a contagious process that 
spreads through interactions among actors within some sort of network. The 
nature of the diffusion may vary according to the type of proximity that allows for 
this exchange to happen, namely: geography, trade and culture (Albuquerque et 
al., 2007). Through interactions, firms collect evidence on the benefits of 
adopting a certain practice. Once a firm decides it has gathered enough 
evidence – or as the authors say, once it has reached its evidentiary threshold – 
the firm decides to join or adopt the practice at hand.  
The amount of evidence requested for a decision to be made, as well as the 
time it takes to gather it, will vary across firms (Albuquerque et al., 2007). The 
diffusion of a new practice therefore will depend primarily on the perception of 
benefits for adoption and also on the number of adopters (Castka and Balzarova, 
2008), the latter supporting the communication of the former. Late adopters will 
generally adopt a practice quicker than early adopters (Viadiu et al., 2006). 
Once the new practice achieves a critical mass, the perceived risks associated 
with adopting it drops (Albuquerque et al., 2007). Therefore, the evidentiary 
threshold for late adopters tends to be lower, speeding the decision making 
process. When comparing cross-national diffusion of a practice, this may be 
observed in higher rates of within country diffusion in late adopting countries. 
Eventually, late adopters may catch up with earlier adopting countries 
(Albuquerque et al., 2007). 
                                                
9 Source: UNGC dataset 
10 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html 
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Understanding the characteristics of an initiative is key to understand its pattern 
of diffusion (Castka and Balzarova, 2008). Castka and Balzarova (2008) argue, 
for example, that studies on the diffusion of ISO14001 and ISO9000 may not 
have reasonable predictive power to explain the spread of ISO26000, given that 
the latter is not a management system nor it is certifiable. While the authors do 
not elaborate further on this thought, one could argue that such characteristics 
may influence perceived risks and benefits associated with the adoption of a 
new practice. For example, it is not unreasonable to propose that a legitimate 
third party stamp of approval such as a certification may present a stronger 
immediate perceived benefit for the adopter than a simple joining statement. 
Equally, because management systems are clearly specified in such standards, 
they may arguably also be a more valuable tool in communicating to 
stakeholders the organisation’s practices and commitments, as external 
stakeholders are more likely to know what exactly they entail. In view of these 
challenges, the authors point to the need to go beyond the literature on 
certifiable standards, also looking into the diffusion of organisational practices, 
innovation and technologies to fully understand the diffusion of a voluntary 
initiative such as the ISO26000 (Castka and Balzarova, 2008), and one cold 
argue such as the UNGC as well.  
3.3.3.1 Motivations to adopt novelties and impact on speed of adoption 
As discussed before, two explanations on motivations for adoption of a practice 
are prominent in the literature, namely a search for legitimacy or approval from 
its stakeholders and a search for greater efficiency or superior performance 
(Bansal and Bogner, 2002). The two-stage model proposed by Tolbert and 
Zucker (1983) integrates these two approaches in light of speed of adoption and 
suggests that while early adopters focus on technical benefits from adoption, 
late adopters are more concerned about ensuring their legitimacy.  
Neo-institutional theory also reconciles these visions, and proposes that early 
adopters, i.e. those that adopt a practice in the early stages of the 
institutionalisation process, do so in views of achieving improved performance 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or fulfilling a specific need or interest (Scott, 2008). 
As the institutionalisation of a practice progresses, the decision to adopt it 
becomes more of a requirement than a choice, as normative and cultural 
pressures reach a point where non-adopters risk to be seen as deviants from 
the norm, or behind the time (Scott, 2008, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In other 
words, adopting the new practice becomes more a matter of ensuring legitimacy 
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following a logic of appropriateness, than achieving efficiency, following a sense 
of instrumentality (Scott, 2008, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
This two-stage model of diffusion has recently been questioned by some 
authors (Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). Kennedy and Fiss (2009), in a study of the 
diffusion of total quality management in US’ hospitals, found that economic and 
legitimacy motivations to adopt a new practice coexist among early and late 
adopters. Similar concerns have been raised in the context of the adoption of 
voluntary CSR initiatives. Arevalo et al (2013) in a study of the adoption of the 
UNGC in Spain, suggest that early UNGC adopters were mainly focused on 
image gains, rather than economic gains. The authors defend that, being UN-led, 
the UNGC has been widely known from its inception and therefore firms would 
see the potential for image gains from the early days. Also, they add, a business 
case for signing up was not discussed in the early days. Therefore, it was only 
among late adopters that economic benefits interest emerged, while still keeping 
an interest in image gains (Arevalo et al., 2013). 
3.3.3.2 Attributes and context influences on speed of adoption 
Besides motivations, firm attributes have also been pointed as influencing early 
adoption of voluntary CSR practices (Scott, 2008, Arevalo et al., 2013). For one 
thing, firm size is proposed to be associated with early adoption. The reasons 
for this are many: larger organisations are more visible and therefore subject to 
greater scrutiny and pressures by stakeholders, larger organisations generally 
have more resources and therefore may be more prone to invest in new 
practices, and larger organisations are more sensitive to environmental changes 
(Scott, 2008). Studies provide evidence that larger firms were more likely to 
become early adopters of ISO14001 certification (King and Lenox, 2001) and to 
join the UNGC early in the Spanish context (Arevalo et al., 2013). 
King and Lenox (2001) propose that besides size, two other firm attributes make 
adoption of a new practice “easier”, and therefore are likely to lead to early 
adoption. Studying the case of ISO14001 certifications, the authors propose that 
organisations with slack resources are more likely to take the risk of adopting a 
new practice in a time that uncertainty regarding benefits for adoption is still very 
high. The authors also propose that previous investment and experience in 
ISO9000 certification may lead to early adoption of ISO14001 (King and Lenox, 
2001).  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 85 
Good previous environmental performance has also been pointed as a predictor 
for the adoption of voluntary environmental initiatives (Delmas and Montes-­‐‑
Sancho, 2010). Bansal and Hunter (2003), for example, found that firms with 
higher environmental legitimacy and fewer environmental crisis were more likely 
to be early adopters of ISO14001. The authors propose that such firms would 
become ISO14001 certified as a means to reinforce their position or strategy in 
regards to CSR and would accrue image benefits and increased legitimacy by 
adopting it early. 
It is important to highlight however that organisational level variables, while 
important determinants of adoption on the early stages of the diffusion of new 
practice, may see their predicting power reduce overtime once the practice or 
initiative at hand becomes more institutionalised (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). In a 
study of the diffusion of civil service reform in the United States, Tolbert and 
Zucker (1983) found that a set of city’s characteristics (such as size, percentage 
of immigrants, among others) were important determinants for the adoption of 
the reforms in the early stages of the diffusion of the new practices. However, 
their predicted power dropped over overtime, and very sharply in the last period. 
The authors propose that as the civil service reform was increasingly taken for 
granted and seen as legitimate, cities began to adopt it as a “social fact” and 
cities’ characteristics became less and less relevant (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).  
In this context, some authors have proposed that one needs to also look beyond 
the firms’ boundaries in order to understand the pattern of adoption of new 
practices. Building on institutional theory, Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) 
theorise that countries where a new practice was adopted earlier are marked by 
different institutional pressures than those countries where the practice was 
adopted later in time. The authors argue that coercive or regulatory forces play a 
bigger role in the take-up phase of a new practice, by providing rewards and 
penalties for adoption and showing potential adopters the benefits of the 
innovation. As institutionalisation progresses normative and cognitive forces 
arguably become stronger in promoting adoption of the new practice (Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho, 2011). 
As discussed in section 2.1.3.1, the regulative pillar with its coercive 
mechanisms is often associated with the political system, or the state (Berrone 
et al., 2013, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). Governments may provide 
rewards for adoption or impose sanctions for non-adoption of a new initiative or 
practice. As proposed by Tolbert and Zucker (1983: 27), once a new practice is 
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legitimated by higher-level organisations, such as the government for example, 
“dependant organisations respond by rapidly incorporating the element into their 
formal structure”. 
These coercive mechanisms can be very efficient in promoting sign up, notably 
in the early stages of institutionalisation when there is greater uncertainty in 
regards to the benefits that can be accrued with participation (Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2011). Therefore, the greater the government’s support to the 
issues covered in the initiative, the more involved is the government in the 
design of the initiative, the more positive the government’s attitude towards the 
initiative, the more likely it will be to provide firms with incentives for adoption 
and therefore the more likely firms in the country will be to adopt the standard or 
join the initiative in the pre-institutionalised period (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011).  
The government is not the only actor to exercise pressures on firms though. The 
community, organised as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), may also 
exercise normative pressure over firms to adopt a certain practice (Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2011). NGOs have gained prominence over the last decades, 
and have been an important voice in seeking to define new roles and 
responsibilities for businesses (Perez-Batres et al., 2011). This pressure may be 
especially prominent in the early phases of adoption of a new initiative, as 
NGOs may turn their focus to newer initiatives as the one at hand becomes 
more widely diffused (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). For one thing, 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) found that the role of civil society was a 
stronger predictor in the early phases of the adoption of ISO14001, as 
compared to later periods.         
Proximity through trade and geographic proximity have also been revised in the 
literature. Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) proposed and found evidence to 
show that trade ties are an important predictor in all phases of the diffusion of a 
standard. Geographic proximity, on the other hand, is proposed to require a 
larger number of adopters to serve as an effective vehicle of diffusion of a new 
initiative (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011), therefore seeing its role increase 
in later phases of adoption. The authors found evidence of that in a study on the 
diffusion of ISO14001, with geographic proximity not a significant predictor in the 
early phases of the diffusion of ISO14001, but becoming significant in the later 
phases (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). One could argue that enough 
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volume of adoption is needed in a country for it to be remarked across borders 
through proximity, as very few adopters would probably disperse the information. 
Finally, the incidence of other certifications/standards of similar nature in a 
country is proposed to be associated with the likelihood of adoption of voluntary 
CSR initiatives. In a study of the implementation of ISO14001, Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho (2011) found that a greater number of ISO9000 certifications in 
a country was associated with higher ISO14001 in all stages of adoption, i.e. it 
was an important predictor in early as well as later phases of ISO14001 diffusion 
in a country. 
In a nutshell, factors influencing firm decision to adopt a new practice in the 
early stages of diffusion are multi-level. They may be related to firm attributes, to 
industry characteristics or to features of the firm’s operating environment, such 
as for example their home country.  
3.3.4 Empirical evidence on drivers for joining and speed of 
adoption in the UNGC 
This section will review empirical evidence that focuses specifically on the case 
of the UNGC. While some authors have posed questions about drivers for 
joining the UNGC (Perez-Batres et al., 2010, Perez-Batres et al., 2011, Perkins 
and Neumayer, 2010), not many studies have sought to respond this question 
empirically. A total of 12 studies were identified in the literature: nine quantitative, 
one qualitative case study and two presenting survey results. Interest on this 
topic is mainly recent, with eight out of twelve studies published from 2010.  
Most of the quantitative studies (eight) were interested in understanding national 
level factors associated with higher level of UNGC sign up. This is hardly 
surprising given that the UNGC is a United Nations led initiative and the largest 
global CSR initiative, therefore naturally raising questions about variations 
across countries and the role of national contexts in these. However, fewer 
showed interest in firm level factors (five) (Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, 
Bennie et al., 2007, Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, Perez-Batres et al., 2010, 
Perez-Batres et al., 2011), and even fewer (three) looked into industry as an 
independent variable (Bennie et al., 2007, Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, 
Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010). In regards to geographic coverage, most studies 
were multi country (8). Once again, this is not surprising given the global nature 
of the UNGC. Finally, the majority of the studies were cross-sectional (6), 
compared to only 3 longitudinal articles. Factors that were found in previous 
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papers to influence corporate sign up to the UNGC are summarised on the table 
below, and a review of the papers follow. 
Table 7: Exploring drivers for joining the UNGC 
National Industry Firm 
- Headquarter in democratic 
country 
- Higher green party 
participation 
- Higher UN commitment 
- INGO pressure in the 
country 
- Participation of 
organisations other than 
firms in the UNGC in the 
country (academic and 
NGOs) 
- Stakeholder pressure 
- Liberal economic policies 
- Short-term trade relations 
- Ties with European 
countries 
- UNGC density in country’s 
inward and export trade 
partners 
- Being in a high impact 
industry (extractive, “dirty” 
industry) 
- Larger size 
- UN Vendor status 
- Listing in NYSE 
 
 
Byrd (2009) explores the factors that led two major American-based 
international public relations agencies to join the UNGC. Based on in-depth 
interviews and document analysis, results suggest that while one of the 
agencies saw sign up as an opportunity to reinforce their commitment to the 
UNGC issues, the other decided to join due to a personal relationship between 
their Chairman and the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.  
Perkins and Neumayer (2010) analyse the dissemination of corporate voluntary 
standards, comparing the global diffusion of ISO14001 and the UNGC. Authors 
find that national level factors can influence a country’s receptivity to 
transnational influences. In the case of the UNGC, level of democracy has an 
important conditioning influence on receptivity to transnational forces. 
Transnationally, trade links with countries with higher UNGC membership 
density was found to influence signing up to the UNGC; similar findings were 
shown for FDI and business travellers (ibid). 
Bennie, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2007) found that for the world’s 2,000 largest 
companies, the decision to join the UNGC could be explained both by firm level 
and political or institutional factors. Firm size and participation in the extractive 
industry were positively and significantly associated to engagement in the 
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initiative in all cases. In addition, home country factors such as green party 
participation in the government and country commitment to the UN were found 
to be positively associated with joining the UNGC. 
In a similar paper Bernhagen and Mitchell (2010) approach firm decision to join 
the UNGC as a form of corporate political activity. In a study of Forbes Global 
2000 firms, the authors find the following factors to be determinants of firms’ 
decision to join the UNGC: size (in sales), cost of exit (belonging to extractive 
industries), government involvement (being a UN vendor) and home country 
commitment to the UN (measured as recent commitments to UN environmental 
and human rights activities).  
In a country-level study of UNGC participants in 145 countries in 2009, 
Bernhagen et al (2012) find a democratic regime and participation of 
organisations other than firms in the UNGC to be associated with higher levels 
of firm sign up to the UNGC. In another country-level study, Berliner and 
Prakash (2010) focused on UNGC participants in 89 countries between 2001 
and 2007. They found that country embeddedness in international government 
networks encourages firms to join the UNGC, while country embeddedness in 
international NGOs networks discourages joining. 
Also with a national level focus, Lim and Tsutsui (2012) analysed drivers for 
joining amongst UNGC participants between 2000 and 2007. The authors found 
presence of international NGOs in a country and neoliberal economic policies to 
encourage UNGC sign up in both developed and developing countries. Sign up 
of firms in developed countries, however, was also encouraged by launch of 
UNGC in the country and level of UNGC participation in their export destinations, 
whereas democracy was found to discourage joining among these firms. 
Perez-Batres, Miller and Pisani have recently published two papers, focusing on 
the UNGC (Perez-Batres et al., 2010, Perez-Batres et al., 2011). The first paper 
focuses on 207 Latin American firms, and explores the impact of normative and 
mimetic pressures on firms’ sign up to the UNGC and to the Global Reporting 
Initiative (Perez-Batres et al., 2010). Using three filters - commercial, state-
signalling and distinguished peers – the authors find normative and mimetic 
forces to have an influence on Latin American firms’ engagement in the UNGC, 
notably in regards to home country links with European countries (normative 
pressure) and firm listing on the New York Stock Exchange (mimetic pressure). 
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Their second paper focuses on drivers for joining the UNGC, using a sample of 
394 large companies from Western Europe and Latin America (Perez-Batres et 
al., 2011). Results indicate that normative (represented as number of academic 
institutions participating in the UNGC in country i) and mimetic pressures (peer 
influence represented by listing in the NYSE) are better determinants of sign up 
than coercive pressures (government regulation represented as level of 
regulation in home country). 
In a more recent paper of 1,145 publicly traded American firms, Perez-Bastres 
et al (2012a) analyse stakeholder pressures as drivers for firms' engagement in 
voluntary self-regulatory codes, including the UNGC. Findings suggest that 
“dirtier” industry, more slack resources, and higher scrutiny and pressure from 
some stakeholders are likely to influence firms' decision to join these initiatives. 
In a survey of Spanish UNGC business participants, Arevalo et al (2010) found 
that both image and economic gains are important motivators for firms to join 
the initiative. In another survey and interviews with 29 UNGC participants, 
Cetindamar and Husoy (2007) found multiple motives to drive firms’ decision to 
join, with both ethical and economic reasons mattering. 
In regards to speed of adoption, while the literature on innovation and diffusion 
has covered a diverse pool of phenomena building valuable knowledge about 
these issues, little has been covered in regards to voluntary CSR initiatives – 
except maybe for the ISO14001 certification standard; notably, studies on the 
speed of adoption of the UNGC are extremely scarce (Arevalo et al., 2013). 
While many parallels can be drawn between ISO14001 and the UNGC, or 
between certifiable and non-certifiable initiatives, one cannot refrain from 
recognising that the presence or absence of a certification mechanism, 
especially in the early stages of diffusion where risk perception is generally 
greater, may lead to differences on patterns of diffusion and factors that may 
influence it. To the author’s best knowledge, there was only one study on the 
UNGC that looked into speed of adoption (Arevalo et al., 2013). The study, 
however, was restricted to the Spanish context, and focused mainly on the 
interplay between motivations for joining the UNGC and speed of adoption. 
3.4 To what extent institutional forces shape performance 
in voluntary CSR initiatives / the UNGC? 
With increasing levels of participation in voluntary CSR initiatives, there has also 
been increasing interest from practitioners and scholars alike on the matter of 
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firm performance following sign up. This section will review the current literature 
on corporate performance in voluntary CSR initiatives. More specifically, it will 
look into factors that may moderate the relationship between sign up and 
performance, as well as the literature on the impact of joining the UNGC in CSP. 
3.4.1 Does it always pay to keep a promise? 
A point of concern for practitioners and scholars alike in regards to voluntary 
CSR initiatives is the potential for decoupling between firms’ commitments and 
actual outcomes. Traditional views on decoupling are generally based on a 
cynical view of firm behaviour and portray decoupling as a binary choice (Crilly 
et al., 2012, Kim and Lyon, 2012). Decoupling is often seen as a “convenient 
arrangement” between firms and stakeholders, in which the latter turn a blind 
eye to the former’s empty promise (Crilly et al., 2012). Decoupling has also been 
approached as “calculated deception”, or an intentional action by the firm to 
default on a commitment in order to gain the legitimacy associated with it while 
avoiding the costs of full implementation (Crilly et al., 2012).  
A more recent line of discussion proposes that decoupling is more nuanced than 
a “yes-or-no” decision, allowing firms to choose level of compliance in a 
continuum (Crilly et al., 2012, Kim and Lyon, 2012). In a study on voluntary 
reporting of greenhouse gas emissions, for example, Kim and Lyon (2012) 
compared self-reported emissions in the context of the US Department of 
Energy voluntary program for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, with a 
calculation of actual emissions using fuel usage data from the US electric utility 
industry. They propose that selective disclosure of performance can support 
symbolic management as firms may select the amount of unfavourable 
information they will release. The authors found a significant gap between actual 
and reported reduction in greenhouse gas emissions for participants in the 
voluntary program. Participants generally reported reductions that albeit real, did 
not show the full picture of an actual increase in total emissions (Kim and Lyon, 
2012). In a similar line, Fig (2007) found in a study of Aracruz Celulose activities 
in Brazil that while the firm reported to be using water more efficiently, it failed to 
account for serious water depletion in its area of work due to the high water 
consumption of its eucalyptus plantations. 
Similarly, a more recent discussion on decoupling proposes that there may be 
more beyond “bad intentions” in leading to the failure of keeping promises. Crilly 
et al (2012) add to this the role of “muddling through”, or the failure to abide to 
commitments due not only to intentional deceit but also to a lack of expertise or 
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internal coordination in dealing with conflicting demands. On a similar line, Lim 
and Tsutsui (2012) in a study of engagement in the UNGC and the GRI propose 
that many organisations adopt global models with the intent of gaining 
legitimacy, but lack the capacity to implement them, resulting in a decoupling 
between commitment and action. They found that government endorsement in 
the form of UNGC launch in developing countries also leads to ceremonial 
commitment, by engaging firms that do not have the capacity to implement the 
principles (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012).  
To our present interest, Kim and Lyon (2012: 01) highlight the fact that not all 
firms resort to the smilingly very profitable strategy of decoupling, suggesting 
that “symbolic management is useful for some firms under certain 
circumstances, but not for all firms nor in all circumstances”. Firms’ attributes 
and characteristics of its operating environment may create different incentives 
or disincentives for firms to engage in symbolic management. The behaviour 
explored here – performance in voluntary CSR initiatives – is particularly 
interesting because, given its voluntary nature, there are often no obvious forces 
to ensure that participants abide to their commitments.  
While there are clear benefits for decoupling, costs of this decision are less 
explored in the literature. Kim and Lyon (2012) propose that firms incur in 
internal and external costs when decoupling. The former relates to resources 
used to implement the minimum to be able to claim and communicate 
compliance (Kim and Lyon, 2012). By definition, they will arguably always be 
lower than the cost of substantive (full) implementation. External costs, on the 
other hand, refer to risks associated with increasing scrutiny revealing 
discrepancy between firm’s discourse and action (Kim and Lyon, 2012). This is 
arguably where most variation may be found, with different institutional 
arrangements providing incentives and constrains to symbolic or substantive 
engagement. 
The fact that not all firms choose symbolic commitment suggests that these 
external costs may indeed vary for different firms, depending on the 
environment within which they operate. One can argue, therefore, that an 
environment that can increase the external costs of decoupling by increasing 
risks of firms being caught in their empty promises and being penalised for that, 
are likely to lead to a reduction in firms’ likelihood of engaging in symbolic 
commitment/decoupling. 
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3.4.2 Under what conditions are promises more likely to be 
delivered upon? Factors moderating the relationship between 
sign up and performance 
 
Building on the emerging discussion on institutional influences on other aspects 
of corporate social performance (Campbell, 2007, Matten and Moon, 2008, 
Jeurissen, 2004, Gjolberg, 2009), and a more recent line of study on decoupling 
(Kim and Lyon, 2012), it is proposed that there are conditions under which 
symbolic engagement in voluntary CSR initiatives is appealing for firms, and 
conversely circumstances under which substantive engagement is of more 
interest. In other words, there are elements that may moderate the relationship 
between sign up and performance (Knudsen, 2011, Perez-Batres et al., 2012a).  
While there is much interest and discussion on drivers for joining voluntary CSR 
initiatives (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011, 
Perez-Batres et al., 2010), the literature is incipient in providing explanations for 
drivers for firm performance in the commitments made (Knudsen, 2011). In 
addition, where studies exist, they focus on quite different universes, industries, 
and also vary substantially on their choice of dependant and independent 
variables, making one cautious about comparing and contrasting them to make 
conclusions and build one single body of knowledge.  
The literature, however, highlights a number of elements that may moderate the 
relationship between sign up and performance. These can be divided in four 
groups: what they talk about me matters to my behaviour, where I come from 
matters to my behaviour, what I do matters to my behaviour and who I am 
matters to my behaviour. 
3.4.2.1 What they talk about me matters to my behaviour 
Factors proposed to influence firms’ CSP after joining a voluntary CSR initiative 
are proposed to be multilevel, ranging from the firm to its institutional 
environment at national or global levels (Christmann and Taylor, 2006, Knudsen, 
2011, Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). A number of these factors, however, have a 
common thread of argument, making explicit reference to, or boiling down to, 
the impact of stakeholder scrutiny and pressure on performance. These 
stakeholders are varied, ranging from NGOs, governments, employees and 
others. For one thing, Annandale et al (2004), on a study of 40 multi-sector 
Australian companies, found that respondents perceived in-firm pressures – i.e. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 94 
from parent company or senior management/board – to have an important 
influence on their environmental performance.  
Clients and customers have also been pointed as important stakeholders 
influencing performance. For one thing, Christmann and Taylor (2006) found 
that the higher the frequency of customer monitoring, the more likely suppliers 
are to substantively implement a voluntary CSR standard.  Equally, Annandale 
et al (2004) found that pressure from clients was ranked second in level of 
importance in regards to their impact on studied firms’ environmental 
performance.  
In a similar line but with a broader focus, Knudsen (2011) found that the more 
internationalised the national economy of a firm’s home country the less likely 
the firm was to be delisted from the UNGC. Likewise, Lim and Tsutsui (2012) 
showed that a country’s bilateral export context is positively and significantly 
associated with substantive commitment to a voluntary CSR initiative – in other 
words, firms in short-term, arm’s-length economic relations are more likely to 
use voluntary CSR initiatives to signal good business practices than those in 
long-term economic relations in the form of foreign direct investment. It has 
been proposed that short-term business partners are more likely to rely on such 
initiatives as they have fewer opportunities to collect information on their 
partners; those on long-term trade relations are generally able to implement 
broader screening processes (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have an important role in defining and 
advancing standards and norms related to CSR, either by helping design them, 
or by exercising voice and mobilising resources to promote these norms 
(Berrone et al., 2013). As such, NGOs, as well as other social actors such as 
labour organisations for example, exert strong normative pressures on firms to 
change the traditional modus operandi and impose more sustainability minded 
roles and responsibilities for businesses (Perez-Batres et al., 2011, Berrone et 
al., 2013, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011, Campbell, 2007, Bernhagen et al., 
2012). Firms, seeing their legitimacy potentially at peril, will arguably seek to 
engage with these actors, and ultimately tend to conform to these pressures, in 
order to protect their legitimacy. 
It would be expected, therefore, that stronger presence of counterbalancing 
voices is likely to be associated with substantive implementation of voluntary 
CSR standards. Evidence in the literature, however, is mixed. Perez-Bastres et 
al (2012a), in a study of large publicly traded US firms on stakeholder pressures 
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as determinants of CSR, found higher stakeholder scrutiny to be positively and 
significantly associated with firm’s choice of substantive engagement in 
voluntary CSR initiatives. Lim and Tsutsui (2012), however, on a study of 
participation and performance in the UNGC, found that level of national 
economic development would moderate this relationship. Focusing on pressure 
of international NGOs, the authors demonstrated that while in developing 
countries pressures from international NGOs remained positively and 
significantly associated with substantial commitment to the initiative, in 
developed countries those pressures were positively associated with ceremonial 
commitment to the UNGC (i.e. delisting) (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012).  
3.4.2.2 Where I come from matters to my behaviour 
In a similar line, level of democracy has been pointed as an important factor. 
More democratic countries normally outperform less democratic peers in a 
number of welfare areas, including the UNGC issue areas (Bennie et al., 2007). 
In addition, more democratic countries are more prepared to listen to critical 
voices in society, including in regards to corporate behaviour (Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2010, Bernhagen et al., 2012). For one thing, Lim and Tsutsui (2012) 
found democracy to discourage ceremonial commitment to the UNGC in 
developed countries and encourage substantive commitment in developing 
countries. 
Other elements of firms’ home country’s domestic governance have also been 
pointed in the literature as influencing performance (Knudsen, 2011). Kaufman 
et al (2009) propose six dimensions of domestic governance, namely: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Together 
they are proposed to represent the institutional framework through which 
authority is exercised in a particular country (Kaufmann et al., 2009). It can be 
argued that strong domestic governance can create the conditions to hold firms’ 
accountable for the commitments they make, therefore leading to substantive 
implementation of voluntary CSR standards.  
In a study of UNGC participants, Knudsen (2011) found evidence that good 
domestic governance is associated with substantive commitment to the UNGC. 
Supporting the mirroring argument (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010), Knudsen 
(2011) found that good governance in the home country tends to spill over into 
firms’ compliance with commitments made; equally, poor governance was 
associated with higher levels of delisting from the UNGC.  
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Still looking into national influence, it has been discussed that a neoliberal 
orientation in home country is likely to be associated with increased 
engagement in voluntary CSR initiatives. The latter will present an opportunity to 
try to reduce regulatory risk, while deflecting criticism and protecting legitimacy 
by demonstrating engagement in sustainability issues (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). 
While this might be a driver for joining, no evidence was found that neoliberal 
policies might be associated with higher performance. For one thing, Lim and 
Tsutsui (2012) found neoliberal economic policies to be positively and 
significantly associated with ceremonial commitment to voluntary CSR initiatives 
in developed countries. Once again, evidence points to support a mirroring 
argument (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010), where lower levels of government 
intervention are likely to lead to ceremonial commitment to voluntary CSR 
initiatives. 
A last point relates to government’s support to the voluntary initiative and impact 
on performance. A government that is sympathetic to an initiative may, for 
example, provide firms with incentives to join (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011) and arguably to perform better. Using the launch of the UNGC in a 
country (represented by launch of a local network) as a proxy for government’s 
support, Lim and Tsutsui (2012) found, however, that in developing countries 
this endorsement may lead firms that do not have implementation capacity to 
join the initiative. In developed countries, while UNGC launch increased sign up, 
there was no evidence that this was associated with improved performance. The 
authors conclude that UNGC launch only seems to encourage a shallow 
commitment to the initiative (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012).  
3.4.2.3 Who I am matters to my behaviour 
In regards to firm attributes, studies have pointed size and slack resources to be 
important influences on performance in voluntary CSR initiative (Knudsen, 2011, 
Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, Annandale et al., 2004). Authors propose that the 
larger the firm the more visible are its actions, and the more likely it is to be 
exposed to greater stakeholder scrutiny and attention (Johnstone and Labonne, 
2009, Knudsen, 2011, Schembera, 2012). Therefore, larger firms are likely to be 
under greater pressure to conform to society’s expectations and demands, and 
therefore more likely to respond to such pressures in order to enhance its 
legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). For one thing, Knudsen (2011) found 
that small and medium sized firms were more likely than larger firms to be 
delisted from the UNGC due to failure to communicate on progress. 
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Slack resources were found to have an impact in various elements of CSP (Levy 
and Shatto, 1978, Melnyk et al., 2003, Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, Waddock and 
Graves, 1997). Financial resources allow firms to engage in new endeavours or 
routines, as they provide firms with the discretion for decision making that a lack 
of resources would otherwise prevent (Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, McGuire et al., 
1988). In addition to this, implementing new processes arguably requires 
resources; as a result, an organisation that disposes of slack resources will be 
better placed to substantively implement the principles or standards they sign up 
for.  As a case in point, Perez-Bastres et al (2012a), in a study of publicly traded 
large US firms, found that presence of slack resources are positively and 
statistically significantly associated to  firms’ choice of substantive CSR.  
3.4.2.4 What I do matters to my behaviour 
Finally, characteristics of the industry the firm belongs to are also proposed to 
influence their decisions and behaviour. For one thing, belonging to high impact 
industries has been found to impact performance. Firms in those industries are 
likely to face higher stakeholder scrutiny and pressure to display alignment with 
societal expectations (Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, Bansal and Bogner, 2002). 
Such firms may face real losses if their customers or other stakeholders pull 
back support for them due to poor (real or perceived) sustainability performance 
(Bansal and Bogner, 2002). These firms, therefore, find their legitimacy and 
economic interests to be more at risk, and as a result, would arguably have 
greater incentives to abide to commitments made. 
Some studies found evidence to confirm this proposition. Perez-Bastres et al 
(2012a) found that firms in pollution intense industries were more likely to 
choose substantive engagement in voluntary CSR initiatives. Similarly, Knudsen 
(2011) found that firms in the oil sector were less likely to be delisted from the 
UNGC – i.e. less likely to display ceremonial commitment to the initiative. 
Knudsen (2011), however, found that manufacturing firms (another proxy for 
high-impact industry on her study) had no more or less probability of being 
delisted when compared to firms in services (proxy for low impact industry). This 
suggests that this element calls for further exploration. 
3.4.3 The impact of joining the UNGC on CSP 
The debate on whether voluntary CSR initiatives are actually capable of 
influencing corporate behaviour is an important one and a number of authors 
have explored this question empirically. Studies, however, point to conflicting 
and contradictory results, with initiatives being placed anywhere on a continuum 
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from no impact to significant impact on corporate behaviour (Barla, 2007, Toffel, 
2005, King et al., 2005, Chen and Bouvain, 2009, Runhaar and Lafferty, 2009). 
To some extent, this may be explained by the use of a number of different 
variables to measure outcomes and performance. Given that most initiatives do 
not have pre-defined performance indicators, this is not surprising. Scholars 
need to use the best available data – or the only data available – to measure 
such outcomes. These may therefore vary greatly depending on the industry the 
study focuses on, or the geographical region of the study, among other factors. 
Equally, focus on a specific industry or geographic location may lead to results 
that cannot be generalised to the initiative or initiatives in general. 
In any case, it is clear that results vary greatly. In regards to the ISO14001, 
studies have found the initiative able to impact behaviour. Toffel (2005), in a 
study of US manufacturing facilities, found that the ISO14001 has attracted 
companies with higher environmental performance, and that the certification led 
to further performance improvements. Similarly, on a study of US facilities, 
Postoski and Prakash (2005b) found ISO14001 to improve facilities’ compliance 
with government regulations. On another study focusing on US facilities 
regulated under “major sources” under the US Clean Air Act, the same authors 
found ISO14001 certification to lead to reduction in pollution emissions, when 
comparing with non-certified firms (Potoski and Prakash, 2005a). 
Conversely, other studies did not found the ISO14001 standard to be effective in 
leading to improvements in firm performance. Barla (2007), in a study of 
Quebec’s pulp and paper industry, found that while ISO14001 had no impact on 
reducing the total suspended solid emissions nor the total quantity of rejected 
process water, it also only had a temporary impact in reducing discharge of 
biological oxygen demand. In like manner, Aravind and Christmann (2010) 
found no difference in performance between ISO14001 certified and non-
certified firms amongst a sample of US facilities. 
The UNGC being the largest CSR initiative in the world (Arevalo et al., 2013), 
the impact it has on performance has been a major concern of both academics 
and practitioners. The initiative has often been accused of not “having teeth”, i.e. 
not having the means of ensuring substantive responsible corporate behaviour 
consistent with the principles participants sign up for. In addition, even though it 
has a number of integrity measures in place in order to prevent free riding 
behaviour, such as for example the COP policy, this initiative arguably offers 
firms significant room for manoeuvre in deciding how to implement the 10 
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principles. It has been argued that this room for manoeuvre is likely to lead to 
the development of ceremonial behaviour and symbolic engagement, 
transforming the initiative into an organisational myth, rather than a tool to 
achieve improved corporate social performance (Boiral, 2007). 
Surprisingly though, only a small number of studies have tackled this question 
empirically, and often with a limited sample or a measure of performance that 
did not encompass the full spectrum of UNGC issues. A total of 18 articles were 
found to address the impact of the UNGC at some level, empirically or not. 
Within those, the larger group (9 articles) focused on a higher level of analysis, 
such as impact on sustainable development in general, the UNGC’s ability to 
establish fairer markets, among others (Barkemeyer, 2009, Bremer, 2008, 
Meyer and Stefanova, 2001, Nason, 2008, Neace, 2007, Smith, 2010). This 
focus may be related to the fact that the UNGC is part of the United Nations, 
therefore potentially expected to address global challenges. Two other articles 
focused on the UNGC’s impact on specific issues, namely women inequality 
(Kilgour, 2007) and the challenges faced by a particular region (Prasad, 2004), 
while another two looked into the impact of joining for firms (e.g. benefits of 
being a UNGC participant) (Janney et al., 2009, Cetindamar and Husoy, 2007). 
More interestingly, however, five studies were found to focus specifically on 
UNGC’s impact on firm behaviour: two were qualitative case studies of level of 
UNGC implementation in firms, and three sought to quantitatively verify the 
UNGC impact on firms’ CSP. While they aligned in focus, results found were 
inconclusive and inconsistent through the articles. Some found the UNGC to 
have an impact on firm behaviour in regards to some aspect of CSP, whereas 
others found the initiative was innocuous in influencing corporate action.  
In a study of the world’s 2000 largest companies, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2010) 
find that signing up to the UNGC increases the likelihood of firms developing 
explicit human rights related policies. Chen and Bouvain (2009) also find some 
positive impact of the UNGC in regards to corporate non-financial reporting. 
Using a sample of leading companies from US, UK, Australia and Germany, the 
authors conclude that joining the UNGC has a positive effect in reporting, 
although limited to issues related to the environment and labour.   
Runhaar and Lafferty (2009), however, found less promising results. In a case 
study of three telecommunication companies the authors found that the UNGC’s 
role in shaping these firms’ behaviour in regards to CSP is modest at the best. 
The authors argue that the principles are seen as minimum standards, not 
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offering incentives for improved performance. In addition, these companies tend 
to deal with their industry-specific CSP issues through dedicated networks. On a 
similar note, Hamman et al’s (2009) study of South African listed companies 
found that being a UNGC participant was not associated with improved 
corporate performance in regards to human rights. Finally, Baumann and 
Scherer (2010), in a case study of the implementation of the UNGC in five Swiss 
companies, also found that these firms are still far from actually embedding the 
principles into their business routine. 
In sum, the literature is far from clear on the ability of the UNGC to shape 
corporate behaviour in regards to CSP. Results are contradictory and studies 
are often challenging to compare as they focus on different elements of the 
initiatives and metrics of CSP. The question remains open academically as to 
the extent to which the UNGC is able to drive improved performance amongst 
participants. 
3.5 A Research Agenda 
While valuable knowledge has been shared in the literature on institutional 
influences on corporate engagement in voluntary CSR initiatives in general and 
the UNGC in particular, some gaps remain. Two main areas of involvement call 
for further studies: drivers for joining and drivers for performance. The first part – 
exploring drivers for joining – brings interesting gaps both in understanding what 
drives firms to join and also what influences speed of adoption. In regards to 
drivers for joining the UNGC, studies have mainly focused on national level 
influences on the decision to join; less attention was dedicated to understanding 
drivers at other levels. For one thing, the role of corporate social performance in 
driving the decision to join a voluntary CSR initiative has been found to be mixed 
- greener firms have been pointed as more likely to join voluntary CSR initiatives 
in some studies (Bansal and Hunter, 2003), while in other cases firms with 
poorer performance were found to be attracted to such initiatives (Videras and 
Alberini, 2000). Questions remain as to what that implies for the UNGC. Equally, 
the role of mimetic mechanisms and of industry factors in determining firms’ 
decision to join voluntary CSR initiatives could benefit from more discussion. To 
the author’s best knowledge, on the literature on the UNGC, industry level 
factors have only been explored as a dichotomous variable concerning whether 
the industry is a high impact one. Questions that could be answered are, for 
example: to what extent UNGC’s penetration in an industry globally might affect 
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subsequent signing up? Similarly, to what extent UNGC penetration in firms’ 
home country might drive firms to sign up to the UNGC? 
In the sphere of speed of adoption, little has been covered in regards to 
voluntary CSR initiatives – except maybe for the ISO14001 certification standard; 
notably, studies on the speed of adoption of the UNGC are extremely scarce 
(Arevalo et al., 2013). While many parallels can be drawn between ISO14001 
and the UNGC, or between certifiable and non-certifiable initiatives, one cannot 
refrain from arguing that the presence or absence of a certification mechanism, 
especially in the early stages of diffusion where risk perception is generally 
greater, may lead to differences on patterns of diffusion and factors that may 
influence it. To the author’s best knowledge, there was only one study on the 
UNGC that looked into speed of adoption (Arevalo et al., 2013). The study, 
however, was restricted to the Spanish context, and focused mainly on the 
interplay between motivations for joining the UNGC and speed of adoption. 
Questions remain open here at drivers for speed of adoption in the UNGC at a 
global level, crossing different institutional contexts. 
As for part 2 – exploring performance – questions remain both in regards to the 
influence of the institutional environment on participants’ performance and the 
impact of joining the UNGC in firms’ CSP. Despite great interest on firm 
performance after joining voluntary CSR initiatives and on institutional influences 
on other aspects of corporate social performance (Campbell, 2007, Matten and 
Moon, 2008, Jeurissen, 2004, Gjolberg, 2009), the literature on institutional 
influences on firm performance on voluntary CSR initiatives was found to be 
incipient (Knudsen, 2011). Articles exploring firms’ corporate social performance 
after joining a voluntary CSR initiative are mainly focused on the impact the 
initiative itself may have on firm behaviour (Boiral and Henri, 2012, Yin and 
Schmeidler, 2009) . Very few articles have looked beyond the immediate impact 
of the initiative to understand the extent to which the characteristics of the firm, 
industry or of its operating environment may influence their performance 
(Knudsen, 2011, Perez-Batres et al., 2012a). While there seems to be some 
agreement in regards to the relevance of stakeholder pressure and scrutiny in 
different guises in improving performance, the small number of studies, different 
focus, idiosyncratic methods and diverse choice of variables make it challenging 
to make conclusions and leave questions open in regards to the drivers for 
performance for firms that decided to participate in these initiatives in general 
and in the UNGC in particular. 
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In addition, a lot of attention has been placed on the UNGC’s ability to shape 
corporate behaviour in regards to CSP. The initiative has often been accused of 
not having the means of ensuring substantive responsible corporate behaviour 
consistent with the principles participants sign up for. Surprisingly though, only a 
small number of studies have tackled this question empirically, and often with a 
limited sample or a measure of performance that did not encompass the full 
spectrum of UNGC issues. Results found were mixed, with some acknowledging 
the UNGC impact on firm behaviour, while others positing that the initiative was 
weak at best in influencing corporate action (Hamann et al., 2009, Baumann and 
Scherer, 2010, Chen and Bouvain, 2009, Runhaar and Lafferty, 2009). While this 
discussion remains open, enough evidence exists on the variation on 
performance across participants, highlighting the importance of further exploring 
this question. Finally, still in regards to performance, it was often the case that 
the measures of performance in the UNGC were focused on a single issue, 
such as human rights (Hamann et al., 2009), or on one aspect of performance 
(Chen and Bouvain, 2009); a measure of performance encompassing the full 
spectrum of UNGC issues and principles was not found in the literature.  
In response to these shortcomings, the overall objective of this study is to 
understand the extent to which institutional forces can shape firm involvement in 
the UNGC. Specifically, this study aims at answering the following questions:  
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A stronger understanding of the impact of institutional pressures on corporate 
involvement in voluntary CSR initiatives can arguably represent valuable 
information in a number of spheres, notably in a context where these aim to play 
an important role in governing corporate behaviour in a globalised world. This is 
especially relevant for the UNGC. Being the largest CSR initiative in the world, 
the UNGC is watched closely by supporters and critics of this model of 
decentralised institutions through voluntary CSR initiatives. Arguably its success 
or failure may have an impact on this model as a whole. Therefore, knowledge 
on aspects that make the initiative more or less effective in attracting firms and 
getting them to abide to the commitments made, is very valuable for both 
academics and practitioners.  
The next chapter will address the methodological aspects of the thesis covering 
the epistemology and ontology that guided this research, the methodological 
choices, an overview of the data, and the limitations of this study. While 
methodological aspects specific to each empirical study will be covered in the 
corresponding chapter, chapter three will offer an overview of the methodology 
used in this thesis. 
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4 Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will cover the overall research strategy of this thesis. In other words 
it will not cover details of samples or methodology specifics to each empirical 
chapter - that will be covered within each empirical chapter; it will rather present 
overarching information about the methods used and key considerations that 
underpin this work. It will start with a discussion on the epistemology and 
ontology that guided this research. This will be followed by an explanation of the 
research strategy and design used and what has been done in previous UNGC 
studies. A discussion on the data used will follow. Once again that will not cover 
the specifics of sample for each study, but rather present the key data sources 
and justify the choice of data, notably for the dependent variables. Finally, a 
brief discussion on the limitations of this approach will be presented. 
4.2 Epistemology and Ontology 
Epistemology refers to “what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable 
knowledge in a discipline” (Bryman, 2008: 13). There are primarily two main 
“epistemological paradigms” in research: positivism and interpretivism, which 
are mainly divided by the discussion on whether the social world can and should 
be studied following the same approach as the one applied to the natural 
sciences (Bryman, 2008). Positivism is an epistemological position that supports 
the application of the methods of the natural science to the study of the social 
world. Among other aspects, positivism proposes that an objective external 
reality exists beyond our descriptions of it and that only knowledge that can be 
confirmed by the senses can be considered knowledge (Bryman, 2008). The 
position that underlines this study is that corporate social performance is an 
observable phenomenon, which, despite the challenges and limitations 
discussed in earlier sections can be measured.  
Ontology, on the other hand, refers to whether the social world is external to the 
actors (objectivism), or if it is something actors are in the process of building and 
modifying continuously (constructionism) (Bryman, 2008). If understood as a 
continuum between those two extremes, this thesis is towards the objectivism 
side, understanding organisations as concrete objects, with its own set of rules, 
procedures, guides, hierarchy, that exist separate from actors. 
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4.3 Research methodology 
The research methodology applied in this thesis is guided by the objective to 
answer four questions. These focus on the relevance of institutional influences 
at national, industry and firm levels in driving firms’ decision to join the UNGC, in 
defining speed of adoption, in shaping corporate performance in the UNGC 
principles and finally the role of the UNGC itself in shaping corporate 
performance in the commitments firms signed up for. Figure two below 
represents the research questions. Starting from broader areas of enquiry, it 
narrows down to show the specific research questions. 
Figure 2: Research agenda 
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analysis and collection, sees social reality as an objective reality external to the 
social actor, follows a positivist model and generally uses a deductive approach 
to establishing the relationship between theory and research, i.e. going from 
theory, to hypothesis building, data collection, results, review of hypothesis and 
of theory (Bryman, 2008). This work used a quantitative strategy, and followed a 
process of deduction, as outlined below: 
1. Theoretical review: review of different theories explaining drivers for CSP 
and choice of institutional theory as the one best fit to help building 
understanding on institutional influences on firm involvement with the 
UNGC. Development of an overarching conceptual framework, followed 
by specific theoretical pieces within each empirical chapter, i.e. focusing 
on each empirical question. 
2. Hypothesis: Based on the theory, development of specific hypothesis in 
regards to each of the four empirical questions within each empirical 
chapter. 
3. Data collection: Based on the theoretical review and informed by 
previous empirical work, gathering of secondary data followed both for 
the dependent and independent variables. 
4. Findings: Data analysis followed, and relevant findings emerged. 
5. Hypothesis review: Following the findings, hypothesis were reviewed and 
either confirmed or rejected. 
6. Revision of theory: a discussion on to what extent and how findings and 
theory align or contradict each other closes each empirical chapter and 
the overall thesis. 
Given the stated epistemology and ontology, as well as the need to understand 
drivers for certain corporate behaviour (involvement with voluntary CSR 
initiatives) across different countries – therefore by necessity dealing with a 
large number of observations – a quantitative strategy seemed most appropriate.  
4.3.2 Research design 
This thesis uses a combination of cross-sectional and longitudinal research 
designs, depending on the research question at hand in each empirical chapter. 
Cross-sectional research design is defined as focusing in more than one case 
(generally several) at a single point in time, with the objective of having a body 
of quantitative data on two or more variables to be used to understand patterns 
of association (Bryman, 2008). Longitudinal design, on the other hand, 
considers repeated observations of the same cases overtime (Bryman, 2008), 
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making it a valuable tool to understand, for example, change in firm’s 
performance. 
4.3.3 Methods for analysis 
Methods for analysis will be explored in more details within each empirical 
chapter. However, it is important to note that given this thesis’ interest in 
understanding predictors for corporate behaviour related to involvement in 
voluntary CSR initiatives, it relies on regression as method for analysis. The 
type of regression used varies across the four empirical studies depending on 
the dependent variables and specifics of each study. 
4.3.4 Alignment with previous research on drivers for joining and 
performance in the UNGC  
In addition to being methodologically appropriate to achieve the objectives of 
this thesis, the choices of strategy, design and methods are largely aligned with 
the previous research on the UNGC, both in studies exploring decisions on 
joining and performance. The table below presents a summary of relevant 
studies:
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participation in the NYSE (mimetic). 
Being from a Western Europe country 
was only relevant when no other 
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Analyses drivers for engagement in the 
UNGC. Finds that firm size, 
government involvement (UN Vendor), 
cost of exit (extractive industry) and 
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found to increase the likelihood to 
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country;   
DV4=Launch 
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principles integration into 5 Swiss 
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are still far from actually fully 
embedding the UNGC into their 
business routines. 
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Analyses South African companies' 
reporting practices, to assess how 
companies deal with human rights. 
Participant status in the UNGC is an 
IV. Focus is not on the UNGC only, but 
hypothesises that "Members of the 
UNGC will show greater due diligence 
on human rights". Used content 
analysis of annual and sustainability 
reports of largest 100 companies by 
market cap listed on JSE stock 
exchange to assess human rights 
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level study, author found that firms 
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firms have a higher probability of being 
delisted, however, firms in the oil and 
gas sector have a lower probability of 
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author found that good domestic 
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It is clear that the research is mostly quantitative, relying often on large samples 
of firms across different countries. Regression of some type is also predominant 
(67% of studies) as a method for analysis. Cross-sectional research 




This section will present the dependent and independent variables used in this 
study. Specific details on sample and building of dependent variables will be 
provided in each empirical chapter. This section will offer an overview of the 
variables used, the sources and the some of the challenges encountered in the 
process of data collection. 
4.4.1 Dependent variables 
The ASSET4 dataset, provided by Thompson Reuters, was used to build the 
dependent variables in performance and sign up. ASSET4 provides in-depth 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) data on more than 4,000 global 
listed companies, including S&P 500, Russell 1000, MSCI Europe, FTSE 250, 
ASX 300, the MSCI World Index and the 250 MSCI emerging markets 
companies. With history going back to 2002 on over 1,000 firms, the dataset 
includes over 750 ESG data points and more than 250 key performance 
indicators. Trained analysts prepare the ratings using publicly available data 
about the companies including annual and sustainability reports, NGOs 
websites, stock exchange filings, various news sources, among others. 
According to Thompson Reuters, ASSET4 specialises in providing information 
to professional investors and has a process in place to ensure that every data 
point goes through a multi-step verification and quality control, including data 
entry checks, historical comparisons and automated quality rules. This data is 
divided into four pillars representing performance in economic, environmental, 
social and governance issues. A summary of the structure of the ASSET4 data 
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Figure 3: ASSET4 data structure (ThomsonReuters, 2014) 
 
 
Following the assessment of different datasets, it was clear that ASSET4 offered 
a valuable source of data for the studies in this thesis. First, it offered a global 
coverage, with firms from both developed and developing countries. Finding a 
dataset with this coverage was a major challenge, as a number of the datasets 
used in the literature cover only developed countries or a single country (for 
example, the KLD). However challenging, this coverage was necessary to study 
the UNGC, given the global nature of the initiative. Secondly, it offered a wide 
range of CSP indicators, covering to a good extent all UNGC issues and 
principles. This was also an important condition to understand firms’ 
performance in the commitments they have signed up for. Finally, it offered CSP 
data for most of the time that the UNGC has existed. While the time coverage 
was not perfect, as it would have been ideal to have data since before the 
launch of the UNGC, ASSET4 data starts from only two years after the launch of 
the initiative.  
This is not to say that it is not with out limitations. Three issues should be 
highlighted. First, while both developed and developing countries are 
represented, the majority of the firms in the dataset are from developed 
countries. This is arguably a result from the fact that most large listed firms 
globally are from developed countries and therefore while not desirable it was 
expected given ASSET4’s universe. Secondly, large companies compose the 
dataset. This arguably does not cover the full spectrum of the UNGC 
participants, given that small and medium enterprises also participate. However, 
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comparable and consistent data on small and medium enterprises across 
different countries are very challenging to obtain and, at the large scale needed 
for this thesis, to the author’s best knowledge, is not available. While this might 
not be ideal, it is not different from most of UNGC research, as shown on table 
five. Finally, some level of data inconsistency was found. There was some 
discrepancy in regards to the data of whether firms were participants or not in a 
given year, when compared to the data on sign up provided by the UNGC. 
Although not desirable, the level of discrepancy was not deemed to be high 
enough to compromise the results. More details are presented in chapter four 
under dependent variable (section 5.2.2). 
ASSET4 data has been used before in the academic literature, for example in a 
2012 paper by Ioannou and Serafeim (2012). In this paper, the authors analyse 
the role of nation-level institutions in driving firm behaviour in regards to CSP, 
and use ASSET4’s ESG data to measure firms’ corporate social performance. 
More specifically the authors use the environmental and social metrics to build 
their own composite CSR index (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). Roulet and 
Touboul (2014) also used the ASSET4 dataset in a study of the relationship 
between economic liberalism at national level and firms’ engagement in 
symbolic and substantive corporate social action.  
This thesis used different variables and subsamples of the ASSET4 dataset. 
More details are provided in each empirical chapter. 
4.4.2 Independent variables 
Following a revision of the literature and the conceptual development, 
independent and control variables were selected for each empirical chapter. The 
table below summarises the variables used, indicating the chapter where they 
were used. A more detailed description of the variables follows. 
 
Table 9: Summary of independent and control variables 







Government support to the 
UN’s human rights instruments 




Government support to the 
UN’s labour instruments 





Government support to the 
UN’s Environment instruments 
1 or 0 4, 5 






Government support to the 
UN’s anti-corruption 
instruments 
1 or 0 4, 5 
5 Credit market 
regulation 
 
Stringency of regulatory 








4, 5, 6 
6 Labour market 
regulation 
 
Stringency of regulatory 












Stringency of regulatory 








4, 5, 6, 7 
8 Voice and 
Accountability 






9 Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence 




























13 Control of 
Corruption 






14 Polity IV Level of democracy -10 to +10 4, 5, 6 
15 Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Inward FDI investment stock Any 6 
16 DEVELOPEDV
SNOT 









Number of GRI participants in 
the country 
Any 5 
18 UNGC Network  Presence of a UNGC Network  1=yes, 0=No 6 





Number of academic UNGC 
participants in a country 
Any 4 
20 Local NGOs 
 
Number of local NGOs UNGC 
participants in a country 
Any 4, 5, 6 
21 Global NGOs 
 
Number of global NGOs 
concentration in a country 
Any 4, 5, 6 
22 Regional 
Participation 
Measure of geographic 
proximity 





Measures of UNGC 
penetration in country  





Measures of UNGC 
penetration in industry 
Any 4, 5 
25 Peer pressure 
for performance 
at country level 
Peer pressure for performance 
at country level 
Any 6, 7 
26 Peer pressure 
for performance 
at industry level 
Peer pressure for performance 
at industry level   
Any 6, 7 
27 Extractive 
industry 
Firm belongs to the extractive 
industry (metal mining, coal 
mining, oil&gas extraction, 
mining and quarrying of non-
metallic minerals) 
1=Yes, 0=No 4, 5, 6, 7 
28 Firm size Firm size measured as the log 
of employees 
Any 4, 5, 6, 7 
29 ROTA  Slack resources measured as 
return on assets 
Any 4, 5, 6, 7 
30 Leverage Slack resources measured as 
leverage, which is a ratio of 
long term debt by assets 




Advertisement intensity Any 4, 5 
32 Trade with the 
EU 
 
Trade ties with Europe 1=Yes, 0=No 4, 5 
33 Foreign sales 
per total sales 
 
Level of firm 
internationalisation 
Any 6 
34 Board gender 
diversity 
Board diversity Any 6 
35 SOCSCORE Corporate Social Performance 
- Social 
0-100 4, 5 
36 ENVSCORE Corporate Social Performance 
– Environment 
0-100 4, 5 
37 CGVSCORE Corporate Social Performance 
– Corporate Governance 






1=Yes, 0=No 5 
39 Previous 
performance 
Lag of each dependent 
variable 
Any 6, 7 
40 Time of 
participation in 
the UNGC 
Number of years since first 





Indicates whether firm is a 
participant in that year 
1=Yes, 0=No 7 
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current year 
42 Early Indicates whether a firm is an 
early joiner or not 
1=Yes, 0=No 7 
43 Middle Indicates whether a firm is a 
middle joiner or not 
1=Yes, 0=No 7 
44 Late Indicates whether a firm is a 
late joiner or not 
1=Yes, 0=No 7 
 
 (1 to 4) Government’s support to the UN reflects whether a country had ratified 
or otherwise presented the appropriate expression of support to the international 
agreements/declarations/treaties that underlie the UNGC 10 principles, by the 
end of 2009. Data for the following international instruments were used: 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Labour Organisation's 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development and the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption. This data was obtained from the United Nations’ website and is 
represented by a dummy variable (1 meaning yes and 0 meaning no). In the 
case of human rights and labour, where more than one international instruments 
are at the base of the principles, a country only received a “1” if they had 
demonstrated support for all of them by the end of 2009. The use of this variable 
is inspired by and builds mainly on the work of Lim and Tsutsui (2012) but of 
some other authors as well (Bennie et al., 2007, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, 
Bernhagen et al., 2012). 
(5 to 7) Stringency of regulatory environment was operationalised following 
Berliner and Prakash (2010). It encompasses measures of the stringency of 
credit market regulations, labour market regulations and business regulations, 
taken from the Economic Freedom of the World dataset. For these indicators, 
the larger the number the higher the freedom or the less stringent the regulatory 
environment is. 
The variable for credit market regulations is formed by a combination of the 
following elements: ownership of banks, private sector credit and interest rate 
controls / negative real interest rates. A higher rate indicates that the country 
uses a private banking system to allocate credit to private organisations and 
refrains from controlling interest rates. Labour market regulations combines 
hiring regulations and minimum wage, hiring and firing regulations, centralized 
collective bargaining, working hours regulations, mandated cost of worker 
dismissal, and conscription. A country that receives a higher rating therefore has 
more flexible labour laws, leaving market forces to define wages as well as 
hiring and firing conditions. Finally, business regulations refer to a combination 
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of administrative requirements, bureaucracy costs, starting a business, extra 
payments/bribes/favouritism, licensing restrictions and cost of tax compliance. 
Countries that receive higher ratings here leave markets to define prices and do 
not display regulatory activities that cause delays to entry into business and 
increase costs of production (Gwartney et al., 2011). 
(8 to 13) Governance was represented by the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). The WGI cover over 200 countries since 1996, 
and consists of composite indicators in six dimensions of governance, namely: 
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption. Estimate of governance for each dimension ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak governance performance) to +2.5 (strong governance 
performance). Voice and Accountability represents the extent to which citizens 
feel they are able to select their government, as well as enjoy freedom of 
expression and association. Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
represents the perception of the likelihood that a government will be destabilised 
by unconstitutional or violent means. Government Effectiveness represents 
perceptions of the quality of civil service as well as of policy formulation and 
implementation; it also reflects perceptions of government’s commitments to 
public policies. Regulatory Quality reflects perceptions of the government’s 
ability to define and implement policies that allow for the development of the 
private sector. Rule of Law reflects the extent to which stakeholders trust and 
are likely to abide by the rules of society. Finally, Control of Corruption shows 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is used for private gain. 
(14) Level of democracy was represented by the Polity IV dataset provided by 
the Centre for Systemic Peace. It follows similar use in other studies (Perkins 
and Neumayer, 2010, Lim and Tsutsui, 2012, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, 
Bernhagen et al., 2012). This indicator ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 
(full autocracy).  
(15) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was represented by Inward FDI investment 
stock, annual, as provided by UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development), Division on Investment and Enterprise. 
(16) Level of economic development was represented by a dummy variables 
DEVELOPEDVSNOT, which takes a value of 1 if the country is classified as a 
developed economy and 0 if otherwise. Country classification was obtained from 
the 2013 World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP), prepared by the 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA), the 
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the five 
United Nations regional commissions (Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (ESCWA).  
(17) GRI participation in home country was calculated by aggregating at country 
level the ASSET4’s data on firm’s use of GRI in reporting, using SPSS.  
(18) UNGC Network Launch was obtained from the UNGC website and is 
represented by a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a UNGC network was 
launched in the country in 2010 or before and 0 if otherwise.  
(19) Academic organisations concentration in a country is represented by the 
cumulative participation of academic organisations in the UNGC in each country 
per year. This data was calculated using the UNGC dataset. 
(20 and 21) NGOs concentration in a country is represented by the cumulative 
participation of such organisations (global and local NGOs) in the UNGC in each 
country per year. These variables were calculated using data from the UNGC 
dataset and follow similar use in the literature (Bernhagen et al., 2012, Perez-
Batres et al., 2011).  
(22) Geographic proximity was also calculated from ASSET4 data and 
represents the number of UNGC participants in a given geographical sub-region 
of the world in a particular year, namely: Australia and New Zealand, Central 
America, Central Asia, Eastern Africa, Eastern Asia, Eastern Europe, Northern 
Africa, Northern America, Northern Europe, South America, South-Eastern Asia, 
Southern Africa, Southern Asia, Southern Europe, Western Africa, Western Asia, 
Western Europe. Country classifications were taken from the United Nations 
Statistics Division. This builds on Lim and Tsutsui’s (2012)  use of a similar 
measure, although these authors used broader geographic areas.  
(23 and 24) Measures of UNGC penetration in country and industry were 
calculated from ASSET4 data, and reflect the percentage of firms in the sample 
that were participants in a given industry, or a given country per year, lagged by 
one year. That follows and builds on Lim and Tsutsui (2012) use of number of 
participants in the country lagged by one year as an independent variable. 
(25 and 26) Peer pressure at country and industry levels reflects the average 
performance of firms in the total sample (i.e. participants and non-participants) 
for each of the dependent variables, i.e. for each model a different set of 
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variables was created. It was calculated from ASSET4 data, using SPSS, and 
lagged by one year. 
(27) A dummy for extractive industry was created in SPSS. It gathers firms 
classified under SIC codes 10 (metal mining), 12 (coal mining), 13 (oil and gas 
extraction) and 14 (mining and quarrying of non-metallic minerals, except fuels). 
Authors have found different solutions to represent high impact industries. 
Bansal and Bogner (2002) focused on mining, forestry and chemicals; Knudsen 
(2011) focused on oil and manufacturing; Perez-Bastres et al (2012b) developed 
their own pollution intensiveness ranking; and Bernhagen and Mitchel (2010) 
looked into oil and gas and materials (these including mining and forestry 
product companies). Recognising this variety and the lack of a one fully agreed 
definition of high impact / extractive industry, this study follows EITI (Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative)’s focus on oil, gas and mining companies as 
firms in the extractive industry (EITI, 2014).  
(28) Firm size was measured as the log of employees, calculated from the 
variable number of employees provided by Datastream.  
(29 and 30) Slack resources are represented by ROTA (return on total assets) 
and Leverage (ratio of long term debt by assets). The data was obtained from 
Datastream. 
(31) Advertising intensity was built as a ratio of advertisement expenditure by 
sales. The data was obtained from Datastream.  
(32) A large number of articles use measures of trade ties at national level, 
rather than firm level (Perez-Batres et al., 2010, Neumayer and Perkins, 2004, 
Delmas and Montiel, 2008, Tambunlertchai et al., 2013). This study measures 
trade ties with Europe at firm level in order to allow for a more fine-grained 
analysis of the impact of this relationship in the decision to join the UNGC. One 
could argue that the fact that a country has trade ties with Europe does not 
necessarily imply in that all firms in that country will have the same. Therefore, 
for the purpose of this study a firm level variable seemed to offer a more 
appropriate measure. This indicator was calculated using Datastream data for 
home country and trade activities outside of home country. It takes a value of 1 
if a firm is not from the EU but has trade activities with it and a value of zero if 
otherwise (firm from the EU or firm not from the EU but has no trade activities 
with the EU).  
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(33) Level of firm internationalisation was represented by the variable 
FORSALESTOTALSALES. This is represented by foreign sales as a percentage 
of total sales, both obtained from Datastream. 
(34) Board gender diversity was obtained from ASSET4 and represents the 
percentage of women on the board of directors. 
(35 to 37) Three composite measures of performance were used, namely: 
SOCSCORE (social performance), ENVSCORE (environmental performance) 
and CVGSCORE (corporate governance performance). This data was obtained 
from ASSET4. Scores are a number between 0 and 100 that show the firm’s 
performance in comparison to the remaining ASSET4 universe for a particular 
issue.  
(38) Prior ISO 14001 certification was obtained from ASSET4’s variable 
ENERDP073. This is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm was 
ISO14001 certified and 0 if otherwise. The data used was for the year 2009. 
(39) To measure Previous performance the dependent variable for each model 
was lagged by one year. 
(40) Time of participation in the UNGC was measured as the number of years 
that have passed since the focal firm was first classified as a UNGC participant 
by ASSET4.  
(41) UNGC participant in current year – This variable indicates whether a firm is 
an UNGC participant in the current year. This data was obtained from ASSET4. 
It takes a value of one if the firm was a participant in that year, and zero if 
otherwise. 
(42) Early – This variable builds on ASSET4 data. It takes a value of one if the 
firm was first classified as a UNGC participant by ASSET4 in 2002 or 2003, and 
zero if otherwise.  
(43) Middle - This variable builds on ASSET4 data. It takes a value of one if the 
firm was first classified as a UNGC participant by ASSET4 between 2004 and 
2007, and zero if otherwise.  
(44) Late - This variable builds on ASSET4 data. It takes a value of one if the 
firm was first classified as a UNGC participant by ASSET4 in 2008 of afterwards, 
and zero if otherwise.  
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4.5 Limitations of methodology used 
The main limitations to be highlighted relate to the data. Limitations in regards to 
data availability have been discussed in more details above, but in a nutshell 
ASSET4 covers basically large firms, i.e. it does not cover a large part of UNGC 
participants that are small and medium enterprises. While this is not desirable, 
in practical terms and to the author’s best knowledge there are no alternatives 
sources covering all types of firms’ CSP at this scale. A review of other UNGC 
studies reflects similar constraints, with most cross-national studies covering 
mainly large firms.  
It should also be highlighted that, even though the ASSET4 dataset covers all 
UNGC principles to greater or lesser extent, there is not a single widely 
accepted list of variables to measure performance in the UNGC. In other words, 
while every effort was made to ensure the choice of performance variables was 
based on a clear methodology and a solid argument, reflecting performance in 
every principle, there is some degree of researcher discretion on the choice of 
variables. In this regard, it would be interesting to replicate the study with other 
set of variables to see if results would be similar. 
4.6 Summary and next chapter 
This chapter aimed at presenting an overview of key methodological aspects of 
this thesis. It did not aim at giving a detailed description of the methods used, as 
this is treated within each empirical chapter. This thesis uses a quantitative 
strategy, and a combination of cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. It also 
makes use of a multi-country dataset, and covers multiple levels of institutional 
influences in corporate behaviour, namely at firm, industry and national levels. 
These set of methodological choices offered the most appropriate alternative to 
answer the research questions as it allowed for a cross-national analysis of 
multi-level institutional influences on firm behaviour in regards to the UNGC, 
covering a large number of firms, from several countries and industries, over 
most of the UNGC’s lifetime. 
The next chapter (chapter four) will address the first empirical question, i.e. to 
what extent institutional pressures shape firms’ decision to join the UNGC. 
Using a quantitative strategy and a cross-sectional design, it explores the extent 
to which regulative, normative and cognitive/mimetic pressures shape the 
decision to join this voluntary CSR initiative. 
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5 Chapter 4: Understanding drivers for the 
decision to join the UNGC 
The literature has theorised about reasons for firms’ decision to join voluntary 
CSR initiatives. As discussed in section 3.2.1, two explanations are prominent: a 
search for legitimacy or approval from its stakeholders and a search for greater 
efficiency or performance (Bansal and Bogner, 2002). There is arguably great 
appreciation from a number of stakeholders for such initiatives, which may 
confer companies the desired legitimacy following the decision to join. In the 
case of ISO14001, a number of governments were involved in the design of the 
certification, therefore arguably being more prone to providing incentives for the 
adoption of it (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). However, some stakeholders 
show concern that firms may use voluntary CSR initiatives to signal commitment 
without actual behaviour change. In such cases, the initiative’s power to confer 
legitimacy may be at stake. On the efficiency side, the literature remains largely 
inconclusive about the actual impact of said initiatives on corporate social 
performance (Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, Darnall and Sides, 2008, Arimura 
et al., 2011, Aravind and Christmann, 2010). While some firms may publicise 
high savings following the implementation of Environmental Management 
Systems (EMS) or ISO14001 certification for example, others find the 
investment not to result on any savings at all (Bansal and Bogner, 2002). Given 
the uncertain outcomes in both fronts, what still drives firms to join CSR 
voluntary initiatives?  
In addition to uncertain outcomes, the act of joining imposes restrictions on firms’ 
actions. The UNGC, while not having the mandate or the resources to verify 
actual performance, arguably imposes restrictions on corporate behaviour once 
firms’ commitment to the principles is made public and so are their 
communications on progress. Other initiatives such as the ISO14001 impose 
more direct control of firms’ actions, through verification and certification. The 
question is presented again as to what drives firms to choose to join and self-
impose limitations to their own actions.  
It has been theorised that characteristics of the firm, its industry and its 
environment may increase pressures and benefits for firms to join voluntary 
CSR initiatives. As discussed in section 3.2.2, bigger and wealthier firms in 
highly polluting industries, firms with higher levels of internationalisation, those 
dealing with a broad network and notably critical voices, those whose peers 
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have higher levels of adoption, those under stricter regulation or trying to pre-
empt higher levels of regulation, have all been pointed as being more likely to 
engage in voluntary CSR initiatives (Bansal and Bogner, 2002, Bernhagen and 
Mitchell, 2010, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011, Campbell, 2007, Johnstone 
and Labonne, 2009). Evidence on the role of previous performance has been, 
however, mixed - greener firms have been pointed as more likely to join 
voluntary CSR initiatives in some studies (Bansal and Hunter, 2003), while in 
other cases firms with poorer performance were found to be attracted to such 
initiatives (Videras and Alberini, 2000). 
In the case of the UNGC, as reviewed in section 3.2.4, studies have mainly 
focused on national level influences on the decision to join. Higher level of 
democracy, green party participation, country commitment to the UN, presence 
of counterbalancing voices, home country trade ties with Europe and/or with 
UNGC-oriented trade partners, and liberal economic orientation at home have 
all been associated with higher likelihood of joining. Less attention was 
dedicated to understanding drivers at other levels, although being in a high 
impact industry, as well as being big, being a UN vendor and listed in NYSE 
have also been pointed as leading to a higher likelihood of joining (Bennie et al., 
2007, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, Bernhagen et al., 2012, Lim and Tsutsui, 
2012, Perez-Batres et al., 2010, Perez-Batres et al., 2011, Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2010). 
While valuable knowledge exists on the drivers for corporate decision to join 
voluntary CSR initiatives in general and the UNGC in particular, gaps remain in 
the literature. For one thing, the role of firms’ CSP in driving the decision to join 
the UNGC is incipient in the literature. Are higher performers more or less likely 
to join the UNGC? Equally, the role of mimetic mechanisms and industry factors 
in determining firms’ decision to join could benefit from more discussion. To the 
author’s best knowledge, on the UNGC literature, industry level factors have 
only been explored as a dichotomous variable representing belonging to a high 
impact industry. Questions that remain are: to what extent UNGC’s penetration 
in an industry globally might affect subsequent signing up? Similarly, to what 
extent UNGC penetration in firms’ home country might drive the decision to join? 
This study aims at answering these questions and helping build knowledge on 
the drivers for joining the UNGC, contributing to the flourishing literature on this 
initiative. 
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5.1 Understanding the decision to join 
This section builds on the overarching theoretical framing provided in chapter 
one, and applies it to the specific questions this chapter aims at answering. The 
proposed hypothesis are organised around the three pillars or mechanisms of 
institutions. 
Firms’ signing up to voluntary CSR initiatives has grown over time (Waddock, 
2008). Given their voluntary nature, firms are able to decide whether or not to 
become a participant. This decision, even though ultimately made by the firm, is 
not an isolated one, but rather a decision taken within a context. Institutional 
theory predicts that regulative, normative and cognitive aspects of firms’ 
institutional environment will influence firms’ decision to adopt a certain 
organisational practice (Scott, 2008). Institutions establish what is considered 
appropriate behaviour through explicit rules and procedures, as well as through 
principles and norms implicit in daily activities (Bernhagen et al., 2012). Firms 
will aim to conform (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to the dominant practices 
within their operating environment in order to obtain legitimacy and ultimately 
ensure its survival in the long run (Scott, 2008). This will lead to increasingly 
homogenous behaviour, as firms strive to “fit-in” and conform to expectations 
and requirements.   
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose that organisations will often be rewarded 
for being similar to other organisations in their field, even if the isomorphic 
process does not present clear efficiency benefits for the implementing 
organisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This similarity may facilitate inter-
organisational transactions, ensure that firms fit into eligibility requirements for 
public and private contracts, help attract professionals and ultimately help firms 
being acknowledged as legitimate and reputable (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
In the case of the UNGC, the number of participating firms has increased from 
42 when the initiative was launched in 2000 11  to over 7,000 business 
participants in 2013, from more than 145 countries (UNGC, 2013i). The 
numbers have led to the UNGC being pointed as the foremost CSR initiative in 
the world (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010), suggesting an important convergence 
in firm behaviour in regards to joining the Compact.  
Whereas indeed the UNGC covers a vast number of firms, there remain 
companies that decide not to join the UNGC. Even if an institutional perspective 
                                                
11 Source: UNGC dataset 
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focuses on structure and constraints, one cannot refrain from appreciating that 
firms subject to similar institutional pressures may choose to respond differently 
to them (Oliver, 1991). The tension between actors’ ability to act and limitations 
imposed on their action by structural and cultural constraints is an on going 
discussion in the literature (Scott, 2008).  
As discussed in section 2.1.6, Oliver (1991) suggests that conforming is not the 
only available choice for an organisation faced with institutional pressures and 
organisations’ willingness, capacity and ability to conform will drive their 
response to the institutional demands. Therefore, despite the UNGC being 
recognised as the largest CSR initiative in the world (Arevalo et al., 2013), 
despite the support and engagement from several firms, NGOs, among other 
stakeholders, there remains variation in sign up across countries, industries and 
ultimately firms.   
5.1.1 Regulative / Coercive Mechanism 
Following institutional theory and as discussed in section 2.1.3.1, the regulative 
pillar is based on coercive isomorphism (Scott, 2008, DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). Coercive isomorphism stems from formal and informal pressures applied 
to organisations by actors upon whom organisations are dependent and theory 
predicts that the higher the level of dependency the higher the observed level of 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
The regulative pillar with its coercive mechanisms is often associated with the 
political system, or the state (Berrone et al., 2013, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011). States may influence organisational behaviour and adoption of practices 
by providing incentives or implementing sanctions (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011). In the role of customers, states may also exercise coercive force by 
requiring organisations acting as their contractors or suppliers to adopt certain 
practices (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011).  
Greater acquiescence with regulations, rules and laws can offer the organisation 
some protection from political risks (in the form of closer monitoring, for example) 
and legal coercion (in the form of more stringent regulation or enforcement of 
existing regulations) (Berrone et al., 2013). Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) 
illustrate the argument with the example of the EMAS (Eco-Management Audit 
Scheme), the first international environmental standard developed by the 
European Union. While the EMAS was voluntary, the European Commission 
retained the right to implement compulsory registration in the future. By creating 
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the threat of new and more stringent regulation, governments may provide 
incentives for firms to adhere to voluntary standards (Delmas and Montes-
Sancho, 2011).  
Johnstone and Labonne (2009) also use certification of environmental 
management systems (EMS) as an example. The authors propose that 
regulators will see certification of the firm’s EMS as a signal of commitment to 
good environmental performance. Having scarce resources, regulators arguably 
assume that certified EMS are followed by better environmental performance. 
Therefore, regulators may choose not to visit certified firms and focus efforts 
and resources on firms which are perceived as being at higher risk of poor 
performance (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009, Potoski and Prakash, 2005a). 
Authors have also highlighted the potential high costs of non-compliance with 
regulations (Berrone et al., 2013). 
Engagement in voluntary CSR initiatives arguably sends a signal to regulators 
that the focal firm is seeking to improve its CSP, going beyond basic 
requirements of regulations (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009, Potoski and 
Prakash, 2005a). Even though the actual results of firm engagement on 
voluntary CSR initiatives remain uncertain and to some extent controversial, 
these initiatives are arguably often seen as a positive sign of commitment. 
Therefore, a public commitment to these initiatives may not only help firms 
improve legitimacy but also avoid penalties for non-compliance (Berrone et al., 
2013) or the bearing of more stringent regulation (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011). A more stringent regulatory environment is therefore arguably going to 
offer more incentives to increasing firm engagement in voluntary initiatives. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms headquartered in countries with a more stringent 
regulatory environment are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Along similar lines, it has been theorised that governments’ attitude towards a 
certain standard or initiative may influence firms’ decision to join them (Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho, 2011). If a government is sympathetic to an initiative or 
has dedicated resources to support its development, it may, for example, 
provide firms with incentives to join or threaten non-participants (Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2011). Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) found that 
government participation in the design of ISO14001 was positively and 
significantly associated with the number of ISO14001 certifications in a country. 
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The UN -an intergovernmental organisation – is behind the UNGC and the 
UNGC’s principles are based on international treaties, declarations or 
agreements of some sort12, for which member-states may declare their support. 
Arguably the UN’s sponsorship to the UNGC should increase its credibility in the 
eyes of governments and other stakeholders and as a result increase its 
attractiveness to firms (Berliner and Prakash, 2010). Governments however 
have different agendas and the level of support and appreciation of the UN 
varies greatly across countries (Bernhagen et al., 2012, Berliner and Prakash, 
2010). For example, since the UN’s foundation, the United States have been 
particularly ambivalent in their attitude towards this organisation: while it is the 
UN’s host and main financial contributor, the United States delays signing or 
ratifying important human rights and environment treaties (Bennie et al., 2007). 
As a result, differences in governments’ attitudes towards the UN may influence 
firms’ decision to join the UNGC. As noted by Janney, Dess and Forlani (2009) 
“affiliation with the UNGC in Europe is perceived as less controversial, and more 
in line with prevalent, commonly-held values, than it would be in the United 
States”. Therefore, following previous studies (Bernhagen et al., 2012) one can 
argue that the more supportive governments are of the institutions behind the 
UNGC, the more likely they will be to provide incentives for firms to join, or 
constrain non-participation, therefore influencing firms’ signing up in the country. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms headquartered in countries whose government 
demonstrates greater support to the UN are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Home country levels of democracy have also been pointed in the literature as a 
potential influence on firms’ inclination to join voluntary CSR initiatives 
(Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, Bennie et al., 2007, Perkins and Neumayer, 
2010, Bernhagen et al., 2012). Governments in countries that display a more 
democratic political system usually demonstrate concern for and engagement 
with a wider set of societal interests (Bennie et al., 2007, Perkins and Neumayer, 
2010). Equally, more democratic countries normally outperform less democratic 
peers in a number of welfare areas, including the issue areas of the UNGC – 
prevention of human rights violations, as well as control of pollution and 
corruption (Bennie et al., 2007) and are more prepared to listen to critical voices 
in society, including in regards to corporate behaviour (Perkins and Neumayer, 
2010, Bernhagen et al., 2012). Therefore, it is proposed that firms which are 
                                                
12 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labour Organization's Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 
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under the realm of more democratic governments will be under greater pressure 
(actual or perceived) and therefore have greater incentives to incorporate a 
larger number of welfare concerns into its daily business, including the proactive 
joining of voluntary CSR initiatives. 
High green party participation in home country has also been pointed as a factor 
influencing firm inclination to engage in voluntary CSR initiatives (Bernhagen 
and Mitchell, 2010). In this work this factor is considered covered by level of 
democracy in firm’s home country, given that the argument for the consideration 
of both variables is very similar – governments that have high green party 
participation, alike more democratic countries, are more likely to consider and 
address issues related to sustainability and welfare. Therefore, firms in these 
countries will be under greater pressure or have higher incentives to address 
these issues themselves. Despite these arguments, previous studies on the 
UNGC did not find level of democracy to be significantly associated with 
increasing levels of signing up (Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2010, Bennie et al., 2007, Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). This requires 
further analysis and it is therefore proposed that: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms headquartered in countries with a more democratic 
political system are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Finally, trade relations have also been pointed as having an important impact on 
firm behaviour in regards to CSP. While authors have looked into trade relations 
from a number of different angles and used a wide range of variables to study it, 
the underlying argument is in many ways similar across the studies. While 
coercive power is generally associated with the state, firms are also an 
important source of coercive isomorphism (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011), 
and this pressure can become evident in trade relations, notably across 
countries.  
As proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 150) “coercive isomorphism results 
from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organisations by other 
organisations upon which they are dependant”. One could argue that in a trade 
relationship there is arguably an imbalance of power, where sellers will seek to 
ensure contracts with buyers who would have a pool of sellers to choose from. 
Under those circumstances, firms trading with a country where many local firms 
have adopted a certain standard may need to adopt that standard as well in 
order to be able to trade with local firms (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). 
These incentives for adoption may be more formal as well, and result from 
Chapter 4: Drivers for joining the UNGC 
 134 
requirements advanced by buyers for suppliers to adopt standards that are 
widely implemented in the buyer’s country (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010). 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) found evidence of this on their study of the 
diffusion of ISO14001. Perez-Bastres et al (2010) have also found support for 
this effect in the case of the UNGC, with Latin American firms with stronger 
trade ties with Europe (as opposed to the US) more likely to join the initiative.  
While previous studies on the UNGC have largely used country level trade 
variables, one can extend this argument to say that firms engaged in trade 
relations with firms based in more stringent regulatory environments in regards 
to CSR issues are more likely to be under this sort of pressure to display 
commitment. The EU is pointed as a “partial exception” to the notion of CSR as 
voluntary given a number of directives it has put in place to govern sustainability 
issues, such as for example the Directive for Waste of Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment which imposes obligations in regards to the collection, recycling and 
disposal of these materials (Perez-Batres et al., 2011). Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms that have trade ties with Europe are more likely to 
join the UNGC. 
5.1.2 Normative / Normative Mechanism 
As discussed in chapter one (section 2.1.3.2), normative systems help define 
goals and objectives (for example: making a profit) while also defining what 
constitutes appropriate means to pursue them (for example: sustainable 
business practices) (Scott, 2008). Normative pressures have been typically 
associated with professionalisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). According to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) there are two aspects of professionalisation that 
are important sources of organisational isomorphism. The first rests on the 
standards set by formal university education, and the second is on professional 
networks, which cross organisations and through which new models diffuse 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Universities and professional associations are important centres for the 
definition and dissemination of norms on acceptable organisational and 
professional behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The result is a pool of 
individuals with similar mind frames and orientation, occupying similar positions 
across a number of organisations, and leading to increasing similarities across 
organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Therefore, as proposed by Perez-
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Bastres et al (2011:846), “If we wish to talk about the professionalisation of the 
business world and the legitimacy of the education attained by business leaders, 
we then need to look at the normative effect of the voices found in academe”. 
One can observe growing interest from universities and professional knowledge 
centres on business and sustainability. One example of this is the PRME 
(Principles for Responsible Management Education). Launched in 2007, it aims 
at promoting responsible management education (PRME, 2013). In addition, 
over 700 academic organisations from 85 countries have joined the UNGC as 
participants (UNGC, 2013g). Arguably these organisations are interested in 
corporate social performance and are working to incorporate this issue into its 
professionalisation efforts in their countries. Therefore, the larger the number of 
academic organisations engaged in such initiatives, the stronger the normative 
call in a given country for managers and firms to incorporate these issues into 
their business activities and the more likely it is for these to be considered 
legitimate practices, preached and embraced by a growing number of 
organisations. Perez-Bastres et al (2011) found the number of academic 
organisations that are UNGC participants at home country to be significantly 
associated with sign up. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 5: Firms headquartered in countries with a large number of 
academic organisations that are interested in corporate social 
performance (i.e. UNGC participants) are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Professionalisation is not the only source of normative pressures, though. The 
community, in the form of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), may also 
exercise pressure over firms to adopt a certain practice (Delmas and Montes-
Sancho, 2011). NGOs have gained prominence over the last decades, and have 
been an important voice in seeking to define new roles and responsibilities for 
businesses (Perez-Batres et al., 2011). In line with Perez-Bastres et al (2011) 
NGOs are classified here as a normative force in shaping firm behaviour in 
regards to CSP in general, and voluntary CSR initiatives in particular.  
In reason with this argument, one can expect that countries with strong NGOs’ 
presence and an environment which allows for them to express themselves 
(Perkins and Neumayer, 2010), is likely to display strong normative pressures 
on firms to show higher corporate social performance. In their constant seek for 
legitimacy firms in this environment will have more incentives to engage in 
voluntary CSR initiatives. More specifically and in line with the literature (Perez-
Batres et al., 2011, Bernhagen et al., 2012), it is hypothesised that: 
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 Hypothesis 6: Firms headquartered in countries with a large number of 
NGOs that are interested in corporate social performance (i.e. UNGC 
participants) are more likely to join the UNGC. 
5.1.3 Cognitive / Mimetic Mechanism 
As discussed in section 2.1.3.3, the cognitive pillar is based on shared 
understanding and taken-for-grantedness and isomorphism is achieved through 
mimetic processes (Scott, 2008). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) highlight that 
uncertainty is also a powerful force in encouraging organisational behaviour 
towards isomorphism. When there is uncertainty in the environment 
organisations may be encouraged to mimic the behaviour of other organisations 
perceived by them as successful (and therefore legitimate), in order to ensure 
their own legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Haunschild and Miner, 1997).  
In a study on the use of investment bankers as advisers in acquisition, 
Haunschild and Miner (1997) found uncertainty to enhance frequency imitation. 
Following new institutional theory, the authors propose that organisations will 
tend to mimic actions that have been adopted by a large number of other 
organisations. The authors theorise that organisations may choose to adopt a 
practice as the larger the number of adopters the more the legitimacy of such 
practice is enhanced. As a result, firms seeking legitimacy will aim to adopt 
legitimate practices (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). 
Perez-Bastres et al (2010), in a study of Latin American firms participation in the 
UNGC, found signing up in the UNGC to have a significant positive relationship 
with firm listing in the NYSE. The authors contend that Latin American firms 
listed in the NYSE will see their listed peers as distinguished firms or models to 
be followed. Therefore, Latin American firms will tend to mimic their behaviour in 
order to ensure their legitimacy and survive in the long run. Given the high 
proportion of NYSE listed firms which participate in either the UNGC or the GRI 
(compared to non listed firms in the US) authors expected – and found evidence 
of - Latin American firms to imitate this behaviour, given the arguably high 
acceptance of it among their peer group (Perez-Batres et al., 2010). Lim and 
Tsutsui (2012), however, did not find previous levels of sign up to the UNGC in 
the country to significantly influence current levels of sign up at national level. 
This mimicking behaviour may also occur in a more unconscious way, through 
which certain practices or structures that are frequently adopted start to be 
“taken for granted” and embraced without thinking (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). 
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Following this line, one can argue that for the case of CSR initiatives, the larger 
the number of firms that decide to join an initiative, the more the initiative 
acquires recognition and ultimately legitimacy; therefore, the higher the number 
of participants the greater the incentive for other firms to join. The more 
extensive signing up becomes, the more it becomes the “norm” or taken-for-
granted behaviour (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Based on this, it is proposed 
that: 
Hypothesis 7: The higher the number of UNGC participants in the firm’s 
home country, the more likely the firm is to join the UNGC. 
It has also been highlighted in the literature that organisations will seek to mimic 
behaviour of similar organisations in their field that they recognise as more 
legitimate or successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Building on this, one can 
expect the phenomenon above to be even more visible within the same industry. 
While no studies could be found testing this in the context of the UNGC, it is 
proposed that: 
Hypothesis 8: The higher the number of UNGC participants within an 
industry globally the more likely a firm in that industry is to join the UNGC. 
The cognitive pillar involves elements that influence choice, often without a 
process of conscious thought (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011, Scott, 2008). 
It has been theorised that decision makers act under cognitive constraints, 
therefore searching for solutions within a limited pool of available alternatives, 
which are recognised as more familiar to them (March and Simon, 1993). 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) proposes that firms are likely to constrain 
their searches for environmental management systems to contexts that are 
close to them geographically and therefore also culturally. Geographical 
proximity between people and organisations has been identified in the literature 
as a relevant element of transmission of innovation and tacit knowledge 
(Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). A similar hypothesis can arguably be draw 
in regards to other aspects of CSP, including the decision to join voluntary CSR 
initiatives. Firms are likely to search for sustainability solutions within contexts 
that are close to them and that they identify with. Therefore, geographic 
proximity with countries with a large number of UNGC participants may lead 
firms in the neighbouring country to join the UNGC. Lim and Tsutsui (2012), 
however, did not find regional participation in the UNGC to be significantly 
associated with higher levels of sign up at national level. This calls for further 
investigation and it is therefore hypothesised that: 
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Hypothesis 9: The greater the geographical proximity of a firm’s 
headquarter country to other countries with UNGC participants the more 
likely that firm is to join the UNGC. 
5.1.4 Different responses to institutional pressures: the role of 
corporate social performance  
While the focus of this study is on institutional pressures and how these may 
shape firm behaviour, one needs to recognise that not all firms will respond 
equally to these pressures (Oliver, 1991) and that there are firm level factors 
that may moderate their response. The impact of firms’ corporate social 
performance on their decision to join voluntary CSR initiatives has not been 
much explored in the literature. There is an important discussion on the impact 
of belonging to a high impact industry in firms’ decision to join a voluntary CSR 
initiative (Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, Schembera, 2012) (see section 3.2.2.1). 
Firms in those industries will generally be under greater scrutiny and pressure 
from stakeholders to demonstrate alignment with societal goals to protect their 
legitimacy (Bansal and Bogner, 2002, Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, Schembera, 
2012) and therefore have greater incentives to engage in voluntary CSR 
initiatives to communicate this alignment.  
The level of inherent impact and corporate social performance are not, however, 
exact synonyms, as performance is to great extent associated with how one 
manages those very impacts. In other words, it is arguably possible, for example, 
to have an oil company that scores high in corporate social performance and a 
services firm that scores poorly, even though the latter is likely to have a much 
lower inherent impact on people and the environment. Nevertheless, one could 
apply a similar argument as the one above, in that firms with poorer 
performance are likely to face greater challenges to their legitimacy and 
therefore would arguably be more likely to join a voluntary CSR initiative to 
demonstrate willingness to improve social and environmental performance.   
The role of good performance in providing incentives for firms to join the UNGC 
in particular has been surprisingly under discussed. One could argue that a high 
performing firm may have greater incentives to join an initiative such as the 
UNGC, as it may offer a platform for the firm to show its credentials, while not 
requiring much extra investment or resources as the firm is already doing things 
in most or all the required areas. In other words, by joining the UNGC the firm 
would be able to enjoy the legitimacy benefits associated with participation 
without the need for major extra investments. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
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Hypothesis 10: Firms that display higher corporate social performance 
are more likely to join the UNGC. 
5.1.5 Level of economic development as a moderator 
Lim and Tsutsui (2012) discuss the role of economic development as a 
moderator for firm performance in voluntary CSR initiatives. The authors 
propose that firms in developing countries often adopt global models as a result 
of mimetic or normative forces, but lack the capacity to implement the 
commitments made or in some cases are not willing to. Firms in developed 
countries, on the other hand, while having the power to promote global models, 
do not necessarily practice what they preach, promoting models they are not 
willing to commit to, and often using them as a smoke screen when exploiting 
labour and natural resources in developing countries (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012).  
Building on this discussion about performance, one could argue that the level of 
economic development is also likely to moderate the drivers for firms’ decision 
to join voluntary CSR initiatives in general and the UNGC in particular. In other 
words, one could argue that it is likely to exist a developing country path for 
joining and a developed country path for joining. While mimetic forces are 
expected to have an important impact in defining the developing country path, 
higher levels of firm internationalisation and belonging to high impact industries 
are likely to be important determinants of the developed country path. 
5.1.6 Control variables 
5.1.6.1 Firm size 
As discussed in section 3.2.2.6, a number of studies found size to be a relevant 
predictor for firm behaviour in regards to CSP (Bennie et al., 2007, Bernhagen 
and Mitchell, 2010). Authors have found different explanations for the effect of 
size, which could be related to any of the three pillars. Despite the variations in 
focus, the argument is ultimately similar throughout: the larger the organisation, 
the more visible are its actions and therefore more attention and more scrutiny it 
is likely to receive from stakeholders (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009, 
Schembera, 2012). As result of that, larger firms are likely to be under greater 
pressure to conform to society’s expectations and demands, and therefore more 
likely to respond to such pressures in order to enhance its legitimacy (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). Building on this argument, it is proposed that larger firms are 
more likely to join the UNGC. 
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5.1.6.2 Slack resources 
As discussed in section 3.2.2.6, financial resources are arguably essential to 
allow firms to engage in new endeavours or routines, such as for example join a 
voluntary CSR initiative (Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, McGuire et al., 1988). They 
provide firms with the discretion for decision making that a lack of resources 
would otherwise prevent. In the case of ISO14001 certification, for example, the 
costs to start up and certify may be very high and eventually prevent some firms 
with fewer resources from adopting it (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009). In the 
case of the UNGC, while the financial cost of joining is not particularly high, 
firms will probably feature into their decision the costs of maintaining 
membership (preparation of a communication on progress), or an annual 
voluntary financial contribution to the initiative, for example. Therefore, it is 
proposed that firms that dispose of more slack resources will be more likely to 
join the UNGC. 
5.1.6.3 Brand value 
Firms competing on the grounds of brand image are proposed to be more likely 
to join voluntary CSR initiatives. It is argued that firms in markets where product 
differentiation and branding are relevant competing tools would accrue higher 
benefits from joining initiatives that help signalling to trade partners their 
commitment and the quality of their actions in the management of these issues 
(Johnstone and Labonne, 2009). Johnstone and Labonne (2009) found 
signalling to trade partners to be an important motivator at least for larger firms 
to adopt and certify their environmental management systems. In the case of the 
UNGC, while it is not a certification, it arguably has the power to convey a 
message about the firms’ engagement with CSR. Therefore, it is expected that 
firms competing on those basis will be more likely to join the UNGC. 
5.1.6.4  Belonging to the extractive industry 
A number of studies have discussed the role of belonging to a high impact 
industry in firms’ decision to join a voluntary CSR initiative (Perez-Batres et al., 
2012a, Schembera, 2012). Given their inherently high impact on people and the 
environment, firms in extractive industries will generally be under greater 
scrutiny and pressure from stakeholders to demonstrate concern with those 
issues and alignment with societal goals (Bansal and Bogner, 2002, Perez-
Batres et al., 2012a, Schembera, 2012). As a result, these firms are likely to find 
their legitimacy to be more at risk and therefore have greater incentives to 
engage in voluntary CSR initiatives that can help them signal to stakeholders 
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their commitment to social and environmental issues. It is therefore expected 
that firms from extractive industries will be more likely to join the UNGC. 
5.2 Data 
This section provides an overview of the data sources and sample used in this 
study, as well as an explanation about the dependent and independent variables. 
This study uses data provided by ASSET4, combined with institutional data 
provided by a number of publicly available sources (see below and chapter 
three for a full list and description), as well as some UNGC data on participation 
and firm level data provided by Datastream. 
5.2.1 Sample 
This study focuses on a subset of the ASSET4 data, more specifically the data 
for the year 2010. This comprises a total of 4,580 firms, from 59 countries and 
70 different industries. A list of the countries in the sample is provided below. 
The sample comprises firms from developed and developing countries, and 
different regions of the world. The distribution, however, arguably reflects to 
some extent the size of national economies, with larger economies often 
represented with a larger number of firms. 
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Table 10: List of countries in the sample 
  
 
5.2.2 Dependent variable 
In order to help answer the questions posed in this study, the dependent 
variable needs to reflect whether a firm is a participant in the UNGC or not in the 
period studied. Quantitative studies on adoption of voluntary CSR initiatives in 
general and UNGC in particular have generally taken two approaches – a 
dependent variable at firm level, or an aggregated measure of sign up at country 
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variable have largely relied on a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
firm is a participant or not in a given year (Bennie et al., 2007, Bernhagen and 
Mitchell, 2010, King et al., 2005, Melnyk et al., 2003, Perez-Batres et al., 2010, 
Perez-Batres et al., 2011). This paper adopts similar approach using a binary 
variable to indicate whether a firm is (1) or is not (0) a UNGC participant in year 
2010.  
The data on UNGC sign up was obtained from ASSET4, and further triangulated 
with a dataset obtained from the UNGC covering the period since its inception 
until 2010, and with the UNGC website. While the bulk of the data was accurate, 
approximately 1% of firms marked as non-participants in 2010 by ASSET4 
should actually be considered participants (i.e. according to the UNGC dataset 
and website they were participants in 2010). Firms were considered participants 
if they had joined anytime until the end of 2010. In addition, there were four firms 
that were marked as participants but should be marked as non-participants. 
Therefore, the final number of UNGC participants in the sample was 582 (out of 
the 4580 observations).  
5.2.3 Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in this study were gathered from a number of 
publicly available sources and are listed and explained below (and in chapter 
three, under section 4.4.2.).   
5.2.3.1 Regulative / Coercive  
Stringency of regulatory environment was operationalized following Berliner and 
Prakash (2010). It encompasses measures of the stringency of credit market 
regulations, labour market regulations and business regulations, taken from the 
Economic Freedom of the World dataset. For these indicators, the larger the 
number the higher the freedom or the less stringent the regulatory environment. 
The variable for credit market regulations is formed by a combination of the 
following elements: ownership of banks, private sector credit and interest rate 
controls / negative real interest rates. A higher rate indicates that the country 
uses a private banking system to allocate credit to private organisations and 
refrains from controlling interest rates. Labour market regulations combines 
hiring regulations and minimum wage, hiring and firing regulations, centralized 
collective bargaining, working hours regulations, mandated cost of worker 
dismissal, and conscription. A country that receives a higher rating therefore has 
more flexible labour laws, leaving market forces to define wages as well as 
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hiring and firing conditions. Finally, business regulations refer to a combination 
of administrative requirements, bureaucracy costs, starting a business, extra 
payments/bribes/favouritism, licensing restrictions and cost of tax compliance. 
Countries that receive higher ratings here leave markets to define prices and do 
not display regulatory activities that cause delays to entry into business and 
increase costs of production (Gwartney et al., 2011). 
Government’s support to the UN reflects whether a country had ratified or 
otherwise presented the appropriate expression of support to the international 
agreements/declarations/treaties that underlie the UNGC 10 principles, by the 
end of 2009. Data for the following international instruments were used: 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Labour Organisation's 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development and the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption. This data was obtained from the United Nations’ website and is 
represented by a dummy variable (1 meaning yes and 0 meaning no). In the 
case of human rights and labour, where more than one international instruments 
are at the base of the principles, a country only received a “1” if they had 
demonstrated support for all of them by the end of 2009. The use of this variable 
is inspired by and builds mainly on the work of Lim and Tsutsui (2012) but of 
some other authors as well (Bennie et al., 2007, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, 
Bernhagen et al., 2012). 
In line with a number of previous studies, level of democracy was represented 
by the Polity IV dataset provided by the Centre for Systemic Peace (Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2010, Lim and Tsutsui, 2012, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, 
Bernhagen et al., 2012). This indicator ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 
(full autocracy).  
A large number of articles use measures of trade ties at national level, rather 
than firm level (Perez-Batres et al., 2010, Neumayer and Perkins, 2004, Delmas 
and Montiel, 2008, Tambunlertchai et al., 2013). This study measures trade ties 
with Europe at firm level in order to allow for a more fine-grained analysis of the 
impact of this relationship in the decision to join the UNGC. One could argue 
that the fact that a country has trade ties with Europe does not necessarily imply 
in that all firms in that country will have the same. Therefore, for the purpose of 
this study a firm level variable seemed to offer a more appropriate measure. 
This indicator was calculated using Datastream data for home country and trade 
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activities outside of home country. It takes a value of 1 if a firm is not from the 
EU but has trade activities with it and a value of zero if otherwise (firm from the 
EU or firm not from the EU but has no trade activities with the EU).  
5.2.3.2 Normative  
NGOs and Academic organisations interested in CSP is represented by the 
cumulative participation of such organisations in the UNGC in each country as 
of 2009. These variables were calculated using data from the UNGC dataset 
and follow similar use in the literature (Bernhagen et al., 2012, Perez-Batres et 
al., 2011).  
5.2.3.3 Cognitive / Mimetic 
Measures of UNGC penetration in country and industry were calculated from 
ASSET4 and reflect the percentage of firms in the sample that were UNGC 
participants in a given industry, or a given country in 2009. That follows and 
builds on Lim and Tsutsui (2012) use of number of participants in the country 
lagged by one year as an independent variable. 
Geographic proximity was also calculated from ASSET4 and represents the 
number of UNGC participants in a given geographical sub-region of the world in 
2009, namely: Australia and New Zealand, Central America, Central Asia, 
Eastern Africa, Eastern Asia, Eastern Europe, Northern Africa, Northern 
America, Northern Europe, South America, South-Eastern Asia, Southern Africa, 
Southern Asia, Southern Europe, Western Africa, Western Asia, Western 
Europe. Country classifications were taken from the United Nations Statistics 
Division. This builds on Lim and Tsutsui (2012) use of a similar measure, 
although these authors used broader geographic areas.  
5.2.3.4 Firm Attributes and industry 
Corporate Social Performance was measured using the following variables from 
ASSET4: CVGSCORE (corporate governance), SOCSCORE (social) and 
ENVSCORE (environment), all for 2009. Scores are a number between 0 and 
100 that show the firm’s performance in comparison to the remaining ASSET4 
universe for a particular issue.  
Firm size was measured as the log of employees in 2009, calculated from the 
variable number of employees provided by Datastream.  
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Slack resources are represented by ROTA (return on total assets) and Leverage 
(which is built from a ratio of long term debt by assets). This data was obtained 
from Datastream for the year 2009.  
Advertising intensity was built as advertisement expenditure as a percentage of 
total sales, for the year 2009. The data was obtained from Datastream.  
A dummy for extractive industry was also created in SPSS. It gathers firms 
classified under SIC codes 10 (metal mining), 12 (coal mining), 13 (oil and gas 
extraction) and 14 (mining and quarrying of non-metallic minerals, except fuels). 
Authors have found different solutions to represent high impact industries. 
Bansal and Bogner (2002) focused on mining, forestry and chemicals; Knudsen 
(2011) focused on oil and manufacturing; Perez-Bastres et al (2012b) developed 
their own pollution intensiveness ranking; and Bernhagen and Mitchel (2010) 
looked into oil and gas and materials (these including mining and forestry 
product companies). Recognising this variety and the lack of a one fully agreed 
definition of high impact / extractive industry, this study follows EITI (Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative)’s focus on oil, gas and mining companies as 
firms in the extractive industry (EITI, 2014). 
5.2.3.5 National level variables: how different are the national contexts in the sample? 
A number of the independent variables are measured at the national level, such 
as for example, the level of democracy or the stringency of labour market 
regulation. The table below helps one understand the extent to which variation 
can be observed across these different national contexts. The level of variation 
is stronger in some variables than others, for example, while stringency of 
business regulation has a mean of 6.58 and a standard deviation of 0.68, level 
of democracy represented by Polity IV has a mean of 8.52 and a standard 
deviation of 4.187.  
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Given that the outcome variable is a categorical variable (participant or non-
participant) and the predictor variables are both continuous and categorical, the 
method used for data analysis was binary logistic regression (Field, 2009). 
5.4 Results 
Figure four presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients 
for the variables of this study. It can be observed that UNGC participant status in 
2010 is significantly correlated to most variables, except for the variable 
representing country support to The Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, for the ones representing slack resources and advertisement 
intensity. Differently from expected however, participant status is negatively 
correlated to the number of NGOs and academic participants in the UNGC, as 
well as to country support to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
and to belonging to an extractive industry (both at the 0.01% level). Finally, the 
variable for credit market regulations was positively correlated to participant 
status, implying that more flexible credit market legislation is correlated to higher 
sign up. The remaining relationships were according to expectations.
Descriptive Statistics N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Credit market regulation 4570 4 10 8.01 1.279
Labour market regulation 4570 4 9 7.73 1.528
Business regulation 4570 4 8 6.58 0.68
Polity IV 4575 -10 10 8.52 4.187
Government support to human rights 4578 0 1 0.6 0.49
Government support to labour 4578 0 1 0.31 0.462
Government support to environment 4578 0 1 0.97 0.167
Government support to anti-corruption 4578 0 1 0.84 0.37
Academic participants 4580 0 67 25.48 25.937
Global NGOs 4580 0 21 7.514 8.6325
Local NGOs 4580 0 65 24.092 25.7059
UNGC participants in home country 4575 0 1 0.1356 0.15115
Regional UNGC participation 4580 0 122 61.6172 35.62051
Valid N (listwise) 4567
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Figure 4: Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
Variables Mean Std. DeviationN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 PARTICIPANT2010 0.1271 0.33309 4580 1
2 Firm size 8.8241 1.82042 3728 .264** 1
3 Leverage 18.985 18.21263 4299 0.013 -0 1
4 ROTA 3.7933 31.10044 4242 0.009 .067** 0.007 1
5 Advertising intensity 1.0746 33.50389 4542 -0 -0 -0.02 -0 1
6 Extractive industry 0.1135 0.31728 4580 -.054** -.304** -.113** -.094** -0.01 1
7 Trade with the EU 0.1122 0.47158 4580 .033* .198** -.059** 0.016 0 -.065** 1
8 SOCSCORE 50.055 30.74459 3882 .448** .465** .039* .040* .046** -.133** .088** 1
9 ENVSCORE 49.743 31.79824 3882 .398** .444** .049** 0.016 .044** -.170** .113** .808** 1
10 CGVSCORE 52.281 30.1953 3882 .068** .058** .132** 0.006 -0.03 .109** .077** .311** .232** 1
11 Academic Participants 25.48 25.937 4580 -.116** .050** .140** 0.015 -0.01 -.078** .219** -.049** -.087** .488** 1
12 Local NGOs 24.092 25.7059 4580 -.109** .047** .140** 0.024 -0.01 -.095** .192** -.036* -.094** .458** .976** 1
13 Global NGOs 7.514 8.6325 4580 -.150** .045** .131** 0.024 -0.01 -.111** .179** -.041* -.081** .500** .950** .948** 1
14 UNGC participants in home country 0.1356 0.15115 4575 .407** .121** .048** 0.016 0.004 -.132** -.219** .333** .314** -.108** -.250** -.233** -.317** 1
15 UNGC participants in the industry 0.1399 0.0729 4580 .175** .189** -0.03 .046** 0.005 -.187** .065** .218** .216** -.049** -.044** -.030* -.052** .115** 1
16 Regional UNGC participation 61.617 35.62051 4580 .149** .098** 0.011 0.01 0.014 -.172** -.135** .174** .263** -0.02 -.071** -.133** 0.011 .409** .031* 1
17 Credit market regulation 8.01 1.279 4570 .045** -.139** -.112** -.045** -0 .198** -.038** -.068** -0.01 -.209** -.647** -.704** -.747** .113** -0.02 -.078** 1
18 Labour market regulation 7.73 1.528 4570 -.259** -.061** .056** -.038* 0.01 .079** .197** -.183** -.145** .418** .485** .419** .540** -.533** -.136** -.061** -.222** 1
19 Business regulation 6.58 0.68 4570 -.160** -.124** 0.009 -0.02 -0.01 .069** .051** -.136** -.084** .351** .180** .080** .223** -.290** -.095** .223** .252** .508** 1
20 Polity IV 8.52 4.187 4575 .039** -.071** .089** -.040** 0.008 .049** -0 .122** .149** .279** .279** .258** .244** .109** -.043** 0.017 -.170** .072** -.130** 1
21 Government support to human rights 0.6 0.49 4578 .210** -.086** -0.02 -.051** 0.012 .142** -.276** .173** .197** -.188** -.640** -.627** -.647** .449** 0.023 .162** .390** -.353** -.286** .272** 1
22 Government support to labour 0.31 0.462 4578 .235** .042* 0.026 .033* -0.01 -.078** -.330** .313** .245** .076** -.322** -.289** -.229** .569** .055** .338** 0.013 -.450** -.091** .137** .418** 1
23 Government support to environment 0.97 0.167 4578 0.018 0.005 .053** -.036* 0.005 0.004 -0.02 -.115** -.050** -0.02 .149** .141** .149** -.048** 0.018 .258** -.125** .182** .085** -0.02 .211** -.256** 1
24 Government support to anti-Corruption 0.84 0.37 4578 -.086** -.123** .033* 0.016 -.041** .125** -0.01 -.098** -.195** .370** .317** .338** .318** -.220** -.075** -.249** -.056** .031* .266** -.102** -.351** .052** -.076** 1
25 UNGC participants in home country and industry 0.1356 0.23676 4346 .558** .183** 0.01 0.014 -0.01 -.059** -.091** .357** .326** 0.001 -.169** -.161** -.208** .631** .288** .281** .075** -.358** -.184** .062** .290** .373** -0.01 -.141** 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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While most correlation coefficients conform to the norms, correlation coefficients 
amongst UNGC participants other than firms (i.e. Academic organisations, Local 
NGOs and Global NGOs participation in the UNGC) present a concern for 
multicollinearity, as the coefficient is greater than 0.8 (Field, 2009). A similar 
case was observed for the relationship between the variables representing 
social performance and environmental performance. Given the potential 
multicollinearity concern, further tests were run to check the Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF). Using linear regression in SPSS, the table below was prepared: 
 




Although there is not a clearly established threshold of when a value of VIF 
should become a concern, this study follows Field (2009) in that values above 
10 signal potential problems of multicollinearity. Table nine shows that social 
and environmental performance do not seem to present a concern here; 
however, variables representing academic, local and global NGO participation in 
the UNGC all have VIFs above 10. Equally, these three variables have tolerance 
statistics below 0.1 suggesting serious problems of multicollinearity (Field, 2009). 
In order to prevent the unwanted effects of multicollinearity, models were run 
separately with each of these variables. Academic participation was retained as 
it offered a better contribution to the explanatory power of the model.  
Variables Tolerance VIF
(Constant)
Firm Size 0.623 1.605
Leverage 0.935 1.07
ROTA 0.963 1.038
Advertising intensity 0.954 1.048
Extractive Industry 0.822 1.216




Academic Participants 0.027 37.341
Local NGOs 0.02 50.088
Global NGOs 0.02 49.296
UNGC participants in home country 0.232 4.306
UNGC participants in the industry 0.834 1.199
Regional UNGC participation 0.338 2.963
Credit market regulation 0.165 6.046
Labour market regulation 0.268 3.728
Business regulation 0.257 3.885
Polity IV 0.384 2.603
Government support to human rights 0.128 7.812
Government support to labour 0.237 4.225
Government support to environment 0.535 1.869
Government support to anti-Corruption 0.423 2.363
UNGC participants in home country and industry 0.532 1.878
a Dependent Variable: PARTICIPANT2010
Collinearity Statistics
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The results of the logistic regressions are presented in the table below. The 
dependent variable in all models is PARTICIPANT2010, which takes a value of 
1 if the firm was a participant in 2010 or 0 if otherwise. Different models are 
presented below, each with a different block of independent variables following 
the theory on the previous sections. 
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Table 13: Regression table for models one to eleven 
 
 
Model 1: Being big, wealthy and a big name 
Model 1 is the base model and the most parsimonious one, including only 
variables for size, slack resources, belonging to an extractive industry and 
advertising intensity. The data shows that larger firms are more likely to join the 
UNGC. For every unit of increase in size, the odds of a firm deciding to join the 
Independent variables M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11
Constant
-6.882   
(0.351)  
***
-6.565   
(0.805) 
***
-6.799   
(0.361)     
***
-6.831   
(0.366)   
***
-6.783   
(0.36)   
***
-8.897    
(0.429)   
***
-7.616    
(0.371)   
***
-8.214    
(0.856)   
***
-7.445    
(1.01)   
***
-13.813    
(3.294)   
***
-5.547    









0.576     
(0.036)   
***
0.581   
(0.036)   
***
0.568    
(0.036)   
***
0.548    
(0.039)    
***
0.532    
(0.035)   
***
0.569    
(0.042)   
***
0.253    
(0.047)    
***
0.299    
(0.057)   
***
0.172    
(0.095)         
*
ROTA -0.003  (0.005)
-0.005  
(0.006)
-0.001    
(0.005)
0.001   
(0.005)
0    
(0.005)
-0.001    
(0.006)
0.001    
(0.005)
-0.002    
(0.007)
-0.005    
(0.008)
-0.015    
(0.009)
-0.006    
(0.012)
Leverage 0.002  (0.003)
0.005  
(0.003)
0.008   
(0.003)    
***
0.008   
(0.003)       
***
0.007    
(0.003)   
**
-0.001    
(0.003)
0.003    
(0.003)
0.001    
(0.003)
-0.002    
(0.004)
-0.004    
(0.005)
0.009    
(0.009)
Advertising intensity -0.001  (0.004)
0      
(0.002)
-0.001    
(0.003)  
-0.001   
(0.003)
-0.001    
(0.003)
-0.001    
(0.003)
-0.001    
(0.004)
0    
(0.003)
0.007    
(0.024)
-0.002    
(0.026)
0.093    
(0.063)
Extractive Industry 0.301  (0.207)
0.33  
(0.229)
0.297    
(0.212)
0.284   
(0.212)
0.291    
(0.21)
0.854    
(0.235)   
***
0.412    
(0.21)     
*
0.752    
(0.244)   
***
0.607    
(0.261)   
**
0.781    
(0.32)   
**
0.449    
(0.497)




0.602    
(0.128)   
***
0.429   
(0.141)   
***
0.345    
(0.166)   
**
0.223    
(0.33)
Credit market regulation 0.086  (0.062)
-0.064    
(0.074)   
-0.028    
(0.083)
0.062   
(0.101)






-0.124    
(0.052)   
**
-0.133    
(0.061)   
**
0.001    
(0.116)
-0.152    
(0.166)
Business regulation -0.139   (0.11)
0.039    
(0.123)
-0.098    
(0.141)
0.074    
(0.246)
-0.293    
(0.352)
Polity IV 0.011  (0.02)
-0.004    
(0.025)
-0.061    
(0.028)   
**
0.263    
(0.245)
-0.14    
(0.055)   
**




1.369    
(0.323)   
***
0.973    
(0.359)   
***
-0.463    
(0.587)
2.205    
(0.786)   
***
Government support to labour
0.654   
(0.155)  
***
-0.078    
(0.186)
-0.242    
(0.222)
-0.043    
(0.323)
0.701    
(0.743)
Government support to environment -0.049   (0.421)
-0.704    
(0.503)
-0.306    
(0.561)
-0.396    
(1.158)
Government support to anti-Corruption 0.116    (0.142)
0.359    
(0.162)   
**
0.134    
(0.189)
0.282    
(0.251)
-0.097    
(0.71)
Academic Participants
-0.022    
(0.002)  
***
-0.003    
(0.006)
-0.005    
(0.007)
-0.023    
(0.01)   
**
-0.045    
(0.042)
Global NGOs
-0.086   
(0.007)   
***
Local NGOs
-0.02    
(0.002)   
***
UNGC participants in home country
6.108    
(0.31)   
***
4.628    
(0.472)   
***
4.276    
(0.548)   
***
5.499    
(0.814)   
***
5.835    
(2.828)   
**
UNGC participants in the industry
5.302    
(0.78)   
***
5.051   
(0.789)   
***
4.797    
(0.924)   
***
5.939    
(1.115)   
***
1.172    
(1.501)
SOCSCORE
0.04    
(0.005)   
***
0.047   
(0.006)   
***
0.027    
(0.008)    
***
ENVSCORE
0.01    
(0.004)   
**
0.011    
(0.005)   
**
0.013    
(0.008)      
*
CGVSCORE
0.008    
(0.003)   
**
0.004    
(0.004)
0.013    
(0.007)   
**
Regional UNGC participation
0.011    
(0.002)   
***
N 3651 3647 3651 3651 3651 3651 3651 3647 3309 2552 745
Nagelkerke R Square 0.139 0.33 0.188 0.216 0.183 0.36 0.163 0.394 0.517 0.555 0.453
Percentage correct cases 2.4 26.8 5 7.7 5.9 31.7 6.3 34.7 49.3 53.7 47.9
Difference in Nagelkerke R Square 
relative to first model 0.19 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.22 0.02 0.26 0.4 0.4 0.3
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UNGC goes up by 1.72 (p<0.01). The remaining variables were not significant in 
this model. 
The model explained only 13.9% of the variance in sign up (Nagelkerke R2). In 
addition, while it correctly classified 85.1% of the cases, it was only able to 
correctly classify 2.4% of the firms that decided to join (PARTICIPANT2010=1).  
Model 2: The role of regulatory mechanisms 
Model 2 includes additional theoretically relevant variables to account for the 
institutional environment of the firm. More specifically, it brings in the role of 
coercive / regulatory mechanisms in influencing the odds of firms deciding to 
join the UNGC. Model 2 offers an improvement in explanatory power compared 
to model 1 explaining 33% of the variation (Nagelkerke R2). It also was able to 
correct classify 26.8% of the firms that decided to join (PARTICIPANT2010=1).  
Firm size remains positive and significant, increasing the odds of a firm joining 
the UNGC by 1.80 for every unit of increase in size (p<0.01). Country 
commitment to the UN represented as country support to the Human Rights 
covenants was the variable with the greatest impact, increasing by 4.26 times 
the odds of sign up for firms in countries that supported it (p<0.01). Country 
support to The International Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work was also positive and significant, increasing the 
odds of a firm joining by 1.92 (p<0.01). The other two variables for government 
support to the UN were not significant. 
Foreign trade with the EU was also positive and significantly related to sign up, 
with firms engaged in these relationships 1.66 times (p<0.01) more likely to join. 
In regards to regulation, only labour was negative and significant (p<0.01), 
suggesting that more stringent labour regulation in a country increases the odds 
of a firm joining the UNGC. Out of the three elements that are proxies for 
regulation this is the most closely related to social issues (labour) as the other 
two are linked to credit market regulations and business regulations (such as 
bureaucracy costs, licensing restrictions, incidence of corruption, among other 
factors). It is therefore not very surprising that this is the element with the 
greatest influence on firms’ decision to join. 
Model 3: The role of normative mechanisms - Academia 
Model 3 builds on model 1, and adds to it the variable representing the 
participation of academic organisations on the UNGC in a country. Model 3 
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offers a slight improvement from model 1, but its explanatory power is not as 
good as model 2. Model 3 explains 18.8% of the variance (Nagelkerke R2). In 
addition, while it correctly classified 84.9% of the cases, it was able to correctly 
classify 5% of the firms that decided to join (PARTICIPANT2010=1).  
Firm size remains positive and significant and increasing the odds of a firm 
joining by 1.78 (p<0.01). Leverage is positive and significant, i.e. different from 
expected more leveraged firms have slightly increased odds of joining 
(Exp(B)=1.008). More interestingly and also different from expected, 
participation of academic organisations in the UNGC seems to discourage firms 
from joining the UNGC. For every extra academic participant, a firm is 0.98 
times less likely to join (Exp(B)=0.0978, p<0.01). While this is a small reduction 
and this number is very near 1 (which would indicate no change on the odds of 
the dependant variable being 1), it is important to highlight it.  
Model 4 and 5: The role of normative mechanisms – Local and Global NGOs 
Running the models with the variables representing NGO participation (local and 
global) rather than academic participation yields similar results. Due to the high 
concern of multicollinearity between these three variables they cannot be in the 
model at the same time therefore separate models were run. In both cases, firm 
size was positive and significant increasing the odds of a firm joining by 
approximately 1.8 (p<0.01). Leverage was also positive and significant, i.e. 
different from expected more leveraged firms have slightly increased odds of 
joining.  
Participation of NGOs in the UNGC – a proxy for the presence of NGOs 
concerned with corporate social responsibility in a country - was negative and 
significant both for local and global NGOs. Participation of local NGOs 
decreased the odds of a firm joining the UNGC by 0.98 (p<0.01). For Global 
NGOs this number was 0.92 (p<0.01). As in the case of academic participants 
this number represents a small reduction in odds and a Exp(B) very near 1. 
The model including global NGOs explained 21.6% of the variance (Nagelkerke 
R2) and correctly classified 7.7% of firms that became participants. The model 
including local NGOs, on the other hand, explained 18.3% of the variance 
(Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classified 5.9% of the UNGC participants in the 
sample.  
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Model 6: Mimetic mechanisms – Peer sign up within country and industry 
Model 6 builds on model 1 adding to it the variables representing mimetic 
mechanisms. Out of the variables representing the three of Scott’s pillars, 
mimetic mechanisms have the greatest influence on the odds of a firm joining 
the UNGC. For every unit of increase on the percentage of UNGC participants 
within a given industry globally, a firm in this industry is 200.67 times more likely 
to join (p<0.01). Country participation has an even stronger effect, as for every 
unit of increase on the percentage of UNGC participants in a given country 
within the sample, a firm is 449.53 times more likely to join the UNGC (p<0.01). 
Firm size remains positive and significant, and so is belonging to an extractive 
industry in this model. The latter increases the odds of a firm joining the initiative 
by 2.35 (p<0.01). Model 6 explains 36% of the variance (Nagelkerke R2), adding 
22.1% to the explanatory power of the base model. In addition, the model 
correctly classifies 31.7% of the UNGC participants in the sample, which is an 
important improvement when compared to model 1.  
Model 7: Mimetic mechanisms – Peer regional sign up 
Model 7 uses regional levels of participation as a measure of mimetic forces. A 
model including the three measures of mimetic mechanisms (regional sign up to 
the UNGC and UNGC sign up within country and industry) concomitantly 
resulted in regional participation being negative and not significant. The same 
was observed when a model was run with these three measures and all the 
other institutional measures. Even though the correlation and VIF checks did not 
indicate a multicollinearity problem, it is possible that a more subtle case of 
multicollinearity is occurring.  
This model is poorer than model 6, explaining only 16.3% of variance 
(Nagelkerke R2). It also only correctly classified 6.3% of participants. Regional 
participation is, however, positive and significant (p<0.01). For every unit of 
increase on the number of participants within a geographical region, the odds of 
a firm joining the initiative goes up by 1.01 (p<0.01). 
Model 8: A full institutional picture 
Model 8 builds on the previous models using all variables representing the 
institutional pressures together. It brings in concomitantly the role of 
regulative/coercive, normative and cognitive/mimetic mechanisms in shaping 
firms’ decision to join the UNGC. Model 8 represents an important improvement 
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compared to model 1, although it does not change much compared to model 6. 
Model 8 explains 39.4% of the variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classifies 
34.7% of the UNGC participants in the sample. 
Mimetic mechanisms remain a key element with variables for peer sign up to the 
UNGC within country (Exp(B)=102.28, p<0.01) or industry (Exp(B)=156.24, 
p<0.01) displaying the higher impact on the odds of firms joining the initiative. In 
regards to the regulatory pillar, country support to the UN in regards to the 
Human Rights and Corruption covenants, more stringent labour regulation and 
trade relations with the EU are all linked to an increase in odds of firms joining 
the UNGC as well. The normative variable (participation of academic 
organisations in the UNGC) is negative but no longer significant. It is important 
to highlight that the model was subsequently run using the variable for Local 
NGO participation in the UNGC and then for Global NGO participation, but these 
were not significant either and offered a slightly poorer contribution to the 
explanatory power of the model. Therefore, the model presented here retained 
the variable for academic participation in the UNGC as a proxy for normative 
mechanisms. Firm size and belonging to an extractive industry remained 
positive and significant, increasing the odds of a firm joining by 1.77 (p<0.01) 
and 2.12 (p<0.01) respectively. 
Model 9: Adding another layer of complexity – the role of corporate social 
performance 
Model 9 builds on model 8 adding the variables for social, environmental and 
governance performance. It offers an important improvement from model 8, 
explaining 51.7% of the variation in sign up (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly 
classifying 49.3% of the firms that decided to join the UNGC. The model shows 
that higher corporate social performance has an important role in influencing the 
odds of a firm joining the UNGC, as all these variables were positive and 
significant. Out of the three (social, environmental and governance 
performance), social performance has the strongest influence increasing the 
odds of a firm joining by 1.04 (Exp(B)=1.04, p<0.01) for every unit of increase in 
performance.  
Mimetic mechanisms remain a fundamental element in influencing sign up, 
increasing the odds of joining the UNGC by 71.98 (p<0.01) for every unit of 
increase in joining within country and by 121.17 (p<0.01) for every unit of 
increase in joining within an industry globally. From a regulatory/coercive point 
of view, country support to the UN’s Human Rights covenants, a more stringent 
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labour regulation and trade relations with the EU all remain positive and 
significant. Level of democracy, on the other hand, becomes negative and 
significant (p<0.05), differently from expected. Finally, firm size and belonging to 
an extractive industry remain positive and significant. 
Model 10: Developed countries only 
Model 10 starts from model 9 but uses a sub-sample of developed countries 
only. It explains 55.5% of the variation in sign up (Nagelkerke R2), a small 
improvement from model 9. In addition, it correctly classifies 53.7% of the firms 
that decided to join the UNGC. Firm size remains positive and significant, as 
well as belonging to an extractive industry. In regards to the regulatory 
environment, however, only trade ties with the EU remain significant (p<0.05) 
and positive, increasing the odds of a firm joining by 1.41 (Exp(B)). Differently 
from expected academic participation is significantly associated with a drop in 
the odds of firms joining the initiative (Exp(B)=0.98, p<0.05). Peer participation 
in country and industry are positive and significant, increasing the odds of a firm 
in a developed country joining the UNGC by 244.5 and 379.64 times 
respectively (p<0.01). In regards to corporate social performance, however, 
corporate governance performance is no longer significant. Social and 
environmental performances remain positive and significant (p<0.01 and 
p<0.05), increasing the odds of a firm in a developed country to join the UNGC 
by 1.05 and 1.01. 
Model 11: Developing countries only 
Model 11 starts from model 9 but uses a selection of developing countries only. 
It explains 45.3% of the variation in sign up (Nagelkerke R2), therefore 
presenting a poorer explanation power if compared to model 9. In addition, it 
correctly classifies 47.9% of the firms that decided to join the UNGC among the 
selected cases. Interestingly, the model presents a better fit to firms in 
developed countries than firms in developing countries. 
Level of democracy was negative and significant, suggesting that differently 
from expected higher levels of democracy decrease the odds of firms joining the 
initiative (Exp(B)=0.87, p<0.05). Home country support to the UN’s Human 
Rights covenants, however, was positive and significant (p<0.01) as expected, 
increasing the odds of joining by 9.07. Peer participation within country 
remained positive and significant and by far the variable with the greatest impact, 
increasing the odds of joining by 342.01 times (p<0.05). Peer participation within 
Chapter 4: Drivers for joining the UNGC 
 157 
industry at a global level, however, was no longer significant. Finally, in regards 
to corporate social performance, environmental performance is no longer 
significant. Social and governance performance remain positive and significant 
(p<0.01 and p<0.05), increasing the odds of a firm in a developed country to join 
the UNGC by 1.03 and 1.01. 
5.5 Discussing the hypotheses 
A summary of the hypothesis is presented on the table below. For the full 
sample (i.e. developed and developing countries together) hypothesis 1 is only 
partially supported. While more stringent labour regulation was associated with 
increasing odds of sign up in model 9, the other measures of regulation were not 
significant. Hypothesis 2 can only be partially supported as well. When variables 
representing country support to the UN treaties/declarations that underlie the 
four issue areas of the UNGC are included, only country support to the Human 
Rights covenants is significant (and positive), therefore offering some support to 
hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Level of democracy was significant 
in model 9 but it had a negative coefficient, which goes against what the 
hypothesis proposed. Hypothesis 4 refers to firms’ trade ties with Europe. The 
variable representing this relationship is positive and significant in model 9 and 
so this hypothesis is supported.  
Table 14: Discussing the hypotheses 
Hypotheses Status for full sample 
Hypothesis 1: Firms headquartered in countries with a more stringent 
regulatory environment are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 2: Firms headquartered in countries whose government 
demonstrates greater support to the UN are more likely to join the 
UNGC. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 3: Firms headquartered in countries with a more 
democratic political system are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 4: Firms that have trade ties with Europe are more likely 
to join the UNGC. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 5: Firms headquartered in countries with a large number 
of academic organisations that are interested in corporate social 
performance (i.e. UNGC participants) are more likely to join the 
UNGC. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 6: Firms headquartered in countries with a large number 
of NGOs that are interested in corporate social performance (i.e. 
UNGC participants) are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 7: The higher the number of UNGC participants in the 
firm’s home country, the more likely the firm is to join the UNGC. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 8: The higher the number of UNGC participants within an 
industry globally the more likely a firm in that industry is to join the 
UNGC. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 9: The greater the geographical proximity of a firm’s 
headquarter country to other countries with UNGC participants the 
Partially supported 
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more likely that firm is to join the UNGC. 
Hypothesis 10: Firms that display higher corporate social 
performance are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Supported 
 
Academic participation in the UNGC was not significant in model 9. Whenever 
academic participation in the UNGC was significant it had a negative coefficient, 
therefore hypothesis 5 is not supported. The same can be said of NGO 
participation in the UNGC, therefore hypothesis 6 is also not supported. 
Hypothesis 7 and 8 are supported, as peer participation within country and 
industry is positive and significant in model 9. Hypothesis 9 refers to the 
influence of geographical proximity. While this variable was positive and 
significant when used on its own in model 7 (i.e. without the other measures of 
mimetic pressures), it was not significant if substituting the other mimetic 
variables in model 9, therefore this hypothesis is only partially supported. 
Variables for corporate social performance, on the other hand, are positive and 
significant, therefore supporting hypothesis 10. 
If, however, models are run separately for subsamples including only developed 
or only developing countries, a slightly different picture emerges. For developed 
countries, in regards to regulatory mechanisms, only trade ties are positive and 
significant, therefore supporting hypothesis 4, but not confirming hypotheses 1, 
2 and 3. Hypothesis 5 is not confirmed either, as although academic 
participation is significant it has a negative coefficient. Hypothesis 7 and 8 are 
confirmed though, as variables for peer participation in country and industry are 
positive and significant. If the model is run with regional participation in 
substitution of the other two measures of mimetic pressures this variable is not 
significant, therefore hypothesis 9 cannot be confirmed. Finally, hypothesis 10 is 
partially supported as only social and environment performance scores are 
positive and significant. 
For developing countries, the only regulatory hypothesis that is partially 
confirmed is hypothesis 2, as the variable representing country support to the 
Human Rights covenants is positive and significant. Hypothesis 1, 3 and 4 are 
not confirmed. Hypothesis 5 is not confirmed either, as academic participation is 
not significant. Hypothesis 7 is confirmed as average UNGC sign up within 
country is positive and significant, but hypothesis 8 is not as the variable for 
peer participation within industry is no longer significant. If the model is run with 
regional participation in substitution of the other two measures of mimetic 
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pressures this variable is not significant, therefore hypothesis 9 cannot be 
confirmed. Finally, hypothesis 10 is partially supported as only social and 
governance performance scores are positive and significant. 
Table 15: Discussing the hypothesis - developed vs. developing countries 




Hypothesis 1: Firms headquartered in countries 
with a more stringent regulatory environment are 
more likely to join the UNGC. 
Not supported Not supported 
Hypothesis 2: Firms headquartered in countries 
whose government demonstrates greater support to 
the UN are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Not supported Partially supported 
Hypothesis 3: Firms headquartered in countries 
with a more democratic political system are more 
likely to join the UNGC. 
Not supported Not supported 
Hypothesis 4: Firms that have trade ties with 
Europe are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Supported Not supported 
Hypothesis 5: Firms headquartered in countries 
with a large number of academic organisations that 
are interested in corporate social performance (i.e. 
UNGC participants) are more likely to join the 
UNGC. 
Not supported Not supported 
Hypothesis 6: Firms headquartered in countries 
with a large number of NGOs that are interested in 
corporate social performance (i.e. UNGC 
participants) are more likely to join the UNGC. 
Not supported Not supported 
Hypothesis 7: The higher the number of UNGC 
participants in the firm’s home country, the more 
likely the firm is to join the UNGC. 
Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 8: The higher the number of UNGC 
participants within an industry globally the more 
likely a firm in that industry is to join the UNGC. 
Supported Not supported 
Hypothesis 9: The greater the geographical 
proximity of a firm’s headquarter country to other 
countries with UNGC participants the more likely 
that firm is to join the UNGC. 
Not supported Not supported 
Hypothesis 10: Firms that display higher corporate 
social performance are more likely to join the 
UNGC. 
Partially supported Partially supported 
 
5.6 Discussion and conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed at understanding the factors that may influence firms’ 
decision to join the UNGC. Focusing on the three pillars of institutions the 
chapter explored whether regulatory, normative and cognitive/mimetic 
mechanisms may influence firms’ signing up to the UNGC. The study combined 
national, industry and firm level factors in order to allow for a more robust 
understanding of what drives this decision. Together these combined levels 
account for 51.7% of variance in sign up in the initiative amongst the firms in the 
sample, correctly classifying 49.3% of participants.  
Not all pillars, however, had the same level of influence over firms’ decision to 
join. Regulatory influence was patchy. More stringent regulation at home country 
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was not observed to increase the likelihood of joining in every case. While more 
stringent labour regulation was seen to increase the odds of sign up, credit 
market and business regulations did not influence it. Out of the three elements 
that are proxies for regulation, however, it is not very surprising that this is the 
element with the greatest influence on firms’ decision to join, as this is the most 
closely related to social issues. The other two variables are linked to issues 
such as bureaucracy costs, licensing restrictions, among other factors and as a 
result are arguably overall more distantly related to CSP. If firms are trying to 
avoid more stringent regulation or improve legitimacy in the eyes of regulators, it 
arguably makes sense to engage in an initiative that is able to convey this 
message of proactive action in the area of work where they are trying to show 
performance. If comparing the UNGC issue areas and these three areas of 
regulation, labour is indeed the most obvious area of overlap in regards to 
corporate social performance. 
Country support to the UN was also not confirmed to influence signing up for all 
four issue areas of the UNGC, as most of them proved to be non-significant. 
Country support to the Human Rights covenants, however, was positive and 
significant for all the models where it was included.  
Regulative pressures associated with economic incentives, on the other hand, 
were positive and significant throughout. Firms that had trade relations with 
Europe and were headquartered in other parts of the world had increased odds 
of joining the initiative. Given the global nature and applicability of the UNGC, it 
is not surprising that it may be used in trade relations to reduce the information 
asymmetry between partners or to impose some control or direction on supply 
chain management of corporate social performance issues.  
Surprisingly, however, normative forces were in most cases not relevant, and 
where significant they had a negative impact in firms’ likelihood of joining. This 
was not expected, as both NGOs and academic organisations are understood 
as an important normative force in shaping firm behaviour in regards to 
corporate social performance. Berliner and Prakash (2010), however, found that 
the presence of international NGOs in a country was associated with lower 
levels of UNGC sign up due to criticism of these organisations towards some 
aspects of the UNGC. This may be an element at play here as well, although the 
NGOs in this case are UNGC participants and therefore even if not fully 
agreeing with every aspect of the initiative, have demonstrated at least 
willingness to engage with it. It may be that higher levels of signing up of critical 
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voices at a local level may discourage some firms to join due to fear of exposing 
their weaknesses or engaging in a closer dialogue when they might not be fully 
prepared for it – for example if they are still at a learner level in the UNGC. It 
may be as well that this may discourage signing up of firms inclined to 
ceremonial engagement with the UNGC, as this may lead to closer scrutiny and 
pressure to achieve a level of implementation that they are not ready to commit 
to.  
Mimetic forces, on the other hand, have a key role in influencing firms’ decision 
to join. Both the participation of peers within the firm’s home country and within 
the firm’s industry at a global level had a major impact in increasing the odds of 
a firm joining the initiative. This may signal that the UNGC’s initiative to promote 
the establishment of local networks is a good strategy to increase the number of 
participants, as those networks may offer a good space to promote and display 
local participation.  
The role of good corporate social performance in firms’ decision to join the 
UNGC has been largely unexplored in the literature. This study shows empirical 
evidence that higher performers will be more likely to join the UNGC. This is 
especially true for a high performer in social issues (compared to environment 
and governance). It is proposed that these firms can achieve quick benefits from 
joining, as they may obtain the legitimacy benefits associated with participation 
without having to incur in much more investments to abide for the commitments 
made as they already are high performers. It is important to highlight that these 
performance variables represent a relative measure of performance, i.e. they 
measure firm performance as compared to peers in the sample. This implies 
that this interpretation should be made with some degree of caution, as being 
better than peers does not necessarily imply being a very high performer if 
peers are poor. However, given the variables that feed into this score and 
distribution, one can still expect that for a firm to be high in this scale it is highly 
likely to be implementing a number of actions that are in consonance with the 
UNGC principles and requirements. 
The study also showed that larger firms are more likely to join the UNGC. As 
proposed, the larger the organisation, the more visible are its actions and 
therefore more attention and scrutiny they are likely to receive from stakeholders, 
putting them under greater pressure to conform to society’s expectations to 
protect their legitimacy. Larger firms active at a global level may be even more 
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inclined to engage in a voluntary CSR initiative such as the UNGC given its 
global reach and capacity to convey its message internationally.  
Finally, slack resources are not conclusively contributing to increasing or 
decreasing the odds of joining. It might be that firms do not see a clear 
immediate cost of joining (as it is the case with a certification, for example, that 
has a high initial cost) and therefore this may not be a major factor influencing 
their decision. Advertisement intensity was not significant throughout. This goes 
against a common critique of the UNGC, which says that it is mainly large 
brands that join the UNGC to use the UN’s legitimacy power to empower their 
brand in the eyes of stakeholders. Belonging to the extractive industry, on the 
other hand, did contribute to increase the odds of joining in many models, 
supporting to some extent the argument that firms in higher impact industries 
will see their legitimacy most at risk and therefore have greater incentives to join 
the UNGC in order to show alignment with societal interests and protect their 
legitimacy. 
It is interesting to highlight, however, how the factors influencing the decision to 
join varied when the level of economic development of countries acted as a 
moderator. As expected, the developed country path for signing up was marked 
by membership of extractive industry and economic incentives related to foreign 
trade. Strong mimetic pressures, also as expected, marked the developing 
country path for joining. It was surprising, however, that while mimetic forces 
derived from peer participation within home country were relevant for developing 
country firms, mimetic forces at industry level were not significant (they were 
only significant for developed country firms). As this is a measure of mimetic 
forces within an industry at a global level, it may be that firms in developing 
countries are not as well connected globally when compared to peers in 
developed countries, and therefore are less exposed to such pressures. 
Normative forces in the form of academic participation in the UNGC were not 
relevant for firms in developing countries, but were seen to discourage signing 
up in developed countries. It may be that developed countries offer the space for 
these organisations to be effectively more vocal in their criticism of corporate 
behaviour, causing firms to some extent to shy away from sharing with these 
counterbalancing voices the space of dialogue that the UNGC can provide. This 
may specially be true for firms inclined to a ceremonial commitment to the 
initiative. 
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Firm’s performance in social issues influenced firms in both developed and 
developing countries to join. Finally, regulatory pressures at country level were 
only relevant for developing country firms. Firms that were in countries that had 
displayed support for the human rights covenants were mode likely to join. 
Surprisingly, however, firms in less democratic developing countries were more 
likely to join.  
5.7 Relevance for practitioners and for the theory 
This study makes an important contribution to theory by bringing in the role of 
corporate social performance as a driver for firms’ decision to join voluntary 
CSR initiatives in general and the UNGC in particular. While this discussion is 
incipient in the literature on voluntary CSR standards in general and the UNGC 
in particular, the impact of those variables is indeed relevant in driving firms’ 
decision to join. 
For practitioners seeking to promote voluntary CSR initiatives, empirical 
evidence that firms that have higher CSP are more likely to join the UNGC is 
relevant information. Practitioners can arguably work with those firms in order to 
gather enough support to attract more firms to the initiative. Following from that, 
empirical evidence of the important impact of peer participation in firms’ decision 
to join the initiative is also valuable information for practitioners. It suggests that 
the establishment of partnerships with industry organisations, for example, can 
be a good tool to increase sign up. Initiatives at the country level such as the 
UNGC local networks are an equally important tool, as those networks may offer 
a good space for local participants to be seen and a good display of local 
participation for firms that have not decided to join yet.  
5.8 Summary and next chapter 
This chapter aimed at understanding the factors that may influence firms’ 
decision to join the UNGC. Focusing on the three pillars of institutions the 
chapter explored whether regulatory, normative and cognitive/mimetic 
mechanisms may influence firms’ signing up to the UNGC. The study also 
combined not only national but also industry and firm level factors in order to 
allow for a more robust understanding of what drives this decision.  
Results show that larger firms, who are high corporate social performers and to 
some extent that belong to an extractive industry are more likely to join. Equally, 
firms from countries that support the UN human rights covenants and have more 
stringent labour regulation are more likely to become participants. More 
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important, however, mimetic mechanisms seem to play a major role, with firms 
being nearly 72 times more likely to join for every unit of increase on the 
percentage of UNGC participants from the same country, and nearly 122 times 
for likely to join for every unit of increase on the percentage of UNGC 
participants within its industry globally.  
Interestingly, however, different paths for joining seem to emerge for developing 
and developed countries, with the results varying for those two groups of 
countries. While the developed country path for joining was marked by firm size, 
membership of extractive industry and economic incentives related to foreign 
trade, lower levels of democracy and country support for human rights 
covenants marked the developing country path for joining. Strong mimetic 
pressures, as expected, also marked the developing country path for joining. 
Mimetic pressures were also relevant, however, for developed countries, 
reinforcing the importance of this factor. Previous social performance in social 
issues was relevant in driving firm sign up in both groups. 
The next chapter will build on this one, offering a more nuanced understanding 
of the decision to join the UNGC, focusing not only on the overall decision to 
sign up but also more specifically on what drives firms’ speed of adoption. It is 
notorious that firms join in different stages of the initiative, with the UNGC 
having expanded its base of participants from just above 40 on the first year to 
several thousands as of today. Understanding to what extent institutional 
pressures drive firms’ decision to join at early or late stages of the UNGC is the 
focus of chapter five.    
Chapter 5: Speed of adoption of the UNGC 
 165 
6 Chapter 5: Understanding speed of adoption of 
the UNGC 
Participation in the UNGC has grown over the last decades. When the initiative 
was launched in 2000, 42 firms from 14 countries joined13. As of 2013, the 
UNGC had over 7,000 business participants spread across over 145 countries14. 
This growth suggests that the pace and pattern of adoption varies across firms. 
Those numbers leave one with questions – Considering that even a 
considerable time after their launch benefits associated with adoption of 
voluntary CSR initiatives are still under debate, what influences these 
organisations to early adopt in a time when risks and uncertainty are much 
higher? Equally, what factors may drive the decision to join – or not – at later 
stages, when participation in these initiatives becomes more widespread? This 
chapter will explore these questions.  
As discussed in chapter two (section 3.2.3), the diffusion of new practices is 
proposed to happen as a contagious process: through interactions in a network, 
firms collect evidence of the value of a practice; once they have reached its 
evidentiary threshold, the firm decides to adopt said new practice (Albuquerque 
et al., 2007). The amount of evidence requested for a decision to be made, as 
well as the time it takes to gather it, will vary across firms (Albuquerque et al., 
2007). Factors influencing firm decision to become early adopters of a new 
practice are proposed to be multi-level. They may be related to firm attributes, to 
industry characteristics or to features of the firm’s operating environment. For 
example, bigger firms, with more resources and previous good performance, 
were more likely to be early joiners of ISO14001 (King and Lenox, 2001, Bansal 
and Hunter, 2003). These firm level factors may see their predicting power 
reduce overtime, however, once the practice or initiative at hand becomes more 
institutionalised (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Drivers beyond organisations’ 
boundaries are therefore also relevant. For one thing, coercive or regulatory 
forces in the form of government can be very efficient in promoting sign up 
notably in the early phases (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011), by providing 
rewards and penalties for adoption and showing potential adopters the benefits 
of the innovation.  
                                                
13 Source: UNGC dataset 
14 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html 
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As discussed in section 3.2.3.1, motivations to adopt have also been proposed 
to influence speed of adoption. Early adopters, i.e. those that adopt a practice in 
the early stages of the institutionalisation process, are proposed to do so in 
views of achieving improved performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or 
fulfilling a specific need or interest (Scott, 2008). As the institutionalisation of a 
practice progresses, the decision to adopt it becomes more of a requirement 
than a choice, as normative and cultural pressures reach a point where non-
adopters risk to be seen as deviants from the norm (Scott, 2008, DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). In other words, adopting the new practice becomes more a 
matter of ensuring legitimacy following a logic of appropriateness, than 
achieving efficiency, following a sense of instrumentality (Scott, 2008, DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). This two-stages approach, as proposed by Tolbert and 
Zucker (1983) has been widely discussed in the literature. 
While the literature on innovation and diffusion has covered a diverse pool of 
phenomena, little has been covered in regards to voluntary CSR initiatives – 
except maybe for the ISO14001 certification standard; notably, studies on the 
speed of adoption of the UNGC are extremely scarce (Arevalo et al., 2013). 
While many parallels can be drawn between ISO14001 and the UNGC, or 
between certifiable and non-certifiable initiatives, one cannot refrain from 
arguing that the presence or absence of a certification mechanism, especially in 
the early stages of diffusion where risk perception is generally greater, may lead 
to differences on patterns of diffusion and factors that may influence it. To the 
author’s best knowledge, there was only one study on the UNGC that looked 
into speed of adoption (Arevalo et al., 2013). The study, however, was restricted 
to the Spanish context, and focused mainly on the interplay between motivations 
for joining the UNGC and speed of adoption.  
Help building knowledge in this area with a cross-national, multi-industry study 
can therefore make a relevant contribution to the literature on the diffusion of 
voluntary CSR initiatives in general and on the UNGC in particular. In addition, 
understanding the patterns of adoption of voluntary initiatives, as well as the 
relevance of different drivers in each stage of adoption can offer valuable 
knowledge to those aiming at increasing corporate engagement in such 
initiatives. Therefore, this study aims at answering the following questions in the 
context of the UNGC: Considering that even a considerable time after their 
launch benefits associated with adoption of voluntary CSR initiatives are still 
found to be questionable, what influences organisations to early adopt the 
UNGC in a time when risks and uncertainty are much higher? Equally, what 
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factors may drive the decision to join at later stages, when participation 
becomes more widespread? 
6.1 Understanding speed of adoption: a theoretical 
framework 
Despite the fact that the UNGC has existed for a number of years now, levels of 
sign up have continued to increased over time, suggesting that the pace and 
pattern of adoption varies across firms. Institutional theory predicts that 
regulative, normative and cognitive aspects of firms’ institutional environment 
will influence firms’ decision to adopt a certain organisational practice (Scott, 
2008). Institutions establish what is considered appropriate behaviour through 
explicit rules and procedures, as well as through principles and norms implicit in 
daily activities (Bernhagen et al., 2012). Firms will aim to conform to the 
dominant practices within their operating environment in order to obtain 
legitimacy and ultimately ensure its survival in the long run (Scott, 2008). This 
process of isomorphism will lead to increasingly homogenous behaviour 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), as firms strive to “fit-in” and conform to 
expectations and requirements.   
Firms’ responses to those pressures though may vary, as may the speed with 
which firms decide to conform to dominant practices. Organisations’ willingness, 
capacity and ability to conform will drive their response to the institutional 
demands, and responses may range from acquiesce, to compromise, avoidance, 
defiance and manipulation (Oliver, 1991). Equally, and more relevant for this 
work, the speed with which firms respond to such pressures may also vary, and 
such variation may be influenced by a number of factors associated with 
regulative, normative, cognitive/mimetic mechanisms, as well as firms’ and 
industries’ attributes. 
Tolbert and Zucker (1996) propose a three stages process of institutionalisation. 
The first, called habitualisation, is characterised by the development and 
formalisation of a new arrangement or structure in response to a problem the 
organisation (or a group of organisations) is facing. The number of adopters is 
low and although imitation may take place it is not highly likely as there is not yet 
consensus on the value of the innovation at hand (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). 
Objectification, the second stage, represents a moment of semi-
institutionalisation, which follows inter-organisation monitoring and a theorising 
of the value of the new practice. There is some degree of social consensus 
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among decision-makers about the value of the practice and an increasing 
number of organisations adopt it based on that consensus. However, despite 
some degree of normative acceptance, decision-makers still remain aware of 
the relatively untested value of the practice and continue to monitor evidence in 
this regard. Finally, sedimentation represents the third stage - full 
institutionalisation of a new practice. This stage is characterised by the adoption 
of the new practice by virtually all appropriate adopters and by the endurance of 
the practice or structure over a long period of time, across different generations 
of organisation decision-makers (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). At later stages of 
institutionalisation adoption of a new practice is likely to become more a matter 
of ensuring legitimacy and “fit-in” than actually increasing efficiency (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983).  
Given the particularities of the different stages of institutionalisation of a new 
practice, one could expect that different elements may be at play in informing 
and influencing firm decision to adopt a new practice in each stage. For one 
thing, Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) found evidence that the ISO14001 
was more likely to be adopted early by firms in a country where there is high 
government commitment to the environment, a low to moderate number of law 
firms per capita and the presence of a strong civil society. The authors found, 
however, that the predictive power of these factors faded in later phases of 
diffusion. The next section will explore each of the elements that the literature 
has pointed as potential drivers for early or late adoption of voluntary CSR 
initiatives, with a particular focus on the UNGC. 
6.1.1 Pushing the leaders - What factors may lead to early adoption?   
It has been proposed that regulative or coercive pressures have a greater 
impact on the adoption of a new practice in the early phases of 
institutionalisation of said practice, but this power may reduce over time (Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho, 2011). As discussed in section 2.1.3.1, the regulative pillar 
is based on coercive isomorphism (Scott, 2008, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), 
which stems from formal and informal pressures applied to organisations by 
actors upon whom organisations are dependent (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
In other words, organisations will endeavour to resemble the structure, climate 
and behaviour of the organisation they are dependant upon (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) or follow pressures exerted by them to adopt certain practices or 
behaviour. 
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The regulative pillar with its coercive mechanisms is often associated with the 
political system, or the state (Berrone et al., 2013, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011). Governments may provide rewards for adoption or impose sanctions for 
non-adoption of a new initiative or practice. These coercive mechanisms can be 
very efficient in promoting sign up, notably in the early stages of 
institutionalisation, when there is greater uncertainty in regards to the benefits 
that can be accrued with participation (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). 
Therefore, the greater the government’s support to the issues covered in the 
initiative, the more involved is the government in the design of the initiative, the 
more positive the government’s attitude towards the initiative, the more likely it 
will be to provide firms with incentives for adoption and therefore, the more likely 
firms in the country will be to adopt the standard or join the initiative in the pre-
institutionalised period (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). 
In a study on the diffusion of ISO14001, Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) 
found that government’s commitment to the environment, government’s 
involvement on the design of the standard and government’s promotion of other 
environmental management standards were all positive and significant in 
influencing adoption on the take-off phase of ISO14001. Following a similar 
reasoning for the UNGC, one would expect that government’s support to the UN 
and to the principles will incentivise early joining of the initiative. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms headquartered in countries whose government 
demonstrates support to the UN are more likely to join the UNGC early. 
As discussed in section 2.1.3.2, normative pressures help define goals and 
objectives (for example: making a profit) while also defining what constitutes 
appropriate means to pursue them (for example: sustainable business practices) 
(Scott, 2008). The community, organised as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), may exercise normative pressure over firms to adopt a certain practice 
(Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). NGOs have gained prominence over the 
last decades, and have been an important voice in seeking to define new roles 
and responsibilities for businesses (Perez-Batres et al., 2011). In line with 
Perez-Bastres et al (2011) NGOs are classified here as a normative force in 
shaping firm behaviour in regards to CSP in general, and voluntary CSR 
initiatives in particular.  
In this context, and following Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011), it is proposed 
that high concentration of NGOs in a country may influence early adoption of 
voluntary CSR initiatives. NGOs’ pressure is proposed to be more intense and 
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therefore have a higher impact in the early phases of institutionalisation of an 
initiative; as NGOs are constantly instigating change, they might turn their 
attention to a newer initiative once the one at hand is already widely diffused 
(Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). 
Hypothesis 2: Firms headquartered in countries with a large number of 
NGOs that are interested in corporate social performance (i.e. that are 
UNGC participants) are more likely to join the UNGC early. 
In addition to factors exogenous to the organisation, and as discussed in section 
3.2.3.2, Scott (2008) proposes that there are some attributes of the firm, which 
may be associated with early adoption of a standard or initiative. For one thing, 
firm size is proposed to lead to early adoption. The reasons underlying it are 
varied – larger organisations generally have more resources and therefore may 
be more prone to invest in new practices, larger organisations are more visible 
and therefore subject to greater scrutiny and pressures by stakeholders and 
larger organisations are more sensitive to environmental changes (Scott, 2008). 
In a study of the adoption of ISO14001, King and Lennox (2001) found that 
larger firms and firms which are under greater scrutiny tend to adopt the 
standard earlier. Arevalo et al (2013) also found that later adopters of the UNGC 
in the Spanish context were in general smaller companies. In views of this, it is 
proposed that: 
Hypothesis 3: Larger firms are more likely to join the UNGC early. 
Firm previous CSR performance has also been highlighted as a relevant factor. 
It has been proposed that firms that are higher performers in CSR will be more 
likely to be early adopters of new CSR voluntary initiatives (Delmas and Montes‐
Sancho, 2010). Given that they are high performers, the additional commitment 
or efforts to adopt the new practice will arguably be at a lower cost than for a 
poor performer (Delmas and Montes-­‐‑Sancho, 2010). Moreover, their previous 
high performance may also offer protection for any mishaps or issues found 
following the adoption of a new standard or initiative, therefore, arguably 
lowering the perceived risks and consequently the firm’s evidentiary threshold.  
In addition to the lower costs and risks, a high performing firm may arguably see 
higher immediate benefits for “shouting its credentials” or sharing its good deeds 
through the visibility achieved with the new adoption (Delmas and Montes-­‐‑
Sancho, 2010). For one thing, Bansal and Hunter (2003) found that higher 
performers – or more specifically firms with higher environmental legitimacy and 
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fewer environmental crisis – were more likely to be early adopters of ISO14001. 
In the case of the UNGC, it would not sound unreasonable to suggest that high 
performers would be more likely to be early adopters, as they would probably 
already been managing some if not all of the UNGC issues at least to some 
extent. Joining would then be an opportunity to communicate their commitment 
and good performance to a larger audience of stakeholders.  
Hypothesis 4: Firms that display higher corporate social performance are 
more likely to join the UNGC early. 
It has also been also proposed that firms in high impact industries are generally 
subject to greater stakeholder scrutiny, and therefore are under greater pressure 
to demonstrate alignment with societal goals and attention to these matters 
(Bansal and Bogner, 2002). These firms – perceiving a greater threat to their 
legitimacy - arguably have greater incentives to proactively engage in voluntary 
CSR initiatives to signal to stakeholders their commitment and willingness to 
address such issues. Following this line, one would expect that firms that are in 
high impact industries have greater incentives to become early adopters of 
voluntary CSR initiatives. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 5: Firms in high impact industries are more likely to join the 
UNGC early. 
Finally, as explained in section 3.2.3.2, it has been proposed that organisations 
for whom adoption of a practice is easier will be more prone to early adoption 
(King and Lenox, 2001). For one thing, it has been proposed that firms which 
are ISO9000 certified will be more likely to be early adopters of ISO14001 (King 
and Lenox, 2001, Perkins and Neumayer, 2010, Castka and Balzarova, 2008). 
Given the overlap between the two standards, it can be argued that previous 
experience in the ISO9000 is likely to lower costs, information needs (Perkins 
and Neumayer, 2010) and perceived risks associated with the implementation of 
ISO14001, therefore increasing uptake of the latter. This may be especially 
important in the early phases of adoption (King and Lenox, 2001), when 
uncertainty around the new initiative is greater and therefore reassurances such 
as these may see greater impact on firms’ decision. While similarities and 
overlap between the UNGC and ISO14001 might not be as substantial, one can 
argue that they do overlap in a number of areas. Equally important, participation 
in one CSR initiative may reduce an organisation’s hesitancy to participate in 
another one (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010). Based on this, it is proposed that: 
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Hypothesis 6: Firms with prior ISO14000 certification are more likely to 
join the UNGC early. 
6.1.2 Pulling the laggards - What factors may lead to late adoption?   
While much attention may be directed to early adoption, understanding factors 
that lead to late adoption are arguably equally relevant to understand the 
dynamics of the diffusion of an initiative. For one thing, mimetic mechanisms 
may see their importance increase in later phases of adoption. As discussed in 
section 3.2.3.1, institutional theory proposes that early adopters of new 
organisational practices, i.e. those that adopt it in the early stages of the 
institutionalisation process, do so in views of achieving improved performance 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or fulfilling a specific need or interest (Scott, 2008). 
As the institutionalisation of a practice progresses, the decision to adopt it 
becomes more of a requirement than a choice, as normative and cultural 
pressures reach a point where non-adopters risk to be seen as deviants from 
the norm, or behind the time (Scott, 2008). In other words, adopting the new 
practice becomes more a matter of ensuring legitimacy following a logic of 
appropriateness, than achieving efficiency, following a sense of instrumentality 
(Scott, 2008). 
Hypothesis 7: Mimetic pressures are likely to be stronger in the late 
period of adoption than in the early days after the launch of the UNGC. 
On a similar line, it has been proposed that geographic proximity is an important 
determinant of the adoption of innovation (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011).  
The central idea is that decision makers act under cognitive constraints, 
therefore searching for solutions within a limited pool of available alternatives, 
which are recognised as more familiar to them (March and Simon, 1993). 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) propose that firms are likely to constrain 
their searches to contexts that are close to them geographically and therefore 
also culturally. The authors found, however, that geographic proximity requires a 
larger number of adopters to serve as an effective vehicle of diffusion of a new 
initiative and therefore is a relevant predictor in the later phases of adoption of 
the new practice (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). One could argue that 
enough volume of adoption is needed in a country for it to be remarked across 
borders through proximity, as very few adopters would probably disperse the 
information. 
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Hypothesis 8: Geographic proximity is an important predictor of sign up 
to the UNGC in the late period of adoption. 
6.1.3 What factors may be equally important for early and late 
adoption?   
Whereas for some factors a clear division may exist between their influences in 
early or late stages of adoption, others may have an impact on firms’ behaviour 
throughout the existence of an initiative. Proximity through trade relations is an 
example of that. As discussed in section 3.2.3.2, this factor has been pointed as 
having an important impact on firm behaviour in regards to joining voluntary 
CSR initiatives. The arguments vary to some extent in regards to the source of 
pressure – while some authors focus on the state and the level of regulation in 
the country with which firms in the focal country are trading with (Perez-Batres 
et al., 2010), others recognise the role of firms as an important source of 
coercive isomorphism (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011).  
Firms may be subject to formal incentives for adoption of an initiative, for 
example, resulting from explicit requirements advanced by buyers for suppliers 
to adopt standards that are widely implemented in the buyer’s country (Perkins 
and Neumayer, 2010). These incentives may also be more indirect, for example, 
firms trading with a country where many local firms have adopted a certain 
standard may need to adopt that standard as well in order to be able to trade 
with local firms (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). Such pressures are 
proposed to be important drivers not only on the early phases of adoption, when 
coercive pressure may be particularly effective to promote engagement, but also 
at later phases, when adoption is more widespread in countries with whom the 
focal country is trading with (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). 
Equally, Perez-Bastres et al (2010) found that Latin American firms with 
stronger trade ties with Europe (as compared to the US) were more likely to join 
either the UNGC or the GRI. Given that Europe has a more stringent 
environmental regulation as compared to the US (Perez-Batres et al., 2010), 
firms embedded in the European institutional environment would be more prone 
to demanding this kind of behaviour and engagement from firms they are trading 
with, formally or informally. In addition, the EU is pointed as a “partial exception” 
to the notion of CSR as voluntary given a number of directives it has put in place 
to govern sustainability issues, such as for example the Directive for Waste of 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment which imposes obligations in regards to the 
collection, recycling and disposal of these types of materials (Perez-Batres et al., 
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2011). Once again, firms trading with Europe would arguably be under greater 
pressure to display commitment to sustainability issues. While the authors do 
not theorise about effects on different stages of adoption, one could argue that 
this pressure would be present and driving engagement in early as well as later 
phases of adoption. It is unlikely that the level of regulatory stringency in such 
countries may change as well as pressures for higher CSP from trade partners. 
Hypothesis 9: Firms in trade proximity with the EU are equally likely to 
join the UNGC in the early or late periods. 
Normative pressures have been typically associated with professionalisation 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) (see also section 2.1.3.2). Two aspects of 
professionalisation are important sources of organisational isomorphism: 
standards set by formal university education, and professional networks, which 
cross organisations and through which new models diffuse (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Professionals and management consultants are an example of 
the latter – through their work they help disseminate practices and standards 
across organisations.  
For the case of ISO14001, it has been argued that professionals and 
management consultants with experience in ISO9000 are likely to become 
certifiers in ISO14001 as well, given the similarities between the standards, i.e. 
they will have a material stake in the promotion of the new standard and 
therefore are likely to become “champions” of it (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011). While their role may be key in the early stages of diffusion, when firms 
have less knowledge about the standard and therefore may need greater 
support, they are likely to keep pushing for implementation in later phases as 
well, even once the standard has been diffused more broadly in the country 
(Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). Based on this argument, Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho (2011) found support for the proposition that a higher number of 
ISO9000 certified firms in a country will lead to higher likelihood of early and late 
adoption of ISO14001 in that country.  
In the case of the UNGC, however, it is more challenging to make similar 
propositions, as the initiative does not have a clear “predecessor” which could 
lead to the immediate building of experience as proposed above. It would be 
interesting to know, however, whether previous experience with the GRI 
generates greater likelihood of early or late UNGC sign up. While the GRI is not 
a predecessor to the UNGC per se, it was established earlier (in 1997) and 
there are synergies between them – for one thing, the UNGC encourages firms 
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to use the GRI guidelines when submitting their communication on progress 
(Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). Building on Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011), it is 
therefore proposed that: 
Hypothesis 10: Firms headquartered in countries with a high number of 
GRI participants are equally likely to join the UNGC in the early and late 
periods. 
6.1.4 Control variables 
6.1.4.1 Slack resources 
Slack resources have been proposed to be important predictors for firm’s 
decision to engage in voluntary CSR initiatives. Organisations that dispose of 
slack resources are likely to be more willing to take the risk of adopting a new 
practice in a time when uncertainty regarding benefits for adoption is still very 
high (King and Lenox, 2001).  
6.1.4.2 Brand value 
It is argued that firms in markets where product differentiation and branding are 
relevant competing tools would accrue higher benefits from joining initiatives 
that help signalling to trade partners their commitment and the quality of their 
actions in the management of these issues (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009). 
Johnstone and Labonne (2009) found signalling to trade partners to be an 
important motivator at least for larger firms to adopt and certify their 
environmental management systems. In the case of the UNGC, while it is not a 
certification, it arguably also has the power to convey a message about the firms’ 
engagement with CSR. Therefore, it is expected that firms competing on those 
basis will be more likely to join the UNGC, and given the high incentives, it is 
proposed that they will be more likely to join in early phases. 
6.1.4.3 Level of regulation  
Greater acquiescence with regulations, rules and laws can arguably offer the 
organisation some protection from political risks (in the form of closer monitoring, 
for example) and legal coercion (in the form of more stringent regulation or 
enforcement of existing regulations) (Berrone et al., 2013). Engagement in 
voluntary CSR initiatives arguably sends a signal to regulators that the firm is 
seeking to improve its CSP, going beyond basic requirements of regulations 
(Johnstone and Labonne, 2009, Potoski and Prakash, 2005a). Therefore, a 
public commitment to these initiatives may not only help firms improve 
legitimacy but also avoid penalties for non-compliance (Berrone et al., 2013) or 
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the bearing of more stringent regulation (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). A 
more stringent regulatory environment is therefore arguably going to offer more 
incentives to increasing firm engagement in voluntary initiatives, leading to early 
adoption of such initiatives. 
6.1.4.4 Democracy 
Home country level of democracy has been pointed as a potential influence on 
firms’ inclination to engage in CSR initiatives (Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, 
Bennie et al., 2007, Perkins and Neumayer, 2010, Bernhagen et al., 2012). 
Governments in countries that display a more democratic political system 
usually demonstrate concern for a wider set of societal interests (Bennie et al., 
2007, Perkins and Neumayer, 2010). Equally, more democratic countries 
normally outperform less democratic peers in a number of welfare areas, 
including the issue areas of the UNGC (Bennie et al., 2007) and are more 
prepared to listen to critical voices in society, including in regards to corporate 
behaviour (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010, Bernhagen et al., 2012). Therefore, it 
is proposed that firms under the realm of more democratic governments will be 
under greater pressure (actual or perceived) and thus have greater incentives to 
incorporate a larger number of welfare concerns into its daily business. Firms in 
more democratic countries, therefore, are expected to be more likely to join 
early. 
6.2 Data  
This study uses data provided by ThomsonReuters ASSET4, combined with 
institutional data provide by a number of publicly available sources (see below 
and chapter three for a full list and description) as well as some UNGC data on 
participation and firm level data provided by Datastream.  
6.2.1 Sample 
This study focuses on a subset of the ASSET4 data, more specifically the data 
for the year 2010. This comprises a total of 4,580 firms, from 59 countries and 
70 different industries.  
6.2.2 Dependent variable 
6.2.2.1 Dividing the time 
Dividing the time into early and late periods of adoption is arguably fundamental 
for any empirical analysis of the diffusion of a practice or initiative. The rationale 
for this division, however, is often not clearly explained in the literature, and 
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where it is, there is no consistency across articles in the choices made to define 
such periods. To some extent this can be expected. The literature covers a wide 
range of phenomena, from adoption of civil service reforms by US cities (Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1983), to certifying ISO14001 (Albuquerque et al., 2007), to 
becoming a UNGC participant (Arevalo et al., 2013), to adoption of 
manufacturing best practice programs (Love and Cebon, 2008), to innovation in 
human resources practices in law firms (Sherer and Lee, 2002), to adoption of 
total quality management in public hospitals (Young et al., 2001), among others. 
One would expect that such different phenomena would vary in terms of time of 
diffusion to say the least. However, at the same time, this is somewhat 
surprising. The wide variety of solutions used to operationalise stages of 
adoption – even when there are reasonably clear definitions in the literature on 
the characteristics of each stage - seems to suggest that there is no consensus 
on the most appropriate way to do it. 
An overview of the articles illustrates this variety. Some authors, for example, 
divided the period of the study into four (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) or two 
(Arevalo et al., 2013) years groups. The reasons underlining the choice of such 
cutting points are not clear though. Some articles focus on the first years 
following the launch of an initiative and therefore claim to focus only on early 
adoption (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010, Bansal and Hunter, 2003). However, 
what constitutes the early years varies – for example, while Perkins and 
Neumayer (2010) cover a period of the first five years of the UNGC and 
ISO14001, Bansal and Hunter (2003) focus on the first two years after the 
launch of ISO14001. Kennedy and Fiss (2009) follow Westphal et al (1997) by 
defining stages of adoption in relation to the year their survey was done. They 
divided the time into three periods: two years before the survey, between two 
and four years, and over four years prior to the survey. 
More detailed explanations were found in some articles, although they differ 
amongst themselves. Burns and Wholey (1993) divide the period in two – the 
dividing year being chosen to reflect a stabilization in cumulative adoption of the 
matrix structure that occurred in the country. Young et al (2001), in a study of 
adoption of total quality management in public hospitals, chose the year prior to 
the peak on the annual number of adoption as their dividing point between early 
and late stages. Finally, Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) divide their 10 
years of ISO14001 adoption in two – pre-institutionalisation or take-off period 
and semi-institutionalisation period. The cutting point was chosen as 2001, 
when 50% of UN countries had firms that were ISO14001 certified. While 
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Delmas and Montes-Sancho’s (2011) rationale is interesting, there are certainly 
weaknesses to it. Reaching 50% of UN countries does not imply in an even level 
of adoption within countries and it could possibly be the case that some 
countries at that point have only one participant, which would arguably not 
reflect a “wide diffusion” of the initiative.  
Given those challenges and lack of clarity on the literature on the most 
appropriate mean to divide the time, this study used the division of time that 
offered the best econometric solution, i.e. that divided the total number of 
participants in roughly similar groups in size. More details are provided below. 
6.2.2.2 Choosing a dependant variable 
Choice of dependant variable was varied across diffusion studies, although 
more consistency is found here compared to the division of time. Most variables 
aimed to reflect adoption over time, with some variations in the approach. 
Variables were chosen to represent: number of adopters per year per country 
(Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011, Tolbert and Zucker, 1983); growth on 
number of adopters per year per country (Albuquerque et al., 2007); binary 
variable indicating whether the firm is an early or late adopter (Arevalo et al., 
2013); binary variable indicating whether the firm has adopted the practice at 
some point in the studied period (Burns and Wholey, 1993, Bansal and Hunter, 
2003); number of adopters in a country per year normalized by population size 
(Perkins and Neumayer, 2010), among others.  
The objective of this study is to understand patterns and drivers for adoption of 
the UNGC, and how the influence of these drivers change over time; in other 
words, what elements may drive firms to early or late adoption. Therefore, the 
dependant variable needs to capture the point in time when the firm joined the 
UNGC. Aggregate the data per country is not ideal in this case, as firm and 
industry level variables are also being considered as factors that may drive 
adoption and a country level aggregate would arguably prevent a closer 
examination of these factors. Focus on growth rather than year of joining was 
used by Albuquerque et al (2007) to account for the fact that firms need to 
recertify in ISO14001 every three years, and not all firms choose to do so. Some 
parallel may be drawn with the UNGC and the need to submit a COP to 
maintain the status of participant - not all firms decide to produce a report, and 
this results in some being delisted from the initiative. However, the purpose of 
this study is to understand what leads to early or late adoption therefore when 
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the firm join is the most relevant data and once again an aggregate may prevent 
a more fine-grained analysis.  
Initially the study used two dependant variables, reflecting whether the firm was 
an early (joining date between 2000 and 2007) or late adopter (joining date 
between 2008 and 2010). This division built on Delmas and Montes-Sanchos’ 
(2011) rationale, as 2007 is roughly when 50% of UN countries had at least one 
UNGC participant (based on UNGC sign up data). The split, however, was also 
good from an econometric point of view, as it allowed for two groups that had 
approximately the same size. However, there was a need to recalibrate the 
dependant variables to allow for a more nuanced analysis. The objective was to 
be able to better observe especially the very early joiners of the UNGC. The 
solution was to divide the dependant variables into three periods, as per the list 
below. The three new dependant variables were guided by the initial division, 
but chosen to share the number of participants into three groups of 
approximately the same size: 
1. Very early joiners: this variable takes a value of 1 if the firm joined 
between 2000 and 2003, 0 if it never joined and “missing” if it had joined 
in any other period;  
2. Middle joiners: this variable takes a value of 1 if the firm joined between 
2004 and 2007, 0 if it never joined and “missing” if it had joined in any 
other period;  
3. Late joiners: this variable takes a value of 1 if the firm joined between 
2008 and 2010, 0 if it never joined and “missing” if it had joined in any 
other period. 
In order to test for robustness, however, models were also run using the initial 
two variables, yielding similar results. 
6.2.2.3 Independent Variables 
Government’s support to the UN reflects whether a country had 
ratified/presented the appropriate expression of support to the international 
agreements/declarations/treaties that underlie the UNGC 10 principles, by the 
end of 2009. Data for the following international instruments were used: 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Labour Organisation's 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development and the United Nations Convention Against 
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Corruption. This data was obtained from the United Nations’ website and is 
represented by a dummy variable (1 for yes and 0 for no). In the case of human 
rights and labour, where more than one international instruments are at the base 
of the principles, a country only received a “1” if they had demonstrated support 
for all of them by the end of 2009. The use of this variable is inspired by and 
builds mainly on the work of Lim and Tsutsui (2012) but of some other authors 
as well (Bennie et al., 2007, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, Bernhagen et al., 
2012). 
NGOs concentration in a country is represented by the cumulative participation 
of such organisations (global and local NGOs) in the UNGC in each country as 
of 2009. These variables were calculated using data from the UNGC dataset 
and follow similar use in the literature (Bernhagen et al., 2012, Perez-Batres et 
al., 2011).  
Firm size was measured as the log of employees in 2009, calculated from the 
variable number of employees provided by Datastream.  
Corporate Social Performance was measured using the following variables from 
ASSET4: CVGSCORE (corporate governance), SOCSCORE (social) and 
ENVSCORE (environment), all for 2009. Scores are a number between 0 and 
100 that show the firm’s performance in comparison to the remaining ASSET4 
universe for a particular issue.  
A dummy for extractive industry was created in SPSS. It gathers firms classified 
under SIC codes 10 (metal mining), 12 (coal mining), 13 (oil and gas extraction) 
and 14 (mining and quarrying of non-metallic minerals, except fuels). As 
discussed in chapter four, recognising the lack of a one fully agreed definition of 
high impact/extractive industry, this study follows EITI (Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative)’s focus on oil, gas and mining companies as firms in the 
extractive industry (EITI, 2014).  
Prior ISO 14001 certification was obtained from ASSET4. This is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm was ISO14001 certified in 2009 and 0 
if otherwise.  
Mimetic Pressures were measured as UNGC penetration in country and industry. 
These were calculated from ASSET4 data and reflect the percentage of firms in 
the sample that were participants in a given industry, or a given country in 2009. 
Chapter 5: Speed of adoption of the UNGC 
 181 
That follows and builds on Lim and Tsutsui (2012) use of number of participants 
in the country lagged by one year as an independent variable. 
Geographic proximity was also calculated from ASSET4 data and represents 
the number of UNGC participants in a given geographical sub-region of the 
world in 2009, namely: Australia and New Zealand, Central America, Central 
Asia, Eastern Africa, Eastern Asia, Eastern Europe, Northern Africa, Northern 
America, Northern Europe, South America, South-Eastern Asia, Southern Africa, 
Southern Asia, Southern Europe, Western Africa, Western Asia, Western 
Europe. Country classifications were taken from the United Nations Statistics 
Division. This builds on Lim and Tsutsui (2012) use of a similar measure, 
although these authors used broader geographic areas.  
This study measures trade proximity with the EU at firm level in order to allow 
for a more fine-grained analysis of the impact of this relationship in each firm’s 
decision to join the UNGC. This indicator was calculated using Datastream data 
for home country and trade activities outside of home country. It takes a value of 
1 if a firm is not from the EU but has trade activities with it and a value of zero if 
otherwise (firm from the EU or firm not from the EU but has no trade activities 
with the EU).  
GRI participation in country was calculated by aggregating at country level the 
ASSET4’s 2009 data on firm’s use of GRI in reporting, using SPSS.  
6.2.2.4 Control variables 
Slack resources are represented by ROTA (return on total assets) and Leverage 
(which is built from a ratio of long term debt by assets). This data was obtained 
from Datastream for the year 2009.  
Advertising intensity was built as a ratio of advertisement expenditure by total 
sales for the year 2009. The data was obtained from Datastream.  
Stringency of regulatory environment was operationalized following Berliner and 
Prakash (2010). It encompasses measures of the stringency of credit market 
regulations, labour market regulations and business regulations, taken from the 
Economic Freedom of the World dataset. For these indicators, the larger the 
number the higher the freedom or the less stringent the regulatory environment 
is. For more details on these variables please see chapter three. 
In line with a number of previous studies, Level of democracy was represented 
by the Polity IV dataset provided by the Centre for Systemic Peace (Perkins and 
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Neumayer, 2010, Lim and Tsutsui, 2012, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, 
Bernhagen et al., 2012). This indicator ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 
(full autocracy).  
6.3 Methods for analysis 
Given that the outcome variable is a categorical variable (early, middle or late 
joiner) and the predictor variables are both continuous and categorical, the 
method used for data analysis was binary logistic regression (Field, 2009). 
6.4 Results 
The figure below presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation 
coefficients for the variables of this study. It can be observed that the dependent 
variables are significantly correlated to most independent variables. Differently 
from expected, however, the dependant variable representing early joiners is 
negatively correlated to GRI penetration in firms’ home country and NGO 
participation in the UNGC locally (both significant at the 0.01 level). Also 
different from expected this dependant variable is not significantly correlated to 
variables representing slack resources, country support to UN 
declarations/covenants on the Environment and Corruption and trade proximity 
to the EU. GRI penetration was also negatively correlated (at the 0.01 level) to 
late joining, against expectations.  
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While most correlation coefficients conform to the norms, correlation coefficients 
between NGOs that are UNGC participants (i.e. Local NGOs and Global NGOs, 
which are UNGC participants) present a concern for multicollinearity as the 
coefficient is greater than 0.8 (Field, 2009). Also as observed in chapter 6, the 
correlation coefficient between social and environmental performance is also greater 
than 0.8. Interestingly, GRI penetration in home country also presented a concern for 
multicollinearity with a correlation coefficient of 0.818 in relation to the penetration of 
global NGOs in home country. Given the potential multicollinearity concern, further 
tests were run to check the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). Using linear regression 
in SPSS, tables 13 to 15 below were prepared: 
 
Table 16: VIF, dependent variable: very early joiners 
 
 
Although there is not a clearly established threshold of when a value of VIF should 
become a concern, this study follows Field (2009) in that values above 10 signal 
potential problems of multicollinearity. It is clear on table 13 that social and 
environmental performance do not seem to present a concern here; however, 
variables representing both local and global NGO participation in the UNGC have 
VIFs above 10. In addition, these variables have tolerance statistics below 0.1 
suggesting serious problems of multicollinearity (Field, 2009). GRI participation in 





Advertising intensity 0.946 1.057
Credit market regulation 0.153 6.547
Labour market regulation 0.203 4.916
Business regulation 0.255 3.925
Polity IV 0.345 2.898
Government support to human rights 0.140 7.118
Government support to labour 0.227 4.4
Government support to environment 0.564 1.774
Government support to anti-Corruption 0.377 2.654
Local NGOs 0.027 36.722
Global NGOs 0.020 50.765




Extractive industry 0.830 1.204
ISO14001 certified 0.582 1.717
UNGC participants in home country 0.301 3.323
UNGC participants in the industry 0.885 1.13
Regional UNGC participation 0.305 3.279
Trade with the EU 0.782 1.278
GRI participation in home country 0.097 10.346
a Dependent Variable: Very Early joiners until 2003
Collinearity Statistics
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While this does not present a concern as important as in the case of NGO 
participation, this information will be considered when running the models. 
For the case of NGO participation, in order to prevent the unwanted effects of 
multicollinearity, models were run separately with each of these variables. Given the 
better contribution of local NGO participation to the explanatory power and the fact 
that the variable for Global NGOs also had a coefficient correlation greater than 0.8 
in regards to GRI participation, NGO participation at local level was the variable 
retained. 





















Advertising intensity 0.943 1.061
Credit market regulation 0.163 6.129
Labour market regulation 0.203 4.915
Business regulation 0.258 3.879
Polity IV 0.344 2.905
Government support to human rights 0.145 6.876
Government support to labour 0.24 4.169
Government support to environment 0.537 1.863
Government support to anti-Corruption 0.346 2.894
Local NGOs 0.025 40.076
Global NGOs 0.019 52.891




Extractive industry 0.827 1.21
ISO14001 certified 0.581 1.723
UNGC participants in home country 0.305 3.276
UNGC participants in the industry 0.894 1.119
Regional UNGC participation 0.312 3.206
Trade with the EU 0.78 1.282
GRI participation in home country 0.089 11.185
a Dependent Variable: Middle joiners 2004 to 2007
Collinearity Statistics
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Table 18: VIF, dependent variable: late joiners 
 
 
Similar results were obtained when using middle joiners and late joiners as the 
dependent variable – the main point of concern were the variables representing 
participation of local and global NGOs in the UNGC at the country level. 
The results of the logistic regressions are presented in the tables below. The 
dependent variables are three: early joiners, middle joiners and late joiners, which 





Advertising intensity 0.944 1.059
Credit market regulation 0.156 6.43
Labour market regulation 0.21 4.759
Business regulation 0.266 3.756
Polity IV 0.348 2.874
Government support to human rights 0.145 6.913
Government support to labour 0.232 4.302
Government support to environment 0.549 1.82
Government support to anti-Corruption 0.346 2.894
Local NGOs 0.023 43.982
Global NGOs 0.018 55.984




Extractive industry 0.824 1.213
ISO14001 certified 0.59 1.694
UNGC participants in home country 0.316 3.168
UNGC participants in the industry 0.898 1.113
Regional UNGC participation 0.308 3.242
Trade with the EU 0.783 1.276
GRI participation in home country 0.088 11.403
a Dependent Variable: Late joiners 2008 to 2010
Collinearity Statistics
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Table 19: Regression table - dependent variable: very early joiners 
 
  
Dependent variable: Very Early Joiners 
(2000-2003)
M1 M4 M7 M10 M13
Constant
-0.437   
(0.867)   
-12.214   
(1.969)   
***
-4.266    
(1.136)   
***
-0.458    
(0.849)   
-14.726    
(2.233)   
***
!"#$ -0.003   (0.007)
0.01   
(0.014)
0.006    
(0.008)
-0.004   
(0.007)
0.013   
(0.014)
%&'&()*& 0.006  (0.004)
-0.001   
(0.007)
-0.003    
(0.005)
0.006   
(0.004)
-0.001    
(0.007)
$+'&(,-.-/*0-/,&/.-,1 0          
(0.003)
0.017   
(0.034)
-0.007    
(0.032)
0    
(0.003)
0.003    
(0.04)
2(&+-,03)(4&,0(&*56),-7/ 0.062    (0.084)
0.318   
(0.12)   
***
-0.032    
(0.103)
-0.087    
(0.092)
-0.202    
(0.157)
%)875(03)(4&,0(&*56),-7/
-0.538   
(0.059)   
***
-0.299   
(0.098)   
***
0.051    
(0.088)
-0.402    
(0.073)   
***
0.204    
(0.13)
95.-/&..0(&*56),-7/
-0.242   
(0.138)   
*
-0.556   
(0.216)   
**
-0.504    
(0.19)   
***
-0.161    
(0.138)
-0.094    
(0.289)
:76-,10;<
0.236   
(0.072)   
***
-0.011   
(0.076)
0.067    
(0.048)
0.255    
(0.071)   
***
0.07    
(0.079)
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,70?53)/0(-*?,.
1.748   
(0.6)              
***
0.746    
(0.708)
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,706)875(
0.815   
(0.315)   
**
-1.29    
(0.614)   
**
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,70&/'-(7/3&/, 0.758   
(1.246)
-0.614    
(1.499)
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,70)/,-@27((5>,-7/ 0.026   
(0.284)
0.076    
(0.314)
%7A)60B=".
0.019    
(0.009)   
**
0.013    
(0.011)
C-(30.-D&
0.457   
(0.079)   
***
0.466    
(0.09)   
***
E"2E2"!F
0.038   
(0.009)   
***
0.043     
(0.01)    
***
FB<E2"!F
0.018   
(0.009)   
**
0.014    
(0.009)   
2=<E2"!F
0.015   
(0.005)   
***
0.014    
(0.006)   
**
FG,()A,-'&0-/+5.,(1
0.322   
(0.43)
1.027    
(0.469)   
**
;E"HIJJH0A&(,-K-&+
0.436   
(0.265)
0.032    
(0.289)
LB=20>)(,-A->)/,.0-/0?73&0A75/,(1
6.789    
(0.618)   
***
7.332    
(0.914)   
***
LB=20>)(,-A->)/,.0-/0,?&0-/+5.,(1
8.283    
(1.287)   
***
8.046    
(1.716)   
***
!&*-7/)60LB=20>)(,-A->),-7/
0.012    
(0.004)   
***
0.01    
(0.007)
#()+&0M-,?0,?&0FL
0.281   
(0.191)
0.379    
(0.286)
=!;0>)(,-A->),-7/0-/0?73&0A75/,(1
-0.007   
(0.002)   
***
-0.017    
(0.005)   
***
N 3741 2927 3741 3741 2927
Nagelkerke R Square 0.13 0.499 0.369 0.139 0.589
Percentage correct cases 0 40.6 21.6 0 48.8
Difference in Nagelkerke R Square 
relative to Model 1
0.4 0.2 0.0 0.5
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Dependent variable: Middle  Joiners 
(2004-2007) M2 M5 M8 M11 M14
Constant
1.505    
(0.682)         
**
-6.61    
(1.494)   
***
-1.116    
(0.802)
1.552       
(0.683)       
**
-7.922    
(1.586)    
***
ROTA
-0.012    
(0.006)    
**
-0.019    
(0.009)    
**
-0.011    
(0.007)
-0.013     
(0.006)    
**
-0.017    
(0.01)             
*
Leverage 0.005    (0.004)
0.006    
(0.006)
0.001    
(0.004)
0.006     
(0.004)
0.004     
(0.006)
!"#$%&'(')*+')&$)('&, 0                 (0.002)
0.044    
(0.031)
0                 
(0.003)
0    
(0.002)
0.03     
(0.031)
Credit market regulation -0.003    (0.075)   
0.077    
(0.108)
0.01    
(0.08)
-0.014     
(0.09) 
0.017     
(0.12)
Labour market regulation
-0.413    
(0.056)    
***
-0.334    
(0.084)   
***
-0.144    
(0.068)    
**
-0.425     
(0.075)    
***
-0.298     
(0.112)    
***
Business regulation
-0.299    
(0.117)    
**
-0.23    
(0.18)
-0.405    
(0.143)    
***
-0.289     
(0.12)     
**
-0.091     
(0.206)
Polity IV
0.049    
(0.024)      
**
-0.095    
(0.038)         
**
-0.001    
(0.023)
0.051     
(0.025)           
**
-0.121      
(0.046)     
***
Government support to human rights
1.538    
(0.462)    
***
1.546     
(0.552)    
***
Government support to labour -0.058    (0.268)   
-0.256       
(0.351)
Government support to environment -1.079    (0.738)
-1.17      
(0.867)
Government support to anti-Corruption -0.27    (0.262)
0.027      
(0.301)
Local NGOs 0.011    (0.007)
0.001      
(0.009)
Firm size
0.348     
(0.07)    
***
0.337      
(0.073)       
***
SOCSCORE
0.052    
(0.008)   
***
0.053      
(0.008)     
***
ENVSCORE 0.003     (0.007)
0           
(0.007)
CGVSCORE 0.007     (0.004)
0.007      
(0.005)
Extractive industry
0.578    
(0.352)
0.848      
(0.365)      
**
ISO14001 certified
0.371              
(0.236)
0.288       
(0.243)
UNGC participants in home country
3.992    
(0.551)    
***
3.105      
(0.808)      
***
UNGC participants in the industry
4.973    
(1.1)    
***
3.802       
(1.471)     
**
Regional UNGC participation
0.004     
(0.003)
-0.003      
(0.004)
Trade with the EU
 
0.436     
(0.179)     
**
0.178      
(0.227)
GRI participation in home country
0          
(0.002)
0.005     
(0.004)
N 3761 2945 3761 3761 2945
Nagelkerke R Square 0.095 0.397 0.176 0.1 0.416
Percentage correct cases 0 18.5 1.1 0 23.6
Difference in Nagelkerke R Square 
relative to Model 2 0.302 0.081 0.005 0.321
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Dependent variable: Late  Joiners 
(2008-2010) M3 M6 M9 M12 M15
Constant -0.7      (0.688)
-6.38      
(1.4)         
***
-3.181        
(0.777)       
***
-0.553      
(0.681)
-7.62       
(1.488)     
***
ROTA -0.004      (0.006)
-0.007        
(0.01)
-0.002      
(0.007)
-0.004        
(0.006)
-0.004       
(0.011)
Leverage 0.001     (0.004)
-0.002      
(0.005)
-0.003       
(0.004)
0.001        
(0.004)
-0.003      
(0.005)
!"#$%&'(')*+')&$)('&, -0.001      (0.004)
-0.016      
(0.036)
-0.006      
(0.032)
-0.001             
(0.004)
-0.035      
(0.038)
Credit market regulation
0.124     
(0.067)                    
*
0.195       
(0.1)       
*
0.127        
(0.072)      
*
0.049       
(0.082)
0.081       
(0.121)
Labour market regulation
-0.343      
(0.05)         
***
-0.235     
(0.072)       
***
-0.117       
(0.059)      
**
-0.301         
(0.063)         
***
-0.311       
(0.096)         
***
Business regulation -0.156      (0.116)
-0.174      
(0.175)
-0.222         
(0.137)
-0.126             
(0.117)
0.047       
(0.199)
Polity IV
0.055      
(0.023)       
**
-0.046          
(0.031)
0.022         
(0.022)
0.066             
(0.023)      
***
-0.079     
(0.04)        
**
Government support to human rights
0.737      
(0.385)             
*
0.764        
(0.473)
Government support to labour 0.372      (0.234)
0.408       
(0.321)
Government support to environment 0.249      (0.681)
0.764       
(0.791)
Government support to anti-Corruption -0.024      (0.234)
0.29      
(0.283)
Local NGOs -0.001      (0.008)
-0.023       
(0.009)     
**
Firm size
0.119      
(0.06)        
**
0.086     
(0.064)
SOCSCORE
0.032      
(0.006)     
***
0.032      
(0.006)     
***
ENVSCORE
0.017       
(0.006)      
***
0.016      
(0.006)      
***
CGVSCORE 0.006     (0.004)
0.01       
(0.004)      
**
Extractive industry
-0.286       
(0.385)
-0.098        
(0.408)      
ISO14001 certified
0.073      
(0.196)
-0.115       
(0.205)
UNGC participants in home country
3.681       
(0.505)       
***
3.566     
(0.728)     
***
UNGC participants in the industry
5.115        
(0.909)       
***
4.25       
(1.169)      
***
Regional UNGC participation
0.003         
(0.002)
-0.009       
(0.004)     
***
Trade with the EU
0.539       
(0.157)     
***
0.507        
(0.191)     
***
GRI participation in home country
-0.003            
(0.002)                     
*
0.009        
(0.004)   
**
N 3805 2971 3805 3805 2971
Nagelkerke R Square 0.066 0.304 0.143 0.074 0.345
Percentage correct cases 0 3.4 0.4 0 11.8
Difference in Nagelkerke R Square 
relative to Model 3 0.238 0.077 0.008 0.279
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Table 22: Regression table - dependent variables: earlyvsnever and latevsnever 
  
  
Dependent variables: EarlyVsNever 
(M16) and LateVsNever (M17) M16 M17
Constant
-9.558         
(1.451)       
***
-7.489            
(1.342)       
***
ROTA -0.01      (0.009)
-0.001               
(0.01)
Leverage -0.002             (0.006)
0                       
(0.005)
!"#$%&'(')*+')&$)('&, 0.014          (0.029)
-0.013                  
(0.031)
Credit market regulation -0.037             (0.112)
0.035                   
(0.112)
Labour market regulation 0.009           (0.099)
-0.292                  
(0.086)             
***
Business regulation -0.331               (0.203)
0.135                        
(0.181)
Polity IV -0.049           (0.048)
-0.086                     
(0.035)        
**
Government support to human rights
1.241            
(0.532)            
**
0.88                 
(0.424)                
**
Government support to labour -0.55              (0.37)             
0.188                 
(0.292)
Government support to environment -1.103        (0.862)
0.486                  
(0.724)
Government support to anti-Corruption 0.042          (0.256)
0.192                   
(0.257)
Local NGOs 0.003          (0.008)
-0.015                        
(0.008)               
*
Firm size
0.394             
(0.065)    
***
0.115               
(0.059)           
*
SOCSCORE
0.047         
(0.007)        
***
0.036               
(0.006)                   
***
ENVSCORE 0.004        (0.006)
0.013                   
(0.005)                          
**
CGVSCORE
0.012             
(0.004)           
***
0.006                         
(0.004)
Extractive industry
0.993              
(0.334)         
***
0.059                 
(0.354)
ISO14001 certified
0.272             
(0.217)
-0.092                      
(0.189)
UNGC participants in home country
5.185                       
(0.7)       
***
3.675                  
(0.678)                 
***
UNGC participants in the industry
6.216                    
(1.3)                   
***
3.454                      
(1.072)            
***
Regional UNGC participation
0.003                      
(0.004)        
-0.008                           
(0.003)           
***
Trade with the EU
0.253                  
(0.199)
0.522                    
(0.177)               
***
GRI participation in home country
-0.003               
(0.003)
0.006                    
(0.003)             
**
N 3056 3015
Nagelkerke R Square 0.548 0.363
Percentage correct cases 49.1 13.9
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Model 1, 2 and 3: Base models 
Models one, two and three are the most parsimonious ones, comprising variables for 
slack resources, advertising intensity, level of regulation and level of democracy. In 
Model 1, early joiners is the dependent variable, for model 2 the dependent variable 
is middle joiners and for model 3 it is late joiners. In model 1, one can see that for 
early joiners a more democratic political environment and more stringent labour and 
business regulation are associated with higher odds of firms joining in this period. For 
one thing, firms in more democratic countries are 1.27 times more likely to join early 
(p<0.01). The model, however, offers a poor fit explaining only 13% of the variation 
(Nagelkerke R2) and classifying none of the early joiners correctly. 
For middle joiners (model 2), a more democratic political environment and more 
stringent labour and business regulation are also associated with higher odds of 
firms joining in this period. Slack resources, however, differently from expected, 
decreases the odds of firms joining in this period. Model 2 explains only 9.5% of the 
variation (Nagelkerke R2), and is also not able to correctly classify any of the firms 
that joined in this period. 
For late joiners (model 3) more stringent labour regulation and a more democratic 
political system remain significant in increasing the odds of joining in later periods. 
Model 3, however, has a worse fit than the previous two, explaining 6.6% of variation 
(Nagelkerke R2) and not classifying any of the late joiners correctly. 
M4, M5 and M6: Variables relevant for early joining 
Models 4, 5 and 6 build on models 1, 2 and 3, adding to them the variables that the 
theory says are relevant in increasing the odds for firms joining early. Model 4 offers 
an important improvement in the explanatory power of model 1, explaining 49.9% 
(Nagelkerke R2) of the variation and correctly classifying 40.6% of the early joiners. 
As expected, this model has a better fit for early joiners than for middle and late 
joiners given that those are the variables the theory predicts can explain early joining. 
Nevertheless, models 5 and 6 also represent an improvement if compared to models 
3 and 4. While the former explains 39.7% of variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly 
classifies 18.5% of middle joiners, the latter explains 30.4% of variation (Nagelkerke 
R2) and correctly classifies 3.4% of late joiners. 
In model 4, bigger firms are 1.58 times more likely to join early (p<0.01). Still at firm 
level, performance in social (Exp(B) =1.039, p<0.01), environment (Exp(B) =1.018, 
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p<0.05) and corporate governance (Exp(B) =1.015, p<0.01) issues increase the odds 
of firms joining early. More stringent labour and business regulations also increase 
the odds of early joining; in regards to credit market regulations, however, more 
flexible regulation increases the odds of joining by 1.38 (p<0.01). The presence of 
counterbalancing voices in society (local NGOs) also contributes to early joining. 
Country support to the UN is the strongest predictor - support to the relevant UN 
human rights covenants increases the odds of early joining by 5.74 times (p<0.01). 
Model 5 uses middle joiners as the dependent variable. Firm size remains relevant, 
increasing the odds of joining in this period by 1.417 times (p<0.01). Performance in 
social issues is also relevant, increasing the odds of joining by 1.054 (p<0.01); 
environment and governance performance, however is no longer significant. 
Surprisingly, slack resources contribute to a decrease in odds of joining in this period. 
Country support to the relevant UN human rights covenants remains the variable with 
the greatest impact, increasing the odds of joining in the middle period by 4.655 
times (p<0.01). 
Finally, model 6 uses late joiners as the dependant variable. Firm size increases the 
odds of late joining by 1.13 times (p<0.05). Social and environmental performance 
increases the odds of joining in this period by 1.03 and 1.02 (p<0.01 in both cases) 
but corporate governance was no longer significant. A more stringent labour 
regulation also increases the odds of joining in this model (Exp(B)=0.79, p<0.01). 
Given the multicollinearity concerns between the variables for local and global NGOs, 
the models were re-run using global NGOs and Local NGOs separately. When using 
the variable for global NGOs, however, the explanatory power dropped slightly for 
the three models (Nagelkerke R2 equals to 40.6%, 15.7% and 3.9% respectively). 
Given this, the variable for local NGOs participation was retained for future models. 
Models 7, 8 and 9: Variables relevant for late joining 
Models 7, 8 and 9 built on models 1, 2 and 3, by adding to them the variables which 
are, according to the theory, relevant for late joining, namely, mimetic pressures at 
country and industry levels and regional participation. Differently from expected, 
however, this set of variables are able to explain early and middle joining better than 
late joining. Model 7 uses early joiners as a dependant variable - it explains 36.9% of 
variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classifies 21.6% of early participants. Model 9, 
however, which focuses on late joiners, explains only 14.3% of variation (Nagelkerke 
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R2) and is only able to correctly classify 0.4% of late joiners. Model 8 also has a 
poorer fit than model 7, explaining 17.6% of variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly 
classifying 1.1% of middle joiners. 
Also different from expected, and counter intuitively, mimetic pressures at country 
and industry levels have their strongest impact in the early periods rather than late, 
increasing the odds of early joining by 887.8 times (country) and 3954 times (industry) 
(model 7) (p<0.01 in both cases). This compares to an increase in odds of 39.688 
times in late joining for every unit of increase in peer participation in the same 
country (p<0.01) and 166.46 times for every unit of increase in peer participation in 
the same industry (p<0.01) (model 9). Regional participation, also different from 
expected, is only significant in model 7, increasing the odds of early joining by 1.012 
for every unit of increase in the number of UNGC participants at a regional level 
(p<0.01). 
Models 10, 11 and 12: Variables relevant for both periods 
Models 10, 11 and 12 build on models 1, 2 and 3, by adding the variables predicted 
by theory to increase the odds of joining in both early and late periods concomitantly. 
These variables represent trade ties with the EU and the number of GRI participants 
in the firm’s home country. While they represent a slight improvement in explanatory 
power when compared to models 1, 2 and 3 (Nagelkerke R2: 13.9%, 10% and 7.4% 
respectively) they are not able to classify any of the participants correctly, suggesting 
a poor fit of the model. Interestingly, trade ties with the EU are only significant in later 
periods, increasing the odds of middle joining by 1.547 (p<0.05) and of late joining by 
1.715 (p<0.01). GRI participation in home country, different from expected, reduces 
the odds of firms joining in the early periods of the initiative (Exp(B)=0.993, p<0.01).  
Models 13, 14 and 15: A complete model 
Models 13, 14 and 15 build on all previous models, gathering all the variables for 
early, late and both periods at the same time. They offer an important improvement 
in the explanatory power when compared to previous models, with a Nagelkerke R2 
of 58.9%, 41.6% and 34.5% respectively. Model 13 correctly classifies 48.8% of early 
participants; model 14 correctly classifies 23.6% of middle joiners and model 15 
correctly classifies 11.8% of the late joiners. 
Still different from expected, mimetic pressures at country and industry levels have 
their strongest impact in the early periods rather than late, increasing the odds of 
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early joining by 1528 times (country) and 3120 times (industry) (p<0.01 for both) 
(model 13). This compares to an increase in odds of 35.38 times in late joining for 
every unit of increase in peer participation in the same country and 70.1 times for 
every unit of increase in peer participation in the same industry (p<0.01 for both) 
(model 15). The impact on middle joiners is lower than these two, with increase in 
odds of 22.3 for every unit of increase of UNGC penetration in country and 44.796 for 
every unit of increase of UNGC penetration in industry (model 14). GRI aggregated 
participation at country level, on the other hand, is seen to discourage sign up in 
early periods of the initiative (Exp(B)=0.984, p<0.01) (model 13) while increasing the 
odds of joining in later periods by 1.009 times (p<0.05) (model 15). It is not significant 
half way, though.  
Country support to the UN relevant covenants/agreements varies in their impact in 
sign up across the periods. While they are no longer relevant in later periods of the 
initiative (model 15), country support to labour instruments is seen to discourage 
early joining. On the other hand, country support to the UN human rights covenants 
increase the odds of firms joining the middle periods by 4.693 times (p<0.01). 
Firm size looses explanatory power with time – it is significant in early (model 13) 
and middle (model 14) periods, but not in later periods (model 15). Being a firm in the 
extractive industry behaves similarly, increasing the odds of joining early by 2.793 
(p<0.05) (model 13) and by 2.336 times half way (p<0.05) (model 14); in later periods, 
however, it is no longer significant. Finally, firms’ performance in social issues is 
seen to increase the odds of joining the initiative in all periods. Corporate governance, 
however, only contributed for early and late joining (model 13 and 15) and 
environmental performance only contributed to late joining (model 15). 
Models 16 and 17: Testing for robustness with a different division of time 
In order to test for robustness, two new models were run using the original 
dependant variables, i.e. earlyvsnever, which took a value of 1 if the firm had joined 
between 2000 and 2007 and 0 if it had never joined; and latevsnever, which took a 
value of 1 if the firm had joined between 2008 and 2010 and 0 if it had never joined. 
The objective was to verify whether the change on the division of time would yield 
different results on the variables driving early and late adoption. 
One can argue that the key findings remain the same. Mimetic pressures are positive 
and significant in both periods, but have a stronger influence in early joining. A firm is 
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178.5 times more likely to join early for every unit of increase in peer participation at 
country level (p<0.01) (model 16) but only 39.4 times more likely to do so in the late 
period (p<0.01) (model 17). Similarly, a firm is 500.9 times more likely to join early for 
every unit of increase in participation at its industry globally (p<0.01) (model 16), but 
only 31.6 times more likely to do so in the late period  (p<0.01) (model 17).  
Also in line with previous models, economic benefits in the form of trade relations 
with the EU is only significant in the late period, increasing the odds of a firm joining 
in this period by 1.7 (p<0.01). Belonging to the extractive industry is only significant in 
early joining, increasing the odds of joining by 2.7 times (p<0.01) (model 16). 
Regional participation is still only significant – and with a negative coefficient - at the 
late period. Finally, more stringent labour regulation and less democratic political 
environment also have a significant impact on the odds of joining in the late period. 
Slight changes are seen in corporate social performance. In line with the previous 
models, social performance is positive and significant throughout and environment 
performance remains significant only in the late period, increasing the odds of late 
joining by 1.01 (p<0.05) times. Corporate governance performance, however, is no 
longer significant at the late period in this model, although it is still positive. GRI 
participation in the country is still negative in the early period but no longer significant; 
it remains, however, positive and significant in the late period, increasing the odds of 
a firm joining then by 1.006 times (p<0.05). Finally, country support to UN’s 
covenants in labour issues is no longer significant in influencing early joining, but 
support to the human rights conventions is. The latter is also significant for late 
joining for these variables. 
Models 18 to 32: Testing for robustness with a different modelling strategy 
In order to further test for robustness yet another alternative modelling strategy was 
tested. This strategy aimed at more specifically reflecting the reality of the timing of 
the decision making process at each period – early, middle or late. Three new 
dependent variables were created: 
1. NewVsOtherwise – takes a value of one if the firm joined early (2000 – 2003) 
and zero if otherwise, i.e. if it joined in middle or late periods or never joined. 
2. MiddleVsOtherwise - takes a value of one if the firm joined in the middle 
period (2004-2007) and zero if otherwise, i.e. if it joined in the late period or 
never joined. 
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3. LateVsOtherwise – takes a value of one if the firm joined in the late period 
(2008-2010) and zero if it never joined. 
The sampling strategy was also different. For the first set of models (dependent 
variable being NewVsOtherwise) the full sample was included. For the second set of 
models (dependent variable being MiddleVsOtherwise) early joiners were excluded 
and only middle, late or non-joiners were kept. Finally, for late joiners, middle and 
early joiners were excluded, and only late and non-joiners were used. 
By using these dependent variables combined with this sampling strategy, the aim 
was to reflect the actual reality of the time of the decision-making. More specifically, 
early joiners are compared to all firms, as all of them arguably had the opportunity to 
join then. Middle joiners, however, are only compared to late or non-joiners, as those 
that joined early are no longer going to join in middle or late periods. Similar thinking 
was applied to late joiners. 
Models were run using the same independent variables from models one to fifteen 
above. Results were not found to be much different. More details are below: 
1. For the models that had late joining as the dependent variable, no difference was 
found. 
2. For the models that had middle joining as the dependent variable: For the second 
set of models (M5, whose independent variables are only the ones that are relevant 
for early joining), the following differences were found: Local NGOs - became 
significant at 0.1; ISO 14001 certification - became significant at 0.1 and Extractive 
industry - became significant at 0.1. 
While three variables became significant, that was not in the full model, and only at 
0.1, which is not particularly relevant given the size of the sample used. 
3. For the models that had early joining as DV, the following differences were found: 
Labour market regulation  - became significant at 0.05. While this is an acceptable 
level of significance, this does not affect the main results because this is a control 
variable. 
Local NGOs - became significant at 0.1. Once again, this level of significance is not 
relevant given the sample size. 
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Regional participation  - became significant at 0.05. This is the only place where 
there is a relevant difference when compared to the previous set of models (models 
one to fifteen). It would not have an important impact on the overall analysis though, 
as hypothesis eight would still not be supported. 
Overall one can then argue that the results obtained with this new modelling strategy 
are aligned with the previous ones, with no major differences found. The regression 
tables are not included in the chapter in interest of space, but can be found in annex 
two. 
Further testing for robustness: multinomial logistic regression 
In order to further test for robustness another econometric technique was also used: 
multinomial logistic regression. For that, a new dependent variable was created 
combining all possible joining timings. This new dependent variable took a value of 
zero if the firm never joined, one if the firm joined until 2003, two if the firm joined 
between 2004 and 2007 and three if the firm joined after 2008. The sample used was 
the same used in models one to 15 in this chapter (i.e. ASSET4’s data for the year 
2010, comprising a total of 4,580 firms, from 59 countries and 70 different industries) 
and multinomial logistic regression was used to analyse the data. Multinomial logistic 
regression offers an interesting alternative as it allows for the analysis of all possible 
outcomes concomitantly. 
The data analysis showed results consistent with the ones observed in models one 
to 15. Therefore, given that two other tests of robustness had already been reported 
in full details and consistency was observed, and in the interest of space, full details 
were not reported here. 
 
6.5 Discussing the hypotheses 
A discussion on the hypotheses should now follow, and is summarised on the table 
below. Hypothesis 1 is not supported, as country support to relevant UN 
covenants/declarations/agreements does not seem to increase the odds of joining in 
the early phase of adoption of the UNGC. If anything, country support to the UN 
labour covenants seems to discourage early joining. Hypothesis 2 is also not 
supported, as the participation of local NGOs is not significant in explaining early 
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joining. It is only significant in later phases of adoption but then it has a negative 
coefficient. 
Table 23: Discussing the hypotheses 
Hypothesis Status 
Hypothesis 1: Firms headquartered in countries whose government 
demonstrates support to the UN are more likely to join the UNGC early. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 2: Firms headquartered in countries with a large number of 
NGOs that are interested in corporate social performance (i.e. that are 
UNGC participants) are more likely to join the UNGC early. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 3: Larger firms are more likely to join the UNGC early. Supported 
Hypothesis 4: Firms that display higher corporate social performance are 
more likely to join the UNGC early. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 5: Firms in high impact industries are more likely to join the 
UNGC early 
Supported 
Hypothesis 6: Firms with prior ISO14000 certification are more likely to join 
the UNGC early 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 7: Mimetic pressures are likely to be stronger in the late period 
of adoption than in the early days after the launch of the UNGC. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 8: Geographic proximity is an important predictor of sign up to 
the UNGC in the late period of adoption. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 9: Firms in trade proximity with the EU are equally likely to join 
the UNGC in the early or late periods. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 10: Firms headquartered in countries with a high number of 




Hypothesis 3 is supported. Firm size is associated with increasing odds of joining in 
early stages of adoption – a firm is 1.593 times more likely to join in early days for 
every unit of increase in firm size. This is reduced to 1.4 in the middle period, and 
size becomes non-significant in leading to late adoption. Hypothesis 4 is partially 
supported. Social and governance performance are indeed positive and significant in 
early periods, increasing the odds of firms joining early. However, environment 
performance is not significant at this stage. On the other hand, all three areas of 
performance contribute to increasing odds of joining in the later phase of adoption. In 
addition, while the coefficients are slightly higher in the early phase, they are not 
much higher, therefore not suggesting a much larger impact in the earlier phase of 
adoption. 
Hypothesis 5 is supported, as belonging to an extractive industry is positive and 
significant in the early phase of adoption, positive and significant but with a slightly 
lower coefficient for middle joiners and non-significant for late joiners. Hypothesis 6, 
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on the other hand, is not supported, as prior ISO14001 certification is not significant 
in any period of adoption.  
Hypothesis 7 is not supported, as mimetic pressures in the form of peer participation 
in the UNGC at country and industry levels are not only significant but also stronger 
in the early periods of the initiative (rather than in the later period as predicted). 
Geographic proximity, on the other hand, is only significant in the late period; 
however, it is associated with a drop in the odds of joining, therefore hypothesis 8 is 
also not supported. 
The study also found partial support to hypothesis 9, as while trade proximity with the 
EU is not relevant in driving early joining, it does increase the odds of joining in the 
late period. Finally, hypothesis 10 is only partially supported. While the number of 
GRI participants in a country is associated with increasing odds of a firm joining in 
late periods, it is linked to a decrease in odds of sign up in the early days of the 
UNGC. 
6.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
While we have learned valuable information in chapter four about drivers for firms’ 
decision to join the UNGC, chapter five showed that factors moderating firms’ 
decision to join the initiative vary along the different phases of implementation of the 
UNGC. In other words, early joiners are driven to some extent by a different set of 
institutional pressures, if compared to later joiners. For one thing, size has its highest 
impact on firms’ odds of joining in the early period. This impact is reduced in the 
middle phase, and becomes not significant in the late period. This suggests that 
bigger firms tend to join early, with smaller firms tending to follow later in the process.  
Equally, belonging to the extractive industry increases the odds of a firm joining by 
2.793 times in the early period. This impact is slightly reduced in the middle period 
and in the late period this factor becomes not significant. It can be argued that these 
firms, which are normally under greater legitimacy threat due to the nature of their 
activities and as a result under greater pressure to display consonance with societal 
interests, are more inclined to join early to show commitment. 
In general, firms with a good corporate social performance story to tell will tend to 
join the UNGC in all periods. Small variations, however, can be observed. Firms’ 
corporate social performance in regards to social issues was relevant in all periods, 
even though its importance decreases slightly in the later period. Good performance 
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in corporate governance also has a slightly higher influence in the early period. 
Better environmental performance, however, only impacts the odds of joining in the 
late period. Being ISO14001 certified, on the other hand, was not associated with 
increasing odds of joining in any period.  
Different from expected, however, increasing levels of peers sign up to the UNGC 
within the firms’ industry and country has an important impact on early joining, more 
so than in later periods. This is counter intuitive and almost by definition not possible 
according to the theory – one would expect that these pressures would be stronger in 
later periods, when participation becomes more of a requirement than a choice. It 
may be, however, that in early periods uncertainty in relation to benefits of 
participation is at its peak as the initiative is still being established. Therefore for 
every new peer that joins, a little of this uncertainty fades away, and a firm is 
therefore more likely to join. One could then argue that the impact of peer 
participation would be at the highest in this period because that is when the highest 
levels of uncertainty in regards to the benefits (and risks) of joining exist. Another 
possible explanation, when understanding the results as a whole, is that the initial 
group of firms that join (bigger firms, with higher levels of CSP) are actually a “small 
club” at a global level. Therefore, an increase in levels of sign up amongst those 
firms will tend to have a greater impact in the decision of other firms in this small 
circle to join (if compared to peer pressure amongst a much larger group of firms 
nationally or globally). Geographic proximity or the diffusion effect expected from 
high levels of UNGC sign up in neighbouring countries, however, is only significant in 
the later period and then it is associated with lower odds of joining.  
Diffusion through trade relations, on the other hand, is only significant in the late 
period. Only for late joiners economic benefits in the form of trade relations with the 
EU are shown to significantly increase the odds of joining. It can be argued that in 
later stages the initiative has acquired the legitimacy and recognition it needed to be 
used as a commercial tool at a global level. This diffusion through trade could 
happen in this stage, for example, through big firms requirements to small firms 
located abroad that are part of its supply chain.  
At a national level, country support to the relevant UN Conventions/agreements was 
not confirmed to support early joining. Support to the UN’s labour 
conventions/agreements was actually associated with lower odds of early joining. 
Still at the national level, lower levels of democracy and more stringent labour 
regulation were associated with increasing odds of joining in later periods.  
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Normative forces in the form of concentration of NGOs in firms’ home country were 
not associated with increasing odds of early joining; they were actually associated 
with decreasing odds of joining in the late stage of the UNGC. Given that these 
NGOs are directly engaged in the UNGC as participants, it may be that this close 
proximity may shy away firms that are not ready to engage in a closer dialogue with 
these counterbalancing voices; this may be especially true for firms inclined to 
ceremonial commitment.  
The study also showed that while a higher number of GRI participants in a country 
was associated with higher odds of joining the UNGC in the late period, this actually 
reduced the odds of firms joining in the early period. In other words, firms in countries 
with more GRI participants were less likely to join the UNGC in its first years of 
existence. It may be that in the early days of the UNGC the synergies between these 
initiatives were not yet clear, potentially leading to a perception that the two initiatives 
were exclusionary with a sense of “why do I need to join the UNGC when I am 
implementing the GRI?”. While the two initiatives first announced a collaboration in 
December 2001, i.e. in the very early days of the UNGC, this cooperation was 
strengthened with time (UNGC, 2003) - For one thing the UNGC-GRI Value platform 
was only launched in 2006 (UNGC, 2007). It is possible that only with the maturing of 
this collaboration, external stakeholders were able to fully understand the existing 
synergies. In addition, professionals working on the implementation of the GRI might 
have been a bit protective in the early days of the market of implementing the GRI 
and therefore this might be also contributing for the fact that GRI participation in a 
country is discouraging early joining. In later periods, however, synergy between the 
initiatives was probably much clearer to firms and other stakeholders, and 
professionals might actually have started to work with them together. 
In a nutshell, one can argue that early joiners in the UNGC are bigger firms, with a 
good corporate social performance story to tell and with higher legitimacy threats due 
to being from an extractive industry. Early joiners are also highly susceptible to 
mimetic forces in the form of peer participation. Late joiners, on the other hand, show 
concern with the economic benefits of participation. Size and inherent impact are no 
longer significant for those firms, but a good story to tell in all areas of corporate 
social performance is driving late adoption. Peer sign up remains an important 
mimetic pressure. Also, late joiners are firms from countries with more stringent 
labour legislation and less democratic governments, where local NGO participation in 
the UNGC discourages sign up to the initiative.  
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The two-stage model: does it fit the UNGC diffusion pattern? 
Tolbert and Zucker’s (1983) two-stage model proposed that motivations may drive 
different speeds of adoption, as while early adopters focus on technical benefits from 
adoption, late adopters are more concerned about ensuring their legitimacy. Neo-
institutional theory reinforces this idea saying that while those interested in improving 
performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or fulfilling a specific need or interest 
(Scott, 2008) will tend to join early, as the institutionalisation of a practice progresses, 
the decision to adopt it becomes more of a requirement than a choice. This two-
stage model cannot be confirmed in this study.  
For one thing, increasing levels of peers sign up to the UNGC within the firms’ 
industry and country has an important impact on early joining, more so than in later 
periods. This is counter intuitive and almost by definition not possible according to 
the theory – one would expect that these pressures would be stronger in later 
periods, when participation becomes more of a requirement than a choice. On the 
other hand, economic benefits in the form of trade relations with the EU - which can 
arguably be a more instrumental motivation for joining - are only significant in the late 
period. They are not relevant in the early period, as one would expect.  
This is in line, however, with Arevalo et al’s (2013) findings for the adoption of the 
UNGC in the Spanish context. The authors propose that early UNGC adopters in 
Spain were mainly focused on image gains, rather than economic gains. The authors 
defend that, being a UN initiative, the UNGC has, from its inception, been widely 
known and therefore firms would immediately see an image gain by associating 
themselves with the initiative. Also, they add, a business case for participation was 
not discussed in the early days. Therefore, it was only among late adopters that 
economic benefits interest emerged, while still keeping an interest in image gains 
(Arevalo et al., 2013). This argument also finds resonance at the global level, in that 
by being an UN initiative, the UNGC has arguably inherently acquired from the early 
days the legitimacy associated with this institution. In addition, given the reach of the 
UN globally, it was arguably quicker for this initiative to become known for firms 
worldwide, if compared to initiatives flying solo.  
The nature of the diffusion process, therefore, arguably varies in different phases. In 
early periods, geographic proximity plays a key role - mimetic pressures amongst 
peers both at country and industry levels have a crucial impact in increasing the odds 
of more firms joining the initiative. Even though firms in the same industry are not 
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necessarily in the same country or region, the type of contagious process of diffusion 
that may occur within industry is somewhat similar to that of firms in close proximity, 
as in many ways they share a space; among the types of nature of diffusion 
(geography, trade and culture) geography would be the closest representation of this 
effect. In later periods however, while this remains an important force, it is clear that 
proximity through trade – especially bigger firms influencing their supply chain – is 
also a very important mean of diffusion. 
6.7 Contributions to theory and practice 
Most research on the speed of adoption of new practices focuses on innovation. 
Where it looks into voluntary CSR initiatives, it mostly focuses on the diffusion of 
ISO14001 (Delmas and Toffel, 2008, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). This study 
contributes to the literature by providing an empirical verification of drivers for 
adoption at different stages of a voluntary CSR initiative that is non-certifiable – the 
UNGC. To the author’s best knowledge, there was only one study on the UNGC that 
looked into speed of adoption (Arevalo et al., 2013). The study, however, was 
restricted to the Spanish context, and focused mainly on the interplay between 
motivations for joining the UNGC and speed of adoption.   
To practitioners, the information of the general profile of early joiners, combined with 
the evidence from both chapter four and this chapter of the relevance of peer 
participation to attract more participants is relevant in that by targeting the right 
participants in the early days, voluntary CSR initiatives are in a better position to 
grow its base of participants as time progresses. In addition, empirical evidence of 
the important impact of peer participation in firms’ decision to join the initiative 
especially in the early days suggests that the establishment of partnerships with 
industry organisations, for example, or initiatives at the country level such as the 
UNGC local networks, can be valuable strategies to help a new initiative to take off. 
In later periods, however, the relevance of economic benefits in driving sign up 
shows that strategies such as working with champions can be very valuable to 
ensure continuous growth. For example, by incentivising larger firms that are well 
involved in the initiative to promote the UNGC across its supply chain may bring a 
number of new participants to the initiative. 
6.8 Summary and next chapter 
This chapter aimed at understanding the differences in drivers for adoption of the 
UNGC over the different phases of the initiative. The study shows that drivers for 
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adoption vary across time, depending on where the initiative is in the process of 
institutionalisation. Empirical evidence suggests that early joiners in the UNGC are 
bigger firms, with a good corporate social performance story to tell and higher 
legitimacy threats due to being from an extractive industry. Early joiners are also 
highly susceptible to mimetic forces in the form of peer participation. Late joiners, on 
the other hand, show concern with the economic benefits of participation. Size and 
inherent impact are no longer significant for those firms, but a good story to tell in all 
areas of corporate social performance is also driving late adoption. Peer participation 
remains an important mimetic pressure. Also, late joiners are firms from countries 
with more stringent labour legislation and less democratic governments.  
The diffusion process of the UNGC does not seem to follow the classic two-stages 
model proposed by Tolbert and Zucker (1983). One can observe a stronger role for 
mimetic pressures in driving early than late adoption, and the focus on economic 
benefits (in the form of trade relations) only emerging as significant in the late period 
of adoption. While this is different from theory, this is in line with Arevalo et al’s (2013) 
findings for the adoption of the UNGC in the Spanish context, where only amongst 
late adopters interest in economic benefits emerged as a driver for joining. 
The next chapter will move beyond the decision to become a UNGC participant, to 
look into firms’ performance in the initiative. More specifically, it will look into the 
extent to which institutional pressures shape UNGC’s participants’ performance in 
the initiative’s principles and issue areas. 
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7 Chapter 6: Under what conditions are promises 
more likely to be delivered upon? Drivers for firm 
performance in the UNGC 
Participation in voluntary CSR initiatives has grown over the last decades (Waddock, 
2008) and with it interest from practitioners and scholars alike on the matter of firm 
performance following sign up. For one thing, great variation on performance is 
observable across UNGC participants. Although firms are subject to the same 
commitment, performance following becoming a UNGC participant varies greatly, 
with some firms displaying best practices while others are expelled due to failure to 
communicate on progress. For one thing, as of 2 November 2013 4,199 firms had 
been expelled from the UNGC for failure to communicate on progress. Given that in 
the same period the UNGC had 7,868 corporate participants, this is a significant 
number representing over 50% of the accumulated number of participants, and 
suggesting that participants vary in performance and level of commitment. 
While firms’ choice on level of engagement in an initiative lies within the organisation 
itself, a number of institutional forces are proposed to influence this decision. Building 
on the emerging discussion on institutional influences on other aspects of corporate 
social performance (Campbell, 2007, Matten and Moon, 2008, Jeurissen, 2004, 
Gjolberg, 2009), this study aims at exploring the factors that may influence firm’s 
performance in voluntary CSR initiatives in general and in the UNGC in particular, at 
firm, industry and country levels. Following a more recent line of study on decoupling 
(Kim and Lyon, 2012), it aims at understanding the conditions under which symbolic 
engagement in the UNGC is appealing for firms, and conversely circumstances 
under which substantive engagement is of more interest. 
As discussed in chapter two (section 3.3.1), not all firms resort to the seemingly very 
profitable strategy of decoupling, suggesting that “symbolic management is useful for 
some firms under certain circumstances, but not for all firms nor in all circumstances” 
(Kim and Lyon, 2012: 01). One can argue, therefore, that an institutional environment 
that can increase the external costs of decoupling by increasing the risks of firms 
being caught and penalised, are likely to lead to a reduction in symbolic commitment. 
As explained in detail in section 3.3.2, elements that may influence the cost of 
decoupling are proposed to be multilevel, in other words, “what they talk about me 
matters to my behaviour”, in the form of stakeholder pressure and scrutiny of some 
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guise, as well as “where I come from”, represented by firms’ home country 
institutional environment, and “who I am”, represented by firm attributes such as size 
and industry. These factors may make it more or less interesting for firms to keep a 
promise. 
Despite great interest on firm performance after joining voluntary CSR initiatives and 
on institutional influences on other aspects of corporate social performance 
(Campbell, 2007, Matten and Moon, 2008, Jeurissen, 2004, Gjolberg, 2009), the 
literature on institutional influences on firm performance on voluntary CSR initiatives 
was found to be incipient (Knudsen, 2011). Articles exploring firms’ corporate social 
performance after joining a voluntary CSR initiative are mainly focused on the impact 
the initiative itself may have on firm behaviour (Boiral and Henri, 2012, Yin and 
Schmeidler, 2009, Potoski and Prakash, 2005b). Very few articles have looked 
beyond the immediate impact of the initiative to understand the extent to which the 
characteristics of the firm, industry or of its operating environment may influence their 
performance (Knudsen, 2011, Perez-Batres et al., 2012a).  
While there seems to be some agreement in regards to the relevance of stakeholder 
pressure and scrutiny in different guises in improving performance, the small number 
of studies, different focus, idiosyncratic methods and diverse choice of variables 
make it challenging to make conclusions and leave questions open in regards to the 
drivers for performance for firms that have joined these initiatives in general and the 
UNGC in particular. In addition, specifically in the case of studies including the 
UNGC, while there seems to be a good measure of ceremonial commitment with the 
use of delisting (Knudsen, 2011, Lim and Tsutsui, 2012) measures of good or 
substantive performance show room for further development. Some studies resorted 
to the use of GRI as a measure of substantive commitment in contrast with the 
choice of UNGC as ceremonial or symbolic commitment (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012, 
Perez-Batres et al., 2012a). This arguably does not allow for a measure of 
performance in the UNGC that can be used against institutional measures to 
understand their impact. This study aims at contributing to fill this gap, with a cross-
national, multi-industry, longitudinal study of institutional influences on UNGC 
participants’ performance in the initiative’s issue areas, as well as in three compound 
measures of corporate social, environment and governance performance.  
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7.1 Understanding institutional influences in firm behaviour 
in voluntary CSR initiatives 
Institutional theory predicts that regulative, normative and cognitive aspects of firms’ 
institutional environment will influence firms’ decision to implement a certain 
organisational practice (Scott, 2008). Institutions establish what is considered 
appropriate behaviour through explicit rules and procedures, as well as through 
principles and norms implicit in daily activities (Bernhagen et al., 2012). Firms will 
aim to conform (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to the dominant practices within their 
operating environment in order to obtain legitimacy and ultimately ensure its survival 
in the long run (Scott, 2008). This will lead to increasingly homogenous behaviour, as 
firms strive to “fit-in” and conform to expectations and requirements. Oliver (1991) 
suggests, however, that conforming is not the only available choice for an 
organisation faced with institutional pressures. Possible responses may range from 
acquiesce, to compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation (Oliver, 1991). 
Organisations’ willingness, capacity and ability to conform will drive their response to 
the institutional demands (ibid).  
In the context of this debate between structure and agency, it is proposed here that 
while firms’ choice of substantive or ceremonial engagement after joining an initiative 
lies within the organisation itself, a number of institutional pressures may influence 
this decision. As argued in section 3.3.2, firms’ operating environment may offer 
different incentives and threats for certain behaviour. These variations will arguably 
influence the external cost of decoupling, i.e. the risks associated with increasing 
scrutiny revealing discrepancy between firm’s discourse and action (Kim and Lyon, 
2012). This is likely to lead to conditions that are more or less conducive for 
decoupling – the higher the external cost, the less interesting it may be for firms to 
engage in ceremonial behaviour, and vice versa. A number of factors have been 
proposed to influence firms’ decision to make a substantive or ceremonial 
commitment to a voluntary CSR initiative. The table below provides a summary and 
examples of these factors, at which levels they can be observed and some examples 
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Figure 6: Elements impacting level of commitment 
Type Level Some examples in the 
literature 
Size Firm Firm size(Knudsen, 2011), 
facility/unit size (Potoski and 
Prakash, 2005b, Rivera et 
al., 2006, Bernhagen and 
Mitchell, 2010) 
Slack resources Firm Slack resources (Perez-
Batres et al., 2012a) 
Industry/level of impact Industry Level of pollution, level of 
impact (Knudsen, 2011, 
Bernhagen and Mitchell, 
2010, Perez-Batres et al., 
2012a) 
Stakeholder pressure / 
scrutiny 
Firm, industry and country NGOs pressure (Lim and 
Tsutsui, 2012), workers 
pressure, public perception, 
stakeholder scrutiny (Perez-
Batres et al., 2012a), parent 
company pressure, senior 
management / board 
pressure (Annandale et al., 
2004) 
Market pressure / economic 
interdependence 
Firm, country Customers / clients pressure 
(Annandale et al., 2004, 
Christmann and Taylor, 
2006), bilateral export 






Country Democracy (Lim and Tsutsui, 
2012), regulatory pressure 
(Annandale et al., 2004), 
domestic governance 
(Knudsen, 2011), neoliberal 
economic policies (Lim and 
Tsutsui, 2012) 
Government endorsement Country Launch of UNGC in country 
(Lim and Tsutsui, 2012) 
 
7.1.1 Stakeholder pressure / scrutiny 
Firms are generally faced with pressures from a number of different stakeholders – 
customers, clients, governments, civil society, academia, workers, among others. 
Given the variety of interests, priorities and perspectives among them, it is only 
natural to expect that firms may often be faced with competing sovereigns, or 
conflicting demands from different stakeholders. In addition, stakeholder pressure 
and scrutiny may take a number of different forms and be built on different 
institutional pillars. For example, pressure from regulators is generally associated 
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with coercive mechanisms, while normative pressures are often associated with 
professionalisation or with civil society.   
As explained in section 2.1.3.2, the normative pressures help define goals and 
objectives (for example: making a profit) while also defining what constitutes 
appropriate means to pursue them (for example: sustainable business practices) 
(Scott, 2008). While normative pressures have typically been associated with 
professionalisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the latter is not the only source of 
this type of pressures. The community, in the form of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), may also exercise pressure over firms to adopt a certain 
practice (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011).  
NGOs have gained prominence over the last decades and have been an important 
voice in seeking to define new roles and responsibilities for businesses (Perez-
Batres et al., 2011). In line with Perez-Bastres et al (2011) NGOs are classified here 
as a normative force in shaping firm behaviour in regards to CSP in general, and 
voluntary CSR initiatives in particular. In reason with this argument, one would 
expect that countries with strong NGOs’ presence and an environment which allows 
them to express themselves (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010), is likely to display strong 
normative pressures on firms to show higher corporate social performance. In their 
constant seek for legitimacy firms in this environment will arguably have more 
incentives to try to improve performance in consonance with commitments made.  
More specifically in the case of the UNGC, NGOs have been an integral part of the 
initiative since its foundation (UNGC, 2013a). As of November 2013, over 2,000 civil 
society organisations were listed as UNGC participants (UNGC, 2013a). NGOs 
engaged with the UNGC are arguably likely to display particular interest in the 
initiative and on participating firms’ performance post-joining, and therefore will 
arguably be more likely to exert pressure on firms to make a substantive commitment 
to implementation. However, studies on other aspects of voluntary CSR initiatives 
have pointed to some discrepancies in regards to the effects of NGOs’ pressure. For 
example, while Perez-Bastres et al (Perez-Batres et al., 2011) found that NGO 
participation in the UNGC in a country is not significantly related to the likelihood of 
firm engagement in the initiative, Berrone et al (2013) found that normative pressures 
from NGOs have a positive and significant effect on firms’ efforts to engage in 
environmental innovation. These contrasting findings suggest that NGOs’ pressure 
may indeed have varied levels of impact, and therefore it is important to test the 
following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 01: Firms headquartered in countries with a large number of 
NGOs that are interested in corporate social performance (i.e. that are UNGC 
participants) will be more likely to display higher performance in the UNGC 
issues. 
It has been proposed in the literature, however, that the association between NGOs’ 
pressure and level of commitment may not be always straightforward (Lim and 
Tsutsui, 2012). For one thing, Lim and Tsutsui (2012) demonstrated that while in 
developing countries pressures from international NGOs remained positively and 
significantly associated with substantial commitment to the initiative, in developed 
countries those pressures were positively associated with ceremonial commitment to 
the UNGC (i.e. delisting). This may be related to the authors’ choice of proxy for 
substantive commitment (participation in the GRI), which is different from the focus of 
ceremonial commitment (delisting from the UNGC). The fact that they cover different 
initiatives may impose a limitation on the analysis. In any case, it is important to 
understand whether the level of economic development may moderate performance. 
It is therefore hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 02: Firms headquartered in developed countries will be more 
likely to display higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
These pressures may also come from internal stakeholders. Annandale et al (2004) 
found that pressure from the parent company, from senior management or from the 
board to be important influences on firms’ environmental performance. While the 
authors do not offer a theoretical explanation for this finding, one could argue that 
those internal stakeholders are in a position where they can exert coercive pressures 
on firms to conform to commitments made, in order to protect the firm’s reputation 
and ultimately legitimacy. Therefore, where those internal pressures are strong, one 
can arguably expect to observe more substantial implementation of the commitments 
made.  
Hypothesis 03: Firms with a more diverse board are more likely to display 
higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
7.1.2 Peer pressure and mimicking behaviour 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) highlight that coercive authority is not the only source of 
institutional isomorphism – uncertainty is also a powerful force in encouraging 
organisational behaviour towards isomorphism. When there is uncertainty in the 
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environment, organisations may be encouraged to mimic the behaviour of other 
organisations perceived by them as successful (and therefore legitimate), in order to 
ensure their own legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Haunschild and Miner, 
1997). This mimicking behaviour may occur in unconscious ways, through which 
certain practices or structures that are frequently adopted start to be “taken for 
granted” and embraced without thinking (Haunschild and Miner, 1997).  
Building on this, one can argue that the performance of peers, i.e. the performance of 
other firms within the focal firm’s home country or industry, may influence the focal 
firm’s performance. Firms may find themselves compelled to adopt similar practices 
– and arguably level of performance – of peers. These “modelled organisations” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) may be seen as offering interesting solutions for 
problems whose outcomes are difficult to predict (Perez-Batres et al., 2011). If peers 
are displaying higher performance in a certain issue or principle, the focal firm is 
arguably going to tend to mimic that behaviour. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 04: Firms are more likely to display higher performance in an 
UNGC issue if other firms in its home country are also performing high in that 
issue.  
Hypothesis 05: Firms are more likely to display higher performance in an 
UNGC issue if other firms in its industry are also performing high in that issue.  
7.1.3 Economic interdependence and market pressures 
Trade relations have also been pointed as having an important impact on firm 
behaviour in regards to CSP. While coercive power is generally associated with the 
state, firms are also an important source of coercive isomorphism (Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2011), and this pressure can become evident in trade relations, 
notably in the case of firms located in different countries. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 
150) proposed that “coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal 
pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are 
dependant”. In trade relations there is arguably an imbalance of power, where sellers 
will seek to ensure contracts with buyers who would have a pool of sellers to choose 
from. Buyers may require suppliers to adopt standards that are widely implemented 
in the buyer’s country (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010), often to protect their own 
legitimacy. 
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Where information asymmetry exists and it is difficult to measure performance, there 
may be greater incentives for ceremonial behaviour as misbehaviour may be more 
easily concealed (Christmann and Taylor, 2006). In those cases, clients may use 
coercive power and impose requirements and/or mechanisms of monitoring and 
control to ensure substantive implementation on their supply chain (Christmann and 
Taylor, 2006). In a study of ISO9000 certified facilities in China, Christmann and 
Taylor (2006) found support for this proposition. Their results showed that the higher 
the frequency of customer monitoring, the more likely suppliers are to substantively 
implement a voluntary CSR standard. Lim and Tsutsui (2012) propose that firms on 
long-term trade relations are generally more able to implement broader screening 
processes and are better placed to monitor their partners (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012), 
therefore, being more likely to ensure significant commitment and improved 
performance (Christmann and Taylor, 2006). Authors have used Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) as a proxy to long-term trade relation (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012), 
therefore it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 06: Firms headquartered in countries with high FDI are more 
likely to display higher performance in the UNGC issues.  
Still on market and economic interdependence, it has been proposed that firms 
operating in countries where social and environmental legislation is non-existent or 
poorly enforced will face greater challenges to manage those issues and secure its 
legitimacy (Knudsen, 2011). Given the bigger threat to their legitimacy, these firms 
will have greater incentives to manage their social and environmental issues, and as 
a result, arguably display a substantive commitment to voluntary initiatives they 
choose to join. For one thing, Knudsen (2011) found that the more internationalised 
the national economy of a firm’s home country (measured as outward FDI/GDP) the 
less likely the firm is to be delisted, i.e. the lesser the likelihood that the firm will 
display mere ceremonial commitment to the UNGC. Building on this, it is proposed 
that: 
Hypothesis 07: Firms that are highly internationalised are more likely to 
display higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
7.1.4 Domestic governance elements 
Governance can be defined as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised” (Kaufmann et al., 2009: 5). The political system, or the state, is 
often associated with the regulative pillar with its coercive mechanisms (Berrone et 
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al., 2013, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). States may influence organisational 
behaviour and adoption of practices by providing incentives or implementing 
sanctions (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). Greater acquiescence with 
regulations, rules and laws can offer the organisation some protection from political 
risks (in the form of closer monitoring, for example) and legal coercion (in the form of 
more stringent regulation or enforcement of existing regulations) (Berrone et al., 
2013). Through these lenses, the role of different elements of domestic governance 
ought to be explored. 
Kaufmann et al (2009) propose six dimensions of domestic governance, namely: 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Together they 
are proposed to represent the institutional framework through which authority is 
exercised in a particular country (Kaufmann et al., 2009). It is proposed that good 
domestic governance institutions will be associated with substantive commitment to 
voluntary CSR initiatives (Knudsen, 2011). It can be argued that strong domestic 
governance can create the conditions to hold firms’ accountable for the commitments 
they make, therefore leading to substantive implementation of voluntary CSR 
standards.  
Hypothesis 08: Firms headquartered in countries with good domestic 
governance are more likely to display higher performance in the UNGC 
issues. 
In a similar line, home country levels of democracy have also been pointed in the 
literature as a potential influence on firms’ engagement in CSR initiatives (Lim and 
Tsutsui, 2012). Governments in countries that display a more democratic political 
system usually demonstrate concern for and engagement with a wider set of societal 
interests (Bennie et al., 2007, Perkins and Neumayer, 2010). Equally, more 
democratic countries normally outperform less democratic peers in a number of 
welfare areas, including the issue areas of the UNGC – prevention of human rights 
violations, as well as control of pollution and corruption (Bennie et al., 2007) and are 
more prepared to listen to critical voices in society, including in regards to corporate 
behaviour (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010, Bernhagen et al., 2012). Therefore, it is 
proposed that firms under the realm of more democratic governments will be under 
greater pressure (actual or perceived) and therefore have greater incentives to 
incorporate a larger number of welfare concerns into its daily business, including in 
regards to the issues proposed in voluntary CSR initiatives. For one thing, Lim and 
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Tsutsui (2012) found democracy to discourage ceremonial commitment to voluntary 
CSR initiatives in developed countries and encourage substantive commitment in 
developing countries. It is therefore proposed that:  
Hypothesis 09: Firms headquartered in countries with a more democratic 
political system are more likely to display higher performance in the UNGC 
issues. 
Finally, it has been proposed that more liberal national economies are likely to see a 
rise in the popularity of voluntary CSR initiatives, given their logic of lower levels of 
regulation (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). Firms in those countries will see an opportunity to 
work with policymakers to develop such initiatives and frameworks, avoiding 
government regulations while deflecting criticism and ultimately protecting their 
legitimacy (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). While this economic orientation may be 
associated with higher levels of sign up to voluntary CSR initiatives, no evidence was 
found that it might be associated with higher performance as well. Lim and Tsutsui 
(2012) actually found neoliberal economic policies to be positively and significantly 
associated with ceremonial commitment to voluntary CSR initiatives in developed 
countries. Ultimately, one could argue that the underlying argument here is one of 
mirroring (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010) - lower levels of government intervention 
are likely to lead to poorer CSP, and also in some cases ceremonial commitment to 
voluntary CSR initiatives. Similarly, Annandale et al (2004) found regulatory pressure 
to be an important driver for firm environmental performance.  
Hypothesis 10: Firms headquartered in countries with more stringent 
regulation are more likely to display higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
7.1.5 Government support 
Finally, government support to the initiative has been pointed as having a potential 
impact on firm performance post-joining. If a government is sympathetic to an 
initiative or has dedicated resources to support its development, it may, for example, 
provide firms with incentives to join or threaten non-participants (Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2011). Using the launch of the UNGC in a country (through the 
launch of a local network) as a proxy for government’s support to the initiative, Lim 
and Tsutsui (2012) found, however, that in developing countries this endorsement 
may lead firms that do not have the capacity to submit reports to join the initiative. In 
developed countries, while UNGC launch increased sign up, there was no evidence 
that this was associated with improved performance. The authors conclude that 
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UNGC launch only seems to encourage a shallow commitment to the initiative (Lim 
and Tsutsui, 2012).  
Hypothesis 11: UNGC network launch in firm’s home country is not 
associated with higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
7.1.6 Industry 
Belonging to high impact industries has been found in the literature to influence 
corporate social performance. Firms in those industries are likely to face higher 
stakeholder scrutiny and therefore be under greater pressure to display alignment 
with societal expectations (Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, Bansal and Bogner, 2002), 
facing real losses if their customers or other stakeholders pull back support for them 
due to poor (real or perceived) sustainability performance (Bansal and Bogner, 2002). 
These firms, therefore, find their legitimacy to be more at risk, as well as their 
economic interests, and as a result, have greater incentives to engage in voluntary 
CSR initiatives to signal to stakeholders their commitment and willingness to address 
such issues. As argued in section 3.3.2.4, firms in high impact industries, 
consequently, may find greater incentives to display substantive commitment to 
voluntary CSR initiatives – or perceive greater risk of sanctions if behaving otherwise.  
Firms in high impact industries may be subject to different types of pressures. They 
may need to respond to normative calls from relevant stakeholders to adhere to 
sustainability standards (Perez-Batres et al., 2012a). In like manner, they may be 
subject to more coercive forces. For example, their customers may find fit to require 
an environmental management certification in order to protect their own reputation, 
being able to show efforts to make dealings with “environmentally minded” suppliers 
(Bansal and Bogner, 2002). Customers and clients may also control performance 
through audits, visits, among other tools. Finally, firms operating in the same industry 
are exposed to similar challenges and therefore are likely to develop similar CSR 
activities (Knudsen, 2011). In view of these arguments, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 12: Firms in high impact industries are more likely to display 
higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
7.1.7 Firm size 
As reviewed in section 3.3.2.3, studies have found size to be a relevant predictor for 
firm behaviour in regards to CSP (Bennie et al., 2007, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010). 
For example, in a study of UNGC participants, Knudsen (2011) found that small and 
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medium sized firms were more likely than larger firms to be delisted from the initiative 
due to failure to communicate on progress. Explanations behind the effect of size 
have been linked to all of the three pillars. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have 
theorised that organisations that are larger in size are likely to be subject to greater 
pressure for mimetic isomorphism. The authors propose that the larger the personnel 
or customer base of an organisation, the greater the pressure on it to demonstrate 
that it is offering programs and services similar to those provided by other 
organisations; i.e. a larger size may encourage mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  
Authors have also proposed that larger firms are more likely to be subject to 
regulatory pressures, for example in the form of higher inspection frequency by 
regulatory authorities (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009). As a result, larger firms will 
have greater incentives to signal good behaviour to regulators. Finally, normative 
pressures from NGOs and other social actors for higher CSP are also likely to be 
more often directed at larger firms. Baker (2010) discusses the fact that big 
international firms are more likely to receive strong criticism under crisis than small 
companies. Following this reasoning, it is expected that larger firms, which are more 
likely to have their legitimacy put at risk, also have the highest incentive to 
proactively signal good performance to stakeholders. 
Despite the variations in focus, the argument is ultimately similar throughout: the 
larger the organisation, the more visible are its actions and therefore more attention 
and more scrutiny it is likely to receive from stakeholders (Johnstone and Labonne, 
2009, Knudsen, 2011, Schembera, 2012). As result of that, larger firms are likely to 
be under greater pressure to conform to society’s expectations and demands, and 
therefore more likely to respond to such pressures in order to enhance its legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Building on this argument, it is proposed that larger 
size is likely to be associated with higher levels of performance post-adoption of a 
voluntary CSR initiative. 
Hypothesis 13: Larger firms are more likely to display higher performance in 
the UNGC issues.  
7.1.8 Control variables 
7.1.8.1 Slack resources 
Slack resources have been found to have an impact on firms’ decision to engage in 
various elements of CSP (Levy and Shatto, 1978, Melnyk et al., 2003, Perez-Batres 
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et al., 2012a, Waddock and Graves, 1997). As explained in section 3.3.2.3, the 
argument for the relevance of this element is that financial resources are essential to 
allow firms to engage in new endeavours or routines, as they provide firms with the 
discretion for decision making that a lack of resources would otherwise prevent 
(Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, McGuire et al., 1988). One could argue that 
implementing new processes and activities requires resources, especially where 
firms need to implement significant change to current practices. Therefore, an 
organisation that disposes of slack resources will be better placed to substantively 
implement the principles they signed up for. 
7.1.8.2 Time as a participant 
Time as a participant reflects how long a firm has been a UNGC participant. Through 
learning events, dialogue and partnership projects, the UNGC aims at engaging 
participants in the discussion, development and implementation of solutions to 
sustainability challenges, as well as in the sharing of best practices (Rasche, 2009a). 
It is therefore expected that firms that have been participants for longer have been 
exposed longer to these learning opportunities and therefore are likely to display 
higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
7.1.8.3 Previous performance 
Controlling for effects of firms’ previous performance is an important element of 
understanding current performance. One can argue that what the firm did the year 
before will have an important impact on what the firm is currently doing - for example, 
if the firm gave a substantial amount of money to charity in the previous year, it is 
unlikely that it will reduce this amount drastically in the current year. Similarly, if the 
firm had a policy on forced labour the year before, it is most likely that it will still have 
it in the current year. Therefore, it is expected that past higher performers will also 
perform higher in the current period. 
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7.2 Data 
This study uses data provided by ThomsonReuters ASSET4, combined with 
institutional data provided by a number of publicly available sources (see below and 
chapter three for a full list and description) as well as some UNGC data on 
participation and firm level data provided by Datastream.  
7.2.1 Sample 
This study focuses on a subset of the ASSET4 data. More specifically, it uses only 
firms that were UNGC participants at some point between 2002 and 2011 
(UNGCMEMBERCURRENTYEAR=1). This comprises a total of 3.180 observations 
in the period, distributed as shown on the table below: 
Table 24: Sample – total number of observations 
 
The sample includes a total of 707 firms from 42 different countries and 57 industries. 
7.2.2 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables were chosen to cover the four issue areas of the UNGC, 
and the 10 principles. In addition, guided by Wood’s (1991a) definition of CSP, 
variables were chosen to demonstrate whether firms had policies in place stating 
their principles in regards to an issue and processes in place to implement those 
principles. Outcomes other than the existence of policies were more challenging to 
have as a dependent variable, as often there were not a sufficient number of 
observations to allow for those variables to be used. Where possible, however, extra 
outcome dependent variables were added. 
The year 2002 is the initial year as this is the first year of data available in ASSET4. 
While it would have been ideal to have the year 2000 as the initial year, as this is the 
first year of existence of the UNGC, 2002 is still the very early days of the initiative. 
For one thing, the obligation to submit a communication on progress was only 
established in 2003 (Hamid and Jones, 2010) and the UNGC’s 10th Principle on anti-
corruption efforts was only launched in 2004 (UNGC, 2014). The performance data 
goes until 2011. This represents an important proportion of UNGC’s years of 
UNGCMEMCURRYR * YEAR Crosstabulation 
Count   
 
YEAR 




69 110 180 228 269 332 428 491 601 472 3180 
Total 69 110 180 228 269 332 428 491 601 472 3180 
!
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existence – over two thirds, therefore presenting an interesting and rich period for 
analysis.  
A summary of the dependent variables is provided on the table below. 
Table 25: List of dependent variables 





SOCSCORE Social  “The social pillar measures a company's capacity to generate trust and 
loyalty with its workforce, customers and society, through its use of best 
management practices. It is a reflection of the company's reputation and 
the health of its license to operate, which are key factors in determining its 




“The environmental pillar measures a company's impact on living and non-
living natural systems, including the air, land and water, as well as 
complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best 
management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on 





“The corporate governance pillar measures a company's systems and 
processes, which ensure that its board members and executives act in the 
best interests of its long term shareholders. It reflects a company's 
capacity, through its use of best management practices, to direct and 
control its rights and responsibilities through the creation of incentives, as 
well as checks and balances in order to generate long term shareholder 
value.” 
0-100 
Human rights policies in 
house 
P1 “Does the company have a general, all-purpose policy regarding human 
rights?” 
0 or 1 
Human rights processes 
in house 
P1 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in place 
to ensure the respect of human rights in general?” 
0 or 1 
Human rights policies 
supply chain 
P2 “Does the company have a human rights policy applying to its supply 
chain?” 
0 or 1 
Human rights processes 
supply chain 
P2 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in place 
to apply human rights standards to its supply chain?”  
0 or 1 
Freedom of association 
policy 
P3 “Does the company have a policy to ensure the freedom of association of 
its employees?” 
0 or 1 
Freedom of association 
processes 
P3 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention the processes in 
place to ensure the freedom of association of its employees?” 
 
0 or 1 
Trade union 
representation 
P3 “Percentage of employees represented by independent trade union 
organizations or covered by collective bargaining agreements.” 
0-100 
Forced labour policies P4 “Does the company have a policy to avoid forced labour?” 
 
0 or 1 
Forced labour processes P4 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in place 
to avoid the use of forced labour?” 
0 or 1 
Child labour policies P5 “Does the company have a policy to avoid child labour?” 0 or 1 
Child labour processes P5 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in place 
to avoid the use of child labour?” 
0 or 1 
Diversity policies P6 “Does the company have a diversity and equal opportunity policy?” 0 or 1 
Diversity processes P6 “Does the company describe the implementation of its diversity and 
opportunity policy?” 
0 or 1 
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Percentage of women 
managers 





P7/8 “Does the company have a policy for reducing environmental emissions or 
its impacts on biodiversity? “ 
0 or 1 
Resource reduction 
policy 
P7/8 “Does the company have a policy for reducing the use of natural 
resources?” 
0 or 1 
Environmental 
management 
P7/8 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in place 
to maintain an environmental management system?”  
0 or 1 
Environmental 
expenditures by pre-tax 
profit 
P7/8 Total amount of environmental expenditures as provided by ASSET4, 




P9 “Does the company have an environmental product innovation policy (eco-
design, life cycle assessment, dematerialization)?” 
0 or 1 
Product innovation 
processes 
P9 “Does the company describe the implementation of its environmental 
product innovation policy?” 
0 or 1 
Anti-corruption policy P10 “Does the company have a policy to avoid bribery and corruption at all its 
operations?” 
0 or 1 
Anti-corruption 
processes 
P10 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in place 
to avoid bribery and corruption practices at all its operations?” 
0 or 1 






Total amount of all donations by the company as provided by ASSET4, 
divided by Profit before tax, as provided by Datastream. 
any 
It is important to highlight that SOCSCORE, ENVSCORE and CGVSCORE are scores. For ASSET4 data that means that 
they are a number between 0 and 100 that indicates the firm’s performance in comparison to the remaining ASSET4 
universe for a particular issue. 
 
 
7.2.3 Independent Variables 
NGOs concentration in a country is represented by the cumulative participation of 
such organisations (global and local NGOs) in the UNGC in each country per year. 
These variables were calculated using data from the UNGC dataset and follow 
similar use in the literature(Bernhagen et al., 2012, Perez-Batres et al., 2011).  
Level of economic development was represented by a dummy variables 
DEVELOPEDVSNOT, which takes a value of 1 if the country is classified as a 
developed economy and 0 if otherwise. Country classification was obtained from the 
2013 World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP), prepared by the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA), the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the five United Nations 
regional commissions (Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE), Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP) and Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). 
Board Diversity was obtained from ASSET4 and represents the percentage of 
women on the board of directors. 
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Peer pressure at country and industry levels reflects the average performance of 
firms in the total sample (i.e. participants and non-participants) for each of the 
dependent variables, i.e. for each model a different set of variables was created. It 
was calculated from ASSET4 data, using SPSS, and lagged by one year. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was represented by Inward FDI investment stock, 
annual, as provided by UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development), Division on Investment and Enterprise. 
Level of firm internationalisation was represented by foreign sales as a percentage of 
total sales, both obtained from Datastream. 
Governance was represented by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI). The WGI cover over 200 countries since 1996, and consists of composite 
indicators in six dimensions of governance, namely: voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law and control of corruption. Estimate of governance for each dimension ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak governance performance) to +2.5 (strong governance 
performance). Voice and accountability represents the extent to which citizens feel 
they are able to select their government, as well as enjoy freedom of expression and 
association. Political stability and absence of violence represent the perception of the 
likelihood that a government will be destabilised by unconstitutional or violent means. 
Government effectiveness represents perceptions of the quality of civil service as 
well as of policy formulation and implementation; it also reflects perceptions of 
government’s commitments to public policies. Regulatory quality reflects perceptions 
of the government’s ability to define and implement policies that allow for the 
development of the private sector. Rule of law reflects the extent to which 
stakeholders trust and are likely to abide by the rules of society. Finally, control of 
corruption shows perceptions of the extent to which public power is used for private 
gain. 
Level of democracy was represented by the Polity IV dataset provided by the Centre 
for Systemic Peace. It follows similar use in other studies (Perkins and Neumayer, 
2010, Lim and Tsutsui, 2012, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, Bernhagen et al., 2012). 
This indicator ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy).  
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UNGC Network Launch was obtained from the UNGC website and is represented by 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a UNGC network was launched in the 
country in 2010 or before and 0 if otherwise.  
Stringency of regulatory environment was operationalised following Berliner and 
Prakash (2010). It encompasses measures of the stringency of credit market 
regulations, labour market regulations and business regulations, taken from the 
Economic Freedom of the World dataset. For these, the larger the number the higher 
the freedom or the less stringent the regulatory environment is. The variable for 
credit market regulations is formed by a combination of the following elements: 
ownership of banks, private sector credit and interest rate controls / negative real 
interest rates. A higher rate indicates that the country uses a private banking system 
to allocate credit to private organisations and refrains from controlling interest rates. 
Labour market regulations combines hiring regulations and minimum wage, hiring 
and firing regulations, centralized collective bargaining, working hours regulations, 
mandated cost of worker dismissal, and conscription. A country that receives a 
higher rating therefore has more flexible labour laws, leaving market forces to define 
wages as well as hiring and firing conditions. Finally, business regulations refer to a 
combination of administrative requirements, bureaucracy costs, starting a business, 
extra payments/bribes/favouritism, licensing restrictions and cost of tax compliance. 
Countries that receive higher ratings here leave markets to define prices and do not 
display regulatory activities that cause delays to entry into business and increase 
costs of production (Gwartney et al., 2011). 
A dummy for extractive industry was created in SPSS. It gathers firms classified 
under SIC codes 10 (metal mining), 12 (coal mining), 13 (oil and gas extraction) and 
14 (mining and quarrying of non-metallic minerals, except fuels). Authors have found 
different solutions to represent high impact industries. Bansal and Bogner (2002) 
focused on mining, forestry and chemicals; Knudsen (2011) focused on oil and 
manufacturing; Perez-Bastres et al (2012b) developed their own pollution 
intensiveness ranking; and Bernhagen and Mitchel (2010) looked into oil and gas 
and materials (these including mining and forestry product companies). Recognising 
this variety and the lack of a one fully agreed definition of high impact / extractive 
industry, this study follows EITI (Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative)’s focus 
on oil, gas and mining companies as firms in the extractive industry (EITI, 2014).  
Firm size was measured as the log of employees, calculated from the variable 
number of employees provided by Datastream.  
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7.2.4 Control variables 
Slack resources are represented by ROTA (return on total assets). This data was 
obtained from Datastream. 
Time of participation in the UNGC was measured as the number of years that have 
passed since the focal firm was first classified as a UNGC participant by ASSET4.  
To measure previous performance the dependent variable for each model was 
lagged by one year. 
7.3 Methods for analysis 
Given the different types of dependent variables, two different methods were used for 
the analysis. For the models that had a binary variable as a depend variable, binary 
logistic regression was used. For the models that had a continuous variable as the 
dependent variable, linear regression was used. 
7.4 Results 
Correlations were run to identify potential issues of multicollinearity15. While most 
correlation coefficients conform to the norms (correlation coefficient lower than 0.8 
(Field, 2009)), correlation coefficients between some variables presented some 
concern. A number of the correlations higher than 0.8 were observed between 
dependent variables or between dependent variables and the lag of other dependent 
variables (either the LAG of the dependent variable itself or the measures of peer 
pressure). This is, however, not a concern because these variables were not going to 
be together in the same model.  
Of interest to this study, correlations coefficients above the threshold were observed 
among some of the independent variables representing governance, namely 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption. 
Government effectiveness was also highly correlated with business regulation, voice 
with rule of law and the dummy for developed country, and the variable for Global 
NGO was highly correlated with Inward FDI. Given the potential multicollinearity 
concern, further tests were run to check the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). 
Although there is not a clearly established threshold of when a value of VIF should 
                                                
15 Given the large size of the correlation table it was not included in this study; however, this is available 
upon request. 
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become a concern, this study follows Field (2009) in that values above 10 signal 
potential problems of multicollinearity.  
The VIFs for rule of law, government effectiveness and control of corruption 
remained well above 10 in the two different tests for VIFs. In addition, these variables 
had tolerance statistics below 0.1 suggesting serious problems of multicollinearity 
(Field, 2009). Regulatory quality, voice, developed country, Inward FDI and Global 
NGO did not show any VIF above 10. In views of these results, rule of law, 
government effectiveness and control of corruption were dropped from the final 
models. The remaining independent variables were retained. 
Table 26: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
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The results of the linear and logistic regressions are presented in tables 24 to 26. 
There are 26 dependent variables, as listed and described in table 22. 
Models 01 to 26: Base Models 
Table 27: Regression tables for base models 
 
Models 1 to 26 are the base models. These are the most parsimonious models in 
number of variables, allowing for an assessment of the impact of slack resources, 
time as a participant and previous performance in current performance. It is 
important to highlight that, despite being parsimonious in number of variables, these 
models display, in most cases, high R squares and Nagelkerke R squares. This can 
be largely attributed to the use of the lag of the dependent variable as one of the 
independent variables. One could argue that what the firm did the year before, from a 





































(0.879)           
***
24.987                 
(0.873)                            
***
12.163                      
(0.634)      
***
-0.792             
(0.114)                   
***
-2.259                       
(0.114)              
***
-1.539                       
(0.109)                  
***
-2.551                   
(0.121)             
***
-1.586                      
(0.111)                 
***
-2.861             
(0.136)                 
***
4.715                            
(1)                           
***
-1.478           
(0.111)           
***
ROTA 0.028 (0.084)
0.028                    
(0.029)           
0.03                        
(0.036)
0.001             
(0.009)
0.009                   
(0.008)
0.01                                   
(0.009)                 
0.027               
(0.008)                        
***
0.021                
(0.009)              
**
0.025               
(0.009)                      
***
-0.094                      
(0.049)                 
*
0.025              
(0.009)              
***
Years as UNGC participant -0.001               (0.084)
0.125                
(0.092)
0.062                        
(0.112)
0.081                
(0.033)                    
**
0.157                   
(0.026)                     
***
0.185              
(0.031)                   
***
0.167                       
(0.027)                    
***
0.015                    
(0.027)
0.058                         
(0.029)              
**
-0.165                 
(0.143)                
0.085             




(0.011)                 
***
0.707                   
(0.011)               
***
0.834                      
(0.01)             
***
3.872                   
(0.148)                       
***
4.205                      
(0.145)              
***
4.249                   
(0.157)                           
***
4.353                        
(0.155)                
***
4.335                 
(0.139)           
***
4.567                  
(0.156)                    
***
0.95                      
(0.012)                 
***
4.643                 
(0.173)             
***
N 2868 2868 2868 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795 783 2795
R Square 0.578 0.626 0.743 0.894
Adjusted R Square 0.578 0.626 0.743 0.893
Nagelkerke R Square 0.562 0.635 0.658 0.646 0.67 0.633 0.68
Percentage correct cases 88.5 75.6 83.2 75 86.5 76.1 84.3


































-3.638               
(0.173)              
***
-1.387                     
(0.115)        
***
-3.34             
(0.15)          
***
0.046                
(0.196)     
-0.762                
(0.125)          
***
2.587                
(0.37)               
***
-0.659            
(0.166)            
***
-0.125                   
(0.276)
-1.588               
(0.11)                 
***
590.861                               
(358.169)                   
*
-1.694       
(0.128)               
***
ROTA
0.045               
(0.01)            
***
0.027         
(0.01)         
***
0.056             
(0.009)             
***
-0.001               
(0.019)         
0.005                  
(0.01)              
0.022                    
(0.021)  
0.025            
(0.013)         
*
0.002              
(0.027)
-0.003                 
(0.008)               
-3.227                    
(28.675)
0.017              
(0.009)                
*
Years as UNGC participant
0.087                 
(0.035)         
**
0.092             
(0.033)             
***
0.105                
(0.03)                  
***
0.215                
(0.079)         
***
0.222                
(0.041)                 
***
-0.006                        
(0.058)
0.019                    
(0.055)
0.244                 
(0.143)                        
*
0.127                 
(0.028)              
***
-74.586                
(75.08)
0.071               
(0.032)                   
**
LAG Dependent Variable
4.873               
(0.213)            
***
4.723            
(0.182)              
***
4.561                      
(0.177)                  
***
4.086             
(0.265)        
***
3.672                  
(0.156)                  
***
0.913                       
(0.011)                   
***
5.172                 
(0.257)         
***
5.624                
(0.48)                
***
4.153             
(0.139)                 
***
-0.159                                             
(0.193)
4.869                  
(0.163)              
***
N 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795 1283 2795 2795 2795 840 2795
R Square 0.852 0.002
Adjusted R Square 0.852 -0.002
Nagelkerke R Square 0.554 0.686 0.6 0.46 0.53 0.631 0.609 0.653 0.719
Percentage correct cases 66.2 86.4 70.3 100 91.2 95.1 99.1 84 89.9
















-1.226                
(0.085)        
***
-1.121               
(0.128)        
***
-1.945              
(0.115)                
***
140.956              
(151.092)
ROTA
0.02                     
(0.006)            
***
0.046               
(0.012)                 
***
0.045      
(0.009)               
***
0.471                               
(10.088)
Years as UNGC participant
0.092                      
(0.018)          
***
0.072                
(0.04)                
*
0.174          
(0.029)          
***
-21.12               
(32.181)
LAG Dependent Variable
1.713                        
(0.085)         
***
4.802                           
(0.201)                    
***
4.482           
(0.165)                  
***
0.029                
(0.116)
N 2795 2795 2795 1391
R Square 0
Adjusted R Square -0.002
Nagelkerke R Square 0.231 0.666 0.679
Percentage correct cases 67.6 90.3 81.6
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performance perspective, will have an important impact in what the firm will do in the 
current year. This may be especially true for the dummy variables – for example, if a 
firm had a human rights policy in the previous year, it is highly likely that it will still 
have it in the current year. In addition, the literature suggests that firms are relatively 
slow in changing their corporate social performance – i.e. one should expect 
relatively moderate variation from one year to the other. Therefore, in those cases 
and for those reasons, the strong explanatory power was not surprising. 
Model 1, 2 and 3 have SOCSCORE, ENVSCORE and CGVSCORE as the 
dependent variables, respectively. In all three models, only previous performance 
has a significant and positive impact in performance. Nevertheless, all of them 
explain over 50% of the variation in the depended variables, more specifically 57.8%, 
62.6% and 74.3% (R2). 
Models 4 and 5 and 6 focus on human rights and also explain over 50% of the 
variation in the variable, 56.2%, 63.5% and 66% respectively (Nagelkerke R2). For 
those models time as a participant becomes positive and significant, together with 
previous performance. For model 7 (Nagelkerke R2=0.646), which focuses on 
implementation of human rights policies in the supply chain, both these variables and 
slack resources are positive and significant.  
Models 8 to 10 focus on freedom of association (policies, processes and outcomes in 
this order). These models explain respectively 67% (8), 63.3% (9) (Nagelkerke R2) 
and 89.4% (10) (R2) of variation in their respective dependent variables. While 
previous performance was positive and significant for all three models, slack 
resources also increased the odds of firms having a policy and implementing it, and 
time of membership was also positive and significant for implementation. 
Models 11 and 12 focus on policies and processes regarding forced labour, 
respectively. Both have slack resources, time of participation and previous 
performance positively and significantly increasing the odds of better performance. 
While model 11 explained 68% of variation, model 12 explained 55.4% (Nagelkerke 
R2 in both cases). Models 13 and 14, on the other hand, focus on child labour, but 
also see all three independent variables increasing the odds of higher performance. 
Model 13 explains 68.6% of variation and model 14, 60% (Nagelkerke R2). Still within 
the labour umbrella, models 15, 16 and 17 focus on diversity (policies, processes 
and outcomes respectively). Time as a participant and previous performance 
increase the odds of existence of diversity policies (model 15) and the 
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implementation of these (model 16).  Model 15 correctly classifies 100% of firms with 
a diversity policy, explaining 46% of variation (Nagelkerke R2). Model 16 explains 53% 
(Nagelkerke R2) and model 17, 85.2% (R2). Only previous performance was 
significantly increasing the odds of higher percentage of women managers (model 
17). 
Models 18 to 21 focus on the UNGC’s principles 7 and 8 on the environment. 
Previous performance is positively and significantly associated with increasing odds 
of having a policy on emission (model 18) and on resource reduction (model 19) as 
well as on having environmental management in place (model 20). The first three 
models explain over 50% of variation in the dependent variables, or more specifically 
63.1% (18), 60.9% (19), and 65.3% (20) (Nagelkerke R2). In addition, models 18 to 
20 correctly classify over 80% of firms  (95.1%, 99.1% and 84%, respectively). Model 
21, however, explains only 0.02% of variation (R2), and none of the control variables 
were significant. Models 22 and 23 are also part of the environment issue, but focus 
on innovation. While model 22 explains 71.9% of the variation (Nagelkerke R2) and 
correctly classifies 89.9% of firms with a product innovation policy, model 23 explains 
only 23.1% of variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classifies 67.6% of firms that 
show evidence of implementing it. Time as a participant and previous performance 
increase the odds of better performance in both. 
Models 24 and 25 focus on anti-corruption efforts, namely the existence of policies 
(24) and evidence of implementation efforts (25). Model 24 explains 66.6% of the 
variation (Nagelkerke R2) in the dependent variable, correctly classifying 90.3% of 
firms with an anti-corruption policy. Model 25, on the other hand, explains 67.9% of 
the variation (Nagelkerke R2) in the dependent variable, correctly classifying 81.6% 
of firms that display evidence of implementing them. Slack resources and previous 
performance positively and significantly increase the odds of better performance in 
both. Finally, model 26 focuses on philanthropy, as a way of support to the UN goals. 
The model was a very poor fit with a R2 of zero. 
Models 27 to 52: Understanding what drives some participants to improve more than 
others 
This set of models includes, among other independent variables, a LAG of the 
dependent variable to control for the effects of firms’ previous performance on 
current performance. Due to having the lag dependent variable, these models help 
one understand the drivers for different rates of change, or why some participants 
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improve performance more than others. Generally speaking, models 27 to 52 do not 
offer a major improvement in explanatory power compared to the base models; in 
some cases one can actually observe a drop in explanatory power. However, they do 
offer the opportunity for a more fine-grained analysis of drivers for performance 
amongst UNGC participants. 
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22.272                       
(5.046)                   
***
7.427      
(5.193)
2.039                     
(6.412)
-2.565        
(1.559)         
-6.216            
(1.894)                              
***
-3.104                     
(1.524)             
**
-1.501                   
(1.483)
0.694          
(1.499)
-0.791                  
(1.66)      13.542      (9.62)
-2.536                
(1.508)                 
*
-1.946             
(2.066)
LAG Dependent Variable
0.572           
(0.014)              
***
0.618     
(0.014)              
***
0.639           
(0.017)                        
***
3.543                     
(0.178)               
***
3.787         
(0.175)             
***
3.546                      
(0.177)              
***
3.975                    
(0.193)                 
***
3.86                   
(0.164)         
***
4.465              
(0.197)                  
***
0.885          
(0.023)                      
***
4.252                     
(0.199)               
***
4.664                    
(0.276)             
***
ROTA
0.059                     
(0.033)            
*
0.079                       
(0.037)                   
**
-0.065       
(0.045)
-0.01                    
(0.012)
0.006                
(0.01)    
0.004             
(0.011)
0.017                   
(0.01)         
-0.009           
(0.011)
0.02            
(0.011)           
*
-0.082              
(0.064)
0.008                    
(0.011)             
0.029                    
(0.013)           
**
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-0.052                   
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-0.004           
(0.123)
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(0.046)
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(0.038)              
***
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(0.04)                 
***
0.174                        
(0.038)                 
***
-0.039              
(0.037)
0.075                         
(0.041)                
*
-0.134             
(0.228)
0.043        
(0.041)
0.056                    
(0.052)
Global NGO -0.084                      (0.057)
-0.079      
(0.066)
0.06                  
(0.079)
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(0.02)                 
**
0.008                  
(0.018) 
0.029                         
(0.02)
-0.011              
(0.019)
0.03               
(0.019)
0.008                         
(0.02)              
0.035               
(0.115)
0.028            
(0.022)
-0.012                 
(0.023)
Developed country -1.291                              (1.562)
-1.694      
(1.826)
-3.391                 
(2.138)
-0.899                 
(0.576)                  
-0.935             
(0.542)                                          
*
-0.247                  
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(0.534)            
***
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(0.551)           
**
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(0.556)                 
**
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(3.014)
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(0.663)             
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**
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**
0.002                    
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0.004                   
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0.005           
(0.003)              
*
0.007                       
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**
0.007         
(0.003)          
**
0                   
(0.003)
0.013                
(0.017)
0.007              
(0.003)              
**
0.008                    
(0.004)               
**
;1-."&#/2&#..1</,#=-:-,5 -0.573                           (1.495)
-1.776    
(1.637)
8.316            
(1.992)            
***
-0.871               
(0.49)                  
*
-0.891                        
(0.535)                                
*
0.197                     
(0.495)           
0.122                 
(0.53)              
0.332           
(0.492) 
0.36                 
(0.553)
4.78                  
(4.005)
-0.518                
(0.498)
-1.46                       
(0.708)                
**
>1:-,-.#:&%,#=-:-,5
-1.368                            
(0.659)                      
**
0.447     
(0.706)
-1.759                
(0.863)                   
**
0.454                     
(0.223)              
**
0.262                 
(0.197)
0.164         
(0.207)
0.03                 
(0.209)
0.061              
(0.22)
-0.519                     
(0.229)             
**
1.699           
(1.301)
0.184             
(0.214)
-0.197                      
(0.278)
?"3<:#,1$5&@<#:-,5
2.847                                
(1.19)                    
**
1.819             
(1.367)
-1.36                
(1.647)
1.289                    
(0.408)                    
***
0.936                  
(0.413)        
**
0.759               
(0.392)          
*
1.496                   
(0.404)                
***
1.346                 
(0.387)                
***
0.856              
(0.421)            
**
-4.192                  
(2.804)
0.432               
(0.422)
2.016                     
(0.556)              
***
>1:-,5&6;
0.367                             
(0.216)                                
*
0.78                
(0.245)              
***
-0.562               
(0.289)                           
*
0.196                 
(0.074)               
***
0.408                          
(0.142)                    
***
0.036                
(0.069)
0.131            
(0.071)                
*
0.074                
(0.07)
0.108               
(0.079)
-0.143                      
(0.638)
0.061           
(0.072)
0.254                           
(0.098)                   
**
*$"2-,&A#$B",&$"3<:#,-1/ -0.185          (0.279)
-0.031           
(0.318)
-0.167                 
(0.382)         
0.209                      
(0.098)                    
**
0.152                               
(0.092)                          
*
0.003              
(0.096)
0.102                 
(0.096)
0.001            
(0.095)
0.216                     
(0.101)            
**
-0.911                  
(0.558)
0.12                   
(0.096)
0.076                     
(0.13)             
C#=1<$&A#$B",&$"3<:#,-1/ -0.22                 (0.199)
0.019         
(0.212)
0.151                      
(0.24)
-0.068                 
(0.06)             
0.153                        
(0.059)                         
***
0.035         
(0.057)
0.075                     
(0.061)
-0.196             
(0.064)             
***
-0.187                     
(0.072)                 
***
0.167             
(0.453)
-0.002                     
(0.063)
-0.037                    
(0.085)
0<%-/"%%&$"3<:#,-1/ 0.002                    (0.468)
-0.073         
(0.54)
1.319             
(0.645)                   
**
-0.508                
(0.171)                     
***
-0.578                         
(0.157)                  
***
-0.532        
(0.158)          
***
-0.923               
(0.159)            
***
-0.706               
(0.163)             
***
-0.573                   
(0.176)                    
***
-0.511                 
(0.959)
-0.496           
(0.161)                 
***
-0.58                 
(0.227)                 
**
(",71$B&:#</.D&=5&EFGF -0.186                    (1.563)
0.017        
(1.815)
-2.539              
(2.115)
-0.29                      
(0.635)              
-0.402                        
(0.492)
0.06           
(0.473)
-0.175                    
(0.492)
-0.464                  
(0.515)                     
-1.097                      
(0.503)                
**
0.583                 
(2.307)
-0.143                
(0.484)
-0.921              
(0.581)               
Extractive industry -0.5                 (0.985)
-0.736             
(1.095)
0.396                    
(1.4)
1.411                       
(0.536)                  
***
0.426                        
(0.305)
-0.077             
(0.308)
-0.202                 
(0.292)
1.149                         
(0.409)                 
***
-0.143                          
(0.329)
0.085             
(1.384)
0.552                
(0.352)
0.078                         
(0.37)          
Firm size
1.001                   
(0.183)               
***
1.256           
(0.213)                       
***
0.617         
(0.249)                
**
0.172              
(0.061)                        
***
0.17                          
(0.058)             
***
0.246           
(0.057)        
***
0.104                  
(0.059)                 
*
0.15                   
(0.058)              
**
0.076                      
(0.068)
0.125                
(0.391)
0.159              
(0.06)           
***
0.02                
(0.089)    
LAG Peer performance in country 0.016                       (0.026)                           
0.023            
(0.03)
0.269                   
(0.03)                        
***
0.887                
(0.588)
0.541                          
(0.827)   
1.755                 
(0.549)           
***
0.428                        
(0.849)
0.885              
(0.598)    
-1.544                    
(0.941)
0.058               
(0.046)
0.072             
(0.638)
-0.296         
(2.804)               
LAG peer performance in industry
0.061                            
(0.029)                 
**
0.098            
(0.022)              
***
-0.052             
(0.045)
0.019               
(0.76)
2.96                         
(0.987)                   
***
2.926              
(0.73)             
***
3.808                
(1.159)       
***
1.73                         
(0.791)               
**
-0.958                        
(1.45)
0.072                    
(0.03)                 
**
3.052              
(0.722)       
***
3.903               
(2.22)           
*
N 2099 2099 2099 2059 2059 2059 2059 2059 2059 509 2059 2059
R Square 0.539 0.592 0.742 0.886
Adjusted R Square 0.535 0.588 0.739 0.882
Nagelkerke R Square 0.558 0.639 0.654 0.645 0.683 0.626 0.688 0.553
Percentage correct cases 90.7 73.9 84.2 72.3 87.3 74.6 84.6 64
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Table 29: Regression table for models 39 to 52 - understanding improvements in performance 
 
Model 27 has SOCSCORE as the dependent variable. The model can explain 53.9% 
of the variation in SOCSCORE. As expected, regulatory quality (Beta=2.847 p<0.05), 
firm size (Beta=1.001, p<0.01), previous performance (Beta=0.572, p<0.01) and peer 
performance at industry level (Beta=0.061, p<0.05) all significantly contribute to a 
higher score in social management. Firms in less politically stable countries, however, 
were also found to have higher performance in this variable. Model 28 explains 59.2% 
of the variation in ENVSCORE, with firm size (Beta=1.256, p<0.01), followed by level 
of democracy (Beta=0.78, p<0.01), previous performance (Beta=0.618, p<0.01), peer 
performance at industry level (Beta=0.098, p<0.01) and slack resources (Beta=0.079, 
p<0.05) all displaying positive and significant coefficients as expected. Different from 
expected, however, more internationalised firms displayed lower performance. For 
CGVSCORE, model 29 explained 74.2% of the variation. Voice (Beta=8.316, p<0.01), 
size (Beta=0.617, p<0.05), previous performance (Beta=0.639, p<0.01) and peer 
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-3.482                 
(1.637)                
**
-3.134            
(1.949)
-3.041               
(3.468)
-3.742             
(1.788)          
**
-4.658                   
(3.743)
-6.527                    
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***
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(5.457)         
*
-1.153            
(1.373)
513.862              
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-6.716                   
(1.666)                    
***
-3.787        
(1.103)       
***
-4.199               
(1.869)                 
**
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**
437.167              
(440.514)
LAG Dependent Variable
4.152           
(0.207)          
***
4.116      
(0.226)               
***
3.161                   
(0.314)             
***
2.921            
(0.189)                
***
0.797              
(0.021)               
***
4.786        
(0.326)       
***
5.253               
(0.691)               
***
3.65           
(0.161)           
***
0.007       
(0.083)
4.502               
(0.205)              
***
1.525               
(0.124)              
***
4.136                    
(0.229)                 
***
3.768                 
(0.19)               
***
1.312                
(0.345)           
***
ROTA 0.014        (0.012)
0.041                            
(0.012)                       
***
0.001         
(0.024)
0.012                         
(0.012)
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*
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**
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(0.01)
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***
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*
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***
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(3.4)
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**
0.288           
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**
0.138                       
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**
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(0.082)
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(0.079)
0.208                 
(0.197)
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(0.039)               
***
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-0.023                   
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-2.246               
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(0.398)
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(0.002)
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-0.117              
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0.465            
(0.9)
-1.604                       
(0.529)                       
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-0.619                         
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(0.718)        
**
-0.167          
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-0.86              
(0.441)                
*
-392.872             
(452.255)
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0.001                        
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(0.473)
48.898                
(163.84)
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-0.194                   
(0.243)
0.579           
(0.489)
1.191                
(0.297)               
***
0.098               
(0.508)
0.026     
(0.341)
-0.895          
(0.795)
0.006                    
(0.196)
-76.934               
(170.312)
0.124                 
(0.23)
0.57                  
(0.149)            
***
0.348   
(0.277)
1.07           
(0.252)              
***
-22.939                 
(63.632)
:('73#-"$.&;7#3*-.
0.723                
(0.437)             
*
1.648      
(0.462)           
***
0.85               
(0.792)
0.598                 
(0.472)      
0.111                      
(1.05)
0.343      
(0.67)
0.449        
(1.212)
0.867              
(0.367)                   
**
721.882        
(386.867)                 
*
0.934             
(0.446)                      
**
0.828                   
(0.3)                
***
1.238     
(0.488)              
**
0.232             
(0.437)
53.969                
(134.665)
9"3*-.&/5 0.038                    (0.076)
0.325                 
(0.11)                   
***
-0.029              
(0.141)
0.262                           
(0.076)              
***
0.015                  
(0.192)
0.111          
(0.111)
-0.117       
(0.277)
0.108                  
(0.068)
-5.051           
(63.535)
0.088                
(0.083)
0.038                          
(0.056)
0.085        
(0.096)
0.12              
(0.068)                
*
-2.133              
(21.351)
<$(%*-&=#$>(-&$('73#-*")
0.185                   
(0.101)                    
*
0.049                
(0.111)
-0.018                
(0.225)
0.2                 
(0.117)                         
*
0.66                       
(0.223)               
***
0.109           
(0.181)
0.636         
(0.39)
0.227              
(0.089)               
**
-97.468              
(74.916)
0.276              
(0.105)                
***
0.238                       
(0.069)                  
***
0.038              
(0.116)
0.307           
(0.098)              
***
-28.037             
(29.117)
?#8"7$&=#$>(-&$('73#-*") 0.002                  (0.065)
-0.091                   
(0.073)
-0.009               
(0.133)
-0.07                 
(0.071)
-0.193                  
(0.154)
0.013           
(0.108)
-0.011          
(0.218)
-0.066            
(0.056)
-11.804              
(52.524)
0.025               
(0.07)
0.09                    
(0.043)                   
**
0.001         
(0.074)
-0.157             
(0.065)                
**
15.822             
(20.691)
!7,*)(,,&$('73#-*")
-0.558                         
(0.171)                      
***
-0.472                    
(0.196)                             
**
-0.23                
(0.334)
-0.367                 
(0.182)        
**
-0.028                        
(0.375)
-0.134               
(0.25)
-0.326      
(0.572)
-0.754                 
(0.149)               
***
-64.374         
(129.64)
-0.463                        
(0.188)                      
**
-0.987          
(0.118)             
***
-0.24           
(0.189)
-0.504           
(0.153)              
***
-91.491             
(53.439)                
*
@(-0"$>&3#7)6A&8.&BCDC -0.497                    (0.537)
-1.16                    
(0.515)              
**
-0.328              
(1.122)
-0.773         
(0.542)
0.893            
(1.456)
0.318            
(1.052)
0.689            
(1.379)
-0.427              
(0.468)         
563.592               
(427.149)
0.963                  
(0.603)
0.527                     
(0.405)
-0.788            
(0.972)
-1.467                  
(0.498)              
***
-157.407             
(168.335)
Extractive industry
0.875                       
(0.435)           
**
-0.379              
(0.336)
0.409               
(0.863)
-0.235     
(0.346)
0.039                    
(0.664)
0.699              
(0.827)
-0.527           
(0.958)
0.168               
(0.276)
-266.284               
(219.119)
0.367                      
(0.412)
0.484                          
(0.243)          
**
1.22        
(0.604)               
**
0.166                    
(0.333)
53.634               
(86.011)
Firm size
0.239                       
(0.063)                 
***
0.053          
(0.075)
0.207                
(0.12)                             
*
0.263                     
(0.066)                 
***
-0.124                 
(0.15)
0.328      
(0.093)              
***
0.324            
(0.176)                                
*
0.104                  
(0.056)  
*
0.116              
(51.501)
0.246                  
(0.066)                       
***
0.346                 
(0.047)                 
***
0.253         
(0.073)            
***
0.207                
(0.059)               
***
17.914           
(19.714)
LAG Peer performance in country 0.369                     (0.605)               
-0.413               
(1.366)
2.366                 
(1.111)             
**
1.103               
(0.644)                
*
0.043                   
(0.038)
0.536                  
(0.915)
-0.462            
(1.779)
0.345               
(0.517)
0.017                
(0.159)
0.162                  
(0.635)
-0.126                   
(0.367)
1.562          
(0.646)              
**
0.756                  
(0.557)
4.797                
(1.39)                 
***
LAG peer performance in industry
3.642              
(0.725)          
***
5.858             
(1.724)                        
***
0.911                 
(1.306)
1.547                     
(0.69)                                     
**
0.197            
(0.027)         
***
2.061               
(0.754)                
***
2.508           
(1.585)
2.493                
(0.525)                    
***
0.062             
(0.091)
2.743                  
(0.517)                    
***
2.449                
(0.418)           
***
0.014             
(0.644)
1.27               
(0.548)                    
**
0.163              
(1.026)
N 2059 2059 2059 2059 936 2059 2059 2059 596 2059 2059 2059 2059 972
R Square 0.857 0.031 0.048
Adjusted R Square 0.854 -0.003 0.028
Nagelkerke R Square 0.687 0.592 0.453 0.558 0.646 0.609 0.633 0.731 0.376 0.665 0.684
Percentage correct cases 86.9 68.4 99.4 93.5 97 99.7 82.6 90.6 74.1 91.1 81.4
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performance at country level (Beta=0.269, p<0.01) all behaved as expected, 
significantly predicting improvements in governance performance.  
Model 30 focuses on the existence of human rights policies. It explains 55.8% of the 
variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classifies 90.7% of firms that have such 
policies. Previous performance has the greatest impact, increasing the odds of a firm 
having a human rights policy by 34.578 times (p<0.01). This is followed by belonging 
to an extractive industry (Exp(B)=4.098, p<0.01) and regulatory quality 
(Exp(B)=3.629, p<0.01) as the top three elements influencing the odds of  higher 
performance in this variable. For human rights implementation processes, in model 
31, previous performance remains the variable with the greatest influence increasing 
the odds of higher performance by 44.13 times (p<0.01); this is followed by 
performance of other firms in the industry (Exp(B)=19.3, p<0.01) and regulatory 
quality (Exp(B)=2.55, p<0.05). Model 31 explains 63.9% of the variation (Nagelkerke 
R2) and correctly classifies 73.9% of firms that have processes in place to implement 
human rights policies.  
Model 32 focuses on the existence of human rights policies for the supply chain. It 
explains 65.4% of the variance (Nagelkerke R2), correctly classifying 84.2% of the 
firms. The odds of a firm having such policies is increased by 34.675 times by 
previous performance, 18.646 times by the industry peers’ performance and 5.781 
times by the performance of peers at country level (p<0.01 in all cases). Industry 
peer performance (Exp(B)=53.27) and previous performance (Exp(B)=45.077) are 
also strong elements influencing the odds of firm implementing these policies (p<0.01 
in both cases) (model 33). They are followed by good regulatory quality 
(Exp(B)=4.463) Model 33 explains 64.5% of the variation in this variable (Nagelkerke 
R2) and correctly classifies 72.3% of firms. 
Model 34 has the existence of freedom of association policies as its dependent 
variable. It explains 68.3% (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classifies 87.3% of the firms, 
offering an improvement from model 08. Previous performance remains the main 
predictor, increasing the odds of a firm having such policy by 47.459 times (p<0.01). 
This is followed by peer performance within industry (Exp(B)=5.641, p<0.05) and 
regulatory quality (Exp(B)=3.841, p<0.01). Model 35 focuses on the implementation 
of freedom of association policies, explaining 62.6% of the variation (Nagelkerke R2) 
and correctly classifying 74.6% of firms. Once again and as expected previous 
performance is the main predictor (Exp(B)=86.945, p<0.01). This is followed by 
regulatory quality (Exp(B)=2.353, p<0.05) and credit market regulation 
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(Exp(B)=1.241, p<0.05). Model 36 focuses on the outcomes of these policies, having 
trade union representation as the dependent variable. It explains 88.6% of the 
variation (R2) and only has two significant predictors, namely previous performance 
(Beta=0.885, p<0.01) and peer performance at industry level (Beta=0.072, p<0.05). 
Models 37 and 38 have existence of forced labour policies (37) and implementation 
of these (38) as the dependent variables. While model 37 explains 68.8% of the 
variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classifies 84.6% of the firms, model 38 
explains a little less (Nagelkerke R2=55.3%) and correctly classifies 64% of the firms. 
Previous performance is the main predictor in both models, increasing the odds of 
firms having the policy by 70.244 times (p<0.01) and implementing it by 106 times 
(p<0.01). The existence of a forced labour policy was also influenced by peer 
performance at industry level (Exp(B)=21.161, p<0.01) and firm size (Exp(B)=1.173, 
p<0.01). The other two more relevant predictors for implementation were regulatory 
quality (Exp(B)=7.511, p<0.01) and higher levels of democracy (Exp(B)=1.289, 
p<0.05). 
Having a child labour policy and implementing it were the dependent variables for 
models 39 and 40, respectively. Model 39 explains 68.7% of variation (Nagelkerke R2) 
and correctly classifies 86.9% of the firms. Model 40, on the other hand, explains 
59.2% of variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classifies 68.4% of the firms. 
Previous performance is the main predictor of having a child labour policy 
(Exp(B)=63.55, p<0.01), followed by peer performance at industry level 
(Exp(B)=38.17, p<0.01) and belonging to the extractive industry (Exp(B)=2.4, p<0.05) 
as the top three. The odds of implementing child labour policies, on the other hand, 
were mainly influenced by peer performance at industry level first (Exp(B)=349.896, 
p<0.01), followed then by previous performance (Exp(B)=61.316, p<0.01) and 
regulatory quality (Exp(B)=5.195, p<0.01). 
Still within the realm of labour, models 41, 42 and 43 focus on having a diversity 
policy, implementing it and on the outcome percentage of women managers, 
respectively. Model 41 explains 45.3% of variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly 
classifies 99.4% of the firms. The odds of having a diversity policy are only 
significantly increased by previous performance (Exp(B)=23.59, p<0.01), peer 
performance at country level (Exp(B)=10.65, p<0.05) and time as a UNGC 
participant (Exp(B)=1.334, p<0.05). Model 42 has more significant predictors, but the 
top three are previous performance (Exp(B)=18.567, p<0.01), peer performance 
within industry (Exp(B)=4.696, p<0.05) and political stability (Exp(B)=3.291, p<0.01). 
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It explains 55.8% of variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classifies 93.5% of the 
firms. The percentage of female managers, on the other hand, is mainly predicted by 
previous performance (Beta=0.797, p<0.01), peer performance within industry 
(Beta=0.197, p<0.01) and less stringent credit market regulation (Beta=0.66, p<0.01). 
Model 43 explains 85.7% (R2) of the variation in the dependent variable. Previous 
performance was the predictor with the strongest explanatory power (Beta=0.797, 
p<0.01), followed by credit market regulation (Beta=0.66, p<0.01) and peer 
performance at industry level (Beta=0.197, p<0.01). 
Models for the environmental performance start with the existence of an emission 
reduction policy (Model 44) and of a resource reduction policy (Model 45). Model 44 
explains 64.6% of variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classifies 97% of the firms. 
The three main predictors here are previous performance (Exp(B)=119.82, p<0.01), 
peer performance at industry level (Exp(B)=7.853, p<0.01) and firm size 
(Exp(B)=1.388, p<0.01). Model 45, on the other hand, only has one significant 
predictor - previous performance (Exp(B)=191.216, p<0.01). It explains 60.9% of 
variation (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classifies 99.7% of the firms. Model 46 
focuses on implementation and the existence of an environmental management 
system. It explains 63.3% of the variation and correctly classifies 82.6% of firms. The 
top three predictors are previous performance (Exp(B)=38.483, p<0.01), followed by 
peer performance at industry level (Exp(B)=12.092, p<0.01) and regulatory quality 
(Exp(B)=2.381, p<0.05). Environmental expenditure by pre-tax profit is the 
dependent variable for model 47. Model 47 offers a poor fit, explaining only 3.1% of 
variation (R2) in environment expenditures among participants. None of the 
independent variables are significant at 0.05 or less in this model. 
Still on environment, but focusing on innovation, model 48 focuses on the existence 
of an environmental product innovation policy and model 49 on the implementation of 
this policy. Model 48 explains 73.1% of the variation (Nagelkerke R2) on the 
existence of such policies amongst participants and correctly classifies 90.6% of 
firms. Model 49, on the other hand, explains only 37.6% of variation (Nagelkerke R2), 
correctly classifying 74.1% of firms. The three top predictors for model 48 are 
previous performance (Exp(B)=90.174, p<0.01), peer performance at industry level 
(Exp(B)=15.527 p<0.01) and regulatory quality (Exp(B)=2.544, p<0.05). For model 
49, peer performance at industry level is the main predictor (Exp(B)=11.579 p<0.01), 
followed by previous performance (Exp(B)=4.595 p<0.01) and regulatory quality 
(Exp(B)=2.288 p<0.01). 
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Models 50 and 51 focus on anti-corruption efforts, more specifically on the existence 
of anti-corruption policies (50) and the implementation of these (51). Model 50 
explains 66.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variation on the existence of such policies 
amongst participants and correctly classifies 91.1% of firms. Previous performance 
increases the odds of firms having an anti-corruption policy by 62.573 times (p<0.01). 
Other firms in the country having such policies is also amongst the top three 
predictor (Exp(B)=4.767, p<0.05), followed by good regulatory quality (Exp(B)=3.45, 
p<0.05). Model 51 explains 68.4% of the variation (Nagelkerke R2) on 
implementation and correctly classifies 81.4% of firms. Several predictors are 
significant, but the top three factors influencing the odds of implementation are 
previous performance (Exp(B)=43.287, p<0.01), peer performance at industry level 
(Exp(B)=3.562 p<0.05) and political stability (Exp(B)=2.917, p<0.01). 
Finally, model 52 focuses on firms’ support to the UN’s development goals through 
philanthropy. The dependent variable is the total amount of donations by pre-tax 
profit. The model explains only 4.8% of the variations in donations across 
participants. There are only two significant predictors, namely: level of donations by 
other firms in the country (Beta=4.797, p<0.01), and previous donations by the firm 
(Beta=1.312, p<0.01). 
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Summary 
The table below summarises the results of the full models, showing how often an 
independent variable was positive and significant or negative and significant, 
therefore highlighting the variables that were more often found to have a significant 
impact in different aspects of performance. 
Table 30: Summary of occurrence of significant results 
 
The table below shows how often the independent variables were significant 

































LAG dependent variable 25 96.15% 0 0.00% 26 25 96.15%
Peer performance within industry 17 65.38% 0 0.00% 26 17 65.38%
Business regulation 1 3.85% 15 57.69% 26 16 61.54%
Firm size 15 57.69% 0 0.00% 26 15 57.69%
Regulatory quality 12 46.15% 0 0.00% 26 12 46.15%
Years as UNGC participant 8 30.77% 0 0.00% 26 8 30.77%
ROTA 7 26.92% 0 0.00% 26 7 26.92%
Foreing sales per total sales 5 19.23% 2 7.69% 26 7 26.92%
Political stability 4 15.38% 3 11.54% 26 7 26.92%
Credit market regulation 7 26.92% 0 0.00% 26 7 26.92%
Polity IV 6 23.08% 0 0.00% 26 6 23.08%
Developed country 0 0.00% 5 19.23% 26 5 19.23%
Labour market regulation 2 7.69% 3 11.54% 26 5 19.23%
Extractive industry 5 19.23% 0 0.00% 26 5 19.23%
Peer performance within country 5 19.23% 0 0.00% 26 5 19.23%
Voice and accountability 1 3.85% 3 11.54% 26 4 15.38%
Global NGOs 2 7.69% 1 3.85% 26 3 11.54%
Network launch by 2010 0 0.00% 3 11.54% 26 3 11.54%
Board gender diversity 1 3.85% 0 0.00% 26 1 3.85%
Inward FDI 1 3.85% 0 0.00% 26 1 3.85%
IMPROVEMENT IN PERFORMANCE - Models 27 to 52
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Table 31: Summary table by UNGC issue area 
 
The table that follows shows how often the independent variables were significant for 
the models that had the existence of policies as the dependent variable, and those 
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Table 33: Summary of drivers for outcomes 
 
 
Finally, the table above summarises the results for the variables representing outcomes. 
7.5 Discussing the hypotheses 
It is now important to discuss the results in light of the hypotheses proposed in this 
chapter. Hypothesis 01 is partially supported as the presence of NGOs was only 
found to influence improvement in performance in 3 out of the 26 models, i.e. for 
three of the 26 dependent variables. In addition, while it was positively associated 
with increasing the odds of firms performing better in human rights policies and 
implementation of anti-corruption efforts, it was associated with decreasing odds of 
firm showing implementation of its green innovation efforts.  
Table 34: Discussion of hypotheses for the first set of models 
Hypotheses Status 
Hypothesis 01: Firms headquartered in countries with a large number 
of NGOs that are interested in corporate social performance (i.e. that 
are UNGC participants) will be more likely to display higher 
performance in the UNGC issues. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 02: Firms headquartered in developed countries will be 
more likely to display higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 03: Firms with a more diverse board are more likely to 
display higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 04: Firms are more likely to display higher performance in 
an UNGC issue if other firms in its home country are also performing 
high in that issue. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 05: Firms are more likely to display higher performance in 
an UNGC issue if other firms in its industry are also performing high in 
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Hypothesis 06: Firms headquartered in countries with high FDI are 
more likely to display higher performance in the UNGC issues.  
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 07: Firms that are highly internationalised are more likely 
to display higher performance in the UNGC issues 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 08: Firms headquartered in countries with good domestic 
governance institutions are more likely to display higher performance 
in the UNGC issues. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 09: Firms headquartered in countries with a more 
democratic political system are more likely to display higher 
performance in the UNGC issues. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 10: Firms headquartered in countries with more stringent 
regulation are more likely to display higher performance in the UNGC 
issues. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 11: UNGC network launch in firm’s home country is not 
associated with higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 12: Firms in high impact industries are more likely to 
display higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 13: Larger firms are more likely to display higher 
performance in the UNGC issues. 
Partially supported 
 
Hypothesis 02 is not supported, as whenever it was significant, the coefficient was 
negative, i.e. the fact that the firms’ home country was a developed economy 
decreased the odds of improved performance. That was the case for evidence of 
implementation of freedom of association, forced labour, child labour and human 
rights policies in the supply chain. It was also true for the existence of a freedom of 
association policy. Hypothesis 03 is also partially supported as board diversity only 
significantly influenced the odds of performance for one variable (implementation of 
anti-corruption efforts). 
Hypothesis 04 is only partially supported as peer pressure at home country was 
found to significantly increase the odds of improved performance for five variables 
only, namely: governance score, philanthropy, and existence of policies on diversity, 
anti-corruption and human rights on the supply chain. Hypothesis 05 is partially 
supported, as peer pressure at industry level was found to significantly increase the 
odds of improved performance for 65.4% of the variables (17 in total). Hypothesis 06 
is partially supported, as higher levels of inward FDI were only significant for four 
dependent variables, and for three of those the coefficient was zero, making it 
challenging to make any statements on its influence on performance. Hypothesis 07 
is also partially supported either as while firm internationalisation was significant for 
26.9% of the performance variables, it had a negative coefficient in nearly a third of 
the cases, which does not support the hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 08 is only partially supported. While performance variables were 
positively and significantly influenced by at least one of the national governance 
indicators in 17 instances, in 6 cases good governance was associated with poorer 
performance. Similarly for hypothesis 09, only partial support was found. Higher 
levels of democracy were positive and significant for six variables only. Hypothesis 
10 is not fully supported. While at least one of the variables for stringency of 
regulation was significant for 65.4% of the performance variables, they varied in 
positive and negative coefficients, i.e. being either more or less stringent regulation 
and therefore not always in line with the hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 11 is partially supported. Presence of a local network was only significant 
for three of the performance variables, but all three had negative coefficients, in line 
with the hypothesis. Hypothesis 12 is also only partially supported. Belonging to an 
extractive industry is positive and significant for five performance variables only. 
Hypothesis 13 is partially supported, with size having a positive and significant in 
impact on 57.7% of the performance variables.  
7.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at understanding the drivers for corporate social performance 
amongst UNGC participants. Using a sub-sample to include only UNGC participants, 
this study used a longitudinal approach to understand what factors at firm, industry 
and national levels influenced performance in the UNGC principles amongst 
participating firms. Performance variables were classified as the existence of policies 
– understood as a statement of firms’ principles and intentions, processes – whether 
the firm is actually implementing its policies, and whenever possible outcomes – the 
visible result of the implementation of these policies.  
Referring back to the framework proposed in chapter two (section 3.3.2), results 
suggest that elements of “who I am”, “what I do” and “where I come from” are at play 
in influencing improvements in performance amongst UNGC participants16. More 
specifically, results suggest that, overall, larger firms with a good history of previous 
corporate social performance, that are from an industry where competitive pressures 
for higher corporate social performance are stronger, and that come from countries 
with more stringent business regulation will be more likely to display improvements in 
performance.  
                                                
16 This considers only variables that were significant for over 50% of the full models. 
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Improvements in performance in regards to the existence of policies are mainly 
driven by “who I am”, notably in terms of size and previous performance. In other 
words, results suggest that bigger firms with a good story to tell about what they have 
done before are more likely to develop policies related to the UNGC issue areas. 
Those firms are likely to be under greater scrutiny from stakeholders, and failing to 
keep a promise may come at a high cost for them. The BP Deepwater Horizon 
accident is arguably illustrative of the level of scrutiny these firms may attract and the 
impact of perception that performance is below expectations. Nevertheless, what 
peers within industry are doing is also an important driver in most cases, as well as a 
national environment with a more stringent business regulation, i.e. countries where 
regulation and costs of bureaucracy are likely to restrain entry and reduce 
competition. It may be that firms in those countries feel compelled to show proactive 
engagement in corporate social performance to try to pre-empt further regulations.  
Improvements in regards to processes of implementation, on the other hand, have a 
slightly bigger influence from the national environment – where I come from - when 
compared to policies, with both more stringent business regulation and higher 
regulatory quality as significant for most performance variables. It may be that 
implementation requires a higher level of commitment to the promises made than 
policies – “easier said than done” as the adage goes. Therefore, where a set of 
institutions exists at national level that can create the environment to hold firms more 
accountable one should be able to see better performance results in the 
implementation front. In other words, in a mirror effect, a stronger set of institutions at 
national level – where I come from - may increase the costs of failing to keep a 
promise, therefore leading to higher levels of implementation of these promises.  
Peer performance at industry level is associated with improvements in 
implementation in most cases, with firms more likely to give the extra step towards 
better performance when the industry performs better. While this may be more 
acutely visible in regards to implementation, results suggest mimetic pressures within 
industry to be stronger than country level ones throughout. Peers’ performance at 
industry level has an important role in defining participants’ performance in regards to 
policies, implementation and outcomes. It is interesting that this is stronger at 
industry level than country level, although it is not necessarily surprising given the 
global nature of the UNGC and the fact that, in theory, firms may be encouraged to 
mimic the behaviour of other organisations perceived by them as successful (and 
therefore legitimate). One could argue that firms may be more likely to look up to 
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peers within the same industry, who are exposed to similar challenges. If a firm is 
under performing its peers, the cost of failing to keep a promise in regards to this 
performance may be high, as it may have direct implications for its business as well. 
Therefore, participants may tend to mimic their way into higher performance when its 
industry as a whole is displaying higher performance in the UNGC issues. 
Interestingly, time as a participant in the UNGC is more relevant for improvements in 
the implementation of processes than in the establishment of policies. A longer time 
as a participant is likely to lead to higher improvements in performance. In very few 
cases it is associated with improvements in policies. One can argue that by being 
longer in the initiative the firm has been longer exposed to best practices and to 
peers’ practices in general in regards to the UNGC principles, therefore being longer 
exposed to peer pressure to higher performance. In addition, participating firms will 
have the time to learn more about how to transform commitments into practical 
actions, through the learning efforts of the UNGC.  
7.7 Contribution to practice and to theory 
This study makes an important contribution to theory by using a multi-issue measure 
of performance, longitudinally covering all UNGC principles in the aspects of policies, 
processes of implementation and whenever feasible outcomes. To the author’s best 
knowledge no other study on the UNGC offered the same breadth of variables to 
measure participant’s performance in the initiative.  
The empirical evidence of the strong mimicking behaviour element, seen through the 
important impact of peer performance in participants’ performance, notably at 
industry level, makes for relevant information for practitioners. This highlights the 
relevance of strategies of profiling “champions” of the initiative, as well as the sharing 
of good practices in different spaces (meetings, websites, publications, for example), 
as these are likely to push more participants into mimicking their way into better 
performance. 
7.8 Limitations and future research 
The choice of dependent variables is at the same time a strength of this study, as it 
offers a wider set of issues and covers all UNGC principles and therefore makes an 
important contribution to the literature, but also a limitation, in the sense that the 
choice of variables is constrained by their availability. The ASSET4 data starts in 
2002. While these are the early days of the UNGC, it would have been useful to have 
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data going back to the year the initiative was launched and the first firms joined, or 
even before. In addition, a number of outcome variables, especially variables 
covering controversies (as a proxy for bad and externally recognised outcome) and 
awards (as a proxy for good and externally recognised outcome) were not 
consistently available and as a result could not be used.  
It is also important to highlight that while every effort was made to choose dependent 
variables that were aligned with the UNGC principles and with theory, there is not a 
one set of variables that are widely accepted as representing performance in the 
initiative. Therefore, choice is not only guided by data availability, as explained above, 
but also, to some extent, by a certain degree of discretion from the author. It would 
be interesting for future studies to run further tests with a different set of performance 
variables, covering the same issues and principles, to compare results. Finally, 
ASSET4’s universe covers large listed firms, which does not represent the full of 
UNGC participants, given that a significant proportion of those are small and medium 
enterprises. Therefore, it would be interesting to develop a similar study using a 
sample of small firms, for example. 
7.9 Summary and next chapter 
This chapter aimed at understanding the drivers for corporate social performance 
amongst UNGC participants. Its starts from the observation that while all UNGC 
participants make a commitment to implement the 10 principles into their operations, 
actual performance will vary across firms, with some failing to keep this promise 
while others do it well enough to have its actions portrayed as best practices. Using a 
sub-sample to include only the firms that were UNGC participants, this study used a 
longitudinal approach to understand what factors at firm, industry and national levels 
influence performance in the UNGC amongst participating firms.  
The empirical evidence suggests that elements at firm, industry and country levels 
may influence this outcome, when institutional pressures of some guise make it more 
or less costly for participants to fail to keep a promise. Results suggest that, overall, 
elements of “who I am”, “what I do” and “where I come from” are at play in influencing 
improvements in performance amongst UNGC participants. More specifically, this 
means that larger firms with a good history of previous corporate social performance, 
from an industry where competitive pressures for higher corporate social 
performance are stronger, and that come from countries with more stringent 
business regulation will be more likely to display improvements in performance.  
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Looking separately into policies and implementation, improvements on the 
development of policies in the UNGC issue areas are arguably more driven by “who I 
am” or more specifically firms’ size and previous performance. Improvements to the 
implementation of these policies, however, have a greater impact from their national 
institutional framework, especially in regards to the regulatory environment. It is 
argued that implementation may require a higher level of commitment from firms and 
therefore more is needed to ensure promises are kept. Therefore, where a set of 
institutions exists at national level that can create the environment to hold firms more 
accountable one should be able to see better performance results in the 
implementation front. 
The next chapter builds on this one and with a broader sample - including UNGC 
participants and non-participants - seeks to understand the extent to which 
participation in the UNGC shapes firms’ performance in the issue areas and 
principles of the initiative. Chapter seven will also use the knowledge acquired in 
chapter six in regards to institutional factors that may influence performance to 
choose the control variables. 
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8 Chapter 7: Walking the talk: does joining the UNGC 
lead to actual improvements in CSP? 
Interest on voluntary CSR initiatives has increased over time. While their popularity 
has grown, so has the debate on whether they are actually capable of influencing 
corporate behaviour. A major criticism of these initiatives is that their voluntary nature 
allows for varied levels of engagement, often resulting in no significant improvement 
in firms’ corporate social performance (Behnam and MacLean, 2011). A number of 
authors have explored this question empirically. Studies, however, point to conflicting 
and contradictory results, with initiatives being placed anywhere on a continuum from 
having no impact to having significant impact on corporate behaviour (Barla, 2007, 
Toffel, 2005, King et al., 2005, Chen and Bouvain, 2009, Runhaar and Lafferty, 2009).  
Particular focus has been placed on the UNGC’s ability to shape corporate behaviour 
in regards to CSP. The UNGC being the largest CSR initiative in the world (Arevalo 
et al., 2013), the impact it has on performance has been a major concern for 
academics and practitioners alike. The initiative has often been accused of not 
“having teeth”, i.e. not having the means of ensuring substantive responsible 
corporate behaviour consistent with the principles participants sign up for. 
Surprisingly though, only a small number of studies have tackled this question 
empirically, and often with a limited sample or a measure of performance that did not 
encompass the full spectrum of UNGC issues. As discussed in chapter two (section 
3.3.3), results found were mixed, with some acknowledging the UNGC impact on firm 
behaviour, while others positing that the initiative was weak at best in influencing 
corporate action (Runhaar and Lafferty, 2009, Baumann and Scherer, 2010, Hamann 
et al., 2009, Chen and Bouvain, 2009). While this discussion remains open, enough 
evidence exists on the variation on performance across participants, highlighting the 
importance of further exploring this question. 
This study aims at addressing this open question analysing whether joining the 
UNGC is associated with increased corporate social performance. Through a 
longitudinal, cross-national and multi-industry analysis of performance of UNGC’s 
participants, it will look into questions of issue salience, impact of time of participation 
in performance, and how participants and non-participants compare in their CSP 
overtime. In addition to addressing an unresolved question, it can make an important 
contribution to the literature by using a multi-issue measure of performance in the 
Chapter 7: Sign up and Performance 
 246 
UNGC, arguably allowing for a more solid understanding of the initiative’s impact on 
participants’ corporate social performance. 
8.1 Understanding the impact of the UNGC on performance 
Voluntary CSR initiatives – specially certified standards, but to a greater or lesser 
extent all of them – are implicitly seen as a tool to generate homogeneity in CSP 
across firms (Yin and Schmeidler, 2009). Understanding this phenomenon through 
institutional lenses reinforces this perception of isomorphism as this theoretical 
strand focuses on the role of coercive, mimetic and normative pressures in leading 
organisations to adopt similar practices and behaviour overtime (Yin and Schmeidler, 
2009). One would expect that firms that join an initiative such as the UNGC would be 
exposed to such pressures to deliver on commitments made and improve 
performance. The literature and practice show, however, that the way firms choose 
to – or are capable of – implement commitments may vary significantly (Yin and 
Schmeidler, 2009), resulting in different outcomes.  
8.1.1 Substantive and symbolic engagement 
When firms decide to join a voluntary CSR initiative, they commit to abide to the 
principles, norms or standards proposed by that initiative. Firms are then subject to 
normative, mimetic or coercive forces to conform to those proposed norms or 
activities. Oliver (1991) suggests, however, that conforming is not the only available 
choice for an organisation faced with institutional pressures. Possible responses vary 
according to the level of resistance to institutional demands and may range from 
acquiesce, to compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation (Oliver, 1991). 
Organisations’ willingness, capacity and ability to conform will drive their response to 
the institutional demands.  
While the expected outcome is substantive implementation, i.e. a consistent and 
committed incorporation of the proposed activities or norms into the business 
practices, in practice it can be observed that corporate behaviour post-joining varies 
greatly. For one thing, firms often find themselves compelled to adopt a practice or 
structure to maintain its legitimacy, even if adopting it goes against the organisation’s 
immediate (or long run) efficiency needs (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) or management 
priorities and interests (Crilly et al., 2012). In such cases, organisations may often 
resort to decoupling, i.e. giving the impression of adopting the legitimated structure, 
while carrying on with their own practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
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Similarly, it has been theorised that ceremonial adoption of an initiative is more likely 
to occur in a scenario where there is high uncertainty about the benefits of a practice, 
combined with strong pressure for adoption in views of protecting legitimacy 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002). One could argue that this is a highly likely scenario in 
regards to voluntary CSR initiatives. Benefits of adoption remain ambiguous (Bansal 
and Bogner, 2002, Darnall and Sides, 2008). For one thing, while some firms may 
publicise high savings following the implementation of Environmental Management 
Systems (EMS) or after investing in ISO14001 certification, others find the 
investment not to result on any savings at all (Bansal and Bogner, 2002). At the 
same time, there is growing interest in voluntary CSR initiatives, which continue 
growing over the last decades in number of initiatives (Waddock, 2008) and number 
of participants. The support of key stakeholders - such as governments for example 
– for such initiatives may exert an important pressure on firms to adopt them (Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho, 2011). 
As reviewed in section 2.1.6.1, decoupling involves the disconnection between the 
commitments made or the structure the organisation has formally adopted, and the 
actual practices of this organisation (Hess, 2008, Crilly et al., 2012, Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). Meyer and Rowan (1977: 357) proposed that “decoupling enables 
organisations to maintain standardised, legitimating, formal structures while their 
activities vary in response to practical considerations.” More recent work on symbolic 
management also appreciates the fact that decoupling may be more nuanced than a 
“yes-or-no” decision, allowing firms to choose level of compliance in a continuum 
(Crilly et al., 2012, Kim and Lyon, 2012). In a study on voluntary reporting of 
greenhouse gas emissions, for example, Kim and Lyon (2012) found that firms would 
use selective disclosure of performance. Participants generally reported reductions 
that albeit real, did not show the full picture of an actual increase in total emissions 
(Kim and Lyon, 2012). Finally, some authors have also proposed that firms may 
decouple due to a lack of capacity to implement the actions it has committed to (Lim 
and Tsutsui, 2012, Crilly et al., 2012). For example, Lim and Tsutsui (2012) found 
that the launch of the UNGC in a developing country may lead to firms adopting the 
initiative following the launch, but actually lacking the capacity to implement 
substantive measures. 
While the decision on whether to make a substantive or ceremonial commitment lies 
within the firm, it is proposed here that characteristics of the initiative itself and firms’ 
motivations to join may influence firm’s decision as well as define the extent to which 
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firms are able to choose. In other words, firm’s motivations and initiative design may 
impact firm performance.  
8.1.2 Motivations to join tempering the relationship between sign up 
and performance 
After firms decide to adopt a standard or join a voluntary initiative, the action that 
follows may vary significantly. Authors have theorised that firm motivation to join the 
initiative may temper the relationship between sign up and performance (Boiral, 2007, 
Yin and Schmeidler, 2009, Boiral and Henri, 2012, Aravind and Christmann, 2010).  
8.1.2.1 Early-adopters: Joining as a tool for improved performance 
Neo-institutional theory proposes that early adopters, i.e. those that adopt a practice 
in the early stages of the institutionalisation process, do so in views of achieving 
improved performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or fulfilling a specific need or 
interest (Scott, 2008). Theory also proposes that if a firm adopts a new practice in 
views of improving performance, that firm is more likely to display substantive 
commitment to that practice (Delmas and Montes-­‐‑Sancho, 2010, Naveh et al., 2004), 
rather than decoupling commitment and implementation. That is also proposed to be 
the case for voluntary CSR initiatives. Firms that join such initiatives in views of 
learning or achieving efficiencies at some level (for example, reducing waste), are 
proposed to be more likely to display higher performance and substantive 
implementation of the standards or principles they adopted (Naveh et al., 2004, Yin 
and Schmeidler, 2009, Delmas and Montes-­‐‑Sancho, 2010). 
8.1.2.2 Late-adopters: Joining as a search for legitimacy 
Institutional theory also predicts that firms will aim to acquiesce to institutional 
pressures and conform to the dominant practices within their operating environment 
in order to obtain legitimacy and ultimately ensure its survival in the long run (Scott, 
2008), even when these practices are not fully aligned with technical efficiencies 
(Aravind and Christmann, 2010). It is proposed that this behaviour is especially 
observed amongst late-adopters of a practice. As the institutionalisation of a new 
practice progresses, the decision to adopt it becomes more of a requirement than a 
choice, as normative and cultural pressures reach a point where non-adopters risk to 
be seen as deviants from the norm (Scott, 2008, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In 
other words, adopting the new practice becomes more a matter of ensuring 
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legitimacy following a logic of appropriateness, than achieving efficiency, following a 
sense of instrumentality (Scott, 2008, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Theory posits that firms that adopt a certain practice with the intent of ensuring 
legitimacy, rather than efficiency, display a tendency to decouple adoption and 
implementation. In other words, when faced with an inconsistency between external 
demands and internal efficiency needs firms may resort to a ceremonial adoption of a 
practice, i.e. making a commitment to it but not necessarily fully incorporating it into 
its daily activities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In this case, firms aim to accrue the 
benefits of adoption by obtaining support from relevant stakeholders, while 
maintaining a different practice within its boundaries (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Hypothesis 1: Early adopters of the UNGC are more likely to display higher 
performance improvements – i.e. substantive commitment to the initiative - 
than late adopters.  
8.1.3 Program design and potential impacts on performance 
After joining a voluntary CSR initiative, firms are faced with a choice. They may 
choose to make a ceremonial commitment to the initiative, implementing only the 
minimum standards to ensure participant status and freeriding for as long as possible. 
Taking advantage of the fact that much firm action is opaque to stakeholders, firms 
may hope to gain the legitimacy benefits from the act of joining, without needing to 
actually go through the sometimes costly and time-consuming process of 
implementing real change (Crilly et al., 2012, Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Firms may 
also choose to make a substantive commitment to the initiative, potentially gaining 
not only on legitimacy but also on efficiency, deriving from improved performance on 
the issues they have committed to. Besides their own motivations for joining, a 
number of characteristics of voluntary CSR initiatives may be more or less effective 
in leading firms to display a substantive commitment. A brief summary of these is 
presented on the table below, followed by a detailed discussion on each item.  
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Table 35: Success factors of voluntary CSR initiatives 
 
8.1.3.1 An effective learning tool 
A number of learning elements of voluntary CSR initiatives may contribute to 
substantive commitment and higher performance post-joining, such as: provision of 
technical assistance (Darnall and Sides, 2008, Rivera et al., 2006), help for 
participants in the establishment of goals and priorities on their sustainability agenda 
(Darnall and Sides, 2008, Hamann et al., 2009), opportunity to share best practices, 
learning from peers’ experience (Chen and Bouvain, 2009, Rivera et al., 2006, 
Runhaar and Lafferty, 2009), and the opportunity to interact, network and ultimately 
collaborate with other stakeholders and peers to develop or implement sustainability 
solutions (Darnall and Sides, 2008, Runhaar and Lafferty, 2009, Schembera, 2012). 
It is proposed that the sharing of best practices may lead to innovation and 
organisational learning, and finally to the adoption of practices that are more cost 
efficient and effective than the ones imposed by traditional command-and-control 
regulation (Rivera et al., 2006). From an institutional perspective, one could also 
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conformance to higher standards of implementation, building on best practices, and 
therefore a stronger learning element may lead to more substantive commitment. 
Equally, participants may succumb to mimetic forces, being compelled to adopt best 
practices shared and displayed by what they may consider more successful peers 
(Scott, 2008).  
The UNGC is essentially a multi-stakeholders learning network, which participants 
use to share best practices and innovations linked to the ten principles (Rasche, 
2009a, Kilgour, 2007). This learning network element has a fundamental role in 
influencing the behaviour of participants (Kilgour, 2007) and is implemented more 
broadly through learning events and dialogue, and regionally or at national level 
through local network events, for example (Rasche, 2009a). Building on this, 
Schembera (2012) has proposed that the longer a firm has been a participant the 
longer it has had the opportunity to network and engage with different stakeholders, 
therefore time of UNGC membership is likely to be associated with more substantive 
commitment or higher levels of implementation. In like manner, the UNGC 2013 
Global Corporate Sustainability Report found that older participants, who have been 
exposed to the initiative longer, display generally higher performance in the UNGC 
issues than firms that have only recently joined the initiative (UNGC, 2013d). Given 
the central role of learning in the UNGC, it would be expected that participants are 
likely to display substantive behaviour; even more so older participants, as they have 
been exposed to the pressures of the learning network for a longer period of time. 
8.1.3.2 Promoting transparency and accountability 
Voluntary CSR initiatives have different design elements aiming at ensuring 
transparency and accountability. These may be for example a simple public list of 
participants, which informs stakeholders that a firm has made a public commitment. It 
may also be, however, an online report or assessment, which will inform relevant 
stakeholders of the actual performance of the firm in relation to the commitments 
made. Potoski and Prakash (2005a) propose that information asymmetry between 
firms and stakeholders may create conditions to ceremonial behaviour or wilful 
shirking. In other words, if an initiative does not require any form of public disclosure, 
external stakeholders cannot differentiate between program shirkers and non-
shirkers, therefore allowing for symbolic commitment. In this context, authors 
propose that initiative designs that lead to formalised public commitment and 
promote transparency are more likely to obtain substantive commitment from 
participants (Arimura et al., 2011, Runhaar and Lafferty, 2009). When firms are more 
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visible they are likely to be under greater scrutiny and therefore under greater 
pressure to demonstrate higher performance (Campbell, 2007, Darnall and Kim, 
2012) to protect their legitimacy. 
The UNGC, while not having the mandate or the resources to monitor participants’ 
performance, relies on the disclosure of information to hold participants accountable 
(Rasche, 2009a). Once firms become participants, their details are listed on the 
UNGC website. Equally, they are required to systematically submit a communication 
on their progress, which is also made public on the UNGC website. This is expected 
to lead to a social vetting mechanism through which stakeholders can use this 
information to hold participants accountable (Rasche, 2009a). This visibility, leading 
to increasing scrutiny and pressure is arguably likely to lead to substantive 
engagement. 
8.1.3.3 Integrity measures in place to curb shirking 
It has also been proposed that integrity measures of different guises may curb 
ceremonial adoption (Schembera, 2012, Behnam and MacLean, 2011, Rivera et al., 
2006, Darnall and Kim, 2012). These measures may also take a number of different 
forms, such as auditing by third parties, mandatory public disclosure of 
implementation indicators, and/or sanctions for non-compliance, to name a few. 
While integrity measures may vary in form and stringency, Potoski and Prakash 
(2005a) propose that they can be particularly effective if they contain three key 
elements, namely: third-party monitoring, public disclosure of audit information and 
sanctioning by program sponsors. These coercive pressures imposed by the 
programs can arguably ensure compliance with the initiative’s obligations, leading to 
substantive commitment. Firms that do not comply are at risk of sanctions. 
Participants will be inclined to comply, as these organisations fear to have their 
shortcomings revealed (Darnall and Kim, 2012), which could arguably impact their 
legitimacy.  
In the case of the UNGC, the initiative has been largely criticised for what its critics 
see as a lack of compliance monitoring mechanisms (Rasche, 2009a). UNGC critics 
argue that this could allow participating firms to avoid substantial commitment while 
still maintaining the legitimacy benefits of participation, for example through 
association with the UN (Rasche, 2009a). While the initiative does not have the 
mandate or the resources to verify individual participant performance, it does have 
some integrity measures in place. For one thing, participants are required to annually 
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submit a communication on progress (COP) reporting its implementation of the 
principles. Failing to submit a COP within a year will lead to a “non-communicating” 
designation on the initiative’s website; failing to submit a COP after another year will 
result in the firm being expelled from the UNGC (UNGC, 2013j). Non-complying firms 
are named in the UNGC website, and often this information is also captured and 
diffused in the media. A total of 4,214 participants have been expelled from the 
initiative to date (UNGC, 2013b). Even tough this is not a monitoring or auditing of 
performance, it does represent a sanction from program sponsors (Potoski and 
Prakash, 2005a) which could arguably deter ceremonial behaviour as this “naming 
and shaming” mechanism may represent a threat to firm’s legitimacy. On the other 
hand, firms could arguably enjoy the benefits of participation without substantial 
implementation for at least one year but possibly two. Therefore, arguments could be 
done either way on the extent to which the UNGC’s integrity measures are effective 
in shaping performance. 
8.1.3.4 Peer pressure for increased performance amongst “members of the club” 
It is proposed that joining voluntary CSR initiatives may trigger a socialisation 
process through which peers exert pressure on one another to create or maintain a 
collective “green reputation” and trust from their stakeholders (Rivera et al., 2006). 
Socialisation tactics may include sharing periodic reports on best- and worst-practice 
among participants, use of symbols such as labels to identify high performing 
participants, endorsement by key stakeholder such as environmental agencies or 
NGOs, among others (Rivera et al., 2006). It is proposed that such normative 
pressures may be an important factor in leading to more substantive commitment 
(Rivera et al., 2006). 
In the case of the UNGC, some socialisation measures can be observed. For one 
thing, until 2009 the initiative had a Notable COP award program, which recognised 
participants that had submitted high quality COPs. In January 2011, the UNGC 
launched the LEAD program, which challenges leading UNGC participants to 
achieve even higher levels of CSP and recognises them for doing so (UNGC, 2013c). 
It is argued that such measures may incentivise participants to display substantive 
commitment to the initiative. 
8.1.3.5 Excludable “club benefits” 
It has been proposed that joining voluntary CSR initiatives may offer potentially 
excludable “club benefits” to participants (Potoski and Prakash, 2005b, Rivera et al., 
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2006). Therefore, in order to have access to these benefits – generally linked with 
legitimacy obtained through association with the well-reputed initiative – firms are 
more likely to take costly, progressive measures to substantially implement the 
commitments supported by the initiative (Potoski and Prakash, 2005b). For example, 
Postoski and Prakash (2005b) propose that ISO140001 is successful in promoting 
higher performance due to the reputational benefits deriving from the broad positive 
standing the standard has with external stakeholders. Rivera et al (2006) highlight, 
however, that these benefits may to some extent be non-excludable, leaving 
initiatives vulnerable to free riding behaviour. If no controls are in place, once the 
initiative has established a credible “green reputation”, all participants regardless of 
their actual performance may enjoy it, as outcomes may not be fully visible for 
external stakeholders (Rivera et al., 2006).  
In the case of the UNGC, while the initiative may offer excludable benefits for some 
top performers (for example, the now-discontinued Notable COP award), it arguably 
also offers non-excludable benefits for participants with all levels of commitment. For 
one thing, firms only interested on the immediate legitimacy gains associated with 
joining may manage to maintain participation status without incurring in much effort 
for at least one year. In this case, the organisation would be able to obtain the 
legitimacy benefits reserved to participants, without substantial implementation of the 
principles. Therefore, while the UNGC may offer some excludable benefits, some of 
the benefits it offers may arguably be enjoyed by participants that are not engaged in 
substantial implementation.  
8.1.3.6 Other characteristics of the initiative 
It has also been proposed that high costs of adoption and clear standards may lead 
to substantial commitment to voluntary CSR initiatives (Schembera, 2012, Potoski 
and Prakash, 2005b, Behnam and MacLean, 2011, Darnall and Kim, 2012).  
Theory proposes that organisations are more prone to decouple commitment and 
action when they feel under pressure to adopt a practice that seems to conflict with 
their efficiency needs (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). It follows that organisations that are 
motivated for adoption for legitimacy reasons are also more likely to display 
ceremonial commitment to the initiative (Behnam and MacLean, 2011). Given the 
wide choice of voluntary CSR initiatives, it is argued that firms only interested in 
legitimacy gains are more likely to symbolic adopt initiatives that have the lowest 
requirements of effort and resources (Behnam and MacLean, 2011). With that, 
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participants aim to obtain the legitimacy benefits of being a participant, without 
incurring on high costs. Conversely, it is proposed that initiatives that have high costs 
of adoption are more likely to have managerial support to maintain the system and 
achieve the goals the firm commits to (Darnall and Kim, 2012), and are as a result 
less likely to be decoupled (Schembera, 2012). Equally, those initiatives that have 
high costs of adoption and cannot be easily decoupled (such as those requiring 
certification, for example) are more likely to attract firms that are actually prepared to 
a substantive commitment to the initiative and/or envisage a competitive advantage 
from full implementation (Behnam and MacLean, 2011). 
In the case of ISO14001, costs of certification are high, and are accrued not only at 
firms’ initial certification but also when they re-certify (Darnall and Kim, 2012). In the 
case of the UNGC, calculation of cost of adoption is less obvious, and therefore has 
been a point of discussion. Behnam and MacLean (2011) argue that while 
substantive implementation of the UNGC may require significant effort and resources, 
firms only interested on the immediate legitimacy gains of becoming a participant 
may manage to maintain participant status without incurring in many costs. The most 
costly requirement is the annual production of a COP (Behnam and MacLean, 2011). 
In a nutshell, it is proposed that only substantive implementation of the UNGC would 
require higher investments; therefore costs of adoption in this case is not likely to be 
a deterrent for ceremonial commitment (Behnam and MacLean, 2011). 
Clarity of standards has also been pointed as an important factor influencing 
performance post-joining (Schembera, 2012, Behnam and MacLean, 2011). Behnam 
and MacLean (2011) propose that ambiguous language in the definition of the 
standard or principles leave the initiative’s requirements open to interpretation, giving 
participants enough room of manoeuvre to select the level of implementation that 
better fits their needs. Firms that believe the initiative to be relevant for their 
efficiency of competitiveness may take advantage of this flexibility to achieve an 
effective integration of standards into their operations. Conversely, firms that are only 
focused on the legitimacy gains may use this flexibility to adopt standards to the 
minimum, decoupling commitments made from its operations, ensuring legitimacy 
gains while continuing with business as usual. It is therefore proposed that clear and 
unambiguous language in the definition of the initiative’s expectations limits the 
potential for mere ceremonial commitment to it (Behnam and MacLean, 2011). 
The UNGC has been criticised for proposing principles that do not set clear 
expectations for participants or provide concrete guidance for implementation 
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(Behnam and MacLean, 2011, Rasche, 2009a). Principles are aspirational, rather 
than directive (Behnam and MacLean, 2011) and there are concerns that the broad 
language used in the principles may allow uncommitted participants to claim 
compliance without taking substantive action (Rasche, 2009a). Rasche (2009a: 17) 
points, however, that the UNGC does not aim at being a “structured code of conduct 
against which compliance can be measured”; rather, the principles aim to provide a 
starting point for learning and discussion, and for the development of innovative 
solutions for sustainability challenges. In addition, the UNGC is an initiative designed 
for global reach, making no distinction of industry, size or region; the principles 
therefore were designed to allow firms to adapt them to their own operating context 
(Rasche, 2009a). Once again, the discussion in regards to clarity of the standards is 
not a straightforward one, allowing for different perspectives on the initiative’s 
capacity to influence corporate social performance of participants. 
Based on the discussions above, there are reasons to propose that joining the 
UNGC is likely to be followed both by ceremonial or substantive behaviour. While the 
UNGC has a number of integrity measures in place, it has been criticised for not 
having formal monitoring of implementation for example (Rasche, 2009a). The 
principles have been pointed as broad and unclear (Rasche, 2009a). In regards to 
cost, there is no agreement on its potential impact on UNGC participants making it 
difficult to make predictions from this factor (Behnam and MacLean, 2011). The 
UNGC has socialisation measures in place that can arguably trigger peer pressure 
for higher performance, and the initiative does offer some excludable club benefits. 
However, it has also been proposed that some of their adoption benefits are non-
excludable – for example, some firms may enjoy the legitimacy gains of joining the 
initiative, without actually taking many steps to improve performance post-joining. 
Given these mixed propositions, and the mixed evidence found on the literature, it is 
important to propose the following hypotheses for testing: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms that join the UNGC are more likely to display higher 
corporate social performance in all issue areas of the UNGC than firms that 
do not join. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms that join the UNGC are more likely to display higher 
corporate social performance in selected issue areas of the initiative than 
firms that do not join. 
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Hypothesis 4: Firms that join the UNGC are not more likely to display higher 
corporate social performance in the initiative’s issue areas than firms that do 
not join. 
8.1.4 Control variables 
8.1.4.1 Firm size 
Size was often found to be a relevant predictor for CSP (Bennie et al., 2007, 
Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010). Despite variations in focus, the underlying argument 
is that the larger the organisation, the more visible are its actions and therefore more 
attention and more scrutiny it is likely to receive from stakeholders (Johnstone and 
Labonne, 2009, Knudsen, 2011, Schembera, 2012). As result of that, larger firms are 
likely to be under greater pressure to conform to society’s expectations in order to 
protect its legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). It is therefore proposed that 
larger size is likely to be associated with higher performance in consonance with the 
commitments made to the UNGC. 
8.1.4.2 Slack resources 
As discussed in previous chapters, slack resources have been found to have an 
impact on firms’ decision to engage in various elements of CSP (Levy and Shatto, 
1978, Melnyk et al., 2003, Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
Financial resources are arguably essential to allow firms to engage in new 
endeavours or routines, as they provide firms with the discretion for decision making 
that a lack of resources would otherwise prevent (Perez-Batres et al., 2012a, 
McGuire et al., 1988) as well as with the actual resources needed for implementation. 
Therefore, an organisation that disposes of slack resources will be better placed to 
substantively implement the principles they sign up for. 
8.1.4.3 Belonging to the extractive industry 
Firms in extractive industries are likely to face higher stakeholder scrutiny and be 
under greater pressure to display alignment with societal expectations (Perez-Batres 
et al., 2012a, Bansal and Bogner, 2002). Such firms may face real losses if their 
customers or other stakeholders pull back support for them due to poor (real or 
perceived) sustainability performance (Bansal and Bogner, 2002). Firms in high 
impact industries, consequently, may find greater incentives to display substantive 
commitment to voluntary CSR initiatives they choose to join or perceive greater risk 
of sanctions if behaving otherwise. As a result, one can expect to find higher 
improvements in performance amongst this group. 
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8.1.4.4 Good governance 
As discussed in previous chapters, it is proposed that good domestic governance 
institutions will be associated with substantive commitment to voluntary CSR 
initiatives (Knudsen, 2011). It can be argued that strong domestic governance create 
the conditions to hold firms’ accountable for the commitments they make, therefore 
leading to substantive implementation of voluntary CSR standards.  
8.1.4.5 Stringency of regulation 
As discussed before, firms in more liberal economies will tend to engage in voluntary 
CSR initiatives and work with policymakers to develop such initiatives and 
frameworks, avoiding government regulations while deflecting criticism and ultimately 
protecting their legitimacy (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). While this economic orientation 
may be associated with higher levels of participation in voluntary CSR initiatives, no 
evidence was found that it may be associated with higher performance as well (Lim 
and Tsutsui, 2012). Ultimately, one could use a mirroring argument (Jackson and 
Apostolakou, 2010) - lower levels of government intervention are likely to lead to 
poorer CSP, and also in some cases ceremonial commitment to voluntary CSR 
initiatives.  
8.1.4.6 Previous performance 
Controlling for effects of firms’ previous performance is an important element of 
understanding current performance. One can argue that what the firm did the year 
before will have an important impact on what the firm is currently doing - for example, 
if the firm gave a substantial amount of money to charity in the previous year, it is 
unlikely that it will reduce this amount drastically in the current year. Therefore, it is 
expected that firms with previous high performance, will also perform higher in the 
current period. 
8.1.4.7 Peer pressure and mimicking behaviour 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) highlight that uncertainty is a powerful force in 
encouraging organisational behaviour towards isomorphism. When there is 
uncertainty in the environment organisations may be encouraged to mimic the 
behaviour of other organisations perceived by them as successful (and therefore 
legitimate), in order to ensure their own legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 
Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Building on this, one can argue that the performance of 
peers, i.e. the performance of other firms within the focal firm’s home country or 
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industry, may influence the focal firm’s performance. Firms may find themselves 
compelled to adopt similar practices – and arguably level of performance – of peers. 
8.2 Data 
This study uses data provided by ThomsonReuters ASSET4, combined with 
institutional data provided by a number of publicly available sources (see below and 
chapter three for a full list and description), as well as firm data from Datastream, as 
well as some UNGC data on participation.  
8.2.1 Sample 
This study uses the full universe of the ASSET4 dataset between 2002 and 2011, 
including participants and non-participants. This comprises a total of 52,111 
observations, including 4,576 firms, from 59 countries and 77 industries. 
8.2.2 Measuring performance 
Authors have found varied solutions to measure the impact of voluntary CSR 
initiatives in participants’ performance. Measures varied in that they focused on 
change or in absolute performance, whether they were a binary variable or not, 
whether they were survey based or built from publicly available information. 
Measures of absolute performance were more common in the literature than 
measures of change (Arimura et al., 2011, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010, Chen and 
Bouvain, 2009, Christmann and Taylor, 2006, Delmas and Montes-­‐‑Sancho, 2010). 
The absolute measures ranged from CO2 emissions per unit of electricity produced 
(Delmas and Montes-­‐‑Sancho, 2010), to whether the firm assesses the environmental 
performance of suppliers (Arimura et al., 2011), or whether the firm had a human 
rights policy (Hamann et al., 2009), among others. Measures of change were less 
frequent and often relied on self-evaluation of improvement obtained through surveys 
(Darnall and Kim, 2012, Yin and Schmeidler, 2009).  
More specifically in the case of the UNGC, quantitative studies focused on absolute 
measures of performance. These varied from a binary display of formal human rights 
policy (Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010), to assessment of rigour of human rights 
reporting (Hamann et al., 2009),  profile of reporting in UNGC and other issues (Chen 
and Bouvain, 2009), and self-reported level of UNGC implementation (learner, active 
or advanced) (Schembera, 2012). While these help build important knowledge about 
the UNGC, one can argue that the performance measures used to date either fail to 
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encompass all UNGC issues or do not allow for a more fine-grained understanding of 
the impact the initiative on firm behaviour on the different issue areas. The measure 
proposed here therefore aims at addressing this gap, with multi-issue measures of 
performance in the UNGC. 
8.2.3 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables were chosen to cover the four issue areas of the UNGC, 
and as much as possible all 10 principles. In addition, guided by Wood’s (1991a) 
definition of CSP, variables were chosen to demonstrate whether firms had policies 
in place stating their principles in regards to an issue and processes in place to 
implement those principles. Outcomes other than the existence of policies were more 
challenging to have as a dependent variable, as often the number of observations 
was too low to be used. Where possible, however, extra outcome dependent 
variables were added. 
The year 2002 is the initial year as this is the first year of data available in ASSET4. 
While it would have been ideal to have the year 2000 as the initial year, as this is the 
first year of existence of the UNGC, 2002 is still the very early days of the initiative. 
The year 2011 is the end date for the measurement of performance. This represents 
an important proportion of UNGC’s years of existence – over two thirds, therefore 
presenting an interesting and rich period for analysis.  
A summary of the dependent variables is provided on the table below. 
Table 36: List of dependent variables 




SOCSCORE Social  “The social pillar measures a company's capacity to generate trust and 
loyalty with its workforce, customers and society, through its use of best 
management practices. It is a reflection of the company's reputation and 
the health of its license to operate, which are key factors in determining 




“The environmental pillar measures a company's impact on living and 
non-living natural systems, including the air, land and water, as well as 
complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best 
management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on 





“The corporate governance pillar measures a company's systems and 
processes, which ensure that its board members and executives act in 
the best interests of its long term shareholders. It reflects a company's 
capacity, through its use of best management practices, to direct and 
control its rights and responsibilities through the creation of incentives, 
0-100 
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as well as checks and balances in order to generate long term 
shareholder value.” 
Human rights policies 
in house 
P1 “Does the company have a general, all-purpose policy regarding human 
rights?” 
0 or 1 
Human rights 
processes in house 
P1 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in 
place to ensure the respect of human rights in general?” 
0 or 1 
Human rights policies 
supply chain 
P2 “Does the company have a human rights policy applying to its supply 
chain?” 




P2 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in 
place to apply human rights standards to its supply chain?”  
0 or 1 
Freedom of 
association policy 
P3 “Does the company have a policy to ensure the freedom of association 
of its employees?” 
0 or 1 
Freedom of 
association processes 
P3 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention the processes in 
place to ensure the freedom of association of its employees?” 
 
0 or 1 
Trade union 
representation 
P3 “Percentage of employees represented by independent trade union 
organizations or covered by collective bargaining agreements.” 
0-100 
Forced labour policies P4 “Does the company have a policy to avoid forced labour?” 
 
0 or 1 
Forced labour 
processes 
P4 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in 
place to avoid the use of forced labour?” 
0 or 1 
Child labour policies P5 “Does the company have a policy to avoid child labour?” 0 or 1 
Child labour 
processes 
P5 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in 
place to avoid the use of child labour?” 
0 or 1 
Diversity policies P6 “Does the company have a diversity and equal opportunity policy?” 0 or 1 
Diversity processes P6 “Does the company describe the implementation of its diversity and 
opportunity policy?” 
0 or 1 
Percentage of women 
managers 





P7/8 “Does the company have a policy for reducing environmental emissions 
or its impacts on biodiversity? “ 
0 or 1 
Resource reduction 
policy 
P7/8 “Does the company have a policy for reducing the use of natural 
resources?” 
0 or 1 
Environmental 
management 
P7/8 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in 
place to maintain an environmental management system?”  




P7/8 Total amount of environmental expenditures as provided by ASSET4, 




P9 “Does the company have an environmental product innovation policy 
(eco-design, life cycle assessment, dematerialization)?” 
0 or 1 
Product innovation 
processes 
P9 “Does the company describe the implementation of its environmental 
product innovation policy?” 
0 or 1 
Anti-corruption policy P10 “Does the company have a policy to avoid bribery and corruption at all its 
operations?” 
0 or 1 
Anti-corruption 
processes 
P10 “Does the company describe, claim to have or mention processes in 
place to avoid bribery and corruption practices at all its operations?” 
0 or 1 






Total amount of all donations by the company as provided by ASSET4, 




P7/8 Total CO2 and CO2 equivalents emission in tonnes. Any 
Waste recycling ratio P7/8 The waste recycling ratio as reported by the company. 0-100 
Energy use total P7/8 Total direct and indirect energy consumption in gigajoules. Any 
Total injury rate Labour Total number of injuries and fatalities including no-lost-time injuries Any 
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relative to one million hours worked. 
Board gender 
diversity 
P6 Percentage of women on the board of directors. 0-100 
It is important to highlight that SOCSCORE, ENVSCORE and CGVSCORE are scores. For ASSET4 data that means that 
they are a number between 0 and 100 that indicates the firm’s performance in comparison to the remaining ASSET4 
universe for a particular issue. 
 
8.2.4 Independent variables 
UNGC participant in current year – This variable indicates whether a firm is an 
UNGC participant in the current year. This data was obtained from ASSET4. It takes 
a value of one if the firm was a participant in that year, and zero if otherwise. 
EARLY – This variable builds on ASSET4 data. It takes a value of one if the firm was 
first classified as a UNGC participant by ASSET4 in 2002 or 2003, and zero if 
otherwise.  
MIDDLE - This variable builds on ASSET4 data. It takes a value of one if the firm 
was first classified as a UNGC participant by ASSET4 between 2004 and 2007, and 
zero if otherwise.  
LATE - This variable builds on ASSET4 data. It takes a value of one if the firm was 
first classified as a UNGC participant by ASSET4 in 2008 of afterwards, and zero if 
otherwise.  
8.2.5 Control variables 
The choice of control variables builds not only on the literature, but also on the 
knowledge acquired in chapter six in regards to factors that drive performance. 
Chapter six showed that factors at firm, industry and country level influence firms’ 
performance in the UNGC issue areas. Therefore, for chapter seven, a set of control 
variables was chosen to be relevant variables, with a balanced representation of all 
three levels (firm, industry and country). A decision was made to restrict the number 
of control variables as compared to the ones available in chapter six for statistical 
efficiency. However, in order to test for robustness models were run with an 
extended list of control variables. Results were consistent with the ones presented 
here. More details on the variables used follow. 
Firm size was measured as the log of employees, calculated from the variable 
number of employees provided by Datastream.  
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Slack resources are represented by ROTA (return on total assets), obtained from 
Datastream. 
A dummy for extractive industry was created in SPSS. It gathers firms classified 
under SIC codes 10 (metal mining), 12 (coal mining), 13 (oil and gas extraction) and 
14 (mining and quarrying of non-metallic minerals, except fuels). Authors have found 
different solutions to represent high impact industries. Bansal and Bogner (2002) 
focused on mining, forestry and chemicals; Knudsen (2011) focused on oil and 
manufacturing; Perez-Bastres et al (2012b) developed their own pollution 
intensiveness ranking; and Bernhagen and Mitchel (2010) looked into oil and gas 
and materials (these including mining and forestry product companies). Recognising 
this variety and the lack of a one fully agreed definition of high impact / extractive 
industry, this study follows EITI (Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative)’s focus 
on oil, gas and mining companies as firms in the extractive industry (EITI, 2014).  
Stringency of regulatory environment was operationalised following Berliner and 
Prakash (2010). Out of the three available measures provided by the Economic 
Freedom of the World dataset, the one representing Business Regulations was 
chosen. It refers to a combination of administrative requirements; bureaucracy costs, 
starting a business, extra payments/bribes/favouritism, licensing restrictions and cost 
of tax compliance. Countries that receive higher ratings here leave markets to define 
prices and do not display regulatory activities that cause delays to entry into business 
and increase costs of production (Gwartney et al., 2011). 
The measure of Regulatory Quality was taken from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). It reflects perceptions of the government’s ability to 
define and implement policies that allow for the development of the private sector. 
Values range from approximately -2.5 (weak governance performance) to +2.5 
(strong governance performance). 
To measure Previous performance the dependent variable for each model was 
lagged by one year. 
Peer pressure at country and industry levels reflects the average performance of 
firms in the total sample (i.e. participants and non-participants) for each of the 
dependent variables, i.e. for each model a different set of variables was created. It 
was calculated from ASSET4 data, using SPSS, and lagged by one year. 
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8.3 Methods for analysis 
Given the different types of dependent variables, two different methods were used for 
the analysis. For the models that had a binary variable as a depend variable, binary 
logistic regression was used. For the models that had a continuous variable as the 
dependent variable, linear regression was used. 
8.4 Results 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients were run for the variables 
of this study 17 . It was observed that the dependent variables are significantly 
correlated to several of the independent and control variables. Twenty-six out the 31 
dependent variables are positive and significantly correlated with being a UNGC 
participant. Similarly, 26 dependent variables are positively and significantly 
correlated to being an early joiner, 24 are positively and significantly correlated to 
being a joiner in the middle period and 24 to being a late joiner. Amongst the control 
variables, it is interesting to highlight that the majority of the dependent variables (28) 
were positively and significantly correlated to firm size, 25 were negatively correlated 
to business regulation and 15 were positively and significantly correlated to slack 
resources. Different from expected, however, 20 were negatively and significantly 
correlated to regulatory quality and 14 were negatively and significantly correlated to 
belonging to the extractive industry (compared to only nine that were positively and 
significantly correlated to this variable).   
While most correlation coefficients conform to the norms, correlation coefficients 
between business regulation and regulatory quality presented a concern for 
multicollinearity, as the coefficient is greater than 0.8 (Field, 2009). Given the 
potential for multicollinearity concerns, further tests were run to check the Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF). Using linear regression in SPSS, the tables below were 
prepared: 
 
                                                
17 Given the large size of the correlation table it was not included in this study; however, this is available 
upon request. 
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Table 37: Variance inflation factors (VIF) 
 
Although there is not a clearly established threshold of when a value of VIF should 
become a concern, this study follows Field (2009) in that values above 10 signal 
potential problems of multicollinearity. These tests showed no more concerns for the 
variables business regulation and regulatory quality.  
The results of the logistic and linear regressions are presented in tables 35 to 38, 43  
to 44, and 48. There are 31 dependent variables (26 original ones plus five extra 
outcome variables), as listed and described in table 33. 
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Models 01 to 26: Base models 
Table 38: Regression table for models one to 18 
 
Models 1 to 26 include only the control variables, accounting for the impact of firm 
size, slack resources, previous performance, belonging to the extractive industry, the 
regulatory environment and peer pressure at country and industry on the different 
performance variables. It is important to highlight that, despite being parsimonious in 
number of variables, these models display, in most cases, high R squares and 
Nagelkerke R squares. This can be largely attributed to the use of the lag of the 



























-18.614        
(1.837)        
***
-13.436            
(1.754)                 
***
-17.568             
(1.603)           
***
-5.106           
(0.454)              
***
-4.531             
(0.544)        
***
-6.457        
(0.49)          
***
-4.93             
(0.575)              
***
-6.22               
(0.505)             
***
-5.183           
(0.684)            
***
Firm Size
1.346              
(0.078)              
***
1.203           
(0.076)            
***
0.97              
(0.065)             
***
0.313            
(0.021)                
***
0.425             
(0.028)            
***
0.447              
(0.024)                 
***
0.464                
(0.029)              
***
0.358               
(0.024)           
***
0.371             
(0.034)                  
***
ROTA 0.014         (0.011)
0.015            
(0.012)
-0.006             
(0.01)
0.002            
(0.003)
0.005                
(0.005) 
0.009             
(0.003)              
***
0.015               
(0.004)                  
***
0.006            
(0.004)                
*
0.013                 
(0.005)                   
***
Extractive Industry
2.393       
(0.488)               
***
1.076                 
(0.492)                  
**
2.215                 
(0.466)                  
***
0.785            
(0.128)              
***
0.943               
(0.152)             
***
0.3                  
(0.15)                     
**
0.368             
(0.183)                
**
0.902                
(0.143)                      
***
0.501             
(0.203)                  
**
!"#$%&##'(&)"*+,$-%
1.109             
(0.239)              
***
0.024            
(0.237)             
1.712              
(0.215)               
***
-0.281           
(0.067)               
***
-0.631              
(0.083)                 
***
-0.322             
(0.073)              
***
-0.802            
(0.09)          
***
-0.314               
(0.076)            
***
-0.519                   
(0.104)                
***
Regulatory quality
-1.062          
(0.416)                  
**
1.14              
(0.423)                 
***
0.164             
(0.427)        
0.466             
(0.118)           
***
0.686       
(0.146)                
***
0.702              
(0.129)                
***
1.429              
(0.168)              
***
0.803             
(0.136)                
***
0.693              
(0.182)                
***
LAG Dependent Variable
0.811          
(0.005)            
***
0.828             
(0.005)            
***
0.661            
(0.006)                
***
4.722             
(0.077)                     
***
4.837            
(0.104)            
***
4.921           
(0.095)            
***
4.853               
(0.116)                      
***
4.727              
(0.082)                
***
4.917               
(0.123)                  
***
LAG peer performance in industry
0.112          
(0.012)               
***
0.125            
(0.009)          
***
0.017            
(0.014)             
1.11               
(0.243)             
***
3.114              
(0.5)                
***
1.414           
(0.252)               
***
3.743             
(0.44)                
***
1.325        
(0.34)               
***
0.392             
(0.995)
LAG Peer performance in country
0.132             
(0.011)              
***
0.109              
(0.01)                 
***
0.306               
(0.008)           
***
2.971           
(0.192)             
***
2.982                
(0.468)                    
***
3.135            
(0.243)             
***
3.307            
(0.467)               
***
3.586           
(0.236)                
***
4.154             
(0.625)                     
***
N 15921 15921 15921 15287 15287 15287 15287 15287 15287
R Square 0.78 0.797 0.81
Adjusted R Square 0.78 0.797 0.81
Nagelkerke R Square 0.744 0.63 0.719 0.629 0.722 0.571
Percentage correct cases 81.8 69.6 76.4 67.5 80 67.4






















Constant -2.393             (2.06)
-6.366            
(0.499)          
***
-5.996              
(0.869)             
***
-6.682           
(0.501)          
***
-6.253            
(0.728)          
***
-3.685           
(0.471)            
***
-1.494          
(0.362)          
***
2.549        
(1.439)                
*
-4.539             
(0.465)              
***
Firm Size
0.176              
(0.093)               
*
0.452          
(0.024)                 
***
0.372            
(0.045)               
***
0.466              
(0.024)            
***
0.393            
(0.036)              
***
0.235             
(0.021)           
***
0.238            
(0.016)                  
***
-0.107         
(0.069)
0.291            
(0.021)            
***
ROTA -0.011          (0.012)
0.009           
(0.004)           
**
0.013              
(0.005)            
**
0.011               
(0.004)               
***
0.021             
(0.005)             
***
0.003            
(0.003)          
0.005          
(0.003)           
*
0.028          
(0.016)                    
*
0.007        
(0.003)       
**
Extractive Industry 0.035           (0.471)
0.701             
(0.143)                
***
0.289           
(0.277)
0.748                
(0.143)                  
***
0.363            
(0.224)              
0.131          
(0.133)          
0.216         
(0.109)              
**
-0.596                  
(0.504) 
0.523       
(0.132)        
***
!"#$%&##'(&)"*+,$-% 0.141           (0.312)
-0.365                 
(0.074)                     
***
-0.506            
(0.134)                   
***
-0.34                 
(0.074)                 
***
-0.533            
(0.112)                   
***
-0.289            
(0.068)        
***
-0.699           
(0.055)          
***
-0.372               
(0.218)               
*
-0.353           
(0.067)                 
***
Regulatory quality -0.538            (0.579)
0.653           
(0.13)              
***
0.841            
(0.245)               
***
0.617            
(0.127)                  
***
1.15               
(0.206)           
***
0.87           
(0.127)        
***
1.282             
(0.101)                
***
0.459            
(0.442)
0.766         
(0.122)      
***
LAG Dependent Variable
0.942       
(0.008)           
***
5.147            
(0.099)           
***
5.275                
(0.17)              
***
5.068            
(0.095)            
***
4.944            
(0.138)             
***
4.409            
(0.079)              
***
3.699           
(0.064)        
***
0.875           
(0.012)               
***
5.173        
(0.091)       
***
LAG peer performance in industry
0.034            
(0.009)            
***
2.517           
(0.266)             
***
5.796              
(1.023)              
***
2.403               
(0.245)        
***
5.8              
(0.632)          
***
-0.121            
(0.211)
0.714            
(0.17)          
***
0.106            
(0.016)               
***
1.528       
(0.162)       
***
LAG Peer performance in country
0.045              
(0.009)           
***
2.694             
(0.27)                  
***
5.227          
(1.718)           
***
2.911            
(0.237)              
***
4.133           
(0.846)           
***
2.437           
(0.183)              
***
2.024           
(0.168)              
***
0.06             
(0.019)           
***
1.839        
(0.193)            
***
N 2650 15287 15287 15287 15287 15287 15287 2045 15287
R Square 0.953 0.881
Adjusted R Square 0.952 0.88
Nagelkerke R Square 0.736 0.524 0.753 0.57 0.703 0.666 0.784
Percentage correct cases 77.7 61.2 79.2 64.4 91.2 83.6 87.2
Models
Models
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dependent variable as one of the independent variables. One could argue that what 
the firm did the year before, from a performance perspective, will have an important 
impact in what the firm will do in the current year. This may be especially true for the 
dummy variables – for example, if a firm had a human rights policy in the previous 
year, it is highly likely that it will still have it in the current year. In addition, the 
literature suggests that firms are relatively slow in changing their corporate social 
performance – i.e. one should expect relatively moderate variation from one year to 
the other. Therefore, in those cases and for those reasons, the strong explanatory 
power was not surprising. 
Model 01 (R2=0.78) has SCOSCORE as the dependent variable. The three strongest 
predictors for this social performance variable are belonging to the extractive industry 
(Beta=2.393, p<0.01), firm size (Beta=1.346, p<0.01) and less stringent business 
regulation (Beta=1.109, p<0.01). Model 02 (R2=0.797) focuses on an overarching 
environmental performance variable (ENVSCORE). This is mainly predicted by firm 
size (Beta=1.203, p<0.01), followed by good regulatory quality at national level 
(Beta=1.14, p<0.01) and belonging to the extractive industry (Beta=1.076, p<0.05). 
Finally, model 03 (R2=0.81) focuses on an overarching measure of corporate 
governance (CVGSCORE). The top three predictors here are belonging to the 
extractive industry (Beta=2.215, p<0.01), a less stringent business regulation 
(Beta=1.71, p<0.01) and firm size (Beta=0.97, p<0.01). 
Model 04 and 05 focus on the existence of a human rights policy and its 
implementation; they explain 74.4% and 63% of the variation (Nagelkerke R2) and 
correctly classify 81.8% and 69.6% of cases, respectively. The odds of having such 
policy are mainly influenced by previous performance (Exp(B)=112, p<0.01), higher 
performance amongst peers in the country (Exp(B)=19.5, p<0.01), and higher 
performance amongst industry peers (EXP(B)=3.03, p<0.01). These are also the top 
three predictors for model 05, although peer pressure at industry level is stronger 
than at country level. Models 06 (Nagelkerke R2=0.719) and 07 (Nagelkerke 
R2=0.629) correctly classify 76.4% and 67.5% of the cases. These models focus on 
the existence of human rights policies for the supply chain and the implementation of 
these; the top three predictors for these models are the same as for the previous two 
models. 
Models 08 to 10 focus on freedom of association: dependent variables are existence 
of policy, implementation and percentage of unionized employees respectively. 
Models 08 and 09 (Nagelkerke R2=0.722 and 0.571 respectively), correctly classify 
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80% and 67.4% of cases. Model 09 explains 95.3% of variation in unionisation (R2). 
Previous performance and peer pressure at country level are the two main predictors 
in all cases. This is followed by industry peer pressure for models 08 and 10, and 
good regulatory quality for model 09. 
Models 11 and 12 focus on forced labour policies and implementation respectively. 
Explaining 73.6% and 52.4% of the variation (Nagelkerke R2), they correctly classify 
77.7% and 61.2% of cases. Previous performance and peer pressure at industry and 
country level are the most important factors in increasing the odds of having such 
policy and implementing it. Models 13 and 14 (Nagelkerke R2=0.753 and 0.57), on 
the other hand, focus on policies on child labour and the implementation of these, 
correctly classifying 79.2% and 64.4% of cases respectively. The top three predictors 
remain the same as in the previous two models. 
Existence of diversity policies, implementation of these and the ratio of female 
managers are the dependent variables for models 15, 16 and 17. These models 
explain 70.3%, 66.6% (Nagelkerke R2) and 88.1% (R2) of the variation in the 
dependent variables respectively, and the first two correctly classify 91.2% and 83.6% 
of cases. The odds of presence of a diversity policy and its implementation are 
mainly influenced by previous performance, followed by peer performance at country 
level and good regulatory quality. The predictors for the ratio of female managers are 
previous performance, followed by peer performance at industry and country levels. 
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Table 39: Regression table for base models 19 to 26 
 
Models 18 to 21 have the presence of a resource reduction policy, of an emission 
reduction policy, the implementation of environment management and environment 
expenditures as a percentage of pre tax profit as the dependent variables. Model 18  
(Nagelkerke R2=0.784), 19 (Nagelkerke R2=0.799) and 20 (Nagelkerke R2=0.681) 
correctly classify 87.2%, 91.6% and 75.6% of cases. Previous performance 
increases the odds of better performance in models 18, 19 and 20 by 176.515 times, 
226.208 times and 79.304 times respectively (Exp(B)). Good peer performance at 
industry and country levels follow as top predictors. Model 21 explains 80.5% of 
variance. Environmental expenditures per pre tax profit are largely explained by 
previous performance and, surprisingly, poorer performance amongst peers at 
industry and country levels. 
Having a green innovation policy and implementing it are the focus of models 22 and 
23. While model 22 explains 77.4% of variation, model 23 explains only 40.8% 
(Nagelkerke R2); they both correctly classify over 50% of cases (84.4% and 57.2% 
respectively). The odds of having a policy are mainly influenced by previous 
performance, followed by peer performance at industry and country levels. The odds 
of implementing it are mainly increased by previous good performance, previous 
good industry peer performance and good regulatory quality.  



























-5.163    
(0.546)             
***
-1.162          
(0.411)            
***
601.273     
(749.605)
-4.296             
(0.439)                 
***
-0.73         
(0.323)                 
***
-4.027             
(0.421)                 
***
-1.784           
(0.394)           
***
41.404        
(69.087)
Firm Size
0.264        
(0.023)        
***
0.251           
(0.019)              
***
-35.654   
(41.691)
0.234            
(0.02)               
***
0.28              
(0.016)            
***
0.26         
(0.019)           
***
0.228         
(0.018)          
***
2.782           
(3.1)
ROTA
0.008       
(0.004)          
**
0.007           
(0.003)                
**
-1.471      
(8.856)
0.003                 
(0.003)
0.01            
(0.003)            
***
0                 
(0.003)
0.009           
(0.003)             
***
0.591             
(0.63)
Extractive Industry
0.319        
(0.139)              
**
0.679             
(0.117)               
***
-299.306    
(216.425)
0.006           
(0.154)
-0.367                  
(0.126)              
***
0.673                 
(0.128)              
***
0.539            
(0.115)            
***
21.504          
(22.193)
!"#$%&##'(&)"*+,$-%
-0.28          
(0.077)         
***
-0.875          
(0.065)               
***
33.992    
(117.466)
-0.352         
(0.067)            
***
-0.927           
(0.051)            
***
-0.264             
(0.061)             
***
-0.674           
(0.062)               
***
-14.516       
(10.665)
Regulatory quality
0.856         
(0.144)           
***
1.105          
(0.118)              
***
-206.703    
(229.859)
0.732            
(0.126)             
***
1.377            
(0.094)           
***
0.823            
(0.114)             
***
1.193            
(0.113)           
***
11.955           
(16.881)
LAG Dependent Variable
5.421           
(0.103)            
***
4.373            
(0.076)                
***
0.804        
(0.009)                  
***
4.9                
(0.08)                  
***
2.235            
(0.053)         
***
4.719             
(0.085)          
***
4.451          
(0.085)           
***
0.412          
(0.065)                
***
LAG peer performance in industry
1.241          
(0.192)          
***
2.605           
(0.188)              
***
-0.167           
(0.036)                
***
2.409              
(0.155)              
***
1.595             
(0.148)            
***
-0.64           
(0.174)          
***
-0.362               
(0.189)           
*
-0.079              
(0.077)
LAG Peer performance in country
2.306           
(0.2)                
***
1.356           
(0.213)                  
***
-0.286        
(0.088)                   
***
1.72              
(0.203)                      
***
0.701             
(0.158)               
***
2.773       
(0.143)          
***
3.011              
(0.154)           
***
1.02                   
(0.261)                 
***
N 15287 15287 2002 15287 15287 15287 15287 4532
R Square 0.805 0.016
Adjusted R Square 0.804 0.015
Nagelkerke R Square 0.799 0.681 0.774 0.408 0.758 0.716
Percentage correct cases 91.6 75.6 84.4 57.2 86.3 77
Models
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Models 24 and 25 focus on anti-corruption efforts – existence of a policy and 
implementation respectively. Model 24 (Nagelkerke R2=0.758) correctly classifies 
86.3% of cases, while model 25 (Nagelkerke R2=0.716) correctly classifies 77% of 
cases. Previous good performance, followed by peer performance at industry level 
and good regulatory quality are the top three factors increasing the odds of firms 
having an anti-corruption policy and implementing it. Finally, model 26 focuses on 
donations as a ratio of pre tax profit and explains only 1.6% of variation (R2). The 
main drivers for higher levels of donation are peer performance at country level 
(Beta=1.02, p<0.01) and previous performance (Beta=0.412, p<0.01). 
Models 27 to 52: Does joining the UNGC make a difference to performance? 
Models 27 to 52 introduce the independent variable “UNGC participant in current 
year” that shows whether a firm is an UNGC participant. With that, one can 
understand whether being a participant makes a difference in firms’ performance in 
the ten principles. In general, models 27 to 52 offer little improvement in explanatory 
power when compared to models 1 to 26. Nevertheless, they are fundamental to 
understand the role of joining the UNGC in firms’ performance. 
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Table 40: Regression table for models 27 to 44 
 
 
Model 27 (dependent variable is SOCSCORE) explains 78.1% in variation (R2). 
Being a UNGC participant is main predictor for higher performance in this variable 
(Beta=4.007, p<0.01), followed by belonging to the extractive industry (Beta=1.857, 
p<0.01) and size (Beta=1.224, p<0.01). Being a UNGC participant is also the main 
predictor in model 26 (dependent variable is ENVSCORE, R2=0.798). Good 
regulatory quality (Beta=1.204, p<0.01) and larger firm size (Beta=1.08, p<0.01) 
follow as important predictors for overall environment performance. Model 29 



























-16.242       
(1.843)          
***
-12.227     
(1.756)                      
***
-17.897          
(1.591)            
***
-4.659          
(0.462)              
***
-4.303            
(0.546)                 
***
-5.879           
(0.492)          
***
-4.526           
(0.577)          
***
-5.79          
(0.512)         
***
-4.493        
(0.689)          
***
Firm Size
1.224         
(0.079)         
***
1.08            
(0.077)              
***
0.733          
(0.066)             
***
0.24                
(0.022)                  
***
0.341        
(0.029)          
***
0.356        
(0.025)          
***
0.378              
(0.03)          
***
0.303          
(0.025)           
***
0.281           
(0.036)           
***
ROTA 0.018         (0.011)
0.015             
(0.012)     
-0.005                
(0.01) 
0.002           
(0.003)
0.005     
(0.005)
0.01              
(0.003)         
***
0.016         
(0.004)           
***
0.007            
(0.004)          
**
0.014           
(0.005)             
***
Extractive Industry
1.857      
(0.488)          
***
0.656          
(0.494)
1.641           
(0.464)                
***
0.732         
(0.131)        
***
0.824        
(0.157)         
***
0.174            
(0.155)
0.162          
(0.191)
0.877         
(0.148)       
***
0.353            
(0.204)         
*
Business regulation
1.074               
(0.238)              
***
0.101          
(0.237)
1.926              
(0.214)           
***
-0.27           
(0.068)         
***
-0.549           
(0.083)        
***
-0.338           
(0.074)            
***
-0.795           
(0.091)            
***
-0.322            
(0.077)             
***
-0.503           
(0.104)             
***
Regulatory quality -0.683           (0.416)
1.204          
(0.422)              
***
0.154         
(0.424)
0.529          
(0.122)           
***
0.616         
(0.149)             
***
0.873            
(0.135)              
***
1.558              
(0.174)                
***
0.905          
(0.139)         
***
0.64          
(0.183)             
***
LAG Dependent Variable
0.798            
(0.005)                
***
0.82                     
(0.005)                  
***
0.643             
(0.006)               
***
4.624        
(0.078)         
***
4.765       
(0.106)        
***
4.838         
(0.096)            
***
4.757           
(0.117)           
***
4.675          
(0.084)          
***
4.821            
(0.126)          
***
LAG peer performance in industry
0.109           
(0.012)              
***
0.129                
(0.009)            
***
0.016          
(0.014)       
1.242        
(0.249)          
***
3.185        
(0.509)           
***
1.923          
(0.261)         
***
4.427             
(0.455)          
***
1.187               
(0.347)             
***
0.364          
(1.024)        
LAG Peer performance in country
0.104               
(0.011)                    
***
0.091            
(0.011)            
***
0.331             
(0.008)           
***
2.555            
(0.2)                    
***
2.047            
(0.481)              
***
2.399             
(0.256)            
***
2.17              
(0.483)                
***
2.916                  
(0.25)              
***
2.301              
(0.661)                
***
UNGC participant in current year
4.007          
(0.368)           
***
3.053            
(0.365)                   
***
4.852          
(0.312)               
***
1.229             
(0.093)               
***
0.964               
(0.093)           
***
1.217          
(0.088)          
***
1.032         
(0.098)            
***
0.912              
(0.095)               
***
1.037            
(0.117)              
***
N 15921 15921 15921 15024 15024 15024 15024 15024 15024
R Square 0.781 0.798 0.813
Adjusted R Square 0.781 0.798 0.813
Nagelkerke R Square 0.751 0.637 0.729 0.641 0.728 0.581
Percentage correct cases 82 69.5 76.9 67.7 80.1 67.4





















Constant -2.161               (2.1)
-5.924            
(0.502)           
***
-5.835             
(0.877)               
***
-6.307                
(0.505)              
***
-6.004             
(0.739)            
***
-3.534          
(0.477)               
***
-1.314            
(0.365)                    
***
2.834             
(1.445)           
*
-4.326            
(0.466)          
***
Firm Size 0.152             (0.097)
0.376      
(0.025)                    
***
0.294         
(0.047)              
***
0.393             
(0.025)                 
***
0.318      
(0.038)          
***
0.204          
(0.021)          
***
0.205          
(0.017)           
***
-0.136              
(0.073)                   
*
0.256        
(0.021)        
***
ROTA -0.011               (0.012)
0.01            
(0.004)                
***
0.013            
(0.005)            
**
0.013            
(0.004)            
***
0.022             
(0.005)             
***
0.003        
(0.003)
0.005           
(0.003)            
*
0.023             
(0.017)       
0.007                   
(0.003)               
**
Extractive Industry -0.148                 (0.48)
0.615             
(0.147)              
***
0.074           
(0.29)
0.678            
(0.147)           
***
0.201          
(0.228)
0.094           
(0.134)
0.156                     
(0.11)
-0.662           
(0.512)
0.513            
(0.133)           
***
Business regulation 0.207                  (0.315)
-0.342              
(0.074)                 
***
-0.443            
(0.135)            
***
-0.314             
(0.074)          
***
-0.489             
(0.114)               
***
-0.288           
(0.069)                
***
-0.701              
(0.056)             
***
-0.362               
(0.219)
-0.344           
(0.068)               
***
Regulatory quality -0.707              (0.59)
0.693            
(0.134)           
***
0.831          
(0.251)           
***
0.652         
(0.132)             
***
1.158            
(0.21)                 
***
0.93             
(0.13)                  
***
1.336               
(0.103)           
***
0.445                
(0.445)
0.802               
(0.125)            
***
LAG Dependent Variable
0.941                
(0.008)             
***
5.077                
(0.1)                        
***
5.214           
(0.172)           
***
5.012          
(0.097)           
***
4.895               
(0.14)                   
***
4.33                
(0.08)            
***
3.665               
(0.065)                 
***
0.879                 
(0.012)                     
***
5.091            
(0.091)                
***
LAG peer performance in industry
0.034              
(0.009)                   
*** 
2.862                
(0.273)             
***
6.281            
(1.038)          
***
2.765             
(0.252)           
***
6.275           
(0.64)            
***
-0.132                
(0.213)
0.741                  
(0.172)               
***
0.101             
(0.016)               
***
1.581             
(0.164)             
***
LAG Peer performance in country
0.034             
(0.011)              
***
1.814              
(0.284)                 
***
3.203            
(1.759)                        
*
2.129                
(0.25)          
***
2.811           
(0.878)            
***
2.412                
(0.185)              
***
1.989                     
(0.17)              
***
0.057            
(0.019)            
***
1.65               
(0.198)               
***
UNGC participant in current year
0.941             
(0.434)                   
**
1.069             
(0.091)             
***
0.867            
(0.147)             
***
1.141                   
(0.093)           
***
0.825              
(0.124)           
***
1.177                 
(0.143)                   
***
0.662                
(0.087)                    
***
0.229                 
(0.243)
1.025           
(0.123)            
***
N 2603 15024 15024 15024 15024 15024 15024 2024 15024
R Square 0.952 0.88
Adjusted R Square 0.952 0.88
Nagelkerke R Square 0.742 0.535 0.759 0.579 0.706 0.668 0.785
Percentage correct cases 77.6 61.3 79.5 64.5 91.5 83.8 87.5
Models
Models
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(R2=0.813) has CGVSCORE as the dependent variable. Again, joining is the 
strongest predictor (Beta=4.852, p<0.01), followed by a more flexible business 
regulation (Beta=1.926, p<0.01) and belonging to the extractive industry (Beta=1.641, 
p<0.01). 
Models 30 and 31 have the existence of a human rights policy and the 
implementation of it as the dependent variables. They explain 75.1% and 63.7% of 
the variation respectively (Nagelkerke R2), and correctly classify 82% and 70% of 
cases. Signing up to the UNGC, although not in the top three predictors, remains 
positive and significant in both models (Exp(B)=3.417 and Exp(B)=2.621, p<0.01). 
Models 32 and 33 have the existence of a human rights policy for the supply chain 
and the implementation of it as the dependent variables. The models explain 72.9% 
and 64.1% of variation in the dependent variables (Nagelkerke R2), and correctly 
classify 76.9% and 67.7% of cases. Joining the UNGC is positive and significant in 
both cases (Exp(B)=3.376 and Exp(B)=2.806, p<0.01). Previous performance, 
however, remains the main predictor (Exp(B)=126.22 and Exp(B)=116.4, p<0.01). 
Models 34 to 36 focus on freedom of association: dependent variables are existence 
of policy, implementation and percentage of unionized employees respectively. 
Models 34 and 35 explain 72.8% and 58.1% of variance (Nagelkerke R2), correctly 
classifying 80.1% and 67.4% of cases. Joining increases the odds of higher 
performance in both cases (Exp(B)=2.489 and Exp(B)=2.819, p<0.01), even though 
previous performance remains the main predictor (Exp(B)=107.3 and Exp(B)=124.1, 
p<0.01). Model 36 explains 95.2% of variance (R2). Being an UNGC participant 
(Beta=0.941, p<0.05) and previous performance (Beta=0.941, p<0.01) are the top 
predictors for unionisation. 
Models 37 (Nagelkerke R2=0.742) and 38 (Nagelkerke R2=535) have the existence 
of a forced labour policy and its implementation as the dependent variables. They 
correctly classify 77.6% and 61.3% of cases. Joining the UNGC significantly 
increases the odds of a firm having a forced labour policy by 2.914 times and of 
implementing such policies by 2.379 times (p<0.01). Models 39 (Nagelkerke 
R2=0.759) and 40 (Nagelkerke R2=0.579) focus on the existence of a child labour 
policy and its implementation as the dependent variables. These models correctly 
classify 79.5% and 64.5% of cases, respectively. Being a UNGC participant 
increases the odds of having a child labour policy by 3.131 times and the odds of 
implementing these policies by 2.282 times (p<0.01). However, previous 
performance and peer pressure at industry level remain important predictors too. 
Chapter 7: Sign up and Performance 
 273 
Existence of diversity policies, implementation of these and the ratio of female 
managers are the dependent variables for models 41, 42 and 43. These models 
explain 70.6%, 66.8% (Nagelkerke R2) and 88% (R2) of the variation in the 
dependent variables respectively, and models 41 and 42 correctly classify 91.5% and 
83.8% of the cases. Being a UNGC participant increases the odds of a firm having a 
diversity policy by 3.245 times and of implementing such policies by 1.939 (p<0.01). 
Being a participant, however, has no significant impact on the outcome of such policy, 
namely the percentage of women managers.  
Table 41: Regression table for models 45 to 52 
 
 
Models 44 and 45 focus on the existence of an emission reduction policy and of a 
resource reduction policy, respectively. These models explain 78.5% and 80.1% of 
variance (Nagelkerke R2) respectively, correctly classifying 87.5% and 91.9% of the 
cases. Being a UNGC participant increases the odds of a firm having an emission 
reduction policy by nearly 3 times (Exp(B)=2.788, p<0.01). It also increases the odds 
of a firm having a resource reduction policy by 5.017 times (p<0.01). Model 46 has 
the implementation of environmental management as the dependent variable; 
correctly classifying 75.7% of the cases, it explains 68.4% of variance (Nagelkerke 
R2). Being a participant increase the odds of implementing environmental 
management measures by 2.195 times (p<0.01). Previous performance, however, 



























-5.027           
(0.552)         
***
-0.932              
(0.413)                
**
572.595        
(754.751)
-4.262          
(0.44)             
***
-0.625           
(0.325)                
*
-4.038            
(0.424)                
***
-1.696            
(0.396)                 
***
51.963      
(69.225)
Firm Size
0.237         
(0.024)           
***
0.198            
(0.02)            
***
-30.864        
(43.206)
0.199            
(0.021)           
***
0.242            
(0.016)             
***
0.226              
(0.019)                
*** 
0.196               
(0.019)                 
***
4.671    
(3.216)
ROTA
0.008            
(0.004)                    
**
0.006           
(0.003)                        
**
-1.688       
(8.973)
0.003            
(0.003)
0.01              
(0.003)           
***
0                     
(0.003)          
0.01              
(0.003)                  
***
0.549      
(0.63)
Extractive Industry
0.26            
(0.141)            
*
0.585          
(0.119)           
***
-300.238          
(219.076)
-0.061             
(0.158) 
-0.487             
(0.13)           
***
0.637                 
(0.129)         
***
0.493              
(0.116)              
***
27.893     
(22.374)
Business regulation
-0.263              
(0.078)             
***
-0.829            
(0.065)             
***
37.178           
(118.686)
-0.309             
(0.067)              
***
-0.895               
(0.052)           
***
-0.245            
(0.062)                   
***
-0.666             
(0.062)        
***
-17.221     
(10.732)
Regulatory quality
0.863             
(0.146)              
***
1.053           
(0.119)            
***
-220.868       
(233.375)
0.72            
(0.127)                
***
1.365               
(0.095)           
***
0.904                
(0.117)         
***
1.241             
(0.115)        
***
10.506     
(16.887)
LAG Dependent Variable
5.324            
(0.104)             
***
4.331           
(0.076)            
***
0.804                      
(0.009)                  
***
4.854            
(0.081)          
***
2.193          
(0.054)           
***
4.686              
(0.086)            
***
4.433              
(0.086)                  
***
0.412       
(0.065)            
***
LAG peer performance in industry
1.285           
(0.195)                
***
2.718              
(0.192)            
***
-0.169             
(0.036)             
***
2.469             
(0.158)          
***
1.765                  
(0.151)               
***
-0.697             
(0.176)              
***
-0.437                  
(0.192)                   
**
-0.08             
(0.077)
LAG Peer performance in country
2.134            
(0.204)          
***
0.888          
(0.222)                 
***
-0.288                  
(0.09)                
***
1.467          
(0.209)             
***
0.394                  
(0.164)                  
**
2.813            
(0.145)              
***
3.072              
(0.157)            
***
0.996            
(0.261)             
***
UNGC participant in current year
1.613               
(0.209)            
***
0.786            
(0.082)                
***
-52.902            
(123.806)
0.67          
(0.095)              
***
0.577             
(0.063)                     
***
0.738              
(0.092)            
***
0.522             
(0.079)                
***
-30.35            
(13.842)            
**
1981
N 15024 15024 0.805 15024 15024 15024 15024 4532
R Square 0.804 0.017
Adjusted R Square 0.015
Nagelkerke R Square 0.801 0.684 0.776 0.416 0.759 0.717
Percentage correct cases 91.9 75.7 84.4 57.2 86.2 77
Models
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remains the main predictor, increasing the odds of implementation by 76.02 times 
(p<0.01). Model 47 (R2=0.805) has environmental expenditures by pre tax profit as 
the dependent variable. Being an UNGC participant, in this model, is not significantly 
associated with higher performance. Key predictors here are previous performance 
(Beta= 0.804, p<0.01), followed by peer performance at country (Beta= -0.288, 
p<0.01) and industry levels (Beta=-0.169, p<0.01). Interestingly and different from 
expected, the last two had a negative coefficient. 
Models 48 and 49 focus on the existence of a green innovation policies and the 
implementation of those. They explain 77.6% and 41.6% of variance (Nagelkerke R2), 
correctly classifying 84.4% and 57.2% of cases. Being a UNGC participant is a 
relevant factor for performance in both cases, increasing the odds of a firm having a 
green innovation policy by nearly two times (Exp(B)=1.953, p<0.01) and of 
implementing it by 1.781 times (p<0.01). Previous performance (Exp(B)=128.23 and 
8.962, p<0.01) and peer performance at industry level (Exp(B)=11.815 and 5.844, 
p<0.01) are, however, the top two predictors. 
Models 50 and 51 focus on UNGC’s principle 10, and have the existence of an anti-
corruption policy and its implementation as the dependent variables, respectively. 
These models explain 75.9% and 71.7% of variance (Nagelkerke R2) respectively, 
correctly classifying 86.2% and 77% of cases. Being a participant has a positive and 
significant impact on the odds of better performance in anti-corruption efforts, 
increasing the odds of having a policy by 2.092 times (p<0.01) and of implementing 
such policies by 1.686 (p<0.01).  
Finally, model 52 has total donations by pre tax profit as the dependent variable. This 
model explains only 1.7% of variance. Surprisingly, being a UNGC participant has a 
negative and significant impact in this variable (Beta=-30.35, p<0.05). Previous 
performance (Beta=0.412, p<0.01) and peer performance at country level 
(Beta=0.996, p<0.01) are significantly associated with higher donations as a 
percentage of pre tax profit.  
The table below synthetises the findings of the models described above. The letter P 
indicates that the independent variable for joining the UNGC was found to be positive 
and significant for the dependent variable on that line, N indicates that it was 
negative and significant and blank indicates that it was not significant. 
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Table 42: Summary of results for models 27 to 52 
 
 
Table 43 summarises the findings in a different format. It shows that being a 
participant had a positive and significant impact on performance for 23 out of the 26 
dependent variables, or 88.5% of the models. It also had a negative and significant 
impact on performance on one occasion (or 3.8% of models). 
Table 43: Number of times an independent variable was significant for models 27 to 52 
 
Finally, table 44 indicates the percentage of models within each issue area of the 
UNGC for which sign up to the UNGC was positive and significant or negative and 
significant. For example, being a participant had a positive and significant impact on 
human rights performance variables in 100% of cases but only in 83.3% of 















UNGC participant in current year 78 99:;< = 8:9< 7>
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Table 44: Percentage of cases where the independent variable was significant by issue  
 
Table 45: Summary of impact of sign up on policies, processes of implementation and outcomes 
 
 
Models 53 to 78: Do early joiners improve performance more than late joiners? 
Model 53 (R2=0.782) has SOCSCORE as the dependent variable, model 54 
(R2=0.798) focuses on ENVSCORE and model 55 (R2=0.814) on CGVSCORE. Early, 
middle and late joiners all have a positive and significant improvement in 
performance higher than non-participants, for the three dependent variables. It can 
be observed, however, that middle joiners improved more in SOCSCORE than the 
other two (Beta=4.771, p<0.01), late joiners improved more on ENVSCORE than 
other two (Beta=3.658, p<0.01) and early joiners showed higher increase in 
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Table 46: Regression tables for models 53 to 70 
 



























-16.489          
(1.86)                 
***
-12.291          
(1.77)               
***
-17.405        
(1.592)           
***
-4.564          
(0.458)         
***
-4.294         
(0.546)        
***
-6.075          
(0.494)             
***
-4.55            
(0.579)          
***
-5.778        
(0.516)             
***
-4.341          
(0.693)              
***
Firm Size
1.244             
(0.079)              
***
 1.112        
(0.078)              
***
0.688       
(0.067)           
***
0.229        
(0.022)            
***
0.331            
(0.029)               
***
0.356         
(0.025)        
***
0.364               
(0.031)          
***
0.295       
(0.025)        
***
0.259            
(0.037)              
***
ROTA 0.017        (0.011)
0.014          
(0.011)       
-0.006          
(0.01) 
0.002             
(0.003)
0.005          
(0.005)
0.01           
(0.003)                
**
0.016         
(0.004)         
***
0.008         
(0.004)             
**
0.014          
(0.005)           
***
Extractive Industry
2.026       
(0.487)            
***
0.803           
(0.493)
1.629         
(0.463)             
***
0.759        
(0.131)          
***
0.843          
(0.157)             
***
0.227           
(0.155)               
0.202    
(0.189)
0.874        
(0.148)          
***
0.367        
(0.204)           
*
Business regulation
1.012          
(0.238)           
***
0.031               
(0.237)
1.882           
(0.214)               
***
-0.293          
(0.067)            
***
-0.565          
(0.083)         
***
-0.337          
(0.073)           
***
-0.786          
(0.09)          
***
-0.333           
(0.076)        
***
-0.527         
(0.104)               
***
Regulatory quality -0.572          (0.415)
1.3               
(0.423)                    
***
-0.219            
(0.425)          
0.534        
(0.121)           
***
0.638            
(0.149)        
***
0.876          
(0.133)          
***
1.531           
(0.171)                   
***
0.906           
(0.137)         
***
0.645         
(0.182)             
***
LAG Dependent Variable
0.796          
(0.005)               
***
0.818             
(0.005)                  
***
 0.642          
(0.006)                       
***
4.637           
(0.078)         
***
4.751         
(0.105)             
***
4.836           
(0.095)       
***
4.758            
(0.117)         
***
4.679          
(0.084)            
***
4.82           
(0.127)            
***
LAG peer performance in industry
0.113          
(0.012)            
***
0.13              
(0.009)                     
***
0.017          
(0.014)
1.523            
(0.25)            
***
3.654       
(0.506)       
***
2.258          
(0.264)         
***
4.791         
(0.455)            
***
1.472             
(0.347)           
***
1.141          
(1.042)
LAG Peer performance in country
0.104              
(0.011)            
***
0.089           
(0.011)             
***
0.34         
(0.008)                
***
2.437          
(0.199)         
***
2.149            
(0.472)             
***
2.494         
(0.252)            
***
2.357            
(0.473)                
***
2.753          
(0.249)           
***
2.073            
(0.66)                    
***
Early
2.204          
(0.553)             
***
1.293               
(0.553)            
**
5.348           
(0.482)              
***
1.189         
(0.149)              
***
1.081          
(0.137)                
***
1.088         
(0.136)          
***
1.094           
(0.145)           
***
0.831             
(0.145)          
***
1.265            
(0.166)             
***
Middle
4.771             
(0.436)            
***
3.21            
(0.438)                   
***
4.382            
(0.379)            
***
1.345             
(0.108)          
***
1.069              
(0.113)             
***
1.346          
(0.106)        
***
1.079          
(0.119)           
***
1.074         
(0.114)         
***
1.18             
(0.141)             
***
Late
4.095           
(0.415)                
***
3.658         
(0.422)             
***
3.692          
(0.374)           
***
0.949           
(0.101)               
***
0.848          
(0.12)          
***
0.955           
(0.104)          
***
0.838           
(0.127)           
***
0.941           
(0.109)        
***
1.207             
(0.146)              
***
N 15921 15921 15921 15287 15287 15287 15287 15287 15287
R Square 0.782 0.798 0.814
Adjusted R Square 0.782 0.798 0.813
Nagelkerke R Square 0.754 0.641 0.73 0.64 0.73 0.587
Percentage correct cases 81.9 69.5 76.6 67.5 80 67.2





















Constant -2.534          (2.093)
-6.14                   
(0.506)          
***
-5.769            
(0.876)                  
***
-6.395               
(0.508)         
***
-6.007           
(0.738)                   
***
-3.67          
(0.474)              
***
-1.426        
(0.363)           
***
2.633            
(1.468)            
*
-4.224         
(0.466)           
***
Firm Size
0.18              
(0.097)                       
*
0.384              
(0.026)               
***
0.29         
(0.048)         
***
0.4              
(0.026)              
***
0.322         
(0.039)              
***
0.2             
(0.021)             
***
0.211           
(0.017)          
***
-0.138            
(0.075)             
*
0.245      
(0.021)         
***
ROTA -0.012          (0.012)
0.009          
(0.004)               
***
0.013        
(0.005)              
**
0.013            
(0.004)           
***
0.021              
(0.005)            
***
0.003      
(0.003)
0.005          
(0.003)              
**
0.03            
(0.016)                
*
0.007         
(0.003)         
**
Extractive Industry -0.019      (0.478)
0.651           
(0.147)           
***
0.107    
(0.287)
0.721            
(0.147)          
***
0.235            
(0.226)
0.115        
(0.134)
0.18                    
(0.11)            
-0.684    
(0.509)
0.493         
(0.132)           
***
Business regulation 0.161             (0.313)
-0.352        
(0.074)         
***
-0.454    
(0.134)            
***
-0.34          
(0.074)          
***
-0.496            
(0.112)              
***
-0.292          
(0.069)                    
***
-0.704           
(0.056)             
***
-0.333       
(0.22)
-0.361         
(0.067)            
***
Regulatory quality -0.531            (0.598)              
0.721           
(0.133)         
***
0.825              
(0.248)                
***
0.686           
(0.13)             
***
1.142          
(0.206)            
***
0.931            
(0.129)              
***
1.328           
(0.102)           
***
0.386      
(0.444)
0.817          
(0.124)             
***
LAG Dependent Variable
0.941          
(0.008)                
***
5.079            
(0.1)             
***
5.219              
(0.171)             
***
4.998            
(0.096)             
***
4.892         
(0.139)                  
***
4.342          
(0.08)              
***
3.665             
(0.065)         
***
0.874        
(0.012)          
***
5.112          
(0.091)              
***
LAG peer performance in industry
0.034             
(0.009)              
***
3.134            
(0.274)          
***
6.393           
(1.025)         
***
2.976           
(0.253)           
***
6.329           
(0.638)            
***
-0.002        
(0.213)
0.737         
(0.171)        
***
0.107         
(0.016)       
***
1.724          
(0.164)        
***
LAG Peer performance in country
0.041            
(0.011)              
***
1.891             
(0.278)             
***
3.871       
(1.712)                
**
2.222             
(0.245)              
***
3.191            
(0.856)            
***
2.515        
(0.184)       
***
2.126           
(0.169)        
***
0.06      
(0.019)                 
***
1.542         
(0.196)          
***
Early -0.514          (0.695)              
0.843            
(0.142)              
***
0.867        
(0.21)                     
***
0.91              
(0.144)               
***
0.784           
(0.179)              
***
0.829         
(0.214)          
***
0.495            
(0.128)           
***
0.217          
(0.333)
0.989          
(0.201)        
***
Middle 0.773        (0.514)
1.147           
(0.11)             
***
0.806            
(0.18)             
***
1.171             
(0.112)                   
***
0.74             
(0.153)               
***
1.15             
(0.152)           
***
0.596            
(0.1)                  
***
0.29            
(0.298)
1.102         
(0.129)          
***
Late 0.707       (0.567)
0.99           
(0.105)              
***
0.666             
(0.202)              
***
0.992             
(0.105)             
***
0.567             
(0.165)              
***
0.462          
(0.117)             
***
0.428                
(0.095)             
***
-0.331               
(0.348)
0.743        
(0.115)       
***
N 2650 15287 15287 15287 15287 15287 15287 2045 15287
R Square 0.953 0.881
Adjusted R Square 0.952 0.88
Nagelkerke R Square 0.745 0.531 0.76 0.576 0.708 0.668 0.788
Percentage correct cases 77.6 61 79.4 64.5 91.5 83.9 87.6
Models
Models
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Models 56 and 57 focus on existence of a human rights policy (56) and on evidence 
of implementation (57), respectively. They explain 75.4% and 64.1% of variance 
(Nagelkerke R2) respectively, and correctly classify 81.9% and 69.5% of cases. 
Joining in all periods has a positive and significant impact on improved performance 
in both cases, even though being a middle joiner (EXP(B)=3.837, p<0.01) has a 
greater impact on the existence of policy, while early joiners (EXP(B)=2.946, p<0.01) 
have slightly higher odds of implementing them. Model 58 and model 59 focus on the 
existence of a supply chain human rights policy (58) and its implementation (59) as 
dependent variables. They explain 73% and 64% of the variation (Nagelkerke R2) 
respectively, correctly classifying 76.6% and 67.5% of cases.  
Existence of a freedom of association policy (60), its implementation (61) and level of 
unionisation (62) are the dependent variables for the next three models. They explain, 
respectively, 73%, 58.7% (Nagelkerke R2) and 95.3% (R2) of variation, and the first 
two correctly classify 80% and 67.2% of cases. Sign up in every stage is positively 
and significantly associated with higher odds of improved performance for models 60 
and 61, although, as in previous models, middle joiners have slightly higher odds of 
improving performance in regards to the existence of policies and early joiners of 
improvements on the implementation of such policies. None of them, however, is 
significantly associated with higher levels of unionisation. 
Models 63 (Nagelkerke R2=0.745) and 64 (Nagelkerke R2=0.531) have existence of 
a forced labour policy and its implementation as dependent variables. They correctly 
classify 77.6% and 61% of cases. Existence of a child labour policy and its 
implementation are the dependent variables for models 65 and 66. They explain 76% 
and 57.6% of variation (Nagelkerke R2) respectively, and correctly classify 79.4% 
and 64.5% of cases.  As before, while joining in every stage is positively and 
significantly associated with higher odds of improved performance, middle joiners 
have slightly higher odds of improving performance in regards to the existence of 
policies (Exp(B)=3.149 for model 63, and Exp(B)=3.226 for model 65, p<0.01) and 
early joiners of improvements on the implementation of such policies (Exp(B)=2.38 
for model 64 and Exp(B)=2.19 for model 66, p<0.01). 
Existence of diversity policies, implementation of these and the ratio of female 
managers are the dependent variables for models 67, 68 and 69. These models 
explain 70.8%, 66.8% (Nagelkerke R2) and 88.1% (R2) of the variation in the 
dependent variables respectively, and models 67 and 68 correctly classify 91.5% and 
83.9% of the cases. In models 67 and 68, joining in every stage is positively and 
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significantly associated with higher odds of improved performance, although middle 
joiners have slightly higher odds of improving performance in regards to the 
existence of policies (Exp(B)=3.157, p<0.01) and to the implementation of those 
(Exp(B)=1.814, p<0.01). None of them is significant in model 69. 
Table 47: Regression table for models 71 to 78 
 
Model 70 (Nagelkerke R2=0.788) and model 71 (Nagelkerke R2=0.802) focus on the 
existence of policies for emission and resource reduction, respectively.  They 
correctly classify 87.6% (70) and 91.9% (71) of cases. Model 72 (Nagelkerke 
R2=0.687) has the implementation of environmental management as the dependent 
variable and correctly classifies 75.7% of cases.  All stages of sign up are positive 
and significant in these three models; however, in these three cases middle joiners 
have slightly higher odds of developing such policies (Exp(B)= 3.009 and 4.017, 
p<0.01, respectively) and putting an environmental management structure in place 
(Exp(B)=2.388, p<0.01). Environment expenditure by pre tax profit is the dependent 
variable for model 73 (R2=0.805). For this model none of the sign up measures are 
significant. 



























-4.855        
(0.55)              
***
-0.855         
(0.414)            
**
504.505          
(758.307)
-4.084          
(0.438)         
***
-0.553               
(0.325)           
*
-4.115         
(0.423)             
***
-1.751               
(0.395)                
***
51.656    
(69.472)
Firm Size
0.228         
(0.024)                      
***
0.188           
(0.02)                
***
-26.708            
(43.924)
0.187           
(0.021)             
***
0.225          
(0.016)              
***
0.227        
(0.019)            
***
0.201            
(0.019)              
***
3.406      
(3.297)
ROTA
0.008           
(0.004)               
**
0.007          
(0.003)                  
**
-1.59        
(8.867)
0.003              
(0.003)
0.01               
(0.003)              
***
0                           
(0.003)
0.01                 
(0.003)               
***
0.535                
(0.63)
Extractive Industry
0.291               
(0.14)                               
**
0.591         
(0.118)           
***
-279.445          
(217.796)       
-0.06             
(0.157)
-0.48              
(0.131)            
***
0.654          
(0.129)            
***
0.508          
(0.115)       
***
22.359           
(22.401)
Business regulation
-0.292                
(0.077)               
***
-0.854          
(0.065)          
***
31.883       
(118.132)
-0.326              
(0.067)                
***
-0.905               
(0.051)             
***
-0.25             
(0.062)          
***
-0.665            
(0.062)           
***
-14.649          
(10.757)
Regulatory quality
0.867          
(0.145)                
***
1.097          
(0.118)              
***
-181.445       
(232.84)
0.722          
(0.126)              
***
1.397          
(0.095)          
***
0.897           
(0.116)            
***
1.23                 
(0.114)              
***
6.219          
(17.016)
LAG Dependent Variable
5.338            
(0.104)                  
***
4.325          
(0.076)               
***
0.804        
(0.009)           
***
4.862           
(0.08)              
***
2.16          
(0.054)        
***
4.689          
(0.085)             
***
4.433                 
(0.085)               
***
0.422            
(0.065)        
***
LAG peer performance in industry
1.51            
(0.197)              
***
2.922          
(0.192)            
***
-0.169          
(0.036)                     
***
2.544             
(0.157)              
***
1.953            
(0.152)           
***
-0.642               
(0.175)             
***
-0.375           
(0.19)            
**
-0.086          
(0.077)
LAG Peer performance in country
1.993            
(0.203)                
***
0.921          
(0.218)             
***
-0.293                
(0.088)            
***
1.367             
(0.207)               
***
0.361           
(0.162)             
**
2.913           
(0.145)           
***
3.087            
(0.155)                      
***
1.02          
(0.261)          
***
Early
1.267            
(0.35)               
***
0.799            
(0.128)             
***
-150.426        
(196.126)
0.714               
(0.153)               
***
0.805           
(0.095)       
***
0.615            
(0.142)           
***
0.425           
(0.124)            
***
-12.079         
(22.593)
Middle
1.39             
(0.199)           
***
0.87         
(0.097)             
***
38.065         
(155.028)
0.725              
(0.11)               
***
0.68             
(0.076)           
***
0.766         
(0.107)        
***
0.432            
(0.096)              
***
-0.347         
(16.779)
Late
0.747           
(0.142)           
***
0.637         
(0.099)            
***
14.287     
(162.265)
0.509            
(0.109)            
***
0.63            
(0.076)           
***
0.447          
(0.105)         
***
0.24               
(0.099)                 
**
-63.609          
(20.218)                 
***
N 15287 15287 2002 15287 15287 15287 15287 4532
R Square 0.805 0.019
Adjusted R Square 0.804 0.016
Nagelkerke R Square 0.802 0.687 0.776 0.42 0.761 0.717
Percentage correct cases 91.9 75.7 84.4 56.3 86.3 76.9
Models
Chapter 7: Sign up and Performance 
 280 
Having an environment product innovation policy and implementing it are the 
dependent variables for models 74 and 75. These models explain 77.6% and 42% of 
variance (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classify 84.4% and 56.3% of cases, 
respectively. While joining in every stage is positively and significantly associated 
with higher odds of improved performance, middle joiners have slightly higher odds 
of improving performance in regards to the existence of policies (Exp(B)=2.064, 
p<0.01) and early joiners of improvements on the implementation of such policies 
(Exp(B)=2.236, p<0.01). 
Models 76 and 77 focus on the existence of an anti-corruption policy and its 
implementation as the dependent variables, respectively. These models explain 76.1% 
and 71.7% of variance (Nagelkerke R2) respectively, correctly classifying 86.3% and 
76.9% of cases. Sign up at all stages is positive and significant in both models; 
however, middle joiners have slightly higher odds of improving performance than 
other participants and non-participants (Exp(B)= 2.152 and 1.54, p<0.01, 
respectively). Finally, model 78 focuses on donations by pre tax profit. This model 
explains only 1.9% of variance. Surprisingly late joiners are more likely to decrease 
donations (Beta=-63.609, p<0.05). Variables for early and middle joiners are not 
significant. 
Table 48 below synthetises and summarises the findings on the models described 
above, using the same letters as table 40 above. It shows that in nearly every case 
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Table 48: Summary of results for models 53 to 78 
 
Table 49 below summarises the number of times and percentage of total number of 
models in which each of the three independent variables (early, middle and late 
joiners) was significant (positive or negative) in total and then for each issue area. 
For example, being an early joiner had a positive and significant impact in 
performance in 84.6% of variables, or in 22 out of 26 models.  

























M53 SOCSCORE P P P 2.204 4.771 4.095
M54 ENVSCORE P P P 1.293 3.21 3.658
M55 CGVSCORE P P P 5.348 4.382 3.692
M56 Human Rights policies in house P P P 3.284 3.837 2.583
M57 Human Rights processes in house P P P 2.946 2.913 2.335
M58 Human Rights policies supply chain P P P 2.968 3.842 2.598
M59 Human Rights processes supply chain P P P 2.988 2.942 2.311
M60 Freedom association policy P P P 2.296 2.928 2.562
M61 Freedom association processes P P P 3.544 3.254 3.345
M62 Trade union representation
M63 Forced labour policies P P P 2.323 3.149 2.69
M64 Forced labour processes P P P 2.38 2.239 1.946
M65 Child labour policies P P P 2.483 3.226 2.697
M66 Child labour processes P P P 2.19 2.095 1.763
M67 Diversity policies P P P 2.292 3.157 1.588
M68 Diversity processes P P P 1.64 1.814 1.534
M69 Percentage of women managers
M70 Emission reduction policy P P P 2.69 3.009 2.102
M71 Resource  reduction policy P P P 3.552 4.017 2.11
M72 Environmental management P P P 2.224 2.388 1.89
M73 Environmental expenditures by pre-tax profit
M74 Product innovation policy P P P 2.042 2.064 1.664
M75 Product innovation processes P P P 2.236 1.974 1.878
M76 Anti-corruption policy P P P 1.85 2.152 1.563
M77 Anti-corruption processes P P P 1.53 1.54 1.271
M78 Total donations by pre-tax profit N -63.609


























Early 22 84.6% 0 0.0% 100.0% 80.0% 83.3% 100.0%
Middle 22 84.6% 0 0.0% 100.0% 80.0% 83.3% 100.0%
Late 22 84.6% 1 3.8% 100.0% 80.0% 83.3% 100.0%
Variable
All models
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Models 79 to 83: further understanding the impact on concrete outcomes 
Given the somewhat erratic impact of sign up on actual outcomes, new models were 
run with five new dependent variables. The results did not show more consistency – 
impact on outcomes remains varied as the models show. 
Table 51: Regression table for models 79 to 83 
 
Model 79 (R2=0.99) has total injury rates as the dependent variable. Results suggest 




















covering the existence of 
policies
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Dependent variables 
covering the existence of 
process of implementation
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Dependent variables 
covering outcomes
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0%
Models
Early Middle Late















2.324          
(1.224)                  
*
6.215              
(3.823)
1284237.365              
(1735888.464)
-20271481.99           
(60802570.29)
-3.065              
(0.549)              
***
Firm Size -0.009                 (0.066)               
-0.125             
(0.192)
192876.097            
(89675.431)             
**
8337109.586          
(3267891.516)          
**
0.153               
(0.025)               
***
ROTA 0.001            (0.011)
0.027             
(0.031)
9344.124            
(16681.297)
-78109.096           
(595208.707)
0.003                
(0.004)
Extractive Industry
-0.681              
(0.253)              
***
-4.306                
(1.591)           
***
751796.138              
(528824.275)
65033487.13                    
(19189635.87)                        
***
-0.473            
(0.173)           
***
Business regulation -0.269              (0.186)           
0.408                 
(0.528)
-238343.757                  
(262340.108)
2281218.87                 
(9088535.189)
0.179            
(0.082)                
**
Regulatory quality
0.613             
(0.341)             
*
-1.731            
(1.128)
-524626.62           
(499655.885)
-27772867.13                
(16436182.33)                    
*
0.101                
(0.153)                 
LAG Dependent Variable
0.891           
(0.007)               
***
0.877              
(0.012)             
***
0.928             
(0.006)              
***
0.588              
(0.014)            
***
0.827          
(0.005)             
***
LAG peer performance in industry
-0.125              
(0.007)           
***
0.045            
(0.022)                
**
-0.021             
(0.008)                      
***
-0.119            
(0.035)            
***
0.078                 
(0.016)               
***
LAG Peer performance in country -0.005            (0.006)             
0.02                 
(0.023)
-0.008                 
(0.006)
-0.159                    
(0.048)                   
***
0.196             
(0.009)              
***
UNGC participant in current year
0.567                  
(0.2)               
***
-0.379                 
(0.55)
-385332.542             
(281277.584)
-12227303.11                
(9691529.739)
0.428                  
(0.114)               
***
N 1605 1684 5008 3648 14868
R Square 0.99 0.858 0.841 0.359 0.778
Adjusted R Square 0.99 0.857 0.841 0.358 0.777
Models
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than non-participants. Model 80 (R2=0.858) focused on waste recycling ratio, model 
81 (R2=0.841) on CO2 equivalent total emissions, model 82 (R2=0.359) on total 
energy use. In none of these sign up was significant. Finally, model 83 (R2=0.778) 
focused on gender diversity at board level. It suggests that participants have seen 
better improvements in board diversity than non-participants (Beta=0.428, p<0.01). 
Table 49 below summarises the results, showing that participants were more likely to 
see improvements in board diversity but also to have higher injury rates amongst 
workers. 
Table 52: Summary of results for models 79 to 83 
  




8.5 Discussing the hypotheses 
It is important to highlight here that this study is dealing with a wide variety of 
performance variables, as well as different variables for sign up, resulting in a large 
number of models. The implication of this is that a straight test of a hypothesis is 
challenging as given the variety and number of models, some different results are 
bound to emerge in some case. This section therefore seeks to summarise as 
accurately as possible what the data says, taking this challenge into consideration.  
Table 54: Discussing hypotheses 
Hypotheses Status 
Hypothesis 1: Early adopters of the UNGC are more likely to display higher 
performance improvements – i.e. substantive commitment to the initiative - 
than late adopters.  
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 2: Firms that join the UNGC are more likely to display higher 
corporate social performance in all issue areas of the UNGC than firms that 
do not join. 
Partially supported 
Hypothesis 3: Firms that join the UNGC are more likely to display higher 
corporate social performance in selected issue areas of the initiative than 
firms that do not join. 
Not supported 
Models Dependent Variable UNGC participant in current year
M79 Total injury rate P
M80 Waste recycling ratio
M81 CO2 equivalent emissions total
M82 Energy use total




















UNGC participant in current year 7 89:9; 9 9:9; <
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Hypothesis 4: Firms that join the UNGC are not more likely to display higher 




Hypothesis 1 is partially supported. The variables for early and late adoption are 
concomitantly positive and significant in 22 out of the 26 models (84.6%), suggesting 
that both are displaying improvements in performance that are higher than non-
participants. However, in 17 cases out of these 22 (77.3%) the coefficient (Exp(B) or 
Beta) for early adopters is higher than for late adopters, suggesting a slightly higher 
improvement for early than late adopters.  
Hypothesis 2 is partially supported and 3 is not supported, as joining the UNGC had 
a positive and significant impact in improved performance in 88.5% of the models, or 
for 23 of the 26 dependent variables. Looking at particular issues, being a participant 
had a positive and significant impact on 100% of the human rights variables, 90% of 
the labour variables, 83.3% of the environmental variables and 100% of the anti-
corruption variables. Therefore, while joining has a slightly higher impact on human 
rights and anti-corruption performance, it is still positive and significant for the vast 
majority of the environmental and labour performance variables. 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported as in 88.5% of the models, or for 23 of the 26 
dependent variables, being a participant had a positive and significant impact on 
improvement in performance. However, it cannot be totally dismissed as in one case 
sign up was negatively and significantly associated with performance – for total 
donations by pre tax profit. Similarly, for one of the extra outcomes variables – injury 
rates – participants were also found to perform poorer. 
8.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at understanding whether joining the UNGC is associated with 
higher corporate social performance, and more specifically whether it was associated 
with higher performance in the UNGC issue areas. When firms make the voluntary 
decision to join the UNGC, firms commit to abide to the initiative’s 10 principles on 
human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. One would expect that if a 
firm displays substantive commitment to the initiative, engages with the UNGC and 
works to incorporate these principles into its operations, one would be able to 
observe an improvement in performance over time.  
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The empirical evidence suggests that joining the UNGC is indeed associated with 
higher performance in the UNGC issue areas. In 88.5% of the models (i.e. for 23 of 
the 26 dependent variables) participation in the initiative was positively associated 
with improvements in performance. This was true for all models showing 
improvements in policies, as well as all models focusing on the implementation of 
these policies, suggesting that UNGC participants experienced greater 
improvements in establishing policies and in setting up management structures to 
deliver on the commitments made on these policies, when compared to non-
participants. 
The impact of sign up on outcomes, however, was more erratic. Evidence suggests 
that participants are more likely than non-participants to have a more unionised work 
force and also to have women on its board. However, sign up did not have a 
significant impact on percentage of female managers, environment expenditure by 
pre-tax profit, waste recycling ratio, total energy use, and total CO2 equivalent 
emissions. More of concern, participants were less likely to see improvements on 
level of donation by pre-tax profit and were more likely to experience an increase on 
total injure rates amongst its workforce. 
This may suggest a stages process, by which firms have made strides in 
communicating their commitments to the UNGC and setting up internal structures to 
deliver on them; however, participants still need to do more to deliver on concrete 
outcomes. The latter may be a result of different issues – it may be a lack of capacity, 
i.e. firms are still learning how to effectively make their policies and systems work 
and translate into outcomes; it may be intentional decoupling, although it begs the 
question of why implement management systems if one is not willing to deliver on 
outcomes; or it may also be a matter of more nuanced decoupling in which firms 
choose level of compliance in a continuum, given that for some outcomes sign up 
had a positive impact. 
The impact of joining on improvements in performance is fairly even across the four 
issue areas, even though it is slightly stronger in human rights and anti-corruption. 
This may suggest that firms see their commitment to the initiative as a whole, rather 
than focusing on a specific issue. While issue materiality varies across industries and 
institutional environments, the UNGC seems to have achieved a good balance; the 
initiative seems to have a good coverage of issues that still make sense – or are 
material enough - for a wide variety of industries and firms based on very diverse 
contexts. 
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Finally, evidence suggests that joiners at all points in time experience improvements 
in performance. Even though a more detailed analysis indicates that early joiners are 
slightly more likely than late joiners to improve in most performance variables, one 
cannot affirm that the latter are more inclined to decouple as both early and late 
joiners are showing improvements. While this does not support the theoretical 
argument that early joiners will display substantial commitment due to their interest in 
improving performance and late joiners will display ceremonial commitment as they 
see sign up only as a means to protect legitimacy in a context of high levels of 
adoption, it is in line with findings in chapter six, in which this two-stages model did 
not fit the UNGC diffusion pattern. 
In a nutshell, despite criticisms in regards to the UNGC’s “lack of teeth” and concerns 
that firms may join and not make any changes to their behaviour, there is strong 
evidence to suggest that participants are improving performance more than non-
participants in a number of performance measures covering the UNGC principles. 
Even though more attention needs to be dedicated to the delivery of outcomes, 
results suggest that the UNGC is making important strides in promoting a more 
sustainable and inclusive global economy. 
8.7 Contribution to practice and to theory 
This study makes an important contribution to theory by using a multi-issue measure 
of performance, longitudinally covering all UNGC principles in the aspects of policies, 
processes of implementation and whenever feasible outcomes. To the author’s best 
knowledge no other study on the UNGC offered the same breadth of variables to 
measure participant’s performance in the initiative.  
The strong empirical evidence that participants are in most cases likely to outperform 
non-participants is valuable information for practitioners working with voluntary CSR 
initiatives. This offers support to the importance of such initiatives in helping establish 
higher corporate social performance globally, and the UNGC’s importance in 
particular. The fact, however, that the evidence in regards to outcomes is more 
erratic, is also valuable information for the UNGC, suggesting that participants may 
be in need of extra support (or extra pressure for improvement of performance) in 
how to deliver concrete outcomes on the commitments made.  
Chapter 7: Sign up and Performance 
 287 
8.8 Limitations and future research 
As highlighted in chapter six, the choice of dependent variables is at the same time a 
strength of this study, as they cover all UNGC principles and therefore make an 
important contribution to the literature, but also a limitation, in the sense that the 
choice of variables is constrained by their availability and by a certain degree of 
discretion, in the absence of a widely agreed set of variables to measure CSP in 
general and performance in the UNGC in particular. It would be interesting for future 
studies to run further tests with a different set of performance variables, covering the 
same issues and principles, to compare results. This would be notably interesting for 
variables representing outcomes other than policies. 
8.9 Summary and next chapter 
This chapter aimed at understanding whether joining the UNGC was associated with 
higher performance in the UNGC issue areas. The empirical evidence indicates that 
participants – comparing to non-participants - experienced greater improvements in 
establishing policies and in setting up management structures to deliver on the 
commitments made on these policies. The evidence on concrete outcomes is, 
however, more erratic – not in every case was sign up associated with greater 
improvements. This may suggest that a stages process is at play, with participants 
having made greater strides on communicating commitments and implementing the 
structures to deliver on them, but still needing to improve actual deliver of outcomes. 
Interestingly and contrary to theory, participants at every stage – and not only early 
joiners - have experienced improvements in performance in the period studied. 
Finally, it is important to highlight that the impact of joining on improvements in 
performance is fairly even across the four issue areas, even though it is slightly 
stronger in human rights and anti-corruption. This suggests that the UNGC seems to 
have indeed chosen a set of issues that are material enough for a wide variety of 
industries and firms based on very diverse contexts. 
The next chapter builds on the whole thesis. It will summarise and discuss the main 
findings as well as the key contributions this thesis makes to scholars and to 
practitioners.  
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9 Conclusion 
This chapter will summarise and discuss the main findings of this thesis, as well as 
key contributions to the academic literature and to practitioners, limitations and future 
research. This thesis aimed at contributing to increase the understanding on why 
firms join and how they perform in the largest CSR initiative in the world – the UNGC. 
Using institutional theory, it aimed at understanding the extent to which institutional 
pressures at national, industry and firm level may influence sign up and performance, 
as well as the extent to which the UNGC itself, as a institutional pressure at a global 
level, may influence performance in the initiative’s principles. 
It was clear from the literature review that, while valuable knowledge has been 
shared on institutional influences on corporate engagement in voluntary CSR 
initiatives in general and the UNGC in particular, some gaps remained in regards to 
sign up and performance in the latter. The UNGC being the largest CSR initiative in 
the world, it is watched closely by supporters and critics of this model of 
decentralised institutions through voluntary CSR initiatives. Arguably its success or 
failure may have an impact on this model as a whole. Therefore, further knowledge 
on aspects that make the initiative more or less effective in attracting firms and 
getting them to abide to the commitments made, is very valuable for both academics 
and practitioners. 
9.1 Summary and discussion of key findings  
The four empirical studies yielded important findings that make for relevant 
information for both academic and practitioners. There is strong evidence that 
institutional forces at all levels are at play, influencing firms’ decision to join and 
performance in the UNGC principles. Key findings on the empirical studies are 
presented below. 
9.1.1 On drivers for joining 
While there is strong empirical evidence that institutional pressures at firm, industry 
and national levels play a role in influencing firms’ decision to join, not all pillars had 
the same level of influence over firms’ decision.  
1. The influence of coercive pressures at national level was patchy. Coercive 
pressures associated with economic incentives, on the other hand, were 
positive and significant throughout. Firms engaged in trade relations with 
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Europe and headquartered elsewhere had increased odds of joining the 
initiative. 
2. Surprisingly, normative forces were in most cases not relevant in driving sign 
up, and where significant they had a negative impact in firms’ likelihood of 
joining. It may be that higher participation of critical voices in the UNGC at a 
local level may discourage some firms to engage due to fear of exposing their 
weaknesses or engaging in a closer dialogue when they might not be fully 
prepared for it – for example if they are still at a learner level in the UNGC or 
inclined to ceremonial engagement. 
3. Mimetic forces were found to have a key role in influencing firms’ decision to 
join. Peer participation both within the firm’s home country and industry had a 
significant impact in increasing the odds of a firm joining the UNGC. 
4. While the role of good CSP in firms’ decision to join the UNGC has been 
largely unexplored in the literature, there is strong empirical evidence that 
higher performers will be more likely to join the UNGC. It is proposed that 
higher performers may be able to accrue legitimacy benefits of participation 
quicker and at a lower investment, for they are likely to be already 
implementing several actions in support of UNGC principles. 
5. Larger firms are more prone to join, as well as those in the extractive industry. 
Slack resources and advertisement intensity, on the other hand, are not 
relevant. 
6. Developed and developing countries had slightly different paths for joining. 
 
9.1.2 On speed of adoption 
While valuable information was shared in chapter four about drivers for firms’ 
decision to join the UNGC, chapter five showed that factors moderating firms’ 
decision to join the initiative vary along the different phases of implementation of the 
UNGC. The two-stage model (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) proposes that early joiners 
will be interested in improving performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or fulfilling 
a specific need or interest (Scott, 2008), while later joiners will be more concerned 
with ensuring legitimacy as practice becomes institutionalised. This model cannot be 
confirmed in this study; if anything, empirical results point to the opposite direction, 
with early joiners concerned with legitimacy (due for example, to larger size, or 
belonging to the extractive industry) and late joiners with a stronger instrumental 
focus (for example, trade relations with Europe). While different from expected, this is 
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in line with Arevalo et al’s (2013) findings for the adoption of the UNGC in the 
Spanish context.  
Some other highlights of this empirical chapter are: 
1. Empirical evidence shows that early joiners in the UNGC are bigger firms, 
with a good corporate social performance story to tell and with higher 
legitimacy threats due to being from an extractive industry. Early joiners are 
also highly susceptible to mimetic forces in the form of peer participation. Late 
joiners, on the other hand, show concern with the economic benefits of 
joining. Size and inherent impact are no longer significant for those firms, but 
a good story to tell in all areas of corporate social performance is driving late 
adoption. Peer participation remains an important mimetic pressure. Also, late 
joiners are firms from countries with more stringent labour legislation and less 
democratic governments, where local NGO participation in the UNGC 
discourages sign up to the initiative. 
2. Different from expected increasing levels of sign up of peers in the UNGC 
within the firms’ industry and country has an important impact on early joining, 
more so than in later periods. While this goes against theory, it may be that in 
early periods uncertainty in relation to benefits and risks of participation is at 
its peak and therefore for every new peer that joins, a little of this uncertainty 
fades away, and a firm is therefore more likely to join. It may also be that the 
initial group of participants (bigger firms, with higher levels of social 
performance) are actually a “small club” at a global level. Therefore, an 
increase in levels of participation amongst those firms will tend to have a 
greater impact in the decision of other firms in this small circle to join (if 
compared to peer pressure amongst a much larger group nationally or 
globally). 
3. Evidence suggests that while a higher number of GRI participants in a 
country was associated with higher odds of joining the UNGC in the late 
period, this actually reduced the odds of firms joining in the early period. It 
may be that in the early days of the UNGC the synergies between these 
initiatives were not yet clear potentially leading to a perception that the two 
initiatives were exclusionary; it may also be that professionals implementing 
GRI might have seen some level of competition in the UNGC in the early 
days. As synergies became clearer with time, this competitive element might 
have dissipated in light of complementarities. 
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9.1.3 On drivers for performance amongst participants 
This empirical chapter showed evidence that institutional pressures at different levels 
can influence participating firms’ performance in the UNGC principles. While they are 
subject to the same overall commitment (being a participant) and the pressures 
associated with it, different factors moderate this relationship. This chapter looked 
separately at development of policies, establishment of processes to implement on 
them and on outcomes of these efforts. Some highlights are: 
1. Improvements in performance in regards to the existence of policies are 
largely driven by “who I am”, notable in terms of size and previous 
performance. It could be argued that larger firms with a good CSP story to tell 
are under greater scrutiny from stakeholders, and failing to keep a promise 
may come at a high cost for them. Nevertheless, what peers within industry 
are doing is also an important driver in most cases, as well as a national 
environment with a more stringent business regulation. 
2. Improvements in regards to the implementation of policies, on the other hand, 
have a slightly bigger influence from the national environment when 
compared to policies, with both more stringent business regulation and higher 
regulatory quality as significant for most performance variables. It may be that 
implementation requires a higher level of commitment to the promises made 
than policies – “easier said than done” as the adage goes. Therefore, in a 
mirror effect, a stronger set of institutions at national level – where I come 
from - may increase the costs of failing to keep a promise, therefore leading 
to higher levels of implementation of these promises.  
3. Peers’ performance, notably at industry level, has an important role in 
defining participants’ performance in regards to policies, implementation and 
outcomes. 
9.1.4 On sign up and performance 
Despite criticisms in regards to the UNGC’s “lack of teeth” and concerns that firms 
may join and not make any changes to their behaviour, there is strong evidence to 
suggest that participants are improving performance more than non-participants in a 
number of performance measures covering the UNGC principles. Even though more 
attention needs to be dedicated to the delivery of outcomes, there is strong evidence 
that sign up to the UNGC has an important impact on improvement on a number of 
variables measuring performance in the ten principles. Some important findings are: 
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1. Empirical evidence suggests that joining the UNGC is indeed associated with 
higher performance in the UNGC issue areas. In 88.5% of the models (i.e. for 
23 of the 26 dependent variables) joining the initiative was positively 
associated with improvements in performance. This was true for all models 
showing improvements in the establishment of policies and in setting up 
management structures to deliver on the commitments made on these 
policies. 
2. The impact of sign up on the outcome variables, however, was more erratic. 
This may suggest a stages process, by which firms have made strides in 
communicating their commitments to the UNGC and setting up internal 
structures to deliver on them; however, participants still need to do more to 
deliver on concrete outcomes. This may be due to a lack of capacity; it may 
be intentional decoupling, although it begs the question of why implement 
management systems if one is not willing to deliver on outcomes; or it may 
also be a matter of more nuanced decoupling in which firms choose level of 
compliance in a continuum, given that for some outcomes sign up had a 
positive impact. 
3. The impact of time of participation in performance was assessed in chapters 
six and seven, using different samples, modelling strategies and with different 
focus. Despite the differences in the studies, the results are similar. In chapter 
six, time of participation was significant for eight out of 26 models, in other 
words, in the majority of cases the length of participation was not significantly 
influencing the outcome. In chapter seven, what can be observed is that in all 
but one case, the variables representing early, middle and late are significant 
in exactly the same variables, i.e. early joiners are not overall more likely to 
improve performance than late joiners, as theory would predict. As discussed 
before, even though a more detailed analysis indicates that early joiners are 
slightly more likely than late joiners to improve in most performance variables, 
both early and late joiners are showing improvements. As a result, in both 
studies, one cannot confirm that overall those that have been participants for 
a longer period of time display greater improvements in performance. 
9.2 Contributions to the academic literature 
A key contribution to the literature is the use of a broader measure of performance on 
the UNGC, one that encompasses all UNGC principles and builds on sound 
theoretical base, longitudinally covering all UNGC principles in the aspects of policies, 
processes of implementation and whenever feasible outcomes. Previous research on 
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UNGC performance focused on single-issue indicators (Bernhagen and Mitchell, 
2010), on self-reported levels of implementation (learner, active, advanced, among 
others) (Schembera, 2012), on different angles about reporting (Chen and Bouvain, 
2009, Hamann et al., 2009) or on measures of COP submission and delisting 
(Knudsen, 2011, Perez-Batres et al., 2010). To the author’s best knowledge this is 
the first study with such a broad measure of performance in the UNGC, which is 
arguably an important step in understanding the actual impact of the initiative. 
This thesis also sheds important knowledge on drivers for speed of adoption on the 
UNGC. Most research on speed of adoption of new practices focuses on innovation. 
Where it looks into voluntary CSR initiatives, it mostly focuses on the diffusion of 
ISO14001 (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011, Delmas and Toffel, 2008). This study 
contributes to the literature by providing an empirical verification of drivers for 
adoption at different stages of a voluntary CSR initiative that is non-certifiable – the 
UNGC. To the author’s best knowledge, there was only one study on the UNGC that 
looked into speed of adoption (Arevalo et al., 2013). The study, however, was 
restricted to the Spanish context, and focused mainly on the interplay between 
motivations for joining the UNGC and speed of adoption. This study therefore offers 
not only a cross-national assessment of drivers for joining, but also an assessment of 
intuitional drivers at multiple levels. 
Finally, this study makes an important contribution to theory by empirically testing the 
role of CSP as a driver for firms’ decision to join the UNGC, as well as the role of 
mimetic pressures notably within peers in the same industry. While this discussion is 
incipient in the literature on the UNGC, empirical evidence confirmed the relevance 
of these elements in firms’ sign up to the UNGC and performance in the initiative. 
9.3 Contributions to practitioners 
This thesis makes an important contribution for practitioners. It shares valuable 
evidence on the profile and drivers for firms to join and perform in the UNGC that can 
be useful for those trying to engage firms in this or similar initiatives. For one thing, 
evidence that higher CSP performers will be more likely to join the UNGC is relevant 
as practitioners can arguably work with those firms in order to gather enough support 
to attract more firms to the initiative. Following from that, empirical evidence of the 
important impact of peer participation in firms’ decision to join the initiative is also 
valuable information. It suggests that the establishment of partnerships with industry 
organisations, for example, can be a good tool to increase sign up. Initiatives at the 
country level such as the UNGC local networks are an equally important tool, as 
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those networks may offer a good space for local participants to be seen and a good 
display of local participation for firms that have not decided to join yet.  
As for initiatives in different stages of development, results are relevant in that by 
targeting the right participants in the early days, voluntary CSR initiatives are in a 
better position to grow their base of participants as time progresses. Empirical 
evidence of the important impact of peer sign up in firms’ decision to join the initiative 
especially in the early days suggests that the establishment of partnerships with 
industry organisations, for example, or initiatives at the country level such as the 
UNGC local networks, can be valuable strategies to help a new initiative to take off. 
In later periods, however, the relevance of economic benefits in driving the decision 
to join shows that strategies such as working with champions can be very valuable to 
ensure continuous growth. For example, by incentivising larger firms that are well 
involved in the initiative to promote the UNGC across its supply chain may bring a 
number of new participants to the initiative. 
For practitioners aiming to improve performance, empirical evidence of the strong 
mimicking behaviour element, seen through the important impact of peer 
performance in participants’ performance, notably at industry level, makes for 
relevant information. This highlights the relevance of strategies of profiling 
“champions” of the UNGC, as well as the sharing of good practices in different 
spaces (meetings, websites, publications, for example), as these are likely to push 
more participants into mimicking their way into better performance. 
Finally, strong empirical evidence that UNGC participants are in most cases likely to 
outperform non-participants is valuable information for practitioners. This offers 
support to the importance of such initiatives in helping establish higher corporate 
social performance globally, and the UNGC’s importance in particular. The fact, 
however, that the evidence in regards to outcomes is more erratic, is also valuable 
information for the UNGC, suggesting that participants may be in need of extra 
support (or extra pressure for improvement of performance) on how to deliver 
concrete outcomes on the commitments made.  
9.4 Limitations and future research 
The choice of dependent variables is at the same time a strength of this study, as it 
offers a wider set of issues and covers all UNGC principles and therefore makes an 
important contribution to the literature, but also a limitation, in the sense that the 
choice of variables is constrained by their availability. The ASSET4 data starts in 
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2002. While these are the early days of the UNGC, it would have been useful to have 
data going back to the year the initiative was launched and the first firms joined, or 
even before. In addition, a number of outcome variables, especially variables 
covering controversies (as a proxy for bad and externally recognised outcome) and 
awards (as a proxy for good and externally recognised outcome) were not 
consistently available and as a result could not be used.  
It is also important to highlight that while every effort was made to choose dependent 
variables that were aligned with the UNGC principles and with a solid theoretical 
ground, there is not a one widely agreed set of variables to measure CSP in general 
and performance in the UNGC in particular. Therefore, choice is not only guided by 
data availability, as explained above, but also, to some extent, by a certain degree of 
discretion from the author. It would be interesting for future studies to run further 
tests with a different set of performance variables, covering the same issues and 
principles, to compare results. This would be notably interesting for variables 
representing outcomes other than policies, as these were particularly difficult to use 
for not being widely available. Finally, ASSET4’s universe covers large listed firms, 
which does not represent the full spectrum of UNGC participants. Therefore, it would 
be interesting to develop a similar study using a sample of small firms, for example. 
9.5 Concluding remarks 
This thesis aimed at contributing to increase the understanding on why firms engage 
and how they perform in the largest CSR initiative in the world – the UNGC. Using 
institutional theory, it aimed at understanding the extent to which institutional 
pressures at national, industry and firm level may influence sign up and performance, 
as well as the extent to which the UNGC itself, as an institutional pressure at global 
level, may influence performance in the initiative’s principles.  
The empirical studies showed strong evidence that institutional forces at all levels are 
at play, influencing firms’ decision to join and performance in the UNGC principles. 
For one thing, mimetic forces were very important in driving both firms’ decision to 
join the UNGC and their performance. Being under greater stakeholder scrutiny due 
to large size or belonging to an extractive industry was also an important driver for 
joining the UNGC, arguably in views of protecting legitimacy seen to be at threat.  
Finally, looking into the UNGC as a source of institutional pressure as well, despite 
criticisms in regards to the UNGC’s “lack of teeth”, there is strong evidence to 
suggest that participants are improving performance more than non-participants in 
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the UNGC principles. Even though more attention needs to be dedicated to the 
delivery of outcomes, there is strong evidence that the UNGC is making important 










10 Annex: Regression tables for models 18 to 32 in 
chapter five 
This section will provide the regression tables for models 18 to 32, in chapter five. A 
discussion on the results is provided under chapter five. 
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Table 55: Regression table for dependent variable early vs. otherwise 
 
Dependent variable: Early Vs Otherwise 
(2000-2003) M18 M21 M24 M27 M30
Constant -1.205               (0.836)
-12.205          
(1.802)             
***
-3.93          
(1.029)        
***
-1.244         
(0.818)           
-12.575        
(1.978)            
***
!"#$ -0.001             (0.007)
0.015           
(0.01)
0.009        
(0.007)
-0.002        
(0.007)
0.016          
(0.01)
%&'&()*& 0.005                 (0.004)
-0.001           
(0.007)
-0.003      
(0.005)
0.005      
(0.004)
-0.002       
(0.007)
$+'&(,-.-/*0-/,&/.-,1 0                             (0.003)
0.027           
(0.033)
-0.001         
(0.01)
0        
(0.003)
0.016       
(0.036)
2(&+-,03)(4&,0(&*56),-7/
0.072                 
(0.082)
0.26           
(0.105)            
**
-0.007        
(0.097)
-0.065         
(0.089)
-0.103      
(0.127)
%)875(03)(4&,0(&*56),-7/
-0.486             
(0.059)               
***
-0.172        
(0.089)         
*
0.07       
(0.085)
-0.352        
(0.073)        
***
0.245       
(0.115)          
**
95.-/&..0(&*56),-7/
-0.192               
(0.134)                 
-0.479          
(0.195)           
**
-0.614               
(0.179)            
***
-0.119           
(0.134)
-0.361       
(0.254)         
:76-,10;<
0.22                 
(0.07)                        
***
-0.013          
(0.066)
0.076        
(0.048) 
0.237               
(0.068)           
***
0.113         
(0.078)
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,70?53)/0(-*?,.
1.47               
(0.584)            
**
0.645       
(0.658)
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,706)875(
0.91          
(0.294)             
***
-1.004    
(0.546)         
*
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,70&/'-(7/3&/, 1.035             (1.228)                          
-0.502        
(1.414)
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,70)/,-@27((5>,-7/ 0.07       (0.259)
0.125         
(0.278)
%7A)60B=".
0.013        
(0.007)        
*
0.014        
(0.008)            
*
C-(30.-D&
0.459           
(0.075)              
***
0.435        
(0.08)          
***
E"2E2"!F
0.024           
(0.009)          
***
0.025          
(0.009)                
***
FB<E2"!F
0.018             
(0.008)              
**
0.014         
(0.009)
2=<E2"!F
0.012             
(0.005)              
**
0.01         
(0.005)       
*
FG,()A,-'&0-/+5.,(1
0.405        
(0.405)
0.971         
(0.427)            
**
;E"HIJJH0A&(,-K-&+
0.225          
(0.25)
-0.028         
(0.264)
LB=20>)(,-A->)/,.0-/0?73&0A75/,(1
5.774            
(0.566)          
***
5.006         
(0.728)        
***
LB=20>)(,-A->)/,.0-/0,?&0-/+5.,(1
6.967         
(1.116)          
***
5.587          
(1.357)           
***
!&*-7/)60LB=20>)(,-A->),-7/
0.013              
(0.004)             
***
0.014               
(0.006)          
**
#()+&0M-,?0,?&0FL
0.238          
(0.189)       
0.199           
(0.255)
=!;0>)(,-A->),-7/0-/0?73&0A75/,(1
-0.007         
(0.002)                    
***
-0.015           
(0.004)         
***
N 4149 3309 4149 4149 3309
Nagelkerke R Square 0.105 0.389 0.305 0.113 0.454
Percentage correct cases 0 15.6 8 0 25.6
Difference in Nagelkerke R Square 
relative to Model 1 0.284 0.200 0.008 0.349
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Dependent variable: Middle Vs 
Otherwise (2004-2007) M19 M22 M25 M28 M31
Constant
1.165       
(0.665)       
*
-6.666               
(1.429)              
***
-0.903           
(0.757)
1.21             
(0.666)                
*
-7.332                   
(1.482)                        
***
!"#$
-0.012        
(0.006)             
**
-0.019            
(0.009)               
**
-0.011           
(0.007)
-0.013               
(0.006)                    
**
-0.016            
(0.009)         
*
%&'&()*& 0.005             (0.004)
0.006           
(0.006)
0.002          
(0.004)
0.006               
(0.004)                 
0.004              
(0.006)              
$+'&(,-.-/*0-/,&/.-,1 0                 (0.002)
0.046               
(0.03) 
0           
(0.003)
0                 
(0.002)              
0.039                  
(0.03)
2(&+-,03)(4&,0(&*56),-7/ -0.002              (0.075)
0.076           
(0.105)            
0.002            
(0.079)
-0.013                 
(0.089)              
0.003                
(0.115)
%)875(03)(4&,0(&*56),-7/
-0.387              
(0.056)              
***
-0.253              
(0.08)            
***
-0.139           
(0.067)          
**
-0.399                 
(0.074)                   
***
-0.214              
(0.104)                
**
95.-/&..0(&*56),-7/
-0.285              
(0.115)                 
**
-0.25               
(0.174)                  
-0.426               
(0.14)            
***
-0.273                
(0.118)              
**
-0.131               
(0.198)
:76-,10;<
0.045                
(0.024)               
*
-0.091               
(0.038)              
**
0.001            
(0.023)
0.047                  
(0.025)             
*
-0.103                    
(0.044)          
**
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,70?53)/0(-*?,.
1.416                   
(0.471)                 
***
1.37             
(0.539)           
**
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,706)875( 0.039            (0.259)
-0.17            
(0.337)
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,70&/'-(7/3&/, -1.043                     (0.738)                  
-1.069              
(0.839)
=7'&(/3&/,0.5>>7(,0,70)/,-@27((5>,-7/ -0.247             (0.253)
-0.092           
(0.283)
%7A)60B=".
0.013               
(0.007)                  
*
0.005                 
(0.008)
C-(30.-D&
0.339                   
(0.068)               
***
0.332               
(0.07)              
***
E"2E2"!F
0.049                
(0.008)              
***
0.049                 
(0.008)                
***
FB<E2"!F 0.001            (0.006)
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0.260 0.067 0.004 0.271
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Table 57: Regression table for dependent variable late vs. otherwise 
 
 
Dependent variable: Late Vs Otherwise 
(2008-2010) M20 M23 M26 M29 M32
Constant -0.7             (0.688)
-6.38       
(1.4)          
***
-3.181         
(0.777)       
***
-0.553        
(0.681)                   
-7.62         
(1.488)           
***
!"#$ -0.004               (0.006)
-0.007             
(0.01)             
-0.002         
(0.007 )              
-0.004            
(0.006)
-0.004            
(0.011)
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(0.005)
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(0.004)
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(0.005)
$+'&(,-.-/*0-/,&/.-,1 -0.001            (0.004)
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(0.036)
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(0.032)
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(0.038)
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(0.067)           
*
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*
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(0.121)
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-0.343              
(0.05)            
***
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***
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**
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(0.096)        
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(0.137)
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:76-,10;<
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(0.031)
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0.737            
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*
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-0.098        
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